Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000748

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/59162/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

18th June 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NEILSON

Between

AA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Alhani of Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr Tufan, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 16 April 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction& Background
1. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal (“FtT”) given on 16 December 2024 to dismiss the appellant’s appeal against the refusal of his protection and human rights claim.
2. The appeal came before the Upper Tribunal at an error of law hearing on 16 April 2025. At the hearing I heard submissions from the parties and reserved my decision. For the reasons set out below, I find that there was no error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) and decline to set the decision aside.
3. The First-Tier Tribunal made an anonymity order in this appeal, and I have considered whether it is appropriate for that order to continue pursuant to Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 (as amended). Having taken into account Guidance Note 2022 No.2: Anonymity Orders and Hearings in Private, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to make such an order because the appellant has made an application for international protection and I consider that the UK’s obligations towards applicants for international protection and the need to protect the confidentiality of the asylum process outweigh the public interest in open justice at this stage in the proceedings.
4. The appellant is a national of Iraq of Kurdish ethnicity. He was born in 1992. The appellant entered the UK on 22 December 2021 in the back of a lorry and made an application for asylum on 23 December 2021. The appellant alleged that whilst working as a tea-maker in the security office of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) he had sight of an arrest warrant for three persons, including one of his neighbours. He was distressed by this and took a photograph of the arrest warrant but was disturbed by a secretary whilst doing this. He managed to leave the building and alert his neighbour. He then received news that his family home had been raided by the Asayish (Kurdish security organisation) and he was advised to flee the country. A family friend, SD, assisted in making arrangements for the appellant to leave the country with an agent. That agent then arranged for the appellant to be smuggled into the UK on a lorry. Since arriving in the UK the appellant alleges he has been involved in political activity against the authorities in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region.
5. The application for asylum was refused on 23 October 2023 (“the Refusal Decision”). The grounds for refusal in the Refusal Decision were that the respondent did not accept the material facts of his claim on credibility grounds and accordingly did not accept that the appellant would come to the adverse attention of the KDP for taking a photograph of an arrest warrant in their offices and did not accept that the appellant was politically active in the UK.
6. The appellant appealed that refusal to the FtT.

FtT Decision
7. The FtT refused the appellant’s appeal on the basis that the appellant’s narrative for his asylum claimed lacked credibility. In arriving at that decision the FtT declined to attach any weight to an arrest warrant dated 23 November 2021 produced by the appellant or to attach any weight to two written statements purporting to be from two individuals (RS and SD) that the appellant alleged were directly involved in his asylum narrative.
Grounds of Appeal and Submissions
8. The appellant sought leave to appeal. In a decision of 13 February 2025 First Tier Tribunal Judge Curtis granted permission for the appellant to appeal on two grounds.
9. The first permitted ground of appeal is that the FtT has placed weight on irrelevant matters/made unreasonable findings regarding the handwriting used in the supporting statements. In doing so, the FtT has further acted in a procedurally unfair manner.
10. The second permitted ground of appeal is that the FtT adopted an erroneous approach to the supporting evidence and failed to consider this “in the round”.
11. In relation to the first ground of appeal Mr Alhani submitted that in relation to the witness statements from SD and RS the FtT discounted those witness statements based upon a finding by the FtT (at paragraphs 58 and 186) that the documents were in the same handwriting. It was not open to the Judge himself to make this determination as a lay person. Expert evidence of handwriting would have been required before the FtT could come to such a conclusion. In any event from the perspective of procedural fairness there as a requirement on the FtT to raise this point with the appellant to allow him an opportunity to respond to it. This was not done.
12. In relation to the second ground of appeal Mr Alhani submitted that the FtT had determined credibility before going on to consider the documentary evidence, and specifically the arrest warrant and the statements of SD and RS. The FtT should have considered the documentary evidence as part of the credibility assessment instead of determining credibility first before considering the documentary evidence.
13. In reply Mr Tufan submitted that this was essentially one ground of appeal as it all related to the admissibility of the arrest warrant and the statements from SD and RS. In his submission the issue was whether the evidence, including the documents, had been considered in the round. In his submission it was clear that that had occurred. Mr Tufan referred to S (Ethiopia) -v- SSHD 2006 EWCA Civ 1153 as authority for the proposition that the focus should not be on the structure of the decision but that one has to look at whether the FtT had considered the evidence in the round. On the issue of the FtT comments on the similar handwriting Mr Tufan submitted that it was an unnecessary additional point – as the key issue whether it was considered in the round.
Discussion and Conclusions
14. In deciding whether the Judge’s decision involved the making of a material error of law, I remind myself of the principles set out in Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201, at [26] :- (i) the Upper Tribunal should not rush to find an error of law simply because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently; (ii) where a relevant point was not expressly mentioned by the First-Tier Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal should be slow to infer that it had not been taken into account; (iii) when it comes to the reasons given by the First-Tier Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal should exercise judicial restraint and not assume that the First-Tier Tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning was fully set out; and (iv) it is of the nature of assessment that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case. I also bear in mind that on an appeal there is the danger of “island-hopping”, rather than looking at the evidence, and the reasoning, as a whole (see Fage UK Ltd & Anor v Chobani UK Ltd & Anor [2014] EWCA Civ 5 [114]).
The Second Ground of Appeal
15. I deal firstly with the second ground of appeal as I think the position here is of some relevance to the first ground of appeal. Reference has been made to the principles set out in Tanveer Ahmed 2002 UKIAT 00439. It is helpful to set out the principles at paragraph 38 of that case in relation to the treatment of documentary evidence:-
“In summary the principles set out in this determination are:
1. In asylum and human rights cases it is for an individual claimant to show that a document on which he seeks to rely can be relied on.
2. The decision maker should consider whether a document is one on which reliance should properly be placed after looking at all the evidence in the round.
3. Only very rarely will there be the need to make an allegation of forgery, or evidence strong enough to support it. The allegation should not be made without such evidence. Failure to establish the allegation on the balance of probabilities to the higher civil standard does not show that a document is reliable. The decision maker still needs to apply principles 1 and 2.”
16. The issue here is whether there has been a failure by the FtT to look at all the evidence in the round before considering whether any reliance should be placed upon the arrest warrant and the statements from SD and RS. Mr Alhani submits that in fact the FtT had already made a determination in relation to credibility and only then look at the documents. In particular, he relied upon paragraph 180 of the determination where the FtT state:- “The flaws in the evidence that I have identified in the preceding, leads me to conclude, upon looking at the evidence in the round, that the asylum narrative of the Appellant is a complete fabrication.” After paragraph 180 the FtT go on to consider the arrest warrant at paragraphs 181 and 182 and the statements from SD and RS at paragraphs 184 to 186.
17. I accept that on the face of it would appear that the FtT have made a determination on credibility before going on to consider the documents. However, I consider that there is a danger that in looking only at page 23 of the determination (paragraphs 180 through to 191) one falls into the trap of failing to look at the evidence and the reasoning as a whole. The case referenced by Mr Tufan - S (Ethiopia) -v- SSHD 2006 EWCA Civ 1153 highlights the importance of considering the evidence in the round and not focussing on the structure of the decision. In essence that is part of the larger point that in an appeal one should look at the evidence and the reasoning as a whole.
18. At both paragraph 180 and paragraph 181 of the determination the FtT specifically reference “looking at the evidence in the round” and Tanveer Ahmed before going on to determine that they should attach no weight to the arrest warrant. In what is quite a lengthy determination the issue of the arrest warrant has been referenced by the FtT earlier in the decision. In particular at paragraphs 50 through to 54 of the determination the FtT deal with evidence in relation to the arrest warrant – and specifically the fact that it is provided by SD. At paragraph 100 there is reference to the cross examination of the appellant in relation to the arrest warrant. When the FtT go on to consider the arrest warrant at paragraphs 181, 182 and 183 of the determination it is clear to me that they are not doing that in isolation. In looking at the determination of the FtT as a whole it is clear that they are considering the arrest warrant in light of their earlier findings and the involvement of SD – in particular bearing in mind the findings of the FtT in relation to the credibility of SD set out at paragraphs 164 to 170 of the determination.
19. In looking at the witness statements of SD and RS they are explicitly referenced at paragraphs 54 through to 57 of the determination– before the FtT get to their section on “Findings” at paragraphs 120 through to 228. At paragraph 164 through to 170 of the determination the FtT consider the plausibility of both RS and SD acting as they say they did in the statements that they provide. The FtT conclude at paragraph 170 “Against such a backdrop, I find it incredible, and do not accept, that SD and RS would take such a serious risk to their professional and personal safety, by allaying themselves to a serious breach of security within the military apparatus that they are intimately associated with and answer to, as is said to have been committed by the Appellant.” That is a finding that clearly has relevance to the findings in relation to the two statements provided.
20. In considering the evidence and the reasoning as a whole it is my opinion that the FtT have considered both the witness statements of RS and SD and the arrest warrant having considered all the evidence in the round, and in particular the reliability of the arrest warrant and the witness statements in light of the whole evidence. I accordingly do not consider that there is any error of law in respect of this ground of appeal.
The First Ground of Appeal
21. In relation to the first ground of appeal the submission was that it was not permissible for the FtT to discount the witness statements of SD and SR on the basis that they appear to be in the same handwriting. A view that the FtT appear to have come to without the benefit of any expert evidence. In addition, in terms of procedural fairness the appellant submits that in any event the point should have been raised with the appellant in the hearing – and that was not done.
22. It is trite that hearings before the FtT must be fair. The principle that allegations of dishonesty or untruthfulness must be put to a witness, and the witness be given an opportunity to answer the allegation, is long-established: cf Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 (HL), at 70-71. The principle has been recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in TUI UK Ltd v Griffiths [2023] UKSC 48 and by the Court of Appeal in Abdi and others v Entry Clearance Officer [2023] EWCA Civ 1455, at 33:-
“The recent decision of the Supreme Court in TUI UK Ltd v Griffiths [2023] UKSC 48 re-emphasises the principle that fairness generally requires that if the evidence of a witness is to be rejected, it should be challenged at the hearing so as to give them an opportunity to address the challenge; and that that is a matter of fairness to the witness as well as fairness to the parties, and necessary for the integrity of the court process in enabling the tribunal to reach a sound conclusion: see especially at [42]-[43], [55], and [70].”
23. However, what we are dealing with here is not specifically a challenge to the evidence of the appellant himself – rather it is about the weight that the FtT decide to attach to documents – the written statements of RS and SD. At paragraphs 54 through to 57 of the determination the FtT set out the content of the statements. They then observe at paragraph 58 “I consider that a bizarre feature of the statements by SD and RS in Kurdish Sorani script, is that the originals seem very much to me to be in the same blue coloured handwriting.” Then at paragraph 186 having determined that no probative weight can be attached to the two statements of SD and RS the FtT continue at paragraph 186 “And not least because both original statements in Kurdish Sorani do seem to have been written by the same hand.”
24. In considering this matter I remind myself of the guidance set out in Tanveer Ahmed – that it is for the appellant to show that a document that he seeks to rely upon can be relied upon and the decision maker should consider whether a document is one on which reliance should properly be placed after looking at all the evidence in the round (see in particular Tanveer Ahmed at [34]). Where there is an allegation of forgery then it is for the respondent to establish that with evidence. The FtT do not state that the documents are forgeries – although they do cast doubt upon the statements in light of the handwriting point. However, the FtT do take into consideration the wider evidence in relation to the credibility of the narrative and the place that these statements have within that narrative – see in particular paragraphs 183 and 184 and as mentioned above paragraphs 164 through to 170 (and in particular the finding at paragraph 170 referenced above) where the credibility of the positions of both SD and RS is considered. The FtT further cast doubt upon the statements as being “self-serving” statements with reference to R (on the application of SS) -v- SSHD (self-serving statements) [2017] UKUT 00164 (IAC).
25. In my view to focus on the handwriting point to the exclusion of the broader picture is not the correct approach. At paragraph 35 in Tanveer Ahmed the Immigration Appeal Tribunal comment:-
“In almost all cases it would be an error to concentrate on whether a document is a forgery. In most cases where forgery is alleged it will be of no great importance whether this is or is not made out to the required higher civil standard. In all cases where there is a material document it should be assessed in the same way as any other piece of evidence. A document should not be viewed in isolation. The decision maker should look at the evidence as a whole or in the round (which is the same thing).”
26. I am satisfied that the FtT have considered the statements of RS and SD in the round taking into account all the evidence and in my opinion the FtT were entitled to come to the view (per Tanveer Ahmed) that the statements were not documents upon which reliance could be placed. Taken in the round it was not necessary for the FtT to consider expert handwriting evidence before coming to that view. There was material other than the handwriting issue that the FtT relied upon in coming to a view as to the credibility of the documents. Nor was it a procedural failing not to expressly raise with the appellant the doubts that the FtT had about the reliability of the statements since ultimately it was for the appellant to show that the documents could be relied upon. I accordingly do not consider that there is any error of law in respect of this ground of appeal.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-Tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error of law requiring it to be set aside.
The appeal is dismissed.

S NEILSON
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

12.06.25