Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000757

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/61775/2023

LP/09624/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
15th August 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HILLS

Between

XL
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Nathan, instructed by Fadiga & Co Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Isherwood, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 17 June 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. On 1 May 2025 the Upper Tribunal set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (FtT) in this matter dated 14 November 2024. I now re-make that decision.
2. The appellant is a female citizen of China who appealed against a refusal by the respondent of her asylum claim. The basis of her claim is that she borrowed money from loan sharks for a business. When that business failed and she was unable to repay the loan sharks, they threatened to take her son abroad for work. She volunteered herself instead and arrangements were made for her to travel from China to the United Kingdom. When she arrived in the UK she was taken to a house where she was forced into sex work and became a victim of modern slavery. She escaped three years later. If returned to China, she fears she would be recaptured by the loan sharks because she escaped and still owes them money.
3. Given the different terminology used, I refer in this decision to “loan sharks” and “traffickers” interchangeably.
Preserved Findings
4. The decision of the Upper Tribunal of 1 May 2025 noted at [27] that it had been accepted that the appellant was a victim of modern slavery in Birmingham during approximately 2015-2018 for the specific purposes of sexual exploitation, and preserved the following findings of fact from the FtT:
“…that the appellant had borrowed money from loan sharks which she was unable to repay because her business failed. She was then offered the option of coming to a foreign country to earn to repay the loan. She opted for that option and was brought to this country where she was engaged in sexual exploitation. Eventually, she managed to escape from the clutches of her traffickers in 2018. She therefore served them for no less than three years.”
Upper Tribunal Hearing
5. Much of the background was agreed between the parties. It was accepted that the appellant had been trafficked to the UK and was a victim of exploitation, was part of a particular social group and that she feared harm if returned to China.
6. It was agreed that the issues to be determined were:
a. whether there is a real likelihood of the appellant being re-trafficked or harmed if returned to China;
b. sufficiency of protection;
c. viability of internal relocation; and
d. whether the appellant could rely on Article 3, Article 8, or 276ADE(7) of the Immigration Rules.
7. The appellant was assisted at the hearing by an interpreter in Mandarin. Her witness statement of 23 February 2024 was read into evidence and Ms Isherwood cross-examined her on such matters as her medical history, current state of health and access to healthcare in China; her friendships and private life in the UK; the risk the appellant faced on return to China and her previous engagement with the authorities; and the viability of internal relocation.
8. The appellant explained she has health problems. Ms Isherwood questioned why the only evidence in relation to this was the appellant’s own account, an email from her solicitors and a letter from an acupuncture centre. The appellant said she was being treated with traditional Chinese medicine, that she provided evidence of her health conditions to her solicitors, and that she had been unable to see a GP in the UK because she does not speak English. Ms Isherwood noted that the CPIN titled “Country policy and information note: medical treatment and healthcare, China, July 2022” confirms the availability and accessibility to medical treatment in China and asked the appellant if she accepted that she could access that if needed. The appellant did not accept that and said health insurance is only available for workers. She said she left China a long time ago and doesn’t know what medical support she would get if she returned.
9. Ms Isherwood asked the appellant about her friendships in the UK. The appellant said she had not made many friends in the UK, only the people living with her who were all Chinese. Ms Isherwood asked about the jobs the appellant had undertaken in the UK and the skills she had developed which she could take back with her to China. The appellant said she has had various jobs, but if she returned to China she would struggle to get work because she didn’t have a “certificate,” which I understood to mean formal qualifications.
10. Ms Isherwood asked the appellant a number of questions about what risks she might face if returned to China. The appellant said she did not know the identity of the loan sharks, as the loan was arranged by her father’s friend. She said that she had been harassed by the loan sharks while in China and that the police had been called, most likely by neighbours. Ms Isherwood took the appellant to paragraph 13 of her witness statement where she said “…Chinese police are corrupt. Loan sharks pay protection money to the police so the police collude with them.” She asked how the appellant knew this. The appellant said the loan sharks bully people in daylight and the police take no action. The appellant accepted that since she escaped her traffickers in 2018 there was no evidence they had pursued her for the money she owed, either in the UK or China. The appellant said that since she escaped she had been “like air” and dared not be in contact with people so as not to be found. She said that if you don’t repay the loan sharks “they will always chase you. It doesn’t matter where you are, they won’t let you go easily.”
11. The appellant said she last had contact with her son before COVID. She mostly received information about him through people she knows going back to China, but has not heard from him since around 2019 or 2020. She has not tried to contact him since then. She said someone from the same village told her that her son had moved away to avoid the loan sharks and that he said she should not try to contact him because the police might intercept the call. The appellant said she could not relocate to Beijing because she did not have sufficient money.
12. Mr Nathan did not have any questions for the appellant.
13. Ms Isherwood submitted that the appellant was not at risk of harm or re-trafficking on return to China. She said that the appellant had not produced any evidence of the reach of the loan sharks or that she was still of interest to them. She asked why, if they had the reach suggested, they hadn’t been in contact with the appellant or her son to pursue payment since she escaped from them. She argued that the appellant had not produced any evidence of the connections between the loan sharks and the Chinese authorities, nor sufficiently explained why she could not internally relocate to another part of China where the loan sharks could not find her. In terms of the human rights aspects of the appeal, Ms Isherwood submitted the threshold had not been met. There had been no clear evidence of medical conditions provided and the background evidence supported the position that the appellant could access medical care in China. Ms Isherwood submitted the appellant had not established sufficient connections to the UK to make out an Article 8 claim.
14. Ms Isherwood took me to headnotes 2 and 3 of HC & RC (Trafficked women) China CG [2009] UKAIT 00027 which read:
“(2) Women and girls in China do not in general face a real risk of serious harm from traffickers. Where, however, it can be established in a given case that a woman or a girl does face a real risk of being forced or coerced into prostitution by traffickers, the issue of whether she will be able to receive effective protection from the authorities will need careful consideration in the light of background evidence highlighting significant deficiencies in the system of protection for victims of trafficking. But each case, however, must be judged on its own facts. China is a vast country and it may be, for example, that in a particular part of China the efforts to eliminate trafficking are determined and the level of complicity between state officials and traffickers is low. If an appellant comes from such an area, or if she can relocate to such an area, there may be no real risk to her.
(3) The Chinese state has an obligation to house the homeless and will not allow their citizens to starve. Therefore a returned trafficked woman without family support will not be allowed by the authorities to fall into a state of destitution.”
15. Ms Isherwood also took me through the CPIN titled “Country Policy and Information Note China: Modern Slavery (October 2024)” (the “2024 CPIN”), highlighting the parts which she said supported the respondent’s position and some which she said were positive for the appellant. Those paragraphs included 3.1.1, 3.1.2, 3.1.3, 3.1.10, 4.1.2, 4.1.10, 4.1.11, 5.1.5, 5.1.7, 10.2.1, 10.6, 10.9, part 11, 12.2 and 13.2. I will not repeat those in detail, however I have considered the totality of the 2024 CPIN in reaching my decision.
16. In his submissions, Mr Nathan also took me to a number of parts of the 2024 CPIN which he said supported the appellant’s case including 4.1.2, part 5, 9.1.1, 10.6.3, 10.6.5, 10.7.2, 10.8, 10.9, 12.2.2, 12.2.3, 12.2.5 and part 13. Again, I will not repeat those in detail but I have carefully considered them.
17. Mr Nathan said that when the appellant was initially confronted with the choice between coming to the UK or relocating internally, she decided to go to the UK where she was forced into prostitution. She escaped the loan sharks with the debt unpaid. He said that, were she to return to China, her name would appear in certain government databases through the hukou (household registration) system. He submitted that, given the loan sharks had the reach to send her from China to the UK it is not a leap to say they could track her if she was returned. He said there is no reason to believe the passage of time would mean that the loan sharks would not have an interest in seeking her out to have the debt paid.
18. He pointed to s339K of the Immigration Rules which states:
“The fact that a person has already been subject to persecution or serious harm, or to direct threats of such persecution or such harm, will be regarded as a serious indication of the person’s well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of suffering serious harm, unless there are good reasons to consider that such persecution or serious harm will not be repeated.”
19. Mr Nathan noted 4.1.2 of the 2024 CPIN which states:
“A person who fears a rogue state actor and/or a non-state actor is unlikely to obtain protection from the state. This is because in general, the state is able but not always willing to offer protection.”
20. He submitted that there was no viable state protection for the appellant in this case. He pointed to section 5 of the CPIN, and paragraph 82(1) of HC & RC which states:
“Although the Chinese authorities are intent upon rescuing and rehabilitating women and girls trafficked for the purposes of prostitution, there are deficiencies in the measures they have taken to combat the problem of trafficking. The principal deficiencies are the lack of a determined effort to deal with the complicity of corrupt law enforcement officers...”.
21. He submitted that was precisely what the appellant has always raised as her concern about the loan sharks and the government. He also noted headnote 2 of HC & RC, and submitted that this case is not about the general risk to women, but the specific risk to the appellant. She is someone who had already been trafficked once and that should be considered alongside s339K of the Immigration Rules.
22. Mr Nathan took me to paragraph 5.1.7 of the 2024 CPIN, which states “…the hukou system is reported to exacerbate migrants’ vulnerability to trafficking…”. He said that the appellant faces a well-founded fear from connected traffickers and that the hukou system may, itself, bring her to their attention. He said that the appellant is unlikely to seek protection from the state. In sum, he submitted, she is a refugee.
23. In the alternative, Mr Nathan submitted that the appellant has established a private life in the UK and would face very significant obstacles on return to China. He said that she claimed asylum in 2019 however the respondent did not make a decision on that for four years, and a conclusive grounds decision for five years, and that during the delays to a decision being made about her asylum claim she has made a quiet life for herself in the UK.
The Legal Framework
24. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. The burden of proof is upon the appellant. As per Karanakaran v SSHD [2000] 3 All ER 449 the standard of proof is a reasonable degree of likelihood. I must determine whether it is reasonably likely that:
(a) Taking the claim at its highest, there is a Convention reason;
(b) Considering the credibility of the account, the appellant fears persecution for that Convention reason;
(c) The appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason;
(d) There would not be sufficient protection available; and
(e) The appellant could not internally relocate.
25. The parties accepted that (a) and (b) were not in dispute.
26. To succeed on humanitarian protection grounds the appellant must not be a refugee and they must show substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in their country of origin. The burden of proof is on the appellant.
Analysis
27. The appellant did not rely on expert evidence. Mr Nathan submitted that, in his view, the 2024 CPIN and HC & RC were sufficient to make out the appellant’s claim. I have considered that background evidence, alongside the evidence given at the hearing and included in the bundle.
28. The background evidence confirms that women and girls in China do not in general face a real risk of serious harm from traffickers. There is no evidence to suggest that re-trafficking is widespread and, in general, it is unlikely that a person would be re-trafficked once returned to China. Circumstances which may increase the risk of a person being abused or re-trafficked include the person being homeless, disabled, suffering from a mental illness, or those with a lack of education. In general, the state is able but not always willing to offer protection to those who are at risk of modern slavery. Depending on an individual’s personal circumstances, there are some parts of China (for example Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou and Shenzhen) where a person would not have a well-founded fear of persecution/real risk of suffering harm and it will be reasonable for them to relocate there.
29. All cases must be considered on their individual facts and the appellant must demonstrate, to the lower threshold, that she faces persecution or serious harm.
Risk of harm
30. In this case, the appellant may be at risk of harm if she (i) will come to the attention of the traffickers upon return; and (ii) is still of interest to them.
31. The appellant believes the traffickers will have their own people in the government and when she is required to update her hukou they will be able to find her. While the background evidence notes that corruption is a significant problem in China, including corrupt officials being complicit in trafficking, I was not taken to any specific evidence that traffickers can use the hukou system to identify victims. I am not persuaded that the mere fact of returning to China would, of itself, bring the appellant to the attention of the traffickers or that the traffickers could use the hukou system to identify her.
32. If, however, the appellant returned to the part of China from where she came - and where she first encountered the traffickers through her father’s friend - then the risk of being identified is more pronounced. That is because the reach of the traffickers in that part of China has already been established by the circumstances that led to the appellant being trafficked to the UK in the first place. There is no evidence that position has changed since the appellant left China. The family friend connection to the traffickers further increases the risk of the appellant being identified upon return.
33. The appellant accepted that the traffickers had not been in contact with her since she escaped from them in 2018, although during that time she took steps to prevent herself from being found. I am not persuaded that the passage of time alone means the traffickers will have lost interest in the appellant, given the reasons she was trafficked in the first place remain. She still owes them money. She was told she had to work for a period of five years to repay her debt, but escaped after three years. While this must have reduced the sum owed, I see no reason to conclude that the remaining two years’ debt is an insignificant sum such that the traffickers would not be interested in having it repaid. The fact that the appellant escaped from the traffickers is an additional factor which may increase their interest in finding her.
34. If the appellant returns to the part of China from where she came there is a reasonable likelihood that she will be identified by the traffickers and that they will have a continued interest in her. It is accepted by the respondent that the appellant was trafficked to the UK by the loan sharks from 2015 and I note that a finding of past persecution is a serious indication of a well-founded fear of persecution, unless there PA/61775/2023 (Immigration Rule 339K). There are not good reasons to consider that the harm or persecution which the appellant previously suffered will not be repeated.
35. I find that the appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason.
Sufficiency of protection
36. In line with HC & RC, the issue of whether the appellant will be able to receive effective protection from the authorities needs careful consideration, taking into account both the background evidence and the facts of her case.
37. The 2024 CPIN says at 4.1.1 that “a person who fears the state is unlikely to obtain protection.” Mr Nathan similarly highlighted 4.1.2, that a person who fears a rogue state actor and/or non-state actor will be unlikely to obtain protection from the state. These are important considerations in the appellant’s case as she plainly fears both the authorities and the traffickers.
38. The appellant has given evidence that she believes the authorities work with the traffickers and the background evidence raises concerns about the complicity of some corrupt officials. Whether or not that is true, there is no reason to doubt that the appellant genuinely holds that belief and her previous behaviour is consistent with that. In her asylum interview of 18 September 2023, she said that when the loan sharks threatened her in China she did not report it to the police or authorities because she believed they worked together. While Ms Isherwood challenged that in cross-examination (and the appellant said it was most likely a neighbour who contacted the police when she was harassed by the loan sharks), the fact that the appellant chose to travel to the UK to work for the loan sharks rather than relying on protection from the authorities is a strong indicator that she did not believe the authorities would protect her. The appellant fears the state and believes corrupt officials work with the traffickers. It is reasonably likely she would not report any future harassment, and therefore would not have sufficient protection from the authorities.
39. I find that the appellant would not receive sufficient protection.
Internal Relocation
40. HC & RC says that there may be no real risk to a person if they come from an area, or can relocate to such an area, where efforts to eliminate trafficking are determined and the level of complicity between state officials and traffickers is low. The 2024 CPIN notes that a person is likely to be able to relocate internally to escape harm (para 5.1.2), that China is a very large country with large cities where people are likely to be able to evade non-state actors (para 5.1.3), the Chinese state has an obligation to house the homeless and a returned trafficked woman without family support will not be allowed by the authorities to fall into a state of destitution (para 5.1.5). Part 12 of the 2024 CPIN discusses the hukou system, through which a person can access social services. It notes that it is very difficult to get a hukou in one of China’s major cities like Beijing or Shanghai, although reforms in 2019 made it easier in medium-sized cities (para 12.2.1).
41. Despite those reforms, however, rural migrants without local registration are denied access to public services (para 12.2.2). Mr Nathan noted the 2024 CPIN says at 5.1.7 that the hukou system is reported to exacerbate migrants’ vulnerability to trafficking. Paragraph 12.2.5 also states:
“The USSD TiP report, 2024 noted: ‘The government hukou (household registration) system continued to contribute to trafficking risks of internal migrants by reducing access to social services, particularly for PRC victims returning from exploitation abroad, and by driving hundreds of millions of individuals to live and work illegally outside the jurisdiction of their household registration...”
42. Clearly internal relocation is a possibility for a someone returning to China, but the viability of relocation is complex and dependant on an individual’s circumstances. The question, therefore, is whether it would be reasonable for the appellant to relocate to another part of China or if it would be unduly harsh for her do so (see Januzi (FC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 5).
43. It is the respondent’s position that the appellant could internally relocate to Jiangsu, Hangzhou or Wuhan and that by doing so she could live more independently but maintain a relationship with her son.
44. The appellant has been absent from China for a period of some 10 years. She has had limited contact with her son since 2019/2020, she does not know where he lives and said he has no fixed address because he has to move to avoid her creditors. He has asked that she not try to contact him. Information about her son has come through people visiting the UK from China. She does not have any other significant family who could help her relocate to another part of China. She has developed some skills in the UK but has no formal qualifications. Her financial means are limited.
45. Were the appellant to internally relocate, she would likely be dependant for support on either her son or the authorities. It is not clear if the appellant would be able to find her son and re-establish contact with him. Even if she could, and she relocated to be closer to him, she would need hukou registration to enable her to access social services and other support. Given she believes that it is through the hukou system that the traffickers will be able to find her, it is unlikely that the appellant will in fact obtain a new hukou registration. The 2024 CPIN indicates that a failure to obtain hukou registration would exacerbate the appellant’s vulnerability to re-trafficking.
46. If the appellant were to obtain new hukou registration, she would still likely be dependant on the authorities for support. I have explained that, as the appellant believes the authorities work with the traffickers, she is unlikely to obtain sufficient protection from them. For the same reasons, she is unlikely to be able to access adequate support from them if she relocates internally. If she is unable to rely on support from her son or the authorities, and in the absence of financial means, there is a real possibility that she may become destitute. The background evidence confirms that a person’s risk of being abused or re-trafficked may increase when they are more vulnerable, for example if they are homeless.
47. While internal relocation will be a reasonable possibility for some people on return to China, it is not for the appellant. If she is unable to obtain support from her son or from the authorities, and obtain a new hukou registration, there is a reasonable likelihood that she will become vulnerable such that she is at a heightened risk of being re-trafficked or suffering harm. Such circumstances would amount to unduly harsh conditions.
48. I find that the appellant could not reasonably internally relocate within China without suffering unduly harsh conditions.
Conclusion
49. In light of the above, there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that the appellant would face persecution for a Convention reason if she is returned to China. There would be insufficient protection available to her and she could not reasonably internally relocate without suffering unduly harsh conditions. I therefore uphold her asylum claim.
50. As I have upheld the appellant’s asylum claim, I do not need to make a determination about the other grounds of the appeal.
Notice of Decision
51. The appeal is allowed on asylum grounds.

N Hills

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated: 28 July 2025