Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000752

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/64705/2023
LH/05611/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 23rd of May 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD

Between

Redon Meda
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Badar (Counsel) instructed by Connaught Law Limited Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms L Lecointe, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 15 May 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is my oral decision which I delivered at the hearing today.
Introduction
2. The Appellant, a national of Albania, appeals with the permission of Upper Tribunal Judge Hirst against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Jarvis (“the Judge”) in respect of a paper decision dated 11 November 2024. The Appellant had appealed against the Respondent’s decision on human rights grounds in respect of the refusal of his application to remain as a partner pursuant to Appendix FM of the Immigration Rules.
3. I am considering whether or not there is an error of law in the decision of the Judge. If I conclude that there is no error of law in the Judge’s decision then the decision of the Judge will stand. If I conclude that the Judge’s decision does contain a material error of law then I will remake the decision or remit the matter to the First-tier Tribunal which will consider the matter further. The law in respect of errors of law is well settled and I need not repeat it any length. The Court of Appeal’s judgment in R (Iran) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982; [2005] Imm A.R. 535 sets out the framework. I must also ensure that I have regard to and respect the expertise of the First-tier Tribunal.
The Grounds of Appeal
4. The grounds of appeal, not drafted by Mr Badar, are in a poor state. They do not set out the proper legal basis and are unclear. Instead, there is a narrative over several pages and I know that Mr Badar will inform his instructing solicitors that grounds of appeal have to be set out in the correct way to ease the task not only of the Respondent in assessing the grounds of appeal but also of the Upper Tribunal Judge.
5. Nonetheless Upper Tribunal Judge Hirst, when granting permission, was able to consider the documentation and concluded as follows in respect of the narrative grounds of appeal:
“2. It is arguable that the judge erred, at paragraphs 17 and 26 of the decision, by taking into account the Appellant’s lack of explanation as to why he had not appeared unrepresented at an in person hearing as a material factor in his overall assessment of whether the Appellant was in a genuine and subsisting relationship with his partner and her child, and/or whether he had Article 8 private and family life in the UK.
3. It is also arguable that the judge did not take a balanced approach to the evidence of cohabitation and did not give adequate reasons for finding that the sponsor’s wage slips outweighed the other evidence showing a shared residence.”
The Hearing Before Me
6. At the hearing before me, I first heard submissions from Mr Badar who largely went through the grounds of appeal. I then heard from Ms Lecointe. I had acceded to her request when she had sought an adjournment to look at the paperwork, she having informed me that her computer and access to it had initially let her down this morning and so the mater was put back until this afternoon.
7. Ms Lecointe did not alert me to any Rule 24 response and contended that the submissions made on behalf of the Appellant meant that that there was concern with the timeline relating to the Appellant’s case. Particularly between November 2022 and December 2022.
8. Ms Lecointe said that at paragraph 17 of his decision, the Judge referred to a concern in relation to why a paper hearing had been selected rather than an in-person hearing, that the Appellant would have been aware of the veracity of what was being alleged against him. She said she did not want to make submissions which were made at the First-tier Tribunal, but here one needed to consider the genuineness of the relationship.
9. Ms Lecointe submitted that although there was evidence from other people, it could not replace the evidence from the Appellant and the Sponsor themselves. Ms Lecointe submitted that therefore the ‘Judge’s opinion was valid’. She said that the Appellant and Sponsor had failed to present themselves at a hearing to address any concerns that the Respondent had and therefore these were the concerns of the Judge. It was submitted that there was no error at paragraph 17 of the Judge’s decision, albeit it was accepted that the Appellant had the right to chose whether to have a paper consideration of their case and that it was not compulsory to have an attended hearing.
10. Both parties submitted that if I was to find an error of law then it would be appropriate for the matter to be heard afresh at an attended hearing at the First-tier Tribunal.
Consideration and Discussion
11. In my judgment there is a material error of law in the Judge’s decision. My reasons for coming to this conclusion are as follows.
12. Firstly, there was an extensive amount of written evidence presented by the Appellant with his paper application. This included:
(1) The Appellant’s address and that he lived with the Sponsor;
(2) The Sponsor’s work; and
(3) The Appellant’s assistance to the Sponsor’s child. Here, the evidence included written documentation from the Sponsor’s child’s school that the Appellant has permission to liaise with the school and to collect the child from school. The ‘correct’ address also appears in that letter.
13. There are numerous other documents confirming the address of both the Appellant and the Sponsor.

14. At paragraph 16 of his decision, the Judge noted that wage slips for the time period referred to in 2022 showed the Sponsor’s address as being that of her former address of her former partner. Namely, the child’s father.

15. In my judgment the Judge materially erred in law because this required reasoning of a relatively substantial nature as to why the many other documents were not accepted by the Judge.

16. Moreover, the Judge materially erred in law when concluding, at paragraph 17 of his decision that, “the Appellant has provided no explanation at all as to why he has not sought an in-person hearing”.

17. In fact, as Mr Badar points out, the Appellant had made clear through his solicitors in his application and which the Judge records earlier in his decision at paragraph 4 that, “the Appellant does not have the means to continue with an oral hearing”.

18. Indeed, this is one of the reasons why paper hearings are an option for Appellants.

19. Ultimately, a very substantial amount of documentation was presented by the Appellant in his paper application, and although Ms Lecointe is correct that credibility points were raised, it appears clear that it was thought that the substantial amount of documentation presented by the Appellant would thereby easily meet the concerns which the Respondent’s Review had noted.

20. With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy for the Appellant and his legal representatives to see that the Appellant should have sought an attended hearing, even as a litigant in person. In my judgment however, the Judge materially erred in law in this instance in concluding that it was inappropriate to have a paper hearing and for him state that no reason had been provided why a paper hearing was being sought, when in fact a reason had been provided. In addition, the Judge had not adequately considered all of the other substantial evidence in the round which was presented to him other than the wage slips which actually show an address which was a former address for the Sponsor when she lived with the child’s father.
21. Whilst the Judge was doing the best he could because he did not have the benefit of the parties before him, the error of law is manifest. I therefore must set aside the decision of the Judge.
22. Having canvassed with the parties what the venue of the remaking ought to be applying AEB [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC), I carefully consider whether to retain the matter for remaking in the Upper Tribunal, in line with the general principle set out in statement 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement. I also take into consideration the history of this case, the nature and extent of the findings to be made as well as the fact that the nature of the errors of law in this case mean that the Appellant was deprived of an adequate consideration of his appeal. I further consider that it would be unfair for either party to be unable to avail themselves of the two-tier decision-making process and I therefore remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains a material error of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside.
There will be a hearing afresh at an attended hearing at the First-tier Tribunal in respect of all issues before a different Judge.
None of the current findings shall stand.
No anonymity order is made.

Abid Mahmood

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

15 May 2025