Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000733

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/52722/2024
LP/09037/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 28 April 2025

Before
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MOXON

Between
MA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Badar, Counsel
For the Respondent: Ms Young, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 11 April 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. The Appellant appeals, with permission, the decision, dated 1st January 2025, of a judge of the First-Tier Tribunal (“the Judge”) who upheld the Respondent’s decision to refuse the Appellant’s claim for asylum. It is argued that the decision contains material error of law.

Background

2. The Appellant is a national of Bangladesh, born in 1996.

3. He entered the United Kingdom pursuant to a student visa on 6th October 2022. He claimed asylum on 17th November 2022. In summary, he claimed that he had been a member of Chatra Dal, the student wing of the Bangladesh National Party (“BNP”) in Bangladesh from August 2017, which resulted in him being attacked by the Chatra League, the student wing of the ruling Awami League, in November / December 2018 and January / February 2022. He fears that he will be mistreated by Chatra League and the police upon return to Bangladesh.

4. The claim was refused by the Respondent on 18th January 2024. It was concluded that the Appellant’s narrative account is not genuine.

5. The Appellant’s appeal against that decision was heard by the Judge on 16th December 2024 and was dismissed within a determination dated 1st January 2025.

The Judge’s determination

6. The Judge refused to allow the Appellant to rely upon a skeleton argument and an appeal bundle provided only the working day prior to the hearing.

7. At paragraph 2 of his determination, he outlined that directions had been issued on 26 April 2024, 8 July 2024, 6 September 2024, 26 September 2024 and 18 October 2024 to the Appellant's legal representatives requiring them to file the Appellant’s skeleton argument and bundle of documents, but that these directions were not complied with.

8. At paragraphs 5 to 8 he outlined the relevant considerations:

“5. The Practice Direction issued on 1 November 2024 makes it clear by reference to the Overriding Objective that parties must ensure they conduct proceedings with procedural rigour. The Tribunal will not overlook breaches of the requirements of the Procedure Rules, Practice Directions, Practice Statements and failures to comply with directions issued by the Tribunal.

6. Where evidence is provided later than 5 working days prior to the hearing, as in this case, I am required as a preliminary matter whether to admit that evidence at the hearing.

7. Failure, without good reason, to comply with case management directions is a serious matter, which undermines the good administration of justice and is inconsistent with the Overriding Objective.

8. The Tribunal exercises its powers under rule 6(2) of the Procedure Rules. In doing so I have considered what is ‘just’. My assessment takes into account all relevant principles including the seriousness or significance of the failure to comply and the explanation offered by the Appellant. I have looked at all the circumstances of the case.”

9. At paragraph 9 he detailed the submissions of the Appellant’s counsel, Ms Bonifai, that the skeleton argument and bundle had been provided late due to lack of funds to instruct his representatives, but that she could not explain why the directions dated April, July, September and October had been disregarded.

10. The Judge’s decision to exclude the evidence is detailed at paragraphs 11 and 12 of his determination:

“11. There have been flagrant breaches of the directions issued by the Tribunal. The Appellant has been given several opportunities to remedy the breaches but has failed to do so or to explain the reasons why the directions have been ignored. Without making an application, after close of business on the last working day before the hearing, the Appellant’s representatives uploaded the Appellant’s documents without permission. Ms Bonifai was instructed at the very last minute and put in an invidious position. The Appellant did not ask for an adjournment knowing that such an application was likely to be refused. The Appellant’s representatives appear to have assumed that the Tribunal would admit the evidence. This would inevitably cause the Respondent to apply for an adjournment.

12. The Tribunal does not have inexhaustible patience and must have regard to the resources available to hear cases expeditiously, avoiding delay. The Tribunal must exercise its power to give effect to the Overriding Objective. The Appellant’s disregard of the Tribunal’s directions wastes resources and delays justice in other cases waiting to be heard. In the circumstances of the present case, it is just to refuse the Appellant’s application to admit evidence out of time.”

11. The Judge summarised the Appellant’s case at paragraph 13:

“As is apparent from the documents before the Tribunal, the Appellant entered the UK in October 2022 and claimed asylum on 17 November 2022. He is a national of Bangladesh and claims to be a member of Chatra Dal. This is a student organisation affiliated with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). He says that he was the associate organisational secretary. He claims that he was attacked by the Chatra League in Bangladesh in November/December 2018 and again in January/February 2022. The Chatra League is the student wing of the Awami League which until October 2024 was the ruling party in Bangladesh. The Appellant claims that if he is returned to Bangladesh he will be kidnapped and imprisoned by the Chatra League and the police.”

12. At paragraph 23 he detailed the Respondent’s submissions:

“The Respondent’s submissions are that:
• the Appellant originally came to the UK on a student visa on 6 October 2022,
• he claims that he was already of adverse interest to the Chatra League and the Bangladeshi police,
• this is ‘externally inconsistent’ that he would have been able to apply for a student visa to the UK and leave Bangladesh unnoticed by authorities,
• the Appellant was asked about his journey to the UK but his response lacked sufficiency of detail and specificity concerning his ability to leave Bangladesh even though he claims to have already been of adverse attention to the Chatra League from 2018,
• the Appellant failed to provide a detailed explanation as to why he believe he was at risk from the Chatra League, he provided no supporting/documentary evidence to demonstrate he had received any threats,
• he did not provide any evidence that he had attended demonstrations or activities that have been monitored by the authorities in Bangladesh. It is therefore considered that this part of his claim does not demonstrate that he will be identified by the Bangladesh authorities upon return to Bangladesh due to your claimed political activities
• he has failed to submit evidence, which shows he was attacked in 2018 and 2022 in Bangladesh by the Chatra League as claimed,
• he has failed to provide a detailed explanation as to why he believes he is at risk from the Chatra League,
• he has stated that the Bangladeshi police released him without any conditions, which is a further indication that he is not a person who has been adverse attention of the police nor the Chatra League,
• he has stated that after he was released from the police station he went home then went to his in-law’s brother’s house and remained there for 3 months while applying for a student visa to the UK.,
• this is considered to show that he was not a person with adverse attention of the Chatra League nor the Bangladeshi authorities.
• the Appellant would be returning to Bangladesh as a normal civilian from the UK.
• the Appellant’s account lacks specificity and sufficient detail concerning his fear of being returned to Bangladesh, who he fears, and why he fears them,
• the Appellant stated that he had reported the attacks to the police, and the police started an investigation which demonstrates that the police in Bangladesh is willing and able to help
• it is not accepted that the Appellant is a person who will need to modify his behaviour upon return to Bangladesh due to his claimed political profile.”

13. At paragraph 25, the Judge outlined Ms Bonifai’s submissions, including that the Appellant’s case was consistent with background evidence.

14. The Judge stated, at paragraph 26:

“In the absence of the Appellant’s evidence, I make formal findings of fact based on the Respondent’s evidence and submissions.”

Grounds of appeal

15. Grounds of appeal were submitted on 14th January 2025, which are summarised at paragraph 7, as follows:

“Ground 1: J has not made adequate findings
Ground 2: J has made has made irrational findings
Ground 3: Failure of J to admit A’s evidence
Ground 4: J has materially erred by not making any findings on A’s credibility”

16. Permission to appeal was granted by another judge of the First-Tier Tribunal on 8th February 2025, on the following basis:

“3. Although the judge was entitled to refuse to admit the Appellant’s evidence due to the numerous directions that had not been complied with [9], the Appellant had given an account though his asylum interview of fearing persecution based on his political opinion. The judge summarised the claim at [13]. It is arguable that the judge in simply summarising the submissions of the Respondent’s representative failed to give adequate reasons for dismissing the Appellant’s claim.

4. The judge did not set out why the submissions of the respondent were preferred to the account of the Appellant. Furthermore, at [24], the judge stated that the Prime Minister of the Awami League had resigned in August 2024, but did not go on to examine how this event affected the Appellant’s claim or made it less credible.

5. It is arguable the judge failed to give adequate reasons for dismissing the Appellant’s appeal and I allow the appeal on this ground”

The hearing

17. The papers were contained within a 509-page electronic bundle in addition to a Rule 24 response from the Respondent. The bundle contained, at Part C, the Appellant’s evidence that the Judge refused to admit. Part D contained the Respondent’s bundle before the First-tier Tribunal.

18. I heard oral submissions from the advocates.

19. Mr Badar relied upon the written grounds of appeal. He argued that the decision to refuse to admit the Appellant’s evidence was irrational and that the Judge had failed to have regard to the overriding objective. He argued that the Judge failed to consider adjourning and making an order for costs against the Appellant. He accepted that there had been no separate application for the Appellant to give oral evidence. Nevertheless, there were conflicts between the Appellant and Respondent that were not resolved within the Judge’s determination.

20. Ms Young relied upon the Rule 24 response. She argued that there was no error of law in the Judge’s refusal to admit the Appellant’s evidence, a decision that was open to the Judge and adequately reasoned. The Judge adequately outlined the cases of both parties and had adopted the Respondent’s assessment of the evidence, which was open to him. There is nothing in the determination to indicate that evidence, such as the Appellant’s account in interview, was not considered. It can be inferred from reading the determination as a whole that the Judge made an adverse credibility finding.

Discussion and analysis

21. Throughout my consideration of the appeal, I had regard to the guidance provided by the Court of Appeal in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 462 at paragraph 2:

"[i] The approach of an appeal court to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled:

[ii] An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.

[iii] The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.

[iv] An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.

[v] The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.

[vi] An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.

[vii] Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract."

22. The restricted jurisdiction of the Upper Tribunal was also outlined by the Court of Appeal in Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201, which at paragraph summarised the settled case authorities:

“(i) the FTT is a specialist fact-finding tribunal. The UT should not rush to find an error of law simply because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49 [2008] 1 AC 678 at paragraph [30];

(ii) where a relevant point was not expressly mentioned by the FTT, the UT should be slow to infer that it had not been taken into account: e.g. MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49 at paragraph [45];

(iii) when it comes to the reasons given by the FTT, the UT should exercise judicial restraint and not assume that the FTT misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning was fully set out: see R (Jones) v First Tier Tribunal and Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority [2013] UKSC 19 at paragraph [25];

(iv) the issues for decision and the basis upon which the FTT reaches its decision on those issues may be set out directly or by inference: see UT (Sri Lanka) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1095 at paragraph [27];

(v) judges sitting in the FTT are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them. There is no need for them to be referred to specifically, unless it was clear from their language that they had failed to do so: see AA (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 1296 at paragraph [34];

(vi) it is of the nature of assessment that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case. The mere fact that one tribunal has reached what might appear to be an unusually generous view of the facts does not mean that it has made an error of law: see MM (Lebanon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 10 at paragraph [107].”

23. In addition to the principles above, I also reminded myself of the merits of concise decision writing, as outlined within the ‘Practice Direction from the Senior President of Tribunals: Reasons for decisions’, dated 4th July 2024:

“Providing adequate reasons does not usually require the First-tier Tribunal to identify all of the evidence relied upon in reaching its findings of fact, to elaborate at length its conclusions on any issue of law, or to express every step of its reasoning. The reasons provided for any decision should be proportionate, not only to the resources of the Tribunal, but to the significance and complexity of the issues that have to be decided. Reasons need refer only to the main issues and evidence in dispute, and explain how those issues essential to the Tribunal’s conclusion have been resolved.

Stating reasons at any greater length than is necessary in the particular case is not in the interests of justice. To do so is an inefficient use of judicial time, does not assist either the parties or an appellate court or tribunal, and is therefore inconsistent with the overriding objective. Providing concise reasons is to be encouraged. Adequate reasons for a substantive decision may often be short. In some cases a few succinct paragraphs will suffice. For a procedural decision the reasons required will usually be shorter.”

24. I considered ground three of the grounds of appeal first. At paragraphs 16-20 of the written grounds, it is argued that the Judge failed to consider the reasons for the failure to comply with directions or alternative action, such an award for costs arising from any adjournment. This argument is summarised at paragraph 20 of the grounds:

“It is therefore submitted that J has erred materially by not considering A’s explanation for late production of his evidence and not considering all options available to the Court before the most serious course of action, which was to refuse an asylum seeker to rely on any of his evidence.”

25. The overriding objective is contained within rule 2 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014:

“(1) The overriding objective of these Rules is to enable the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly.
(2) Dealing with a case fairly and justly includes—
dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate to the importance of the case, the complexity of the issues, the anticipated costs and the resources of the parties and of the Tribunal;
avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in the proceedings;
ensuring, so far as practicable, that the parties are able to participate fully in the proceedings;
using any special expertise of the Tribunal effectively; and
avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues.
(3) The Tribunal must seek to give effect to the overriding objective when it—
exercises any power under these Rules; or
interprets any rule or practice direction.
(4) Parties must—
help the Tribunal to further the overriding objective; and
co-operate with the Tribunal generally.”

26. Mr Barad argued that the Judge failed to have proper regard to rule 2(2)(b) and (c). There is no merit in that submission. The Appellant had every opportunity to engage with proceedings and to provide documentation over a prolonged period of time and in accordance with various directions but failed to do so. Rule 2(2)(b) and (c) are not provisions that excuse parties from their obligations detailed within Rule 2(4). The Judge noted, at paragraph 9, that no reason was given why directions between April and October 2024 were disregarded.

27. The Judge did not need to outline each of the options open to him, for example adjourning with an order for costs. That would have been contrary to the Presidential Direction for concise decision writing. Further, he is an expert tribunal and it is not arguable that he would not have had regard to his cost powers and all the options open to him. He did not need to outline each option, as detailed in point (ii) of Ullah, above.

28. In any event, adjourning with an order for costs would not have reimbursed the public purse for the Tribunal costs arising from the appeal not proceeding nor would it have limited the delay which the overriding objective seeks to avoid, where it can be fairly avoided. It would not have addressed the factors that the Judge correctly identified in paragraph 12, which merit repeating:

“The Tribunal does not have inexhaustible patience and must have regard to the resources available to hear cases expeditiously, avoiding delay. The Tribunal must exercise its power to give effect to the Overriding Objective. The Appellant’s disregard of the Tribunal’s directions wastes resources and delays justice in other cases waiting to be heard. In the circumstances of the present case, it is just to refuse the Appellant’s application to admit evidence out of time.”

29. The Judge adequately outlined the procedural history which was such that his refusal to admit the evidence could not be properly described as “irrational”. The refusal to admit the evidence was reasonably open to the Judge in all of those circumstances. Further, his reasoning in paragraph 11 and 12 of his determination was adequate and demonstrated adherence to the overriding objective.

30. Grounds 1, 2 and 4 criticise the Judge’s analysis of the evidence.

31. Paragraph 10 of the grounds argues:

“J’s findings appear to be the entirety of R’s evidence and submissions. This is respectfully irrational. Even in the absence of J admitting A’s evidence, it is not clear whether any evidence from A was called. Within the RB, A had provided a substantive asylum interview (RB Pg 21 onwards). Submissions were made on A’s behalf. However, J’s resolution of the entirety of A’s evidence is simply that R’s evidence and submissions are preferred, which does not set out which material facts were decided in A’s favour or not, questions (JCK v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Botswana) [2024] UKUT 100) were satisfied or which key conflicts in A’s evidence were resolved.”

32. Paragraph 11 of the grounds argues:

“It is also not clear which part of R’s evidence J has placed reliance on. There is no DVR or any evidence within the R’s bundle, which can be deemed as R’s own evidence.”

33. Paragraph 15 of the grounds argues:

“… even in the absence of A’s bundle, A’s evidence was still before J. A’s asylum interview (AIR) was before J. Within the AIR, A has given a detailed account, which simply has not been considered by J. It is therefore submitted that there was evidence before J, which J has irrationally disregarded.”

34. Paragraphs 21-24 of the written grounds argue that the Judge failed to make credibility findings or to direct himself that an appeal should not be dismissed solely due to the fact that the Appellant has told lies.

35. The Judge clearly took into account of all the documents admitted into evidence. Whether the asylum interview is referred to as the Respondent’s evidence (as it is provided by the Respondent within its bundle) or the Appellant’s evidence (as it is his account) is immaterial.

36. As outlined above, the Appellant’s documentary evidence was not admitted and it was confirmed before me that the Appellant did not give oral evidence nor was there any application for him to do so absent an admitted witness statement.

37. Within his determination, the Judge expressly identified at paragraph 16 that the documentation was on myHMCTS and, at paragraph 21, stated that he made his determination “...based on the documents contained in the Respondent’s bundle”. That Respondent’s bundle contained, amongst other documents, the Refusal and the Respondent’s asylum interview. It is therefore clearly evident that the Judge had regard to the Appellant’s asylum interview when he was considering the appeal.

38. The Judge summarised the Appellant’s case at paragraph 13, which accurately reflects the Appellant’s account in his asylum interview. As detailed within the authorities outlined above, the Judge was not required to go through in detail all of the evidence that he considered. The contents of his determination show that he had regard to all of the admitted evidence.

39. Similarly, he had regard to submissions made on behalf of the Appellant, which he summarised at paragraph 24 of the determination.

40. The Judge clearly had the Appellant’s account and submissions in mind when he made his findings. Upon doing so, the Judge made, as he detailed at paragraph 26 “..formal findings of fact based on the Respondent’s evidence and submissions”. These were contained under the heading ‘Findings’. By Respondent’s evidence he clearly meant the evidence contained within the Respondent’s bundle, which was all the admitted evidence before the him.

41. The Judge rejected the Appellant’s account and, to that extent, and whilst not stating explicitly, found the Appellant’s not to be credible. That was his clear conclusion when reading his determination in its entirety. He did not dismiss the appeal upon reliance on one particular feature of the case and the submission that he failed to accurately direct himself pursuant to the case of R v Lucas [1981] QB 720 is without any foundation as this is not a case where a lie was identified and findings reached as a consequence solely on account of that lie.

42. The Judge adopted the burden and standard of proof as required, and concluded at paragraph 27 that the Appellant would not be persecuted upon return to Bangladesh. That was a finding reasonably open to him and adequately reasoned when the determination is read as a whole.

43. The Judge therefore made appropriate factual findings and applied those findings to the relevant legal considerations. There is nothing irrational about the Judge’s approach, findings or reasons.

44. As such, grounds 1, 2 and 4 do not show any material error of law.

45. Ground 1 also includes what Mr Badar accurately described as a “tertiary” argument, which is detailed at paragraph 12 of the grounds of appeal:

“J also sets out the change of the political situation at ¶24. It is not clear which evidence J had before them to make out this position. It is noted that R has now updated the CPIN (delayed by nearly 5 months - Country Policy and Information Note Bangladesh: Political situation Version 1.0 December 2024), and A had provided an expert report (which J had not admitted). It appears that the only evidence before J was the expert report (Mr Mohammad Abrar Elias), therefore either J had other evidence that was not referred to or J referred to A’s expert report to find the change in government. In either event, this position is simply not clear. Furthermore, it is not clear how J has concluded that this position effects A. A would submit that key conflicts have simply not been resolved.”

46. The impugned paragraph 12 of the determination is as follows:

“I take judicial not of the fact that since October 2024, Bangladesh has been governed by an interim administration after the resignation of the Awami League Prime Minister in August 2024.”

47. There is no error of law in that approach as the Judge was relating what is public knowledge of the change in the political situation in Bangladesh. In any event, given his findings that the Appellant was not of adverse interest to the Awami League, any error of law would not be material.

Conclusion

48. The Judge’s determination contains findings of fact that were open to him and were adequately reasoned. As such, no error of law is made out, either material or otherwise.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error on a point of law. The decision shall stand.

DUTJ Moxon
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

16th April 2025