Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000775

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/67385/2023
LP/07083/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 26 August 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HANSON
DEPUTY UPPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BUTLER

Between

NMA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Johnrose, Solicitor, on behalf of Broudie Jackson Canter Solicitors.
For the Respondent: Mr McVeety, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 29 July 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. Both members of the Tribunal have contributed to this decision.
2. The Appellant appeals with permission a decision of a panel of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the Panel’), promulgated following a hearing at Manchester on 26 November 2024, in which they dismissed his appeal against the refusal of his application for leave to remain in the United Kingdom on protection and/or human rights grounds.
3. The Appellant is a citizen of Iraq. The Panel note his immigration history and his claim between [4] – [5] of the decision under challenge, issues in dispute at [10], and set out their findings from [15].
4. In relation to the first issue, whether the Appellant was threatened as claimed in Iraq, the Panel’s findings are to be found between [17] – [30] in which they find no merit in the Appellant’s protection claim.
5. Section 8 of the 2004 Act is considered at [31] – [32] which includes a finding the Appellant had not provided a reasonable explanation for failing to claim asylum in the first safe country which damaged his general credibility by virtue of section 8 (4) of that Act.
6. The Panel deal with the second issue, that of identity documents at [33] – [36] in which they did not accept the Appellant’s bare assertion that he was not in possession of any Iraqi identity documents or does not have access to his original CSID or INID because the Appellant had not been found to be a witness of truth upon whose testimony any reliance could properly be placed, for the reasons set out earlier in the determination.
7. The Panel applied the law to the facts as found between [37] – [38] leading to the appeal being dismissed.
8. The Appellant sought permission to appeal on two grounds. Permission to appeal was refused by another judge of the First-tier Tribunal but granted by the Upper Tribunal on 1 April 2025.
9. The appeal is opposed by the Respondent in a Rule 24 response dated 23 April 2025, the operative part of which reads:
2. The respondent opposes the appellant’s appeal. In summary, the respondent will submit inter alia that the judge of the First-tier Tribunal directed himself appropriately.
3. The Respondent submits that it is clear from the record of proceedings that the issue of the divorce certificate and who initiated the divorce proceedings was clearly raised at the hearing. There was no attempt to deal with this in re-examination and as such the Respondent submits that if any objection to the questioning, or any further evidence could have been sought then the issue should have been raised at the hearing. The Respondent submits there can be no procedural unfairness in making findings on an issue clearly raised at the hearing.
4. The Respondent further submits that the FTT has given cogent and valid reasons at paragraphs 20-27 for finding that the Appellant has not given a credible or consistent account and the challenges to the findings amount to mere disagreement.
Discussion and analysis
10. Ground one asserts unfairness in relation to the divorce certificate. This document was provided by the Appellant in support of his appeal, in relation to which the Panel write:
11. The Appellant claims he is an Iraqi national of Kurdish ethnicity from Halabja in the Independent Kurdish Region (IKR). He says his wife (‘RM’) was engaged to a powerful man from the Jaff tribe who works for the Asayish security services and is a member of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). RM was scared of this man and refused to live with him. With support from her father, she instructed a lawyer to end the marriage contract and a divorce certificate was issued by the court. Her ex-husband (‘M’) did not agree but had no choice given the court decision. The Appellant met RM after she was divorced but ‘M’ believed he was the reason why she ended their marriage. Shortly after they were engaged the Appellant received threatening messages on Facebook warning him to end the relationship. He says after they were married shots were fired at her parents’ home. Thereafter, they decided to flee the country.
12. The Appellant says he reported the threats to the local police in Halabja but as the messages were from a fake Facebook account there was nothing they could do. When he reported the shooting, he was told the police would not intervene because ‘M’ was a member of the Asayish security services. He claims that he has a well-founded fear of becoming the victim of a so-called ‘honour’ crime on return to Iraq, that there is no effective state protection and he cannot relocate because ‘M’ is from a large tribe and has sufficient influence and power to locate him throughout the IKR. He also says that ‘M’ has been to his house looking for him and his father burnt the Appellant’s and his wife’s identity documents as a means to demonstrate they will not be returning to Iraq.
13. It is important not to lose sight of the fact the proceedings in the immigration tribunals are adversarial. Directions are provided at an early stage after an appeal is lodged giving dates by which parties are expected to file all the evidence on which they are seeking to rely. Such directions were given in this appeal in response to which the Appellant provided his appeal bundle. Within the bundle was the divorce certificate. The Panel were therefore entitled to take this evidence into account in the context in which it had been produced, namely by the Appellant to prove an element of his appeal. The Panel cannot be criticised for doing so, per se.
14. At [17] the Panel consider the first issue of whether the Appellant was threatened in Iraq as claimed and whether his claims in that respect were reasonably likely to be true.
15. At [18] the Panel write:
18. The Appellant has provided what purports to be a court document relating to his wife’s divorce from her ex-husband. In accordance with Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 439, it is for the Appellant to show this document can be relied upon. The divorce document from the ‘Court of Personal Status of Chamchamal’ quite clearly states that ‘M’ divorced his wife under Sharia Law. In contrast, the Appellant’s entire claim is predicated on his wife having obtained a divorce against ‘M’s wishes. In his asylum interview, he said his wife took the matter to court because ‘M’ was refusing to divorce her (Asylum Interview Record (AIR), question [40]). He confirmed this in oral evidence but was unable to offer any explanation as to why the divorce documents suggest it was the other way around. We find that this fundamentally undermines the Appellant’s claim because it casts significant doubt on his assertion that ‘M’ was dishonoured and humiliated when the Appellant got engaged to RM such that gave rise to threats in the name of so-called ‘honour’.
16. The Appellant argues that the Judge’s treatment of the divorce certificate is unfair as the Secretary of State raised no issue with regard to the reliability of the document at any stage during the proceedings prior to the hearing.
17. It is clear from the Refusal Letter and Respondent’s Review that the Appellant’s claim in relation to facing a real risk of an honour killing from his wife’s ex-husband was not accepted. This was despite the documents provided with the protection claim including the translation of the divorce certificate dated 9 July 2018. The refusal letter, however, gave a number of reasons to why the Appellant’s claim was not found to be credible.
18. The conclusions in the refusal letter are not binding upon the Panel. That document sets out the Secretary of State’s case in relation to the merits of the application made for international protection and/or leave on any other basis which can then be challenged on appeal. If that occurs, a tribunal will be required to determine what evidence they accept as being credible or not and what findings could or should be made based upon the weight given to the evidence.
19. It is important to note [18] very carefully because the Panel do not find the document is a forgery, as that will be a point not taken by the Secretary of State, but rather that considering the document in accordance with Tanveer Ahmed they were not able to put the weight upon that document that the Appellant would have preferred them to have done. We find the Panel considered the document with the required degree of anxious scrutiny and assessed the weight that could be attributed to that document together with the evidence as a whole.
20. Considering the specific grounds of appeal: paragraph [1] does not establish legal error as even if the Respondent took no issue with the divorce certificate that did not prevent the Panel from considering the weight that they could give to it.
21. Paragraph [2] claims the Respondent did not take issue with whether the Appellant’s wife was divorced but that was not the core issue in the appeal. The Appellant’s wife might have been divorced previously but not under the circumstances that it is claimed gave rise to the protection claim. The ground fails to establish material legal error.
22. Paragraph [3] claims the Respondent had never explicitly stated there were any concerns over who divorce who but, even if this is so, that does not prevent the Panel from examining the evidence provided, which included the divorce documents, which the Panel identified went to the core of the Appellant’s claim. The Panel were not estopped from doing so. There is a clear contradiction between the evidence provided by the Appellant and the divorce certificate. The Secretary of State’s position was based upon the documents provided with the application whereas the Panel had the benefit of considering subsequent evidence, including oral evidence given at the hearing.
23. Paragraph [4] states that although the Appellant was given the opportunity to address the point when it was raised by one of the panel members, it is claimed it was difficult to reconcile how the Appellant will be in a position to provide any reasonable explanation as he was not a party to the divorce proceedings and did not purport to be a Sharia divorce lawyer in Iraq. The ground argues that the absence of the wife giving evidence did not negate the Panel from adopting a fair and equitable approach to that aspect of the case. The ground argues the issue could not have been anticipated by the Appellant and so he had no fair opportunity to properly clarify the issue and that expecting him to do so amounted to prejudicial unfairness. We find this ground does not establish material legal error.
24. As submitted by Mr McVeety in his reply, the one person who would have been able to provide evidence relating to this issue was the Appellant’s wife, yet she was not called to give evidence and did not attend the hearing. It is quite clear from reading the transcript that has been provided of the hearing that the Appellant was made fully aware of the concerns and was given the opportunity to address the point that was raised following questions by the Panel in his oral evidence. Although the Appellant was represented by Ms Johnrose, the transcript shows that although there was some re-examination in relation to other matters there was none in relation to this issue, meaning that although an opportunity was provided to enable the Appellant to respond and try to provide an explanation, it was not taken.
25. Even if, as per the pleadings, the Appellant had no direct knowledge of what occurred in his wife’s previous marital relationship, if this was considered an issue of concern that the Appellant felt needed to be addressed an application could have been made for an adjournment which could have been considered by the Panel to enable the Appellant’s wife to attend, but no such application was made. When Ms Johnrose was asked during the course of the hearing why this was so she failed to provide a satisfactory explanation.
26. We do not find the Appellant has established prejudicial unfairness or any form of unfairness in the manner in which the divorce certificate was considered.
27. We find no merit, in particular, in the suggestion at [5] of the grounds of appeal that if the wife’s evidence would have been of assistance the Panel ought to have adjourned the hearing to allow her evidence to be obtained. As noted above, proceedings in the immigration tribunals are adversarial and it is not for judges to prove a party’s case. The Panel did not adjourn to allow the wife to attend because there was no application for an adjournment made by Ms Johnrose and because they were entitled to believe that a represented appellant would have provided all the evidence he was seeking to rely upon. The test is always whether the interests of justice require a particular approach to be taken, but in light of the fact there was no suggestion the Appellant or his representatives intended to call his wife or thought her attendance was necessary, there was nothing to indicate the Panel should have thought differently. The overriding objective and interests of justice did not require such action to be taken. It is not for the Panel to point out deficiencies in a party’s case and then of its own motion take action to enable that party to call evidence to deal with such issues, per se. If the Appellant had been significantly prejudiced by the failure of his wife to attend that is not a situation that arose as a result of anything for which the Panel is responsible. It is reasonable to expect that he would have been fully aware of the fact that his wife was not going to be called to give evidence and neither he nor his representative raised an issue at the beginning of the hearing explaining why they wanted her to attend when she had not previously engaged with the proceedings.
28. Paragraph [6] refers to names but that does not undermine the Panel’s concerns at [18]. The Panel were considering the weight they could give to the document based upon the evidence as a whole, whatever it may or may not have said. There was nothing arguably irrational in the conclusion of the Panel that they could place very little weight upon that evidence. That finding is supported by the fact that during the error of law hearing, when discussing the evidence relating to the marriage certificate, it became clear that the document is infected by potential ambiguity. It does not clearly state what the Appellant claimed it did in his evidence and the Panel were fully entitled to raise concerns in relation to the same.
29. Paragraph [7] alleging the Tribunal stepped into the arena is totally without merit. We have had the benefit of reading the transcript and it is clear that the Panel did not behave in a similar manner to that of the judge criticised by the Court of Appeal in Sarafin [2019] EWCA Civ 852, subsequently considered by the Supreme Court at [2020] UKSC 23 or in such a way as to give rise to the findings of unfairness reached in that case. There is insufficient evidence to support a finding the Panel “stepped into the arena” rather than asking question to enable them to understand the evidence that was being given. Claiming the Panel’s questioning was extensive is a gross exaggeration. It is also clear that the questions were asked after cross-examination which would have given the Appellant’s representative the opportunity to re-examine on any points raised and the representative did not take that opportunity. The Panel were entitled to ask questions that they thought were necessary to enable them to do their job properly even if it related to a matter not raised by the Respondent.
30. Paragraph [8] asserts the Panel adopted an unfair approach arising from the fundamental issue of their view on the divorce certificate which is said to adversely impact the assessment of the Appellant’s credibility, but such claim is without merit. We do not accept the approach of the Panel has been shown to be unfair, their approach to the divorce certificate was one properly open to the Panel in light of their duty to properly determine the merits of the appeal on the evidence. As noted above, the document was tendered by the Appellant as key material in his appeal. The divorce certificate was taken into account as one aspect of the evidence considered by the Panel and it has not been made out that the weight the Panel chose to give to the certificate is outside the range of that they were reasonably entitled to give it on the evidence.
31. Paragraph [9] challenges [19] of the determination but is without merit as there is no unfair assessment in the Panel’s approach to the divorce certificate or related findings.
32. We find no material legal error made out in relation to Ground 1 as a whole.
33. Ground 2 asserts unfairness in relation to the Panel’s findings at [20]. The wording of [10] of the grounds must be read carefully as it states, “It is submitted that the Tribunal’s unfair approach further infects the findings at paragraph [20]”. In light of our findings above, we do not accept that the Panel’s approach to the marriage certificate or evidence was in anyway unfair. The Appellant asserts that it was not disputed he and his wife were married but that was not the issue before the Judge as the claim was said to arise from the Appellant’s wife’s ex-husband which was the aspect that was not satisfactorily made out on the evidence. We find it disingenuous in this paragraph to write “The tribunal has displayed an adopted approach which illustrates propensity to disbelieve all that is claimed by the Appellant despite the R’s acceptance of many aspects of his claim”. This illustrates a theme of the submissions made to us which was, in effect, that as the Secretary of State did not raise the points or challenge the evidence in the manner the Panel did the Panel were not able to make the findings recorded in the determination. There is absolutely nothing in this case to show that the Panel’s approach is illustrative of a propensity to disbelieve. The Panel disbelieved the Appellant as they found he had not discharged the burden of proof upon him to the required standard to prove that what he was saying was true. It was reasonable for the Panel to find as they did.
34. Paragraph [11] alleges a further example of the Panel’s unfair approach but we do not accept that the Appellant has established that the Panel’s approach was unfair. The Appellant was not being asked to provide evidence which he said was not in existence. The Appellant’s evidence was that he had contacted with his family but did not ask them about ongoing threats. That is what the Panel record at [22]. The Panel also identify discrepancies in the evidence in that paragraph which is in the range of findings clearly open to them on the evidence.
35. The assertion at [12] is totally without merit for the reasons set out above.
36. The assertion at [13] is without merit as the approach of the Panel has not been shown to be unfair.
37. The assertion at [14], a reasons challenge, is without merit. Whatever the country evidence may say in relation to blood feuds and honour killings, the core finding of the Panel was that the Appellant had not established his claim to face a risk as a result of a blood feud or honour killing was credible. Whatever the country material said that was clearly not, on the evidence, shown to be applicable to this Appellant.
38. Paragraph [15] refers to documentation alleging that the findings in relation to this aspect were based upon the Panel’s unfair approach to the Appellant’s evidence but that is it, again, disagreement with the Panel’s findings and assertion of unfairness where none has been established on the facts.
39. There is no evidence of artificial separation of the evidence by the Panel in relation to the issues they were required to consider and therefore no merit in paragraph [16].
40. In relation to [17] the grounds failed to refer to where in the documentation the Panel was asked to consider that this as an issue. It was accepted the Appellant has three minor children but there is no evidence they could not return to Iraq with their parents who have access to valid identity documents. There was insufficient evidence before the Panel to establish an entitlement for leave to remain based on Article 3 ECHR in relation to these children and Iraqi immigration law.
41. We find no error in relation to the findings concerning section 8 of the 2004 act. The Panel were entitled come to the conclusion that they did on the evidence in relation to failure to claim asylum earlier.
42. Having sat back and considered the evidence as a whole, we find the Appellant has failed to establish that the decision of the Panel is outside the range of those reasonably open to it on the evidence. Whilst the grounds disagree and try to undermine key aspects of the determination, they failed to show that the findings of the Panel are plainly wrong. In particular, the Appellant has failed to establish the decision to dismiss the appeal is rationally objectionable.
Notice of Decision
43. The First-tier Tribunal has not been shown to have materially erred in law.
44. The determination shall stand.

C J Hanson

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

30 July 2025