UI-2025-000736

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 24 Jul 2025
• Promulgation date: 28 Aug 2025
• Publication date: 12 Sep 2025
• Last updated on: 12 Sep 2025

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000736

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/60140/2023
LP/09355/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 28 August 2025

Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NORTON-TAYLOR

Between
FA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the appellant: Mr A Malik, Counsel, instructed by Syed Shaheen & Partners
For the respondent: Mr K Ojo, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 24 July 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


RE-MAKING DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. This the re-making of the decision in the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his protection and human rights claims. It follows my previous decision, issued on 25 April 2025, by which I concluded that the First-tier Tribunal had materially erred in law when dismissing the appellant’s appeal and that its decision should be set aside. The error of law decision is set out in an annex to this re-making decision and the two should be read together.

2. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh who arrived in this country on 28 February 2022 on a student visa. He made his protection and human rights claims on 27 May of that same year. The appellant’s protection claim can be summarised as follows. He asserts that he was an active member/supporter of Jatiyatabadi Jubo Dal (“JJD” - a political organisation opposed to the Awami League – “the AL”) in his home area of Zakiganj between 2018 and 2022. His older brother was a vice-president of the organisation in the locality. As a result of his political activities, the appellant had been threatened by members of the AL in his local area (which is apparently a district of Sylhet City). On 5 January 2022 and at the instigation of the AL, a false criminal case was lodged against the appellant. An arrest warrant was subsequently issued on 19 May 2022. Once the appellant was told of this by his mother a few days later, he made his protection claim in the United Kingdom.

3. In refusing the claims, the respondent accepted that the appellant had been politically active whilst in Bangladesh. However, no other material aspects of his claim were conceded.

4. At the error of law stage, I concluded that the First-tier Tribunal had gone wrong in three respects. First, it erroneously concluded that the appellant had not referred to a particular MP in his area who was adverse to his activities. In fact, the appellant had mentioned this individual in his asylum interview, albeit briefly. Secondly, it erroneously concluded that there was no evidence that the appellant’s brother had held a specific position with the JJD: the appellant’s own evidence should have been assessed. Thirdly, the rejection of the court documentation was flawed because it was essentially based on speculative plausibility and failed to have regard to other relevant evidence.

5. I specifically preserved the First-tier Tribunal’s finding (which itself was based on the respondent’s concession) that the appellant had been politically active for the JJD between 2018 and February 2022.

6. I also preserved the First-tier Tribunal’s negative conclusions on the appellant’s Article 8 claim. There had been no challenge to these at the error of law stage and that remained the case at the re-making stage.

The live issues
7. In terms of fact-finding, I must determine the following material matters on an application of the lower standard of proof:

(a) Whether the relevant individual, Hafiz Majumder, had an adverse interest in the appellant, whether he still does, and whether he has such power and influence that he would be able to locate and do harm to the appellant in any part of Bangladesh;

(b) Whether the appellant’s brother was in fact a vice-president of the JJD in the home area;

(c) Whether the documentation relating to the claimed false criminal case against the appellant is reliable and, in turn, whether there are in fact ongoing proceedings.

8. In terms of risk assessment, I must determine whether the appellant would be at risk in his home area, whether he could obtain sufficient state protection, alternatively whether he would be at risk throughout Bangladesh, and finally whether he could reasonably internally relocate if he was at risk is home area but was not at risk throughout the country.

9. The risk assessment is conducted on the lower standard of proof and in the context of the current political situation in Bangladesh following the fall of the AL government in August 2024.

The evidence
10. The documentary evidence provided by the appellant was contained in a consolidated bundle, indexed and paginated 1-445.

11. The respondent relied on two CPINs: “Bangladesh: Political situation”, published in December 2024; and “Bangladesh: Documentation”, published in November 2024.

12. The appellant attended the hearing and gave oral evidence with the assistance of a Bengali Sylheti interpreter. I was satisfied that there were no apparent communication difficulties during the hearing.

13. The appellant adopted two witness statements and was not asked any further questions by Mr Malik. Mr Ojo cross-examined the appellant. The questioning focused on the circumstances of the appellant’s brother and whether he had in fact fled to India, why he did not have a lawyer now, and the particular incident which led to the false case being instigated.

14. For the purposes of clarification, I asked the appellant about his fears of being arrested on return and Mr Majumder’s alleged influence.

15. There was no re-examination by Mr Malik.

16. The oral evidence as a matter of record. I will deal with relevant aspects of it when setting out my findings of fact and risk assessment, below.

The parties’ submissions
17. Mr Ojo relied on the reasons for refusal letter. He submitted that there was no evidence of the brother having gone to India. Neither the brother nor Mr Majumder had been mentioned in the JJD letter. There was no reliable evidence to show that the individual was so influential that he could find the appellant anywhere in Bangladesh. There was an error on the appellant’s age in the FIR. There was inconsistency as to what event prompted the false case. I was referred to a number of passages within the CPINs concerning the current political climate in Bangladesh, risk, and legal process in that country.

18. Mr Malik relied on his brief skeleton argument. He submitted that the appellant was credible. The brother’s history increased the profile of the appellant. Mr Majumder did have significant influence, although Mr Malik accepted there was no objective evidence to support this. The court documentation was reliable. The case against the appellant was entirely false and so the dates of the particular incident were not of great importance.

19. Mr Malik confirmed that the central focus of the appellant’s case was that he would be arrested on return because of the outstanding warrant. Following this, it was submitted, Mr Majumder would come to know of the arrest “within days” and then be able to do harm to the appellant. The political and law and order situation in Bangladesh was “not ideal” at the present time.

20. With reference to HJ (Iran) (which had been cited in the skeleton argument), Mr Malik accepted that there was no evidence that the appellant would wish to undertake political activities if he were to return to Bangladesh.

21. At the conclusion of the hearing I announced the parties that I would reserve my decision.

Findings of fact
22. In making the relevant findings of fact, I have considered the evidence as a whole and asked myself the question of whether it is reasonably likely that the material aspects of the appellant’s claim are factually accurate.

The appellant’s own political activities
23. I restate the preserved finding that the appellant was politically active on behalf of JJD between 2018 and February 2022. The organisation was aligned with the BNP. It is right to say that the appellant has not provided very much detail as to what precisely he did on behalf of the organisation. Based on the asylum interview, I am prepared to accept that he helped to arrange meetings in his local area and tried to recruit people, particularly at election time.

24. As rightly acknowledged by Mr Malik, there is no evidence of the appellant having undertaken political activities whilst in United Kingdom, or any desire on his part to do so if he were to return to Bangladesh. I find that the appellant has not in fact been involved in any political activities in this country. I also find that the appellant has no intention to carry out any physical activities if returned to his home country.

The position of Hafiz Majumder
25. I find that it is not reasonably likely that Mr Majumder had any specific adverse interest in the appellant whilst the latter was in Bangladesh. I also find that it is not reasonably likely that this individual would have any adverse interest in the appellant in the future. These two findings are based on the following reasons.

26. First, I accept that the appellant did mention this particular individual in his asylum interview.

27. Secondly, there is some evidence from Wikipedia that the individual exists, that he is now elderly (having been born in 1935), was an MP for the AL, and that he comes from a well-known family. That evidence satisfies me that the individual exists.

28. Thirdly, the Wikipedia evidence says nothing about any nefarious or otherwise suspect conduct on the individual’s part. In fact, the evidence suggests that he was deemed fit to serve as the Chairman of the Board of Directors of a bank. No other independent evidence has been provided to indicate that Mr Majumder has a reputation for using threats or violence against deemed political opponents, particularly those operating at a relatively low-level, as was the appellant. Nor is there any independent evidence to suggest that he has significant influence throughout Bangladesh. The entirety of the appellant’s bold assertion that such wide-ranging influence does exist is predicated on the appellant’s word. Whilst taking that evidence into account, it is unreliable for all the reasons set out in this decision.

29. Fourthly, I find that Mr Majumder left Parliament many years ago. He was self-evidently not currently a “big minister”, as described by the appellant at question 60 of the asylum interview (the final question of that interview). No further information was provided at the interview. Indeed, it appears to me as though the appellant mentioned this individual simply as an afterthought.

30. Fifthly, Mr Majumder was not mentioned at all by the appellant in his 2024 witness statement, nor was he referred to in the JJD letter dated 10 August 2023.

31. Sixthly bringing the above together, and viewed in the context of my assessment of the evidence in the round, the appellant’s own evidence that he had been of adverse interest to Mr Majumder was inconsistent with independent evidence, vague, unsupported by any other evidence, and simply implausible, even on the lower standard of proof.

32. Seventhly, on the evidence before me and in light of what I have already said, it is fanciful that Mr Majumder now holds any desire and/or ability to find out if the appellant returned to Bangladesh. It is fanciful that he would now have the wherewithal to find out if the appellant had been arrested on return to Dhaka. It is fanciful to suggest that even if he were to find out, he would have the ability to do harm to the appellant in police custody, particularly given the significant changes in Bangladesh which took place over a year ago.

The appellant’s brother
33. The appellant has been consistent in asserting that his brother held a relatively prominent, albeit localised, position in the JJD. That clearly counts in his favour.

34. The brother is not mentioned in the JJD letter. That is somewhat odd given the familial connection. However, the omission by itself does not significantly undermine the appellant’s own evidence because the letter was addressed to the appellant.

35. What is significant is the total absence of any evidence from the brother. Corroborative evidence is not a requirement in protection claims. That does not mean that its absence must be discounted in all circumstances. In this case, the appellant stated that he maintains telephone contact with his brother, who is said to have fled to India. When pressed as to why there was no evidence from the brother, or even in respect of his claimed residence in India, the appellant was in my judgment deliberately vague. He stated that the brother had “nothing”, but it is clear that he has been in possession of at least a telephone. The applicant then sought to avoid the subject by referring to his own allegedly false case in Bangladesh.

36. There has been no explanation at all as to why the brother cannot have provided any form of supporting evidence. Such evidence would, I find, have been readily available. I of course take into account the fact that the brother would not have been able to give oral evidence and could not have been tested by the respondent. However, evidence from the brother was relevant to the appellant’s claim that the two of them were subject to false allegations and that the brother’s circumstances increased the appellant’s risk profile.

37. I am left with the appellant’s word alone, and having regard to my overall assessment of his evidence, I find that it is not reasonably likely that the brother was forced to flee Bangladesh in 2022, as claimed. That of itself does not mean that the brother did not hold a role of greater prominence than the applicant’s. I am prepared to accept that the brother was politically active and did hold a formal role in the local branch of the JJD.

The criminal case documents
38. I consider this documentary evidence in the round with everything else before me and direct myself that it is for the appellant to show that it is reliable as to its form and, more importantly, its content.

39. For the following reasons, I find that, even on the lower standard, the appellant has failed to demonstrate that the documentary evidence is reliable.

40. First, the appellant’s evidence in respect of why and in what circumstances the case was instigated has been materially inconsistent and confused. The FIR and Charge Sheet refer to an incident (a rally/disturbance) which apparently took place on 5 January 2022. At question 28 of the interview, the appellant stated that the case was filed against him on 19 January 2022, and went on to say that he had attended a rally on either 17 or 18 January (the dates of 18 or 20 January was stated later on, but I do not hold that inconsistency against the appellant); the implication being that his attendance at the latter resulted in the former. Clearly, that narrative makes no sense given the date on the case documents.

41. When this evidential difficulty was put to the appellant at the hearing, he initially stated that the case against him related to 19 May 2022 and referred to the arrest warrant of that date. However, he had not been asked about the arrest warrant and the warrant did not represent the initial filing of the case. He then suggested that he had been to “many rallies” and one of these might have been on 5 January 2022. That, however, was inconsistent with what he had said in his 2024 witness statement, in which he categorically stated that he had not attended any rally on that date. Having seen and heard the applicant providing his answers at the hearing and in light of other aspects of his evidence and the evidence more generally, I find that he was initially being evasive and then having to make answers up off the cuff, as it were, in order to repair problems in his account. To be blunt, it appeared as though he was not aware of what the case documents actually said, as against what he himself had put forward in interview.

42. Secondly, the appellant’s evidence as to how he obtained the documentary evidence and why there has been no additional evidence about his case is unclear and wholly implausible. He stated that he had been able to obtain the case documentation through a lawyer in Bangladesh. However, he then told me that he had been unable to instruct a lawyer to obtain any further information at all until and unless he (the appellant) surrendered himself to the court in that country. No expert or country evidence has been provided to support that contention. There is no letter from the lawyer previously instructed to support the contention, or even to explain how the case documents were obtained in the first place. For example, obtaining an arrest warrant where the individual concerned was not in the country would presumably be a procedurally difficult/restricted endeavour. There is no evidence that bribery was used to obtain the documents. Overall, the appellant’s evidence on this particular issue is not reasonably likely to be true.

43. Thirdly, I have taken account of the November 2024 CPIN on documents and the particular passages refer to me by Mr Ojo. The ability to obtain false and/or unreliable documents is a relevant factor in my assessment, although it is not in any way decisive.

44. Fourthly, and emphasising once again that corroborative evidence is not a requirement, there is no expert evidence before me which might otherwise have assisted the appellant’s reliance on the documents. Its absence means that I only have the evidence from the appellant himself, the country information, and the contents of the case documents.

45. Fifthly, the arrest warrant is dated 19 May 2022, after the appellant left Bangladesh. The appellant has not suggested that he used bribery to leave, or that he otherwise faced difficulties in doing so on his own passport. In those circumstances, it is very odd indeed that the warrant makes no reference to the appellant being outside of the jurisdiction at the time it was issued. The authorities would have known of the appellant’s departure from the country in February 2022. I take account of the need for caution when relying on a plausibility matter and of the fact that the Bangladeshi systems may not be particularly efficient. Despite that, this consideration is relevant to my overall assessment.

Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004, as amended
46. In the circumstances of this case, I am satisfied that there was no material delay in the appellant claiming asylum. Although I have rejected all but one aspect of the claim, on the appellant’s own case he made the claim soon after allegedly been told the arrest warrant by his mother in February 2022. There is no damage to the appellant’s credibility.

Summary of findings of fact
47. Having regard to everything said above, I make the following core findings of fact:

(a) The appellant was politically active in Bangladesh between 2018 and 2022, albeit at a low-level;

(b) The appellant’s brother held the position of vice-president of the local branch of the JJD, but was not forced to flee Bangladeshi 2022 as result of any political problems;

(c) Mr Hafiz Majumder has had, currently has, and would have, no adverse interest in the appellant and certainly none which would lead into seek any information on the appellant’s return to Bangladesh and or any place of relocation and/or any detention of the appellant as result of any criminal proceedings;

(d) There is in fact no criminal case against the appellant or his brother.

Conclusions on risk
48. In the first instance, my findings of fact mean that the appellant cannot demonstrate that it is reasonably likely that he would be at risk on return to Bangladesh by virtue of past political activities and/or any adverse interest from Mr Majumder and/or any criminal case. The appellant could return to his home area and reside there without there being any risk at all. He would not need to turn to the authorities for protection.

49. My conclusion on this particular scenario is further supported by the country situation on Bangladesh, which can be broadly summarised as follows. The AL are no longer in power. It is not currently functioning as an organised political force. Many individuals who held power under the AL have been removed from their posts and steps have been taken to reform the main aspects of the state. There remain problems: there have been reports of attacks by AL supporters and some positions within the state apparatus are still held by AL supporters. Overall, it is now a good deal less likely that a person with the appellant’s profile would be targeted for adverse attention by AL supporters. That is particularly so where, as here, the individual concerned would not be undertaking any political activities in the country.

50. Even if there was a risk in the particular home area and that there was insufficient state protection, the appellant could quite clearly internally relocate without facing a risk elsewhere and without it being unreasonable in any way. He would not be undertaking any political activities in the place of relocation and it is fanciful to suggest that his past history of activities in his home area will in some way come to light or, even if it did, that it would excite sufficient interest with political opponents. Beyond that, the appellant is a healthy young man who would be able to re-establish himself elsewhere in Bangladesh without any real difficulty at all.

51. I now address the alternative scenario that there is a criminal case against the appellant. If that were so reasonably likely that he would be detained on or soon after arrival in the capital. It is reasonably likely that he would be held in pre-trial detention pending relevant court hearings. The appellant has not relied on any country information to suggest that the conditions of any such detention would breach Article 3 and I find that they would not. The appellant has not referred me to any country information indicating that he would be flagrantly denied a fair trial process. The respondent has referred me to country information in the CPIN which indicates that steps are being taken to clear out AL supporters from the justice system. The interim government has transferred and promoted more than 300 lower court judges. The appellant has not shown it to be reasonably likely that he would face persecution and/or Article 3 ill-treatment if he was detained. As I have to suggest that Mr Majumder would come to know of the appellant’s detention and/or be able to do him harm. Beyond that, there is no reason to suppose that the appellant would not be able to assert his innocence and, if what he says is true, demonstrate that the case against him was fabricated by the AL, a party known to use such tactics and which is now out of power and discredited.

52. Finally, the HJ (Iran) principle does not assist the appellant. I have found that he does not intend to undertake any political activities if returned to Bangladesh and so there would be nothing to trigger the risk of persecution and nothing to conceal even if such a risk existed.

53. For all the reasons set out above, the appellant’s appeal fails.

Anonymity
54. I maintain the anonymity direction previously made on the basis that this case involves a claim for international protection and the need to anonymity outweighs the important principle of open justice.

Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of an error on a point of law and that decision has been set aside.

The decision in this appeal is re-made and the appeal is dismissed on all grounds.

H Norton-Taylor
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
Dated: 1 August 2025

ANNEX: THE ERROR OF LAW DECISION

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000736

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/60140/2023
LP/09355/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NORTON-TAYLOR

Between

FA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT/ENTRY CLEARANCE
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M Uddin, Solicitor from Syed Shaheen & Partners Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S Lecointe, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 14 April 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The Appellant appeals against the decision of a panel of the First-tier Tribunal (comprising Judges Bagral and Sharma – (“the panel”), promulgated on 10 December 2024. By that decision, the panel dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s refusal, dated 24 October 2023, of his protection and human rights claims.

2. The Appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh who arrived in this country on 28 February 2022 on a student visa. He made his protection and human rights claims on 27 May of that same year.

3. The protection claim can be summarised as follows. The Appellant asserts that he was an active member/supporter of Jatiyatabadi Jubo Dal (“JJD”) between 2018 and 2022. His older brother was a vice-president of the organisation. As a result of his political activities, the Appellant had been threatened by members of the Awami League (“AL”) in his local area, a district of Sylhet City. On 5 January 2022 and at the instigation of the AL, a false criminal case was lodged against the Appellant. An arrest warrant was subsequently issued on 19 May 2022. Once the Appellant was told of this by his mother a few days later, he made his protection claim in the United Kingdom.

4. In refusing the claims, the Respondent accepted that the Appellant had been politically active whilst in Bangladesh. However, no other material aspects of his claim were conceded.

The panel’s decision
5. Before the panel, the Appellant relied on the elements of his claim as discussed above. In addition, he contended that he would be at risk on return notwithstanding the political changes which occurred in Bangladesh in August 2024, cumulating in the removal of the AL government. The panel agreed with the Respondent’s concession in respect of the Appellant’s activities in Bangladesh: paragraphs 35 and 41(1).

6. Somewhat unusually, the panel set out its findings on the risk of persecution before setting out its findings of credibility. In any event, at paragraph 47 (and having accepted the political activities in Bangladesh) the panel found that on the basis of a single paragraph in the assessment section of a September 2020 CPIN, the Appellant would not be at risk because he had been a low-level member. At paragraph 47(3) the panel did not accept that the Appellant’s brother had been vice-president of the JJD because there was “no evidence” before it to support the Appellant’s assertion. At paragraph 47(4) the panel accepted that the Appellant would have been able to leave Bangladesh on his own passport because the arrest warrant post-dated the departure. At paragraph 47(5) the panel found that the suppression of political opponents by the AL had not continued since August 2024. In respect of its credibility findings, at paragraph 48 the panel reiterated its previous finding in relation to the Appellant’s brother. At 48(2) the panel addressed the arrest warrant and other police and court documents relied on by the Appellant. The panel referred to a CPIN on Bangladeshi documentation, which stated that there was a significant prevalence of fraudulent documents in that country. At paragraph 48(2) the panel went on to say that:

“We accept the Respondent’s position on this and find that the documents lack credibility. We do not accept that false charges have been made against him. Mr Uddin stated that the Respondent needed to provide evidence to show that these documents were fraudulent. It is for the Appellant to prove his case and we find the documentation is not reliable. The reason why we have made this finding is because we find it difficult to comprehend why an arrest warrant would be issued over 4 months after the alleged incident of 5th January 2022. We accept the Respondent’s position that little weight can be attached to these documents.”

7. At 48(3) the panel did not accept that there was a “harsh crackdown” in Bangladesh by the AL or political opponents. Finally, at paragraph 48(4) the panel rejected the Appellant’s evidence that a local AL MP had caused and would in the future cause the Appellant particular problems. That rejection was based on the panel’s view that this individual had not been referred to by the Appellant prior to the hearing. As a result of the above, the panel concluded that the Appellant had failed to show that there was a reasonable likelihood of him being persecuted or otherwise ill-treated on return and the appeal was dismissed on protection grounds.

8. Article 8 was then dealt with briefly, with the panel concluding that removal would not be disproportionate.

The grounds of appeal and grant of permission
9. The grounds of appeal make five points: first, that the Appellant had in fact mentioned the local MP prior to the hearing; second, that the panel had speculated and failed to provide adequate reasons for rejecting the documentary evidence; third, that the panel had failed to deal with up-to-date evidence relating to the situation in Bangladesh; fourth, that the panel had failed to acknowledge that the Appellant had mentioned his brother’s role and had failed to give reasons for why that evidence was rejected; fifth, that the panel had failed to properly consider evidence in the September 2020 CPIN concerning the oppression of political opponents.

10. The First-tier Tribunal granted permission on all grounds.

The parties’ submissions
11. Mr Uddin relied on all five grounds. He noted that, having rejected the protection claim in the terms stated, the panel had not gone on to consider state protection or internal relocation. He submitted that the errors of law were all material, at least when taken in combination. In particular, he submitted that the local MP remained a person of influence in the local area, that the Appellant’s brother’s position was relevant to the Appellant’s own political profile, and that if there was indeed an ongoing case against the Appellant, this was relevant to what would happen to him on return. Mr Uddin submitted that the Appellant would be detained because the arrest warrant had been issued by the state, not simply the previous AL government. Country information indicated that AL supporters still worked within the law enforcement apparatus and the Appellant could be at risk in detention.

12. Ms Lecointe accepted that the panel had erred in relation to the Appellant’s brother, accepted that the Appellant had mentioned the local MP during the asylum interview, and observed that the reason given by the panel for rejecting the arrest warrant and other documents had been “unfortunate”. Nonetheless, she submitted that the errors were not material because the panel had been entitled to consider the Appellant’s credibility overall.

13. When pressed, Ms Lecointe accepted that if I were to find that the panel had erred in relation to the brother, the local MP, and the court documents, the panel’s decision should be set aside. She accepted that the Respondent’s concession as to the Appellant’s political activities in Bangladesh should be preserved and that the case would be suitable for a resumed hearing.

14. Mr Uddin submitted that the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal if I were to set the panel’s decision aside.

15. At the end of the hearing I reserved my decision.

Conclusions and reasons
16. I remind myself of the need for appropriate judicial restraint before interfering with a decision of the First-tier Tribunal. The panel read and heard evidence from a variety of sources. It was the primary assessor of the evidence as a whole. It is not for me to substitute my own view for that of the panel, it need not have referred to each and every aspect of the evidence, and it was under no obligation to provide reasons for reasons.

17. Notwithstanding this self-direction, I am satisfied that the panel materially erred in law.

18. I have reached that conclusion for the following reasons. The Appellant did in fact refer to adverse attention from the local MP during his asylum interview: see in particular question 60. The panel was wrong to have found that the Appellant had not referred to the individual prior to the hearing before it: paragraph 48(4).

19. The panel was wrong to have found that there was “no evidence” to show that the Appellant’s brother was the vice-president of the JJD. It is correct that there was no corroborative evidence, but such evidence is not a requirement. There was evidence before the panel, namely that of the Appellant himself. His evidence as a whole had not been entirely rejected; indeed, a significant aspect of his claim as a whole had in fact been accepted by both the Respondent and the panel. The panel was obliged to make a finding on the evidence that was before it and, if the Appellant’s assertion was to be rejected, reasons were required for that conclusion. The panel either failed to recognise that it did have evidence before it or failed to provide reasons for why that evidence was to be deemed unreliable/untruthful.

20. The panel erred in relation to the court documentation. It was entitled to take the CPIN on Bangladeshi documentation into account as part of the general background. However, that generalised country information could not have been decisive as to the reliability of the documents provided in this particular case. In fact, the sole reason provided at paragraph 48(2) was that the panel found it “difficult to comprehend” why the warrant had been issued over four months after the alleged incident in early January 2022. That single reason is flawed on at least three bases. First, it failed to take any account of the fact that a sizeable aspect of the Appellant’s overall account had been accepted and the extent to which this consideration was relevant to the reliability of the documents. Second, a difficulty in comprehending the processes undertaken by the Bangladeshi authorities is a classic example of a plausibility point being taken against an individual. Case-law makes it very clear that real caution must be exercised when finding against a claim based on plausibility grounds: see for example HK v SSHD [2006]EWCA Civ 1037. Here, no explanation has been provided by the panel as to why it was so difficult to understand why the warrant had taken four months to be issued when the relevant timeframe was, on any view, not particularly long. No reference is made to any country information which would have indicated that four months was an implausible amount of time. Third, the reason provided for rejecting the warrant says nothing about any of the other documents relied on by the Appellant and whether these too were unreliable or not. All of these flaws had to be seen in the context of the applicable lower standard of proof.

21. In respect of the ground of appeal relying on the purported “harsh crackdown”, I fail to fully understand the challenge being put forward. In the past, it would be fair to say that blatant political suppression was perpetrated by the AL government. However, the Appellant’s case was being considered in November 2024 after the tumultuous events of August of that year. In and of itself, I see no error in terms of the panel’s general conclusion at paragraph 47(5).

22. In respect of the final ground of appeal, reliance on the September 2020 CPIN was only going to be of somewhat limited value, given what happened in August 2024 and the fall of the AL government. There is no freestanding error by the panel in this respect either.

23. Bringing the above together, I conclude that there have been three errors of law committed by the panel.

24. The next question is whether these errors, taken in isolation or combination, are material. I remind myself that the materiality threshold is low (or high depending on one’s perspective). The test is whether, but for the errors, the outcome would inevitably have been the same: see for example ASO (Iraq) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 1282. It is the case that the AL government was overthrown in August 2024, some months before the hearing before the panel. However, there were reports and media articles (all before the panel) which had indicated that AL supporters had targeted political opponents (largely BNP supporters) since the political unrest of the late summer. In addition, the December 2024 CPIN includes reports that notwithstanding the change of regime and efforts made by the interim government, AL supporters continued to occupy positions of some influence as part of the overall state apparatus. The information indicates that such individuals remain in place as part of the security structure which is likely to include the police and criminal justice system, including the courts and the prison system.

25. The panel’s error in respect of the local MP may not be material because the Appellant may well have been able to internally relocate to avoid that influence. However, the panel did not in fact consider internal relocation at all. As to the error relating to the Appellant’s brother, the true position may have been that the Appellant’s profile was somewhat greater than simply his own activities because there may have been a familial link as well, which the panel failed to recognise. Perhaps most significantly, the error relating to the court case meant that the risk on return was not assessed with regard to what the situation would likely to be as regards the existence of an extant arrest warrant against the Appellant and the consequences thereof. The overthrow of the AL government might possibly have the consequence of the case being thrown out summarily. It may however result in the Appellant being detained and then held in pre-trial detention for a period of time. His previous political profile may come to be known and AL supporters working within the criminal justice system may seek to do him harm.

26. Questions on materiality often involve a degree of speculation, but bearing in mind the low threshold, I am satisfied that the errors are material. Therefore the panel’s decision must be set aside.

Disposal
27. Mr Uddin urged me to remit this appeal to the First-tier Tribunal. I disagree. The normal course of events is that the case should be retained in the Upper Tribunal. Here, there was no procedural fairness below and certain facts which have been found can properly be preserved, specifically the Appellant’s involvement with JJD between 2018 and 2022. Thus, the fact-finding exercise which it now required is not wholesale. The Upper Tribunal is in a position to make necessary additional findings of fact.

28. This appeal shall be retained in the Upper Tribunal for a resumed hearing in due course.

29. I expressly preserve the finding that the Appellant was an active supporter of the JJD between 2018 and 2022. The live issues for the resumed hearing will be:

(a) The position of the Appellant’s brother;

(b) The position of the local (ex) AL MP;

(c) The reliability of the police/court documentation;

(d) Whether the Appellant would be at risk on return in light of the current situation in Bangladesh.

30. It is to be noted that the panel’s assessment and conclusion on Article 8 has not been challenged. This is no longer a live issue.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involve the making of errors of law and that decision is set aside.

This appeal is retained in the Upper Tribunal for the decision to be re-made in due course.

Directions to the parties
(1) No later than 28 days after this error of law decision is sent out, the appellant shall file with the Upper Tribunal (on CE-File) and serve on the respondent (by email) a consolidated bundle of all evidence relied on;

(2) At the same time, the appellant shall confirm whether an interpreter will be required for the resumed hearing and if so, in which language. He shall also confirm whether there will be any additional witnesses at the resumed hearing;

(3) No later than 35 days after this error of law decision is sent out, the respondent shall file and serve (using the appropriate methods stated above) any further evidence relied on;

(4) No later than 7 days before the resumed hearing, the appellant shall file and serve (using the appropriate methods stated above) a skeleton argument;

(5) No later than 3 days before the resumed hearing, the respondent shall file and serve (using the appropriate methods stated above, a skeleton argument;

(6) Any application to vary these directions must be made promptly, copying in the other side.

H Norton-Taylor
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated: 25 April 2025