Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000768
UI-2025-000769

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/52194/2024
PA/62048/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 27th of June 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WILLIAMS

Between

OY
MY
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellants
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellants: Mr I Hussain, Solicitor, Lei Dat and Baig Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr E Tufan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 18 June 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellants are granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellants. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellants appeal with the permission of Upper Tribunal Judge Keith (acting as a Judge of the First-tier Tribunal) against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Meyler (‘the Judge’) promulgated on 9th December 2024, whereby the Judge dismissed the protection claims of both Appellants.

Background

2. The Appellants are nationals of Egypt and are related in that MY is the father of OY. Their protection claims, made to the Respondent in September 2022, were advanced on the basis that whilst in Egypt, OY entered a relationship with a Christian woman, N, without the knowledge of her family. A customary marriage was entered into by OY and N. This relationship was eventually discovered by N’s family and OY was beaten by her family to the point he was hospitalised.

3. The Appellants further claim that as a result of this clandestine relationship, false allegations that they were affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood were laid against them. This precipitated their exit from Egypt and travel to the United Kingdom.

4. The Respondent refused the claims and the Appellants exercised their rights of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal.

The Appeal to the First-tier Tribunal

5. The appeals came before the Judge sitting in the Virtual Region on 22nd November 2024. The Judge heard evidence from both Appellants who were assisted in giving their evidence by an Arabic interpreter. There does not appear to have been any difficulties with either connection to the hearing platform, or the interpretation and communication.

6. In a decision promulgated on 9th December 2024, the Judge dismissed both appeals. The Judge carefully considered the evidence of both Appellants and gave consideration to factors she considered both supported the credibility of the claim, and which detracted from it. The Judge then summarised her findings under the heading ‘conclusions on the evidence’.

47. I am prepared to accept that the appellant and his Christian girlfriend met, fell in love, that temperatures ran high and that the appellant would have been desperate to have sex with his girlfriend. On balance, I also accept that the first appellant eventually managed to persuade her to have sex with him, on the pretext that they would first celebrate a secret customary marriage, even though he knew that the marriage would not be valid because she was below the age of consent in Egypt.

48. I am prepared to accept that the girl's Christian family would have reported the appellant to the police when they found out and that given the law in Egypt, they would have good cause to complain and to expect a prosecution to follow, on the basis that she was under the age of consent at the time of the secret marriage and repeated counts of under-age sex. I am also prepared to accept that the first appellant was beaten up by thugs, but that he managed to escape through the help of passers-by. I find that there was no satisfactory basis for believing that the gang were connected to the girl's family and the evidence of the lawyers was inconsistent with the first appellant's evidence as to the identity of his attackers. I do not accept that there were trumped up terrorism charges, for the reasons set out above. There would be no need for this, given the girl's minority under Egyptian law at the time of the purported marriage and ensuing sex. On that basis I find that the appellant may fear prosecution, rather than persecution.

7. The Judge further went on to consider the risk upon return to the Appellants. She analysed the evidence relating to the Appellants’ exit through the airport if there were charges laid against them. She further considered the power and influence of N’s family and found there was little to support the claim that Egyptian Christians would commit honour killings. The Judge also considered the fact that Coptic Christians are themselves discriminated against in Egypt, which undermined the Appellants’ claim that N’s family had power and influence over the state in the way claimed.

The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal

8. The Appellants sought permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. Although they advance four grounds of complaint, they can be distilled into two separate grounds. The first three grounds all relate to the Judge’s consideration of the age of consent in Egypt. It was said that the Judge’s finding at [19-20] that the age of consent in Egypt is 18 is a mistake of fact, and in any event was not a subject ventilated at the hearing, nor was it an issue taken by the Respondent.

9. Ground Four, or what was in reality the second ground, was that the Judge, having recorded at [14] of her decision the concession that were the Appellants found credible, they would be at risk of serious harm, erred in her consideration of the power and influence of N’s family.

10. Permission was granted on all grounds by Upper Tribunal Judge Keith (acting as a Judge of the First-tier Tribunal) on 14th February 2025. It is on this basis the appeal comes before me.

The Hearing

11. The hearing took place at Field House. Mr Tufan and I were present at Field House, and Mr Hussain appeared via Cloud Video Platform. There were no issues with the connection and I was content Mr Hussain was able to participate effectively in the hearing. I heard submissions from both advocates, and at the end of the hearing I reserved my decision which I now give with reasons.

The Appellants’ Submissions

12. Mr Hussain agreed that grounds one to three could be considered as one ground, which was that the Judge was incorrect to find that the age of consent in Egypt was 18. Mr Hussain submitted there was no evidence before the Judge to support this point. It did not feature in any of the documentary evidence; it was not suggested by the Presenting Officer below. In any event, evidence had been provided with the grounds seeking permission which showed that in fact the age of consent was 16. This was said to be material as it led to the Judge’s finding that the MY feared prosecution, and not persecution.

13. Ground four could be summarised thus: the Respondent conceded in the refusal letter than credibility was the only issue. If the Appellants were found credible, they would be at risk of serious harm and there would be no internal relocation or sufficiency of protection available to them. This concession was confirmed by the Presenting Officer below and recorded at [14] of the Judge’s decision. The Judge therefore erred by going on to consider, having found elements of the claim to be credible, the power and influence of the family and concluding there would be no risk of serious harm to them.

14. If I were to find an error of law in the decision such that it would be set aside, I was invited to remake the decision allowing it, taking into account the Judge’s positive findings. Mr Hussain also confirmed no further evidence would be needed to remake the decision.

The Respondent’s Submissions

15. Mr Tufan responded indicating the appeal was opposed on both grounds. As far as the first issue, that of the age of consent, he had been unable to find the online evidence provided by the Appellants suggesting a 17-year-old girl could marry in Egypt. Even if it were accepted that the Judge had erred in this respect, it was unclear how this would be material to the outcome of the appeal, the Judge still having a number of concerns around the evidence.

16. As far as the second issue was concerned, the position of N’s family was a factor the Judge was entitled to consider when determining any risk which might flow to the Appellants upon return to Egypt. There was evidence before the Judge (Q37 of MY’s asylum interview) that N’s father was a trader, but MY did not know ‘what he does exactly’. The Judge was entitled to take the ability of N’s family into consideration when looking at whether the Appellants would be at risk of serious harm.

17. Mr Tufan submitted that were error to be found in either way, the appeal should instead be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be made de novo.

Discussion

Grounds One to Three

18. I deal with the first three grounds together, that is whether the Judge erred in finding the age of consent in Egypt was 18. As observed by Upper Tribunal Judge Keith when granting permission, neither the refusal letter, the Appellant’s skeleton argument nor the Respondent’s review makes any reference to the issue of N’s age when the putative wedding took place. The Judge carefully records the positive and negative credibility findings in her decision and makes no reference to N’s age being a subject either Appellant was cross-examined on.

19. Mr Tufan accepted that in the entirety of the evidence, there is only one reference to N’s age in the context of the marriage, and that is within OY’s substantive interview. At Q46 of his interview (which does not appear in the bundle prepared for these proceedings but is within the stitched bundle prepared for the First-tier Tribunal), OY was asked ‘why did you get married to someone below the age of consent in Egypt?’. His response to this was ‘I didn’t look to that. I was just considering feelings. We were in love’.

20. I do not consider the assertion made by the interviewing officer reliable evidence that the age of consent to marry in Egypt, whilst it is this assertion the Judge relies on in finding the age of consent was 18. It is clear from the decision of the Judge that the issue of the age of consent is one which featured in a number of places in her consideration.

21. It is clear that the possibility that N was unable to marry because of her age was a matter the Judge was troubled by. There does not appear to have been any opportunity provided to the parties to address the Judge on this point at the hearing. Mr Tufan agreed that the doctrine of judicial notice would not apply to a point such as the age of consent in Egypt, and if this was something within the Judge’s own knowledge, it was a point which should have been ventilated at the hearing.

22. At [19] to [20] the Judge considers whether the ‘honour-based’ element of the claim comes within the ambit of the Refugee Convention. The Judge makes a number of statements which make clear she was of the view that OY had married N whilst she was under the age of consent. The Judge considers a number of international instruments and makes reference to child marriage being ‘a pervasive problem in many countries’. The Judge determines the Refugee Convention ‘does not protect men from the consequences of having sex with girls who, under the law of their land, are under the age of consent’.

23. This element of the decision cannot be said to be material. At [19], the Judge recorded the agreement of both representatives that there was no ‘Convention reason’ in respect of this element of the claim. The point is expressly conceded at [6] of the skeleton argument filed by the Appellants. The Judge’s finding that the age of consent was 18 was in this respect immaterial.

24. This issue arose again in the context of whether or not the marriage between OY and N was valid. The evidence before the Judge as to whether or not OY was married was confusing to say the least. At [36], the Judge records OY’s evidence in his screening interview and his visa application that he was single. At [38], the Judge records the Appellant’s explanation that the marriage was not valid because it had not been registered. The Judge concluded at [39] that in any event, ‘it could never become a valid marriage because the Appellant’s girlfriend was a minor under the age of consent’. This finding is reiterated at [43] of the decision.

25. Standing back from the detail, I do not find the Judge made a mistake of fact in asserting the age of consent in Egypt was 18. The Appellants submitted evidence with the grounds seeking permission to appeal. This evidence was from the website of the Egyptian Consulate in the United Kingdom. The URL is provided at [14] of the grounds. Whilst Mr Tufan indicated he had difficulty accessing the link, I have been able to do so simply by copying the URL provided in the grounds and pasting it into an internet browser.

26. The information provided by the Egyptian Consulate (this being their official website) states the following ‘applicants have to be at least 18 years old’. There is no explanation as to why the evidence provided with the grounds states ‘male applicants must be 18 years or older, 16 or older for females’. That is clearly no longer the position, having accessed the same website at the hearing.

27. The Appellants have provided further evidence under Rule 15(2A). The evidence relevant to the issue of the age of consent consists of a further statement from MY, a document entitled ‘A brief study of legitimate marriage and secret customary marriage in Islam’. There was no opposition by Mr Tufan to this application, and I admit the documents into evidence. I accept they were not adduced before the Judge because the Appellants were unaware the issue of N’s age and the impact that had upon the validity of the marriage was an issue in dispute.

28. Having considered this evidence, I do not find it reliably establishes the Appellants’ claim that a marriage where a party is under 18 is valid. I place little weight on the assertion made by MY that he has ‘never heard of anyone being prosecuted for marrying someone under the age of 18’. MY is not an expert on Egyptian law, and a person being prosecuted is not the same as whether the marriage would be valid.

29. The other document provided by the Appellants is the opinion of an Egyptian lawyer. The document is signed with his Bar Association Enrolment number. There was no challenge before me to the reliability of this document. The document appears to be expert evidence of the kind envisaged at [9] Hussein and Another (Status of passports: foreign law) [2020] UKUT 00250, i.e. that ‘foreign law (especially nationality law) is a matter of evidence, to be proved by expert evidence directed specifically to the point in issue’.

30. There is no evidence before me indicating the author of this opinion is an expert. Beyond the fact he is enrolled in the Egyptian Bar Association, there is no detail as to his qualifications, area of practice, or experience. I do not find this evidence assists in establishing the Appellants’ claim. In any event, the document does not address the law, but simply the validity of marriage within Islam. The document also refers to marriage ‘as soon as a girl hits puberty’, states this ‘was the custom among the people of Upper Egypt, where girls were married at the age of fifteen, sixteen or seventeen’. This does not indicate the practice is presently lawful, nor does it establish that a female of 17 years old can marry.

31. In summary, whilst I find the Judge should have made the parties at the hearing aware that the age of N at the time of marriage was an issue she was concerned with, her failure to do so was not material. The Judge accepted there had been a relationship of sorts between MY and N at [47], and having accepted a relationship existed, she determined risk on that basis. The evidence before her on the issue of marriage was, as she described it, ‘confusing and equivocal’, and as I have observed, the evidence supporting the assertion that the Judge was wrong in her conclusion is unreliable. I do not find the first three grounds are made out.

Ground Four

32. The second ground of complaint is that having determined elements of the claim were credible, the Judge failed to have regard to the concession she recorded at [14] of the decision. It is said that the Judge’s finding that N’s family would not have power or influence over the Egyptian authorities undermined the concession made by the Respondent.

33. I note first that the Respondent’s own position on the issues of internal relocation and sufficiency of protection was less than clear. There was a refusal decision issued in respect of each Appellant. Their claims were advanced on an identical factual basis, and yet the position taken by the Respondent varied between the Appellants.

34. The refusal in respect of OY asserted that even if he was found credible, there would be a sufficiency of protection available to him in Egypt, or alternatively, he could relocate to Cairo. Paragraph [16] of the refusal decision for OY states ‘the person you claim to fear are (sic) non-state actors and you have failed to demonstrate that it is reasonably likely they have sufficient power or influence to be able to locate you anywhere in Egypt’.

35. The refusal of MY’s claim however, concedes that were the claim credible, neither internal relocation nor sufficiency of protection would be open to him. It is unclear why the position varied in this way. The Judge was aware of these inconsistencies, referring to them specifically at [14], and records the concession made by the Presenting Officer that the more generous position would be taken in respect of both Appellants.

36. It is against this background that the Judge’s findings are to be considered. First, it is clear the Judge did not accept the entirety of the account which was presented to her. The Judge accepted OY and N had entered a sexual relationship and accepted that OY had suffered some sort of attack [48]. There are a number of factors however, that the Judge did not accept.

37. She did not accept the Appellants had been charged with terrorism offences, nor did she find the Appellants were accused of being affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood [25]. The Judge did not find that N would be allowed to attend parties and concerts unaccompanied at night [42] and also did not accept OY’s evidence about renting an apartment for a day [44].

38. Further, the Judge took into account the three-month delay in claiming asylum, rejecting the evidence given that the Appellants were unaware of the process in the United Kingdom [45], and considered the untruths told by the Appellants in their visa applications [46]. The Judge explicitly finds ‘the assertions made about false terrorism charges and the assertion that they are at risk of serious harm from a Christian family, both of which I found where wholly unfounded’ [46].

39. In the circumstances, where the Judge found there was no risk of serious harm to the Appellants, I do not consider she erred in considering the position of Christians in Egypt. It is clear the Judge took these matters into account when considering the overall credibility of the claim. It was not a case, as the Appellants assert, of the Judge finding them entirely credible and then disregarding the concession made by the Respondent. Ground Four is not made out.

Conclusion

40. Having considered the decision in its entirety, I find the conclusions reached by the Judge following a careful assessment of the evidence were entirely open to her. Whilst understandably, the Appellants would prefer alternative outcomes to the appeals, I find the grounds advanced are mere disagreement, and do not establish any material errors of law.

Notice of Decision

The appeals to the Upper Tribunal are dismissed. The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Meyler, dismissing the appeals on all grounds, shall stand.

CJ Williams

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

23rd June 2025