Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000740

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/63376/2023
LP/07404/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 18th of June 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE JACKSON

Between

SS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr K Wood of Counsel, instructed by Immigration Advice Service
For the Respondent: Mr J Nappey, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 20 May 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant (is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This has been a hybrid hearing which has not been objected to by the parties. The form of hybrid hearing was by video, using Teams, with Mr Wood and the Appellant appearing remotely and Mr Nappey appearing in person at Field House. There were no technical difficulties for the hearing itself and the papers were all available electronically.
2. The Appellant appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Rakhim promulgated on 27 December 2024, in which the Appellant’s appeal against the decision to refuse his protection and human rights claim dated 23 November 2023 was dismissed.
3. The Appellant is a national of Iraq, who left Iraq on 23 August 2021, made his way to the United Kingdom and claimed asylum here. The basis of his claim was that he was at risk on return to Iraq (i) from his abusive father, who was an influential and powerful man in Iraq through his work at a refugee camp; and (ii) because of honour based violence because he was in a relationship with a girl whose family did not approve and his father wanted to him to marry a different girl.
4. The Respondent refused the application the basis that although the Appellant’s relationship in Iraq was accepted, it was not accepted that that gave rise to any risk of abuse or ill-treatment from his father or any others. In particular, the Appellant’s claim about his father was lacking in detail and inconsistent and it was not claimed that the girl’s family had any influence or power to find or harm the Appellant. Further, the Appellant’s credibility had been damaged by his failure to claim asylum in either Italy or France prior to his arrival in the United Kingdom. The Appellant was not therefore at risk on return to Iraq, nor was he entitled to humanitarian protection. However, if the material facts of the Appellant’s claim were accepted, the Respondent accepted that there would be no sufficiency of protection available, nor any option of internal relocation in Iraq. The Appellant would be able to obtain an INID card for use in Iraq. The Respondent also refused the application on human rights grounds on the basis that the Appellant had no established family life in the United Kingdom, he would face no very significant obstacles to reintegration on return to Iraq and any medical treatment needed would be available on return.
5. Judge Rakhim dismissed the appeal in a decision promulgated on 27 December 2024 on all grounds, albeit the Appellant only pursued the protection elements of his claim and not the human rights grounds. In summary, the reasons for dismissing the appeal turned on the Appellant being found to lack credibility in relation to his claims; as well as having not come to the adverse attention of anyone for his sur place activity. Further, as the protection claim had been rejected, the Appellant had no reason not to be in contact with his family such that if he does not have his CSID (which was found to be likely that he did), his family could assist him to obtain new identity documentation.
6. The paragraphs in the decision of particular relevance for the purposes of this appeal are as follows:
16. I do not find the Appellant was abused by his father. Whilst I accept there are cases where some parent(s) may abuse their own child, I would expect a plausible reason for this. The appellant was unable to provide any reason for this and he stated in oral evidence by stating that he had no indication at all as to why he was mistreated. It was not credible that he would have no idea at all as to why his father mistreats him.
21. The appellant says his father forced him to work as a slave because he wanted to make money from him [Q28]. I do not accept this as there was no allegation of the other two brothers being mistreated and used as slaves to generate money. It was also at odds with the claim that his father had a rank within the government so it is unclear as to what the financial circumstances were that would lead to his father using him as a slave.
24. The appellant also claims to have a leg injury, but breaking or injuring a leg is a common injury and would not lead me to conclude that the cause is one of abuse. It may well be accidental, as is frequently the case. The appellant’s account is that he was thrown down the stairs by his father an in the process he caught his leg in metal railings. He says he passed out so does not know who transported him to the hospital. The appellant stated that he woke up in the hospital and his farther was there. It was thus likely that his father had taken him to the hospital, which does not appear to be consistent with the claimed abuse.
26. The appellant stated in the asylum interview that he had one leg shorter than the other. The evidence before me indicated his family, including his father, appeared to have assisted the appellant to live with this impairment as a special shoe was constructed for him, as confirmed in the ACQ. Even if the x-ray did belong to the appellant, it appeared his family were assisting him with the impairment post accident. This was not consistent with the claim of being enslaved by his father.
The appeal
7. The Appellant appeals on two grounds as follows. First, that the First-tier Tribunal erred in law in failing to consider the Appellant’s likely vulnerability on return to Iraq due to his physical disability and his poor mental health. The First-tier Tribunal failed to make any finding on whether the Appellant was a vulnerable witness in accordance with Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010: ‘Child, vulnerable adult and sensitive appellant guidance’; and failed to take into account any vulnerability when assessing credibility. Secondly, that the First-tier Tribunal made findings which were irrational and without any supporting evidential basis, particularly at paragraphs 16, 21 and 24 of the decision; all of which infected the overall findings based on credibility.
8. Further to the grant of permission, the Appellant submitted an application under Rule 15(2A) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 to rely on further evidence. This included evidence from the NHS that he had been diagnosed with a mixed anxiety and depressive episode and a copy of a positive conclusive grounds decision dated 20 February 2025. This evidence was only relevant to any future remaking of the decision and was not relevant at all to whether there was an error of law on the grounds identified. It has not therefore been considered further at this stage.
9. At the oral hearing, on behalf of the Respondent, Mr Nappey very properly and appropriately conceded that there was a material error of law on both grounds identified by the Appellant. In relation to the first ground, whilst there was very little evidence to suggest at that stage that the Appellant was or should be treated as a vulnerable witness, it was accepted that there should have been a decision on the point at least following the guidance and that the failure to do so infects the decision as whole, particularly the credibility findings made. In relation to the second ground, whilst the decision was overall very thorough, there were obvious concerns as to the findings highlighted in the grounds.
Findings and reasons
10. As accepted by the Respondent, both grounds of appeal identify clear material errors of law by the First-tier Tribunal. In relation to the first ground, the Appellant clearly identified as the first issue in the appeal whether he should be treated as vulnerable. Given the claims of poor mental health, physical disability and abuse as a child, this was self-evidently an issue in any event in accordance with the Joint Presidential Guidance which required the Judge to make an express finding on whether the guidance applied, and if so, to apply it. Although the documentary evidence in support of some of these issues was relatively thin before the First-tier Tribunal, it was a matter which required the Judge’s attention and a decision on the same. Paragraph 7 of the decision, referring to the request for adjustments for the Appellant to give evidence was not sufficient in addressing these questions, given it deals only incidentally and informally with one aspect of the Presidential Guidance only in relation to management of the hearing. A finding that the Appellant was a vulnerable witness would also require, in accordance with the Presidential Guidance, a different approach to have been taken, in particular, to the assessment of credibility.
11. The second ground of appeal causes significant concern about the nature of comments made by the First-tier Tribunal Judge in the paragraphs quoted above in relation to claims of child abuse, both physical and in terms of modern slavery. They are, self-evidently, wholly inappropriate and wholly irrelevant to assessing the credibility of a person, even more so for this Appellant in respect of whom no finding was even made as to vulnerability.
12. There is absolutely no evidential or factual basis for expecting a person to identify rational reasons as to why they were the victim of abuse by a parent, as the Judge expected this Appellant to do in paragraph 19 of the decision. Nor is there any such basis upon which adverse credibility findings could rationally made if a person is unable to do so. It would, in the context of abuse, be at best insensitive, if not completely inappropriate, to even ask the question of a potential victim in this way. The expectation and findings in paragraph 19 have no place in a judicial decision on credibility.
13. Similar comments can be made in relation to the other findings set out above. In paragraph 21 of the decision, the Judge appears to consider that a child would not be subjected to modern slavery by a parent if (i) siblings were not also subjected to the same treatment; and (ii) the parents were sufficiently wealthy that there was no need to exploit a child for financial gain. Neither of these underlying assumptions have any evidential basis. Exploitation and abuse do not require consistent treatment of all children within a family in the same way; nor are they likely to be motivated or caused by the financial circumstances of an individual. The assumption that either of these things undermines the credibility of a person’s account shows a very concerning approach by the Judge which has no rational basis.
14. In paragraphs 24 and 26, the Judge proceeds on the basis that a person who abuses a child would not take them to hospital for treatment of any injuries and would not otherwise provide any support at all to that child because it would be inconsistent with enslaving them. Again, there is no evidential basis at all for such assumptions, which demonstrate a failure to understand the potential complexities of abuse and domestic slavery. There is nothing at all implausible or incredible about a person abusing a child to also offer some support or to seek medical treatment for them. Whilst at the extreme end of the spectrum a child may be completely unsupported in every aspect of their life and health; but that is not a standard or expected position and many cases of abuse, at least in the United Kingdom, are identified through accessing medical care for the child.
15. The misconceptions and assumptions displayed by the Judge in this appeal on issues of claimed abuse and modern slavery had no relevance to the assessment of credibility; were wholly inappropriate and had no place at all in a decision on a protection and human rights appeal. Although there were numerous other reasons given for adverse credibility findings, the points specifically dealt with above raise concern as to the fairness of the assessment and whether the irrational expectations undermined or infected the remaining findings. At least in some respects, such as on the later documentation points, this must be the case. In any event, the failure to apply the Presidential Guidance alone infects the whole of the credibility findings in the decision in any event. For these reasons, the First-tier Tribunal decision contains material errors of law which require the decision to be set aside and for the appeal to be heard de novo in the First-tier Tribunal.
Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did the making of a material error of law. As such it is necessary to set aside the decision.
I set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.
The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing before any Judge except Judge Rakhim.

G Jackson

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

12th June 2025