The decision



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000782

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/55831/2024
LP/06422/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 6th of June 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SAINI

Between

IG
(ANONYMITY direction MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr D Bazini, instructed by AA Immigration Lawyers
For the Respondent: Mr S Walker, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer


Heard at Field House on 24th April 2025


Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.



DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant, a citizen of Tajikistan, appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Webb, promulgated on 13th January 2025, dismissing his appeal against the decision to refuse his protection and human rights claims.
2. The Appellant applied for permission to appeal which was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Parkes in the following terms:
1. The application is in time.
2. The grounds argue that the Judge made contradictory findings stating the case was assessed looking forward rather than if the Appellant had a fear and finding the Appellant did currently have a fear, erred in find[ing] the Appellant would shave voluntarily, wrongly found the Appellant evasive. It is argued that the findings on the Appellant's belief with regard to a beard were contradictory.
3. It is arguable that the Judge may have erred in the approach to what the Appellant regarded as a fundamental belief and his willingness, or otherwise, to shave his beard if returned. All the grounds may be argued.
4. The grounds disclose arguable errors of law and permission to appeal is granted.
3. The Respondent did not file a Rule 24 response; however, Mr Walker initially indicated that the appeal was resisted.
Findings
4. Having heard Mr Bazini’s submissions, Mr Walker, on behalf of the Secretary of State, indicated that he was equally unclear how the judge had reached the conclusion that the Appellant would willingly shave off his beard, a characteristic that put him at risk on return. Notwithstanding that observation, we shall consider the grounds for ourselves and set out our findings below.
5. First, the judge accepts at paragraphs 29-32 that the Appellant’s claim is based on a Convention reason, namely the religious belief the state imputes to young men with beards. He further concludes at paragraph 39 that the Appellant has a characteristic that could cause him to fear being persecuted (again, his beard and the religious belief it is said to express). That is a significant finding in the Appellant’s favour as, once the judge determined that he has a genuine subjective fear of being persecuted, it became necessary to establish whether that fear is objectively well-founded.
6. To that, we note it was conceded by the Secretary of State and accepted by the judge at paragraph 14 that, as the Appellant fears the state, there is no protection or internal relocation option if his account is accepted, which it was as we have rehearsed.
7. However, at paragraph 45 of the decision, the judge takes issue with whether or not the Appellant would remove his beard on return to Tajikistan. This is premised upon AIR 45 of the Appellant’s asylum interview. The Appellant complains that the judge has failed to note that although the Appellant said that he would shave off his beard (and thus remove himself from risk on return), he would only do so because if he is sent back, he would have “no options” but to shave it off. The judge states that the Appellant was “evasive” when this was put to him in cross-examination. However, it is impossible to discern why the judge characterises the responses as evasive and in any event no reasons are given for finding his responses to be evasive. This points to an unclear decision which the losing party cannot objectively comprehend. At paragraph 46, the judge then finds that the response in his interview is the “true position” but, as noted above, the response given in interview is inconclusive because although the Appellant answers that he would shave off his beard, he also states this is because he would have “no options”. Thus, the judge has failed to assess whether the Appellant is shaving off his beard because of “social pressures” or due to a “fear of being persecuted” in analogy with the approach recommended by Lord Roger at [82] of HJ (Iran) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 31. Or, as Lord Roger succinctly put it, “If, on the other hand, the tribunal concludes that the applicant would in fact live discreetly and so avoid persecution, it must go on to ask itself why he would do so”. Thus, we find that this represents inadequate and incomplete reasoning in relation to the key issue of why the Appellant is willing to shave his beard on return to Tajikistan. If he wears a beard out of religious conviction but will conform for reasons of securing his safety, he may be entitled to international protection. If, however, he would conform because of social or other pressures, or simply because wearing a beard is not an act of faith for him, and not because of the risk of persecution, then he may not be a refugee.
8. We further note that at paragraphs 50-52 of the decision, the judge discusses “inconsistencies” in the Appellant’s evidence which lead to an adverse credibility finding. However, notwithstanding that the judge follows an unstructured and chaotic approach to the protection claim, there is only one clear inconsistency that we noted and not “many” as stated by the judge. In case we had misread or misplaced the inconsistencies located at the page references mentioned by the judge, we asked Mr Walker to clarify where the “many” inconsistencies which led to the adverse credibility finding could be seen; however, Mr Walker was unable to point to anything but the one inconsistency explicitly noted by the judge which was flagged in the Respondent’s Review. Therefore, it is unclear where the “many” inconsistencies can be seen, and as they are unreferenced and unillustrated, the only inconsistency we have noted relates to an embellishment of the mistreatment meted out to the Appellant by the authorities whilst detained. Thus, had the judge noted that there was only one, as opposed to “many” inconsistencies, we find that he may have adhered more closely to the self-direction mentioned at paragraph 42 of the decision wherein the judge notes that “(i)n assessing credibility, I remind myself that an individual may tell lies about some aspects of their case but may be telling the truth about others” or put another way, “(i)t is perfectly possible for an adjudicator to believe that a witness is not telling the truth about some matters, has exaggerated the story to make his case better, or is simply uncertain about matters, but still to be persuaded that the centre piece of the story stands. This is particularly so where the critical criterion for an adjudicator is the reasonable likelihood of persecution occurring were a person to return to a particular country”: see Chiver (Asylum; Discrimination; Employment; Persecution) (Romania) [1994] UKIAT 10758, for illustration.
9. Aside from the above, we also note that the judge has failed to consider the objective risk to the Appellant by reference to the background material before him. Mr Bazini took us to several examples in the Appellant’s Bundle which pointed to torture and mistreatment remaining widespread, arbitrary arrest being commonplace, thousands of Tajik men having their beards forcibly shaved and being fingerprinted and recorded by the authorities etc.. Thus, these examples of background material before the judge were relevant to, and should have informed, his assessment of whether the Appellant was at risk on return as well as the likelihood of whether the Appellant would feel compelled to shave due to fear, but they find no mention in the decision.
10. In light of our above findings, we find the above complaints establish material errors of law in the judge’s decision, requiring it be set aside in its entirety.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside for material error of law.
There has been no challenge to the First-tier Tribunal’s finding at [36] that the Tajik authorities impute religious beliefs to men with beards and may subject them to mistreatment.
The appeal is remitted to the FTT for a fresh hearing on all other issues, before any judge other than Judge Webb.


P. Saini

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber


28 May 2025