Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000745

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/61518/2023
LP/04409/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 18th of September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RIMINGTON

Between

SS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Hasan, instructed by Kalam Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Huhne, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 21 July 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity owing to the nature of the appeal.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant, a national of Bangladesh born in 2001, appealed against the decision of First-tier Tribunal S Khan (the judge) promulgated on 7 December 2024 dismissing the appellant’s appeal against the decision of the Secretary of State, dated 8 November 2023, to refuse his protection claim in the United Kingdom.
2. The appellant advanced three grounds:
(1) an arguable failure by the judge to give adequate reasons for the credibility findings in rejecting risk on return;
(2) an arguable failure in considering irrelevant matters and/or failing to anxiously scrutinise the evidence; and
(3) an arguable failure but the judge in applying the wrong test under the Immigration Rules
3. At the hearing Mr Hasan expanded on but essentially relied on the written grounds which were detailed and Ms Rushforth confirmed that there was no Rule 24 response from the Secretary of State.
Ground 1
4. In terms of ground 1 the appellant’s protection claim was brought on the basis of his political affiliation with the Islami Chatra Shibir (ICS) and the judge set out her findings at [14]. At [16] the judge stated, “I set out my findings below, with examples of where I have found the Appellant’s evidence inconsistent, incoherent, or so implausible as to be capable of belief.”
5. Between [17] and [49] there are a series of subheadings, three of which related to issues not directly relevant, such as study, intention to return and timing of the asylum claim.
6. The central submissions was that six out of seven of the core subheadings, the judge relied almost exclusively on her finding at [29], which was flawed.
7. The judge stated at [29] “Simply put, I do not accept that the Appellant was a member of ICS and therefore, I do not accept that he was politically active as claimed.” That finding however was flawed and the judge repeatedly referred back to this finding when answering each of the issues.
8. For example:
(1) in considering the threat from the opposing party the judge considered whether the Appellant was threatened and referred back to [29] stating, “As I find that the Appellant was not a member of ICS, I do not accept that the Appellant was threatened as claimed.” [31]; and
(2) under the subheading “Chased by police” and not arrested again the judge referred back to [29] stating “In view of my findings above, I do not accept that the Appellant was chased as claimed.” [35];
(3) under the subheading “Political activity on return” where the judge considered whether the appellant will be politically active on return, the judge referred back to [29] stating, “I find that the Appellant was not a member of ICS while living in Bangladesh and in view of his evidence that he will not be politically active on return.” [37];
(4) under the subheading “Continued threats” when assessing whether opposing party members attended the appellant’s house she referred back to the finding at [29] stating “I find this part of the Appellant’s claim implausible. As stated above, I do not accept that the Appellant was a member of ICS and therefore I do not accept there is any interest in the Appellant from the opposing party members.” [39]; and
(5) under the subheading “Political activity in the UK” when considering whether the appellant has been politically active in the UK the judge again referred back to her finding at [29] stating “In view of my findings above and in view of the limited evidence relating to the Appellant’s apparent online activity, I do not accept that the Appellant has been politically active online.” [46]
9. It is submitted that the judge’s core findings as to risk persistently referred back to that key finding that the appellant was not a member of the ICS. However, the appellant submitted the finding that [29] was inadequately reasoned.
10. At [29] the judge relied heavily on one answer in his Asylum Interview Record at 53. The judge noted this answer at [26] and at [27] stated that the appellant has “provided vague responses, lacking in detail. … from the above response, the Appellant has provided limited, generalised responses” and at [28] the judge found the Appellant gave limited responses. The finding at [29] was based on the assessment that the Appellant was “vague” or “lacking in detail” or gave “limited responses” to the question of what appealed to the Appellant about the ICS.
11. However, the judge’s own assessment, [26] to [29] was inadequate for the failure to give adequate reasons because the appellant gave a detailed answer at AIR 53. He was merely asked to tell the interviewing officer about “some of your favourite policies of your party” to which he responded with five points as follows:
“Five things, they invite people to join, secondly for students they encourage education system should be better, thirdly we used to train people to be active in this party, then fourthly altogether with other members we do social work to help people in different ways. Fifthly we encourage or ask people to take part in our party actively.”
12. The judge simply failed to reason properly why that was a vague response or lacking in detail or a limited response. The answer at AIR 53 was detailed and the judge failed to properly reason at [27] to [29] why the answer the appellant gave at 53 was lacking in detail.
13. Contrary to the grounds, I find no error of law in the finding of the judge at [29]. That is key to the judge’s findings but I find it was adequately reasoned and the ground is simply a disagreement with the reasoning. The reasons given by the judge for this fundamental point were entirely adequate. The weight given by a judge to the evidence is generally a matter for the judge. As the Court of Appeal said at para 18 of Herrera v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 412, it is necessary to guard against the temptation to characterise as errors of law what are in truth no more than disagreements about the weight to be given to different factors, particularly if the judge who decided the appeal had the advantage of hearing oral evidence, Durueke (PTA: AZ applied, proper approach) [2019] UKUT 197 (IAC). The confirmed the appellant gave oral evidence [10].
14. The answer given by the appellant in relation to favourite policies clearly only related to policies on two of these responses i.e. the education system and social work and secondly, even those were entirely vague and without detail as the judge observed. As the judge stated, she had considered the appellant’s written and documentary evidence and the detail given at [26] was merely an example of his overall response and it was entirely open to the judge to state that, “The Appellant has provided limited, generalised responses and in my view, this indicates that the Appellant did not have a role within the party as claimed.”
15. It is important to consider context. Bearing in mind the judge clearly was told that the appellant had a role and a political role within the party, it was entirely open to the judge to find that the responses by the appellant were inadequate and limited and for this reason rejected at [28] that he was a “member of the ICS as claimed.”. In the light of the appellant’s claimed role the judge was entitled to find the responses, which did lack detail, vague.
16. As this was an underpinning factor in relation to the remainder of the appellant’s own claim it was entirely open to the judge to reject the threat from the opposing party, that he was chased by the police and that he intended political activity on return bearing in mind he was not a member and had limited information about the party itself.
17. Not least the finding at [29] is not simply based on the asylum interview but on an assessment of all of the evidence. Ultimately the judge reached findings open to her. She is not required to reference each and every piece of evidence and [29] was the ultimate conclusion. This ground is simply a disagreement with the decision.
Ground 2.
18. It was submitted in the grounds that the judge at [18] made the finding that the appellant did not enrol at university in the UK (despite coming as a student) and had not studied at the university and this damaged his credibility but this was not relevant what that fact had to do with his overall credibility. It was not an issue of timing of the asylum claim which might potentially damage credibility. Further, the findings at [19] to [22] were arguably flawed because they misunderstood the appellant’s point. The judge found at [21] that because the appellant, when he arrived, stated he intended to return after his studies, that he “did not have a well-founded fear of persecution when he arrived in the UK”. However, when asked at question 56 of his asylum interview whether he had any intention of returning to Bangladesh when he came to study here the appellant stated, “Yes when I came my first intention was to study and get a higher degree unless it becomes easy for me to go back to my own country”.
19. The response “unless it becomes easy for me to go back to my own country” qualified the answer ‘yes’ and “if it becomes easy for me to go back”, meant, “the ruling party lose power”. Thus it could be seen from the question that follows on immediately after AIR 56 where the appellant at answer to Q57 stated “that was my main intention’ [i.e. to return straight home]. The situation of my country is not easy for me to go back now”. The appellant’s answer was that his main intention was go back to Bangladesh but only if and when it became safe and thus the judge arguably mispresented the appellant’s actual evidence.
20. Contrary to the grounds, I find it was entirely open to the judge to factor in the point that the appellant’s answer was that he was intending to go back to Bangladesh after his study on entry to the UK. What is submitted in the grounds is a gloss on what the answer was. The point being made by the judge is that the appellant was interviewed on 17th October 2023 and when interviewed stated that it was not safe for him to return at the point when he gave his asylum interview. He arrived in February 2022, gave no explanation for the university’s failure to enrol him and did not claim asylum until May 2022. It was the difference between the intention when entering the UK and a year and half later. The point on enrolment as to why the university did not enrol the appellant was raised as a credibility issue by the respondent and it was open to the judge to find that the appellant had given no explanation as to why the university did not enrol him.
21. The judge has not misrepresented the evidence and made clear she had considered all the evidence and indeed the appellant’s own witness statement at [9] acknowledged that he did not claim asylum in the UK on entry because he ‘never thought he would stay in the UK’. There was an issue on timing bearing in mind the appellant claimed that his problems occurred before coming to the UK.
22. Even if the findings at [18] were otiose (and which I do not accept) bearing in mind the finding that I have made in relation to [29], which was axiomatic to the claim and fundamentally damaging to the appellant’s claim any findings on this were irrelevant and not imported into that fundamental finding at [29]. In effect when the appellant left Bangladesh he intended to return. That is the point the judge is making.
Ground 3
23. Ground 3, argued that the judge applied the wrong test under the Immigration Rules stating that she found there were no insurmountable obstacles to the appellant returning to Bangladesh but this test applied under Appendix FM and had no relevance to paragraph 276ADE and there was a conceptual difference between insurmountable obstacles and very significant obstacles.
24. This ground has no traction. At [55] the judge specifically referred to “very significant obstacles” and at [56] noted SSHD v Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813 which requires a broad evaluative assessment of possible reintegration. At [57], the judge also identified the case of Agyarko [2017] UKSC 11 (such that the consequences of the decision to remove him would cause very substantial difficulties or exceptional circumstances or unjustifiably harshness). These were the applicable tests and the judge proceeded to consider the appellant’s circumstances in the United Kingdom. At [64] the reference to insurmountable obstacles is merely inelegantly phrased but reading the decision overall, the correct test was applied both at [55] and again at [66] which paragraph was subtitled “Immigration Rules”. where the judge states
“Accordingly, I find that there are no significant obstacles to the Appellant’s integration into Bangladesh. It follows that I find that the Appellant does not satisfy the requirements of paragraph 276ADE(vi) and as such does not satisfy the requirements of the Immigration Rules.”
25. The judge from [66] onwards undertook a legally sound balancing exercise in relation to Article 8 and the decision discloses no arguable error of law.
26. In summary and conclusion, the judge reached findings open to her on the evidence and reading the determination in the round it made sense. The judge is not required to set out every aspect of the evidence. It is clear that the judge reviewed all of the evidence when reaching her conclusion at [29].
27. In relation to ground 2, the judge merely stated that in effect the appellant has not fulfilled the original purposes of entering the United Kingdom and indeed there was a gap between when the appellant should have enrolled and when he applied for asylum. Between [19] and [22] the judge had not misrepresented the evidence before her and in ground 2, the use of the word “now” was significant and indeed seeing question 57 to the answer “That didn’t answer my question, was your intention to study and then return straight home.” The response in fact was “That was my main intention. The situation of my country is not easy for me to go back now.”
28. In terms of ground 3, there were references at [64] to [65] to insurmountable obstacles but for the reasons I have given above, the judge cited the correct test and applied it.
29. I find the grounds disclose no material error of law; there is no error of law in this decision and it shall stand.
Notice of decision
The appellant’s appeal remains dismissed.

Helen Rimington

Judge of the Upper Tribunal Rimington
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

8th September 2025