Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000781

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/56225/2024 LP/10102/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 20th of January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PINDER
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WALSH

Between

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant in the UT / Respondent in the FtT

and

D M
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent in the UT / Respondent in the FtT

Representation:
For the Appellant in the UT: Ms S Simbi, Senior Presenting Officer.
For the Respondent in the UT: Mr M Brooks, Counsel.

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 26 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Respondent DM (in the UT) is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Respondent DM, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Respondent. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This is the re-making of the decision in the Respondent DM’s appeal against the Appellant Secretary of State’s refusal of his protection and human rights claims. This follows Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Walsh’s earlier decision to set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the FtT’). The FtT decision had allowed the Respondent DM’s appeal on humanitarian protection grounds and was set aside because this contained material error(s) of law. Judge Walsh’ earlier decision (‘the error of law decision’) was promulgated on 1st July 2025 and is annexed to this decision.
2. We have maintained the Anonymity Order in favour of the Respondent DM. We continue to consider that, on the specific facts of this appeal, the maintenance of the integrity of the United Kingdom’s immigration system and DM having raised a claim to international protection are such that an Anonymity Order is a justified derogation from the principle of open justice.
3. Following a transfer order, we heard the re-making appeal together on 26th September 2025.
4. For ease of reference, we will refer to the parties as they appeared below, namely to the Secretary of State as the Respondent and to DM as the Appellant.
5. As was recorded at paras 38 and 42 of the error of law decision, the FtT’s findings in respect of the Appellant’s conversion to Christianity at [18]-[35] were preserved and the FtT’s findings with regards to the Appellant’s humanitarian protection claim were set aside.
6. The Respondent’s decision refusing the Appellant’s claims is dated 28th February 2024.
The evidence
7. We had before us the parties’ composite bundle of evidence of 299 pages, which had been prepared for the error of law hearing. The Appellant also sought to rely on two further letters from the Church Centre (name anonymised) dated 8th and 14th September 2025, which had been submitted by those representing the Appellant to the Tribunal’s online portal on 16th September 2025. However, Ms Simbi had not been served and so we permitted her time to consider these two short documents and to confirm her position in respect of the same. Once able to do so, Ms Simbi helpfully confirmed that the documents did not pose her any difficulties despite the short notice and she was content to proceed with the hearing. Nor did she have any objection to these documents being admitted into evidence. Accordingly, we duly admitted these on this basis.
8. No further documents were submitted on behalf of the Respondent in preparation for the re-making of this appeal. We have given careful consideration to all of the written materials contained in the composite bundle and separately.
The hearing
9. At the outset, we determined, with the assistance of both advocates, the nature of the issues that we are to determine. Mr Brooks, on behalf of the Appellant, acknowledged that the FtT’s findings on the Appellant’s conversion to Christianity were preserved and he confirmed that he was seeking to pursue the Appellant’s claim on the ground of his religion on the lower standard of proof that applied to the appeal on humanitarian protection grounds.
10. In other words, Mr Brooks accepted that the FtT’s findings were preserved, namely that, on the balance of probabilities, the Appellant did not have a characteristic (being a genuine Christian convert), which could cause him to fear on the grounds of religion set out in the Refugee Convention. Neither did Mr Brooks seek to persuade us that we could depart from those findings. However, Mr Brooks pursued the appeal on the basis that the standard of proof of balance of probabilities, set by section 32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (‘the 2022 Act’), did not apply to claims pursued under Article 3 ECHR. It was open therefore to the Appellant to seek to demonstrate that there remains a reasonable degree of likelihood that he will be subjected to serious harm, contrary to Article 3 ECHR, on return to Iran because he has or will be perceived as having converted to Christianity. Mr Brooks also added that the other characteristics relevant to the Appellant continued to apply, namely his illegal exit from Iran, his residence in the UK and his Kurdish ethnicity. Ms Simbi confirmed that she had prepared the appeal accordingly and agreed that this was the premise for the appeal hearing and the issues that we are to determine.
11. The Appellant attended the hearing and was called to give oral evidence. He was assisted by a Kurdish Sorani interpreter and confirmed the truth and accuracy of his witness statements dated 7th August 2024 and 6th November 2023, which he adopted as his evidence-in-chief. The Appellant was then cross-examined by Ms Simbi on behalf of the Respondent. There was no re-examination of the Appellant by Mr Brooks and neither did we have any questions by way of clarification for the Appellant.
12. Following the Appellant’s oral evidence, we heard legal submissions from both advocates, after which we confirmed that we would be reserving our decision. We have addressed both parties’ competing evidence and submissions below when setting out our analysis and conclusions. Judge Pinder is sorry for the time that it has taken to issue this decision, which has been as a result of Judge Pinder’s professional and other commitments in the time that has passed since the hearing.
Findings of fact and Conclusions
13. In reaching the findings of fact and conclusions set out below, we confirm again that we have very carefully considered the evidence as a whole.
14. As noted by the FtT and Judge Walsh in her error of law determination, the Devaseelan principles apply since there are two previous determinations. The first such determination is that of FtT in 2023, when the FtT considered the Appellant’s protection appeal on grounds of imputed or actual political opinion based on his claimed support of the KDPI in Iran prior to coming to the UK and on his sur place activities when in the UK. This aspect of the Appellant’s previous claims is not one that has been pursued by the Appellant and so we do not summarise that decision any further.
15. The second determination is the decision at first instance of the FtT in 2025 with the findings preserved at [18]-[35]. It is worth in our view summarising this second set of findings, which we have done immediately below, as these are to act as our starting point, pursuant to Devaseelan.
16. In their consideration of the Appellant’s claim under the Refugee Convention, the FtT recorded and found the following (references in ‘[…]’ are to the FtT’s determination):
(a) The Appellant claimed to have gone through a low period in his mental health during Covid and after speaking to a friend (whom we will refer to as ‘X’), who was himself a Christian convert, the Appellant was introduced to Christianity and would discuss this religion together – [20];
(b) The Appellant had submitted a letter from Pastor RH (name anonymised), of the Church Centre, dated 5th August 2024, that confirmed that he had attended his Church and had been baptised on 13th August 2023. The Respondent had also submitted evidence, in the form of a later e-mail from Pastor H, dated 7th January 2024, which confirmed that the Appellant had stopped attending his Church – [21];
(c) In his oral evidence and addressing the Respondent’s evidence summarised immediately above, the Appellant stated that he had stopped attending the Church for a period of approximately six week since his friend X, who used to take him there, had moved to Plymouth. From March 2024 however, X had been travelling from Plymouth every two weeks so that they could go to Church together. The Appellant maintained that he did not know anyone else who could take him to the Church so as to ensure a more regular attendance. The Judge found the Appellant’s evidence implausible and also considered that the Appellant could take public transport if he was truly committed to attending Church – [22];
(d) The Appellant stated that he did not know that a further letter from Pastor H would be needed to address the e-mail sent by Pastor H to the Respondent. The Judge did not accept this considering the centrality of this issue to the Appellant’s appeal – [23];
(e) There were no other statements from other members of the Church’s congregation, other than from X and no witnesses had attended in support of the Appellant’s appeal hearing, including X – [24];
(f) A statement was produced approximately one week before the appeal hearing from X, which in the Judge’s view did not contain much detail and was missing key parts of evidence that would otherwise have assisted the Appellant. The statement was “very vague” and did not give details as to the Appellant’s continued attendance at Church nor corroborate the Appellant’s claim that the witness had driven every two weeks a significant distance to take the Appellant to Church. As briefly referred to above, the witness did not attend the hearing to have their evidence tested and the Judge found that this was of concern. Accordingly, the Judge confirmed giving little weight to this statement – [26] and [29];
(g) There was no copy of the church register in evidence to confirm the services that the Appellant had attended – [27];
(h) The Appellant showed the Judge in the FtT his mobile phone as he claimed that he was a member of the Church’s WhatsApp group. The Judge accepted that he did have this group on his WhatsApp but found that this was a group, where the Church would alert its group members to its services and where video recordings of the services would also be uploaded. The Judge found that they had no evidence as to how this group otherwise worked, whether its membership was terminated if a person did not attend regularly. The Judge commented that it appeared that a member of the group could still receive these messages until the receiver decides to leave the group – [30];
(i) The Judge reminded themselves at [31] that matters of faith are intensely personal and not always easy to talk about or explain, particularly in another language. However, the Judge found that the evidence of the Appellant was particularly lacking in any depth, appearance of genuineness, enthusiasm, knowledge or understanding of the tenets of Christianity. The Judge gave examples of this with extracts from the Appellant’s evidence as to why he had decided to convert, which the Judge found superficial – [31]-[32];
(j) The Judge also considered the Appellant’s answers as to why he had decided to leave the Islamic religion and found these to be, in our summary, limited, simplistic and not remotely convincing in a context where the Appellant had been a follower, on his own evidence, of the Islamic faith for the vast majority of his life – [33];
(k) The Judge considered the timescales involved with the Appellant’s attendance in Church to be of note as he had received on or around 3rd June 2023 his previous FtT determination, dismissing his appeal under the Refugee Convention, which at that time had been pursued on political opinion grounds. The Appellant had then registered with the Church on 18th June 2023. The Judge did not find this to be a “coincidence” – [34];
(l) The Judge considered the Appellant’s evidence of his posts published on Facebook, which include religious materials and content. The Judge found it strange that the Appellant would post pictures of the Church and service dates when some of these related to the period during which the Appellant was not attending. The Judge also took into account the Appellant’s evidence of illiteracy and did not find, for these reasons, that the Facebook posts corroborated the Appellant being a genuine convert – [35].
17. The Judge drew the above together and concluded at [37] that the Appellant was not a genuine Christian convert and was not therefore entitled to international protection under the Refugee Convention.
18. We now turn to consider the evidence that the Appellant has presented in support of his appeal, on re-making, seeking to demonstrate that that is there a reasonable degree of likelihood that he has, or will be perceived, as having converted to Christianity, holding a genuine belief in the Christian religion and all that that entails.
19. As was the case before the Judge at first instance, the facts of the Appellant’s baptism in August 2023 and the Appellant’s attendance at Church during the period confirmed by Pastor H, namely from when he was introduced to the Church by X on 18th June 2023 and until he stopped attending after 7th January 2024, are not in dispute. What is contested before us by the Respondent is whether the Appellant’s motivation to convert and stated beliefs in the Christian religion are genuine, i.e. in good faith or merely to support a means of securing permission to stay in the UK. The other issue that is contested by the Respondent is whether the Appellant continued to attend Church after 7th January 2024. We turn to consider both of these issues against the lower standard of proof applicable to Article 3 ECHR claims that has not been affected by s.32 of the 2022 Act.
Has the Appellant attended the Church Centre since 7th January 2024 ?
20. The date of 7th January 2024 is significant because this is the date that Pastor H confirmed directly to the Respondent in his e-mail of 19th February 2024 that the Appellant had stopped attending his Church. As per our summary above, the FtT did not accept the Appellant’s explanation as to why he had not attended since nor the Appellant’s evidence that he had resumed attending. In particular noting the lack of corroborative evidence to this effect, when this was reasonable to expect the Appellant to obtain considering the centrality of this issue to the Appellant’s appeal.
21. As part of his evidence before us, the Appellant relies on two further letters from the Church Centre. The first is dated 14th September 2025 and written by AE (name anonymised), who has three positions to his name: Retired Senior Associate Solicitor, Birmingham, Associate Pastor of Church Centre and Trustee of a Christian Church Centre (names anonymised). This letter confirms that the author met the Appellant through his attendance at church since he first attended on 18th June 2023 and has attended on Sunday since then. The author also gives further information as to the different type of church meetings and prayer and bible-reading activities, also stating that the Sunday meetings are recorded and posted to a church WhatsApp group, which the Appellant belongs to. The author also records in this letter that the Appellant has a Facebook page where he posts teachings and scriptures from the Bible as well as songs. Lastly, the author states that there are many Iranian and Kurds at the Church and the Appellant has the opportunity to speak Kurdish and to get to know fellow Kurdish Christians and grow in his faith.
22. The second letter is dated 8th September 2025 and is from Pastor H. For ease, we extract the content of the letter that applies to the Appellant, omitting the first paragraph which provides the same biographical information that Pastor H provided in his previous letter. This reads as follows (emphasis and punctuation original; names replaced in brackets for purposes of anonymity):
“Further to my previous letters I am pleased to...
.... confirm that (‘X’) who is a member of (the) church, introduced (the Appellant) to our church on 18th June 2023.
He has regularly and faithfully attended worship and after attending the weekly teaching on the basics of Christianity together with the believers baptism preparation class and we were confident of his belief as a Christian he was baptised as a believer on 13th August 2023 in (the) Church in the presence of the members.
His faith in God & Jesus Christ has given him a new hope and confidence for life.
Since moving to Plymouth he has continued to regularly join with us each month.
I believe (the Appellant’s) profession of faith in Christ Jesus to be genuine. I have found him to be honest, pleasant and of good character and I would support his application to stay in the UK knowing that he will make a good contribution to society in the future.”
23. Neither author was called as a witness by the Appellant.
24. Ms Simbi asked questions of the Appellant in cross-examination including how the letters were obtained. The Appellant explained that he had asked both authors for support, they then wrote and gave him their respective letters and he passed these on to his solicitor. The Appellant was also asked whether or not he had asked either AH or Pastor H to attend the hearing as witnesses and the Appellant replied that both “no longer attend court to support anyone”. The Appellant did not know the reason for this.
25. Ms Simbi also put to the Appellant that Pastor H’s signature in the letter dated 8th September 2025 was one that had been scanned into the letter – this was visible on her printed copy where it could be seen that a text box or a picture of the signature had been inserted. The Appellant stated in response that the letter contained Pastor H’s e-mail address and the Respondent could contact him to ask him directly. Should she do so, the Appellant stated that the Respondent will find out that the letter is genuine.
26. In relation to the second letter, Ms Simbi asked the Appellant whether he had spoken to the other Kurdish Christians whom AH had referred to. The Appellant confirmed having been introduced to them by X. The Appellant maintained that he was only friends with X and was not close to the other Kurdish Christians who attended the Church.
27. Ms Simbi asked about the Appellant’s move to Plymouth - this had been referred to by Pastor H in this letter as can be seen from para 23 above. The Appellant first responded that he lived with X there and when asked when he had moved, the Appellant responded that he had not moved to Plymouth but goes there and stays with X occasionally. When asked how often he attended the Church Centre, which is located in Birmingham, the Appellant state that he did so every week if he can but sometimes, he attends every two weeks as he cannot always afford the bus fare. Ms Simbi asked whether the Appellant continued to live in Birmingham and the Appellant corrected Ms Simbi confirming that he lived in Derby. The Appellant explained that Pastor H must have misunderstood where he lived as X lives in Plymouth, not him, and he had told Pastor H that he lived in Derby. The Appellant maintained that he attended the Church in Birmingham as previously stated, namely every week and if not every two weeks.
28. We have considered the totality of the Appellant’s evidence very carefully but conclude that, even on the lower standard of proof, this is not sufficient for us to be satisfied that the Appellant has demonstrated that it is reasonably likely that he has continued to attend Church as claimed.
29. The Appellant has been aware that this issue has been disputed ever since the Respondent’s decision dated 28th February 2024. Furthermore, he has been aware of the reasons why the previous FtT judge did not accept his claim, on the balance of probabilities, and the reasons why, since the decision was promulgated on 6th January 2025. This includes being on notice that Pastor H had confirmed to the Respondent on 19th February 2024 that the Appellant had not attended Church since 7th January 2024 – a copy of Pastor H’s e-mail was disclosed by the Respondent in her FtT appeal bundle.
30. In support of his appeal at first instance, the Appellant had obtained a further letter from Pastor H dated 5th August 2024 but importantly this did not address the earlier e-mail to the Respondent from Pastor H nor confirm the Appellant’s attendance since 7th January 2024. This was noted by the judge at first instance.
31. This appears to have happened again – the Appellant has obtained a third letter from Pastor H, as we have summarised and extracted at para 23 but this also does not address the concerns that were plainly expressed by the judge at first instance about the lack of information previously provided by Pastor H. The most recent letter of Pastor H is effectively in the same terms as his letter of 5th August 2024 save for this sentence and the punctuation appearing above the second paragraph:
“Further to my previous letters I am pleased to...
....”
32. Whilst it may be correct that neither Pastor H nor AH no longer attend immigration appeal hearings of their Church members, we do not consider that the Appellant has addressed the concerns with the lack of information that remains from Pastor H and now from AH. Their respective confirmation of the Appellant’s attendance at Church is in general terms only and devoid of any reference to the concerns held by the first instance judge. We accept Mr Brooks’ submission that Pastor H, with his experience in the Church and his reference to having supported other Kurdish Iranians’ journey into conversion and the Christian faith, places him in good stead for being able to assess whether a person seeking conversion, and indeed a person who has converted, is sincere. Such experience however does not permit in our view to make general assertions without addressing prior concerns.
33. We acknowledge, as did the Respondent in her review, that written and oral evidence from “church witnesses” is potentially significant in cases of Christian conversion - see TF & MA v SSHD [2018] CSIH 58). Mr Brooks placed much emphasis on this guidance however there is no oral evidence before us from such witnesses and we have concerns over the written evidence for the reasons stated above. On this basis therefore, we can only attach very limited weight to both of these letters.
34. We also consider it reasonable to expect the Appellant to have obtained further or other supporting evidence of his attendance at Church and of his involvement more generally with the Christian faith and Church. This includes the Appellant’s friend X, who has featured quite heavily in the Appellant’s claim and the letters from the Church Centre as being the one who introduced the Appellant. We have no reasonable explanation as to why there is no attendance from him as a witness, which is surprising considering the concern about this already expressed by the judge at first instance. We consider that Ms Simbi is right to raise concerns over the lack of other witnesses, for example other members of the congregation, whether Kurdish or otherwise, who may have been able to give evidence as to the Appellant’s attendance or discussions with them of his faith. We consider the Respondent’s concerns to be reasonable.
Does the Appellant hold genuine Christian beliefs and does he genuinely practice the Christian faith ?
35. The same concerns that we have set out above in relation to the Appellant’s evidence as to church attendance can be reiterated of the Appellant’s own evidence of his claimed faith. He has not put forward any further written statement to address the concerns held by the judge at first instance, and which he was on notice of – these having been preserved by this Tribunal following the hearing on 23rd May 2025. The only witness statements before us date from 7th August 2024 and 6th November 2023, both prior to the last FtT hearing. There is a dearth of evidence explaining, from the Appellant’s point of view, what motivated him to convert and what he claims continues to motivate him to openly or publicly practice the Christian faith, so as to place him at risk on return.
36. For the reasons above and in light of the paucity of evidence from the Appellant on these two issues, we remain satisfied that the Appellant has not discharged the burden of proof, even on the lower applicable standard, to show that he genuinely holds beliefs and genuinely practices the Christian faith.
Assessment of risk on return
37. Following our findings set out above, we are satisfied that the UK’s obligations would not be engaged under Article 3 ECHR because it is not reasonably likely that the Appellant would seek to practice the Christian faith on return to Iran.
38. It remains for us to determine whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that the Appellant would experience serious harm contrary to Article 3 on return for being perceived by the Iranian authorities or others on return as a Christian, whether together with or separately to the other characteristics that the Appellant does possess: an illegal exit from Iran, his residence in the UK and his Kurdish ethnicity.
39. With regards to a perception of the Appellant as a Christian, this is only reasonably likely to arise as a result of the Appellant’s Facebook posts, which share content relating to the Christian religion. In this respect, we must consider the guidance given by the Upper Tribunal in XX v SSHD (PJAK – sur place activities – Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 23 (IAC) at [100]-[102] in particular. This passage states as follows:
“100. Instead, in deciding the issue of risk on return involving a Facebook account, a decision maker may legitimately consider whether a person will close a Facebook account and not volunteer the fact of a previously closed Facebook account, prior to the application for an ETD: HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2011] AC 596. Decision makers are allowed to consider first, what a person will do to mitigate a risk of persecution, and second, the reason for their actions. If the person will refrain from engaging in a particular activity, that may nullify their claim that they would be at risk, unless the reason for their restraint is suppression of a characteristic that they have a right not to be required to suppress, because if the suppression was at the instance of another it might amount to persecution. It is difficult to see circumstances in which the deletion of a Facebook account could equate to persecution in this sense, because there is no fundamental right protected by the Refugee Convention to have access to a particular social media platform, as opposed to the right to political neutrality.
101. The second part of our answer relates to Lord Kerr's concern about whether an analysis of what a person will do is too speculative or artificial an exercise. We accept Mr Jaffey's submission that there may be cases where the exercise is too speculative, particularly in the context of a volatile militia. That is not the case here.
102. We consider that it may be perfectly permissible for a decision maker to ask what a returnee to Iran will do, in relation to a contrived Facebook account or fabricated protection claim. Whether such an inquiry is too speculative needs to be considered on a case-by-case basis, but factors which may point to that question not being impermissibly speculative include: where a person has a past history of destroying material, such as identification documents, or deception or dishonesty in relation to dealings with state officials; whether the government has well-established methods of questioning (in the Iranian state's case, these are well-documented and therefore predictable); and whether the risks around discovery of social media material, prior to account deletion, are minimal, because a personal's social graph or social media activities are limited.”
40. The context before us is the same as that before the Upper Tribunal in XX, namely Iran. Thus, applying the factors that are listed at [102] of XX to this appeal, we find as follows:
(a) We are not aware of the Appellant having a past history of destroying material;
(b) We, and several other judges before us, have found the Appellant not to have demonstrated his claim to have converted to and to practice the Christian religion in good faith. This leads us to the inevitable conclusion that this claim was raised and has been pursued by the Appellant in order to secure a means of remaining in the UK;
(c) As was the case in XX, the authorities in Iran have well-established methods of questioning;
(d) The risks around discovery of the Appellant’s social media material, prior to its account deletion, are in our view minimal. The Appellant has not provided his full download of his Facebook account, in compliance with the guidance contained on this issue also in XX. From the content that has been disclosed within these proceedings, namely at first instance, which amounts to approximately 50 pages, the Appellant has 49 ‘friends’. These pages do not clearly confirm whether or not the Appellant’s profile was set to ‘public’ or a more ‘private’ setting but against many of the posts published by the Appellant (but not all), there appears the globe symbol, which we have judicial notice indicates a more public setting for those particular posts.
From our consideration of these posts in printed form in the consolidated bundle, it does not appear that these attracted many, if any, ‘likes’, ‘comments’ or ‘shares’. If we are wrong in this respect, nor was any information to show otherwise provided by the Appellant. The printed screenshots of the Appellant’s Facebook account include posts up to 2024 but not later. The Appellant did not seek to submit updating evidence as to his Facebook account for the purposes of the re-making hearing. This is despite the Tribunal permitting either party to file and serve any further evidence upon which they wished to rely for the re-making hearing.
This leads us to conclude that the Appellant’s presence on the “social graph”, so to speak, is low.
41. We remind ourselves of the guidance in XX at [103] that “(d)iscovery of material critical of the Iranian regime on Facebook, even if contrived, may make a material difference to the risk faced by someone returning to Iran.” As we know, the material posted by the Appellant is not critical of the Iranian regime but displaying instead Christian religious content.
42. The Respondent has accepted that the background evidence and relevant country guidance confirms that those who have converted to Christianity are likely to be at risk of persecution and those who seek to openly practice their faith would face such a risk - PS (Christianity - risk) Iran CG [2020] UKUT 00046. This country guidance decision also instructs on the approach to take with regards to those who are found to be insincere in their conversion. At head-note para 4, the Upper Tribunal gave the following guidance in PS:
“4. In cases where the claimant is found to be insincere in his or her claimed conversion, there is not a real risk of persecution ‘in-country’. There being no reason for such an individual to associate himself with Christians, there is not a real risk that he would come to the adverse attention of the Iranian authorities. Decision-makers must nevertheless consider the possible risks arising at the ‘pinch point’ of arrival:
i) All returning failed asylum seekers are subject to questioning on arrival, and this will include questions about why they claimed asylum;
ii) A returnee who divulges that he claimed to be a Christian is reasonably likely to be transferred for further questioning;
iii) The returnee can be expected to sign an undertaking renouncing his claimed Christianity. The questioning will therefore in general be short and will not entail a real risk of ill-treatment;
iv) If there are any reasons why the detention becomes prolonged, the risk of ill-treatment will correspondingly rise. Factors that could result in prolonged detention must be determined on a case by case basis. They could include but are not limited to:
a) Previous adverse contact with the Iranian security services;
b) Connection to persons of interest to the Iranian authorities;
c) Attendance at a church with perceived connection to Iranian house churches;
d) Overt social media content indicating that the individual concerned has actively promoted Christianity.
43. This guidance also needs to be considered together with the guidance in XX concerning Facebook published material. Applying the two sets of country guidance therefore to the Appellant’s circumstances, we find as follows:
(i) The Appellant can be reasonably expected to close his Facebook account and to do so in good time – see [103] of XX that closure of a Facebook account 30 days before an ETD is applied for will make a material difference to the risk faced by someone returning to Iran, who has a “critical” Facebook account. The timely closure of an account neutralises the risk consequential on having had such an account, provided that someone's Facebook account was not specifically monitored prior to closure. We do not consider that it is reasonably likely that the authorities will have been monitoring the Appellant’s Facebook account, neither did the Appellant seek to argue otherwise;
(ii) Following the guidance in PS, the Appellant can reasonably be expected to sign an undertaking renouncing his claimed Christianity, should the latter have been disclosed when questioned on return as to why the Appellant was in the UK and the basis of any asylum claim mase. As per the guidance in PS, the questioning is reasonably likely to be short and will not entail a real risk of ill-treatment. Apart from asserting that the Appellant will be at real risk of ill-treatment upon the authorities becoming aware of the basis of the Appellant’s protection claim in the UK, the Appellant has not addressed the country guidance in PS nor has he sought to place any background or expert evidence seeking to justify any departure from this guidance;
(iii) We have reminded ourselves of the guidance in PS that if there are any reasons why the detention becomes prolonged in the Appellant’s case on return, the risk of ill-treatment will correspondingly rise. We have consequently considered the factors list at para 4(iv) of PS as they may apply to the Appellant:
(a) Previous adverse contact with the Iranian security services – this does not apply as any claim to this effect has not been accepted by previous judges. Neither has the Appellant sought to argue otherwise before us;
(b) Connection to persons of interest to the Iranian authorities – as above;
(c) Attendance at a church with perceived connection to Iranian house churches – this does not apply since the Appellant’s conversion and claimed interest in Christianity dates from 2023 and in the UK only. Neither has the Appellant claimed to have made any connections with other practicing Christians residing in Iran;
(d) Overt social media content indicating that the individual concerned has actively promoted Christianity – this is relevant but is addressed above at (i). It is reasonable to expect the Appellant’s social media content to no longer be in circulation by the time of any proposed return of the Appellant to Iran or by the time of any arrangements being made in preparation for the same.
44. We also consider in tandem the other factors that the Appellant has raised, which he states give rise to a reasonable likelihood that he will be of interest and at risk of serious harm at the ‘pinch point’ on return. In PS, the Upper Tribunal reiterated at [20] that in HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 00430 (IAC) it was found at [26] (of HB) “that the human rights situation in Iran could be “taken as read”, so well-documented and uncontested is the evidence that the record of the regime in that regard is extremely poor.”
45. The country guidance case of HB instructs that “(s)ince 2016 the Iranian authorities have become increasingly suspicious of, and sensitive to, Kurdish political activity. Those of Kurdish ethnicity are thus regarded with even greater suspicion than hitherto and are reasonably likely to be subjected to heightened scrutiny on return to Iran.” However and importantly for this case, the Upper Tribunal also found that “the mere fact of being a returnee of Kurdish ethnicity with or without a valid passport, and even if combined with illegal exit, does not create a risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment.”
46. The Upper Tribunal also identified that Kurdish ethnicity is nevertheless a risk factor which, when combined with other factors, may create a real risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment. We have considered those other factors very carefully but none of these apply to the Appellant. He has not claimed to have resided for any period in the KRI (factor listed at para (6) of the headnote in HB) and he has not been involved or is not reasonably likely to be perceived as having been involved in Kurdish political groups or activity as per the findings of previous judges that we have not been asked to depart from (factors at para (7)-(10)). Mr Brooks placed emphasis on the ‘hair-trigger’ approach of the Iranian authorities but the guidance on this in HB is in the context of the authorities’ suspicion of those involved, or perceived to be involved, in Kurdish political activities or support for Kurdish rights. This was not guidance that followed through to the Iranian authorities’ suspicion or interest in those who are perceived as practicing the Christian faith and the Appellant has not placed any background or other evidence to demonstrate otherwise.
47. In light of the above, we are not satisfied that the Appellant’s claim to be at risk of serious harm on return to Iran, on the lower standard of proof, that applies, has been made out and his appeal stands to be dismissed on all grounds.
Notice of Decision
48. The decision of the FtT dated 6th January 2025 did involve the making of material error(s) of law and has been set aside, pursuant to the earlier decision of DUTJ Walsh dated 1st July 2025.
49. We re-make the decision by dismissing DM’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision of 28th February 2024 on all grounds.

Sarah Pinder

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

09.01.2026

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000781

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/56225/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
01.07.25
…………………………………

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WALSH

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

DM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant (SSHD): Ms. A. Ahmed
For the Respondent: Mr. I. Ali, counsel, instructed by Equity Solicitors

Heard at Field House on 23 May 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal by the Secretary of State for the Home Department against a decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Suffield-Thompson (“the judge”) dated 6 January 2025 allowing the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal on 28 February 2024 of his protection claim made on 21 November 2023.
2. For ease of reference, I will refer to the parties as they were at First-tier Tribunal.
3. The Appellant is a national of Iran and of Kurdish ethnicity. He arrived in the UK on 20 November 2019 and claimed asylum the following day. The basis of that claim was that he would be at risk of persecution on return owing to events in Iran related to the KDPI that brought about his flight. In addition he relied on and his attendance in the UK at three demonstrations posted on Facebook together with anti-government posts.
4. First-tier Tribunal Judge Alis refused the appellant’s appeal in a decision dated 3 June 2023. The appellant’s application to appeal against this decision was refused on 17 July 2023.
5. The appellant made further submissions to the respondent claiming that whilst in the UK he had converted to Christianity and claimed that he would be at risk of persecution due to this conversion and related social media posts.
First-tier Tribunal Decision
6. At [15]-[16] the judge set out the procedural history of the case and the previous decision. The judge determined that as the appellant’s further submissions were based on a totally different set of circumstances, they were able to consider the submissions as a fresh claim and therefore not bound by the previous findings, referencing the principles in Devaseelan [2002] UKIAT 00702.
7. At [17] the judge identified the issues to be decided as “a) whether he was entitled to asylum as a genuine Christian convert and b) whether he is entitled to a grant of humanitarian protection on the basis that due to his claims to be politically active (in his last appeal) and now his new convert claim in this appeal that these factors along with his ethnicity, and illegal exit would place him at risk of authorities on return whether or not his claims are true.”
8. At [18]-[35] the judge considered the evidence as to whether the appellant was a genuine convert and concluded he was not, rejecting his claim for asylum on the convention ground of religious beliefs.
9. At [36] the judge states: “I accept that his FB evidence does not meet the threshold as set out in the case of XX PJAK- (sur place activities-Facebook) Iran [2022] UKUT 23 (IAC) and I do not find that alone they would place him at risk but I do find that they are of significance in his overall claim for HP.
10. The judge went on to consider the appellant’s claim for humanitarian protection at [39] – [41] finding that the combination of factors of his ethnicity, his illegal exit, the bases of his two protection claims and his Facebook posts will mean he would be at risk on return of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR.
Grounds of Appeal
11. The grounds of challenge can be summarised as follows:
a. The judge failed to provide adequate reasons for departing from the findings in the previous decision contrary to the principles in Devasaleen.
b. The judge’s finding that the appellant is entitled to humanitarian protection is perverse and involves a material misdirection in law in that:
i. The judge’s conclusion that the appellant would be at risk on return due to his Facebook postings at [41] is at odds with a previous finding at [36] that they would not do so and effectively, having rejected the appellant’s asylum claim, the judge went on to grant humanitarian protection on sur place/Convention grounds.
ii. The judge failed to apply the Country Guidance as having rejected the appellant’s alleged conversion to Christianity and no making findings that the appellant holds a genuine political opinion, as per XX, the appellant could be expected to delete his Facebook account.
The Hearing
12. The hearing was conducted remotely with both Ms. Ahmed and Mr. Ali attending via CVP.
13. I had before me a bundle consisting of 299 pages. Included in the bundle was the previous decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Alis. There had been no Rule 15 or Rule 24 notices served. The appellant filed a skeleton argument on 22 May 2024 .
14. Ms. Ahmed relied on the grounds of appeal. In submissions she argued that the judge failed to follow Devaseelan principles, reaffirmed in Patel [2022] EWCA Civ 36 that prior findings should be the starting point unless cogent evidence justifies departure therefrom. The appellant’s conversion to Christianity was found not to be genuine and there was no challenge to earlier adverse credibility findings. There has been no cross appeal. The judge’s brief reasoning at [39] – [41] lacked sufficient analysis or clear engagement with the relevance country guidance and prior findings. The judge’s finding that the appellant faced risk on return lacked an adequate explanation and they did not clearly distinguish between asylum and humanitarian protection grounds. Ms. Ahmed submitted that the judge made a material misdirection by allowing the claim on humanitarian protection despite rejecting the asylum on religious persecution grounds. Ms. Ahmed urged me to set aside the decision and remit for a new hearing with all factual findings preserved except for those related to sur place activities.
15. Mr. Ali apologised for the delayed service of the appellant’s skeleton argument explaining that the legal team had only recently been instructed. He submitted that the judge had properly considered the cumulative risk factors (Kurdish ethnicity, political activity, and religious expression). The judge had justifiably departed from the previous decision due to the new cogent evidence of Facebook posts related to his claimed religious conversion. He emphasised that the case of Danian [1999] EWCA Civ 3000, referred to by the judge, which confirms that protection is available even where political or religious activity is found not to be genuine as it is the perception by the authorities which matters. Mr. Ali pointed to the accepted evidence that the appellant attended three demonstrations and had posted pro-Kurdish content on Facebook previously and more recently had posted Christian content. He submitted the judge properly consider the heightened sensitivity of the Iranian authorities to Kurdish activists and converts. He argued that the previous adverse credibility findings did not negate the appellant’s risk on return. The arguments on behalf of the respondent did not engage with the full context of the evidence and was legally and factually inadequate. The judge had explained their reasons and had access to updated evidence. The judge’s findings, Mr. Ali submitted, were with in the range of lawful decisions.
Discussion
16. I will address the grounds together as there is a significant degree of overlap.
17. I start by reminding myself of the guidance in Devaseelan and in particular at [39]:
(1) The first Adjudicator’s determination should always be the starting-point. It is the authoritative assessment of the Appellant’s status at the time it was made. In principle issues such as whether the Appellant was properly represented, or whether he gave evidence, are irrelevant to this.
(2) Facts happening since the first Adjudicator’s determination can always be taken into account by the second Adjudicator. If those facts lead the second Adjudicator to the conclusion that, at the date of his determination and on the material before him, the appellant makes his case, so be it. The previous decision, on the material before the first Adjudicator and at that date, is not inconsistent.
18. I also bear in mind that the authorities are clear, that whilst the previous determination should always be the starting point, it is not necessarily the end point per Davis LJ states in Patel at [31]:
The essential position is that the second FTT judge cannot be subject to any principles of estoppel in relation to an earlier finding. Rather, the judge must conscientiously decide the case in front of them applying principles of fairness. Those principles include the potential unfairness of requiring a party to re-litigate a point on which they have previously succeeded. These propositions were drawn from Devaseelan , Djebbar v SSHD [2004] EWCA Civ 804 and BK (Afghanistan).
19. At [16] that the judge states their reasons for not being “bound by the previous findings” as the “totally different set of circumstances” of the appellant’s new claim.
20. The judge does not define the “totally different set of circumstances” in that paragraph but goes on to set out the issues at [17] as the whether the appellant should be granted asylum as a Christian convert or humanitarian protection on the basis of a combination of his previous claim to have been politically active, his current claim of conversion, his illegal exit and Kurdish ethnicity.
21. Obviously, the appellant’s new claim to be a Christian convert and related Facebook posts are a totally different set of circumstances falling within the ambit of guideline (2).
22. His claim to be politically active, however, is not as the judge acknowledges , having been the subject of the previous appeal. Nor are the factors of his ethnicity and illegal exit new circumstances.
23. As urged upon me by Mr. Ali and as may be inferred from [39], it appears that the that the “totally different circumstances” are that there are now two rather than just one Convention based claims and the combination of factors together now justify a departure from Judge Ali’s determination that the appellant was not at risk on return. In theory, that may also fall within the ambit of Guideline (2).
24. The difficulty arises, however, in the judge’s treatment of the appellant’s sur place activities.
25. Firstly, the judge seems to have created a false dichotomy in defining the issues at [17]. I do not understand why the judge did not consider whether the appellant was entitled to asylum on sur place grounds rather than solely assessing this aspect of his claim in the context of humanitarian protection. This was highlighted in the decision granting permission to appeal. In the appellant’s skeleton argument it is averred that any error in the grant of humanitarian protection is not material as the judge could have allowed the appeal on asylum for the same reasons. That submission in my view misses the point that the judge did not undertake an analysis in the context of the asylum regime and is arguably a misdirection in law. As such it is surprising that this was not raised in a Rule 24 notice. However, as will be seen, I have decided the matter on different grounds and it is not necessary to consider this plank of the appeal further.
26. With respect to the judge’s consideration of the appellant’s sur place political activities, the subject of the previous appeal, the judge notes at [15] and [40] an apparent contradiction in Judge Alis’ findings stating there was a finding that the appellant was a “low level supporter in Iran”1 but later finding that the appellant only attended demonstrations in the UK to bolster his claim.
27. It is not clear to me what significance, if any, the judge attaches to this apparent discrepancy and whether or to what extent it formed part of the rationale to depart from the previous determination as to the risk on return.
28. Although it was not clear to me reading Judge Alis’s decision in full whether this is in fact a discrepancy, it could have been argued that the discrepancy fell within the BK Afghanistan principles for departing from findings. Such an approach is undermined, however by the fact that what the judge did not and could not do is make their own findings on whether or not the appellant is a genuine supporter as no new evidence was adduced to support that claim. As will be seen this is critical to the judge’s treatment of the appellant’s Facebook posts.
29. Similarly, it appears that the judge may also be relying on Danian, not referred to in Judge Alis’ decision, as further justification to depart from Judge Alis’ ultimate finding that the appellant was not at risk on return.
30. The full rationale for departing from the starting point of Judge Alis’ findings is therefore not entirely clear.
31. The main difficulty with the decision however is that the judge seems to departed from Judge Alis’ ultimate finding without engaging with specific findings upon which his determination is based. In particular, the judge does not address Judge Alis’ finding; with reference to the Headnotes in XX set out in full, that the appellant could delete his Facebook account on the basis that his sur place political activism was not genuine.
32. Headnote 9 of XX provides as follow:
In deciding the issue of risk on return involving a Facebook account, a decision maker may legitimately consider whether a person will close a Facebook account and not volunteer the fact of a previously closed Facebook account, prior to application for an ETD: HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2011] AC 596. Decision makers are allowed to consider first, what a person will do to mitigate a risk of persecution, and second, the reason for their actions. It is difficult to see circumstances in which the deletion of a Facebook account could equate to persecution, as there is no fundamental right protected by the Refugee Convention to have access to a particular social media platform, as opposed to the right to political neutrality. Whether such an inquiry is too speculative needs to be considered on a case-by-case basis
33. At [41] the judge states “He will be asked for his internet account, and has posted both political posts and Christian posts on his sites.”
34. This finding is inconsistent with the finding of Judge Alis and suggests the judge did not have in mind Headnote 9 and the possibility of the appellant deleting his account.
35. This is surprising as the judge made a finding at [36] that the appellant’s Facebook evidence linked to his stated conversion alone does not “meet the threshold“ in XX to place him at risk on return.
36. I am unable to understand how the judge came to the finding in [41] having apparently found, like Judge Alis in respect of political sur place activities, that the appellant did not have a profile what would have brought him to the attention of the authorities and therefore could have, in accordance with XX, deleted his Facebook account. There is no justification for departing from Judge Alis’ finding that the appellant could delete his account, it is simply not dealt with at all.
37. I am therefore drawn to the conclusion that the judge did not properly engage with or apply the Country Guidance in XX nor indeed have proper regard to Judge Alis’s full decision.
38. I find that the judge failed to provide adequate reasons for departing from previous findings in relation to the risk arising from appellant’s sur place activities and in particular the possibility of deleting Facebook posts departure and that failure demonstrates a failure to engage with the relevant Country Guidance.
39. I find that these failures constitute a material error of law.
Notice of Decision
40. The decision of the First-tier involves the making of an error of law and is to be set aside and remade in the Upper Tribunal.
Directions
41. Having heard from the parties and considering the principles in Begum and the Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC) and given the nature of the error of law found, it is appropriate for the Upper Tribunal to retain jurisdiction and remake the decision.
42. I have considered the representations of the parties and the principles in AB (preserved FtT findings; Wisniewski principles) Iraq [2020] UKUT 00268 (IAC). The findings in respect of the appellant’s conversion to Christianity at [18]-[35] are preserved.
43. Parties have permission to rely on evidence that was not before the First-tier Tribunal. Any such evidence must be filed with the Upper Tribunal and served on the other party at least fourteen days before the resumed hearing.
44. No later than 7 days before the hearing, the appellant must provide to the Upper Tribunal and the respondent any skeleton argument upon which they intend to rely.
45. No later than 3 days before the hearing, the respondent must provide to the Upper Tribunal and the appellant any skeleton argument upon which they intend to rely.
46. No later than 14 days before the hearing, any request for the Upper Tribunal to provide an interpreter is to be made in writing, stating clearly the language and any specific dialect required.

Martha Walsh
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

17 June 2025