Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000788
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65118/2023
LP/03670/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 9 September 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KIRK

Between

NM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr I Hussain, Counsel instructed by Lei Dat & Baig Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S McKenzie, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 9 June 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant claims he is a national of Syria. He had appealed under the provisions of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 against the Respondent’s decision dated 4 December 2023 to refuse his protection claim made on 24 September 2021.
2. In a decision which was promulgated on 4 January 2025, following a hearing in the First-tier Tribunal on 3 January 2025, Judge Farrelly (‘the Judge’) dismissed the Appellant’s appeal (‘the Decision’).
3. On 15 February 2025, First-tier Tribunal Judge Parkes granted the Appellant permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal.
Anonymity
4. The Tribunal considers that it is appropriate to maintain the anonymity order made by the First-tier Tribunal in light of the circumstances of the Appellant’s protection claims. No party asked for it to be set aside.
Background and claim
5. The Appellant claims he of Kurdish ethnicity and is from a small village in north-eastern Syria. He did not attend school and is illiterate. He claims he worked as a shepherd for his maternal uncle. His parents are deceased, and his maternal uncle now lives in Iraq. The Appellant and his younger brother FM arrived in the United Kingdom on 24 September 2021 and both claimed asylum. FM’s asylum claim was successful.
6. The Appellant claims that in October 2019, he and his brother were approached by members of the Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (People’s Defence Units) (YPG), a US-backed Kurdish group in Syria, who asked that they join the group. They did not wish to do so, but they agreed due to a fear they would be seized and forcibly recruited if they did not join voluntarily. Ten days later, the Appellant’s uncle informed him that members of the YPG had been to his home looking for him and his brother. They decided to flee Syria and they travelled to Turkey where they remained for around 10 months. They then travelled to Bulgaria and remained there for about three months. They then made their way to Italy where they remained for approximately three months until they travelled to France where they stayed for about two months before crossing the channel by boat.
7. The Respondent refused the Appellant’s asylum claim on 4 December 2023. It was not accepted that the Appellant is a Syrian national. International biometric checks revealed the Appellant had made three unsuccessful applications in Iraq between August and October 2018 for a visa to travel to the United States using an Iraqi passport in his name.
8. The Appellant claims that he would be at risk on return to Syria due to potential reprisals from the YPG and/or the Syrian state, who are likely to persecute him as a suspected political opponent.
First-tier Tribunal decision
9. The Judge found the Appellant’s claim that he did not realise he was in Iraq when he made the visa applications for a US visa in 2018 to be ‘an incredible suggestion’ (at [11)]. The biometric checks revealed that the visa applications were made in Erbil, and the Appellant was photographed on three different occasions. The Judge ‘fail[ed] to comprehend how it can be suggested [the Appellant] was unaware of his surroundings or the lead up to his arrival.’ (at [11]).
10. The Judge noted that the Appellant’s explanation that his uncle applied for an Iraqi passport for him and he was unaware of this. His Honour referred to Ahmed (Tanveer) (Documents Unreliable and forged) [2002] UKIT 00439 which considered ‘forged' documents, and distinguished between those that ‘are false in that they are not made by whoever purports to be the author and the information they contain is wholly or partially untrue’ and those which ‘are “genuine” to the extent that they emanate from a proper source, in the proper form, on the proper paper, with the proper seals, but the information they contain is wholly or partially untrue.’ (at [12]). Her Honour considered that ‘[t]here is a need to differentiate between form and content; that is whether a document is properly issued by the purported author and whether the contents are true.’ These are ‘separate questions’ and ‘[i]t is a dangerous oversimplification merely to ask whether a document is “forged” or even “not genuine”’ (at [12]).
11. The Judge stated that she did ‘not have information on any checks carried out by the American authorities on [the Appellant’s] passport.’ Her Honour considered it was ‘reasonably likely that before issuing a visit visa ... there would be fairly intensive scrutiny for security and other factors.’ While the Appellant was refused a visa on three occasions, the reasons for the refusals were unknown. However, there was ‘nothing to indicate [the applications were] rejected on the basis the passport was not considered genuine.’ If the Appellant’s Iraqi passport was considered not to be genuine at the outset, then it would seem ‘improbable’ that ‘two further visa applications would then be made’ (at [13]).
12. Her Honour found it ‘incredible that the appellant's uncle would obtain an Iraqi passport for [him] and take him to be photographed on three occasions without telling him what he was doing.’ She noted that the Iraqi passport was issued on 15 June 2015 and the Appellant’s uncle claims that he was concerned for his nephews’ safety because of the conflict with Turkey and was hoping to get them out of Syria, yet he provided ‘no explanation as to why he did not tell them of this’ (at [15]).
13. The Judge noted that the Appellant had ‘sought to counter the suggestion that he is Iraqi by supplying some documents including a Syrian driving licence in his name and residence documentation’ which he says were sent to him by his uncle. Her Honour noted that ‘it is not possible to forensically examine’ these documents. A statement by the Appellant’s uncle states that ‘he was prepared to obtain an Irai passport and apply for an American visa on a false pretence.’ Her Honour found that ‘[i]f this is correct then his evidence must be treated with caution.’ However, she did ‘not accept the truth of [the uncle’s] claim about his obtaining a passport for the appellant’ and found ‘that the other documents cannot be relied upon, particularly given the acknowledgement that lies have been told’ (at [19]).
14. Her Honour concluded:
“It is my finding that the appellant is an Iraqi national of Kurdish ethnicity. I find the claim made is untrue and does not succeed. I do not accept his claim about events occurring in Syria.
I find it likely on this basis that he has Iraqi documentation or can obtain it. He claims he does not have documentation because he does not accept he is Iraqi.
I see no other basis on which he can remain.”
Permission to appeal to Upper Tribunal
15. The First-tier Tribunal granted permission to appeal on the following grounds
“The grounds argue that the Judge erred in rejecting the Appellant’s credibility with regard to his uncle obtaining the Iraqi passport and not telling the Appellant what he was doing. It is also argued that the Judge erred in the approach to the Appellant's nationality and overlooked evidence that showed that the Appellant is Syrian such as his knowledge of the country and the YPG uniform.
The use of a genuine passport is prima facie evidence of nationality of the issuing country. The fact that the Appellant's brother's application was successful is relevant but not determinative of the Appellant’s case which had to be assessed on the evidence presented. However, the decision does not contain any significant analysis of the Appellant’s other evidence relating to Syria and it is arguable that this might amount to an error on the Judge’s part.
The grounds disclose arguable errors of law and permission to appeal is granted.”
Upper Tribunal hearing and submissions
16. The oral and written submissions at the hearing are a matter of record and need not be set out in full here. The Tribunal had access to all the documents before the First-tier Tribunal and the composite bundle filed by the Appellant.
17. The Tribunal heard submissions from Mr Hussain for the Appellant and Ms McKenzie for the Respondent which have fully been taken into account.
Appellant
18. In relation to paragraph [15], the Judge failed to consider material aspects of the evidence, particularly the relationship between the Appellant and his maternal uncle. The Appellant’s uncle had taken care of him and his brother following the death of their parents. He managed all aspects of their lives. The Appellant is uneducated and lived in a remote village. This evidence was not given adequate consideration by the Judge in considering how and why the Iraqi passport was obtained by the Appellant. The Appellant acted in accordance with his uncle’s instructions, and he was unaware that the visa applications had been made.
19. The Judge failed to give consideration to the evidence in the detailed answers which the Appellant gave when he was asked questions about Syria in his substantive interview. The Appellant provided specific information about his home area, including both large and smaller towns, and the journey time between areas. He gave information about attacks on his village by the Turkish forces, and he described the logo worn by the YPG, which is a Kurdish force in Syria. He explained how he avoided compulsory military service, which is only required in Syria and not Iraq. In his written statement the Appellant detailed the impact of the war in Syria on his community. The Judge did not have regard to this evidence or did not explain why she attached lesser weight to it. The Appellant provided evidence in relation to the instability and lack of security in Syria following the fall of the Asad regime. This evidence highlights the tensions caused for the Kurds and the real risk of continued fighting between the new regime and the Kurdish groups. The Judge failed to consider at all, and make a finding on, the risk to the Appellant on return to Syria as a Kurd.
20. The facts in Hussein and Another (Status of passports: foreign law) [2020] UKUT 250 (‘Hussein’) are very different to the Appellant’s circumstances. The issue in Hussein was whether the appellant was a Tanzanian or Somali national. The appellant travelled to many countries using the Tanzanian passport and it had been scrutinised by entry clearance officers on at least 10 occasions. The Appellant’s circumstances are very different as he has never travelled on the Iraqi passport. There was a duty on the Judge to consider all the evidence and not just focus on the Iraqi passport. There was therefore a material error made by the Judge.
Respondent
21. The grounds are a mere disagreement with the Judge’s decision. The Judge correctly applied the law. The headnote in Hussein is applicable to the Appellant’s circumstances. The Judge focussed on the one key issue, being the nationality of the Appellant and the Iraqi passport at paragraph [11] and [13]. There was no evidence from the Appellant to refute the Secretary of State’s findings in relation to the genuineness of the passport. The burden rested with the Appellant, and it was not discharged by him. There was no material error made by the Judge.
Decision on error of law
22. The grounds are a challenge to findings of fact by the Judge, specifically that the Iraqi passport in his name is genuine and the Appellant is a national of Iraq not a Syrian national as he claims.
23. The Court of Appeal has recognised that the First-tier Tribunal is a specialist fact-finding tribunal, and the Upper Tribunal is required to exercise judicial restraint in its oversight of its reasoning: In Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201; [2024] 1 W.L.R. 4055 (‘Ullah’) Green LJ, with whom Lewison and Andrews LJJ agreed, stated at [26]:
“Sections 11 and 12 TCEA 2007 Act restricts the UT’s jurisdiction to errors of law. It is settled that:
(i) the FTT is a specialist fact-finding tribunal. The UT should not rush to find an error of law simply because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49 [2008] 1 AC 678 at paragraph [30];
(ii) where a relevant point was not expressly mentioned by the FTT, the UT should be slow to infer that it had not been taken into account: e.g. MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49 at paragraph [45];
(iii) when it comes to the reasons given by the FTT, the UT should exercise judicial restraint and not assume that the FTT misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning was fully set out: see R (Jones) v First Tier Tribunal and Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority [2013] UKSC 19 at paragraph [25];
(iv) the issues for decision and the basis upon which the FTT reaches its decision on those issues may be set out directly or by inference: see UT (Sri Lanka) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1095 at paragraph [27];
(v) judges sitting in the FTT are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them. There is no need for them to be referred to specifically, unless it was clear from their language that they had failed to do so: see AA (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 1296 at paragraph [34];
(vi) it is of the nature of assessment that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case. The mere fact that one tribunal has reached what might appear to be an unusually generous view of the facts does not mean that it has made an error of law: see MM (Lebanon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 10 at paragraph [107].”
24. The Court of Appeal has made clear that the circumstances in which an appellate Tribunal may interfere with findings of fact and credibility by the First-tier Tribunal are limited. In Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464; [2022] 4 W.L.R. 48 (‘Volpi’) Lewison LJ, with whom Males and Snowden LJJ agreed, explained that an appellate court may only interfere with a finding of fact where it is ‘plainly wrong’ or ‘rationally insupportable’ at [2]:
“The appeal is therefore an appeal on a pure question of fact. The approach of an appeal court to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled:
(i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
(ii) The adverb “plainly” does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
(iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
(iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
(v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
(vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.”
25. The Judge’s reasons for dismissing the Appellant’s appeal were focussed on her finding that the Iraqi passport in the Appellant’s name is genuine and he is therefore not a Syrian national.
26. The decision in Hussein is squarely on point in this matter although it was not cited by the Judge. Hussein is authority for what is stated in the judicial headnote:
“1. A person who holds a genuine passport, apparently issued to him, and not falsified or altered, has to be regarded as a national of the State that issued the passport.
2. The burden of proving the contrary lies on the claimant in an asylum case.
3. Foreign law (including nationality law) is a matter of evidence, to be proved by expert evidence directed specifically to the point in issue.”
27. The Vice-President observed, at [12]-[13]:
“It is simply not open to an individual to opt out of that system by denouncing his own passport; and it is not open to any State to ignore the contents of a passport simply on the basis of a claim by its holder that the passport does not mean what it says. It is considerations such as these that lie behind the passage in the UNHCR Handbook, paragraph 93:
“93. Nationality may be proved by the possession of a national passport. Possession of such a passport creates a prima facie presumption that the holder is a national of the country of issue, unless the passport itself states otherwise. A person holding a passport showing him to be a national of the issuing country, but who claims that he does not possess that country's nationality, must substantiate his claim, for example, by showing that the passport is a so-called "passport of convenience" (an apparently regular national passport that is sometimes issued by a national authority to non-nationals). However, a mere assertion by the holder that the passport was issued to him as a matter of convenience for travel purposes only is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of nationality. In certain cases, it might be possible to obtain information from the authority that issued the passport. If such information cannot be obtained, or cannot be obtained within reasonable time, the examiner will have to decide on the credibility of the applicant's assertion in weighing all other elements of his story.”
Of course the target of these observations is a passport that genuinely has been issued by the named State to the person named in it, and that is why, all over the world and particularly at international borders, such attention has to be given to the detection of forgeries and alterations in passports. A document detected as deceptive will not have the effect of a genuine passport. But the converse is also true: a document not detected as a forgery does have that effect, both at the diplomatic level and in the way its holder is perceived in a country that is not his country of nationality.”
28. The Appellant contends that the Iraqi passport in his name is not genuine, and it was obtained for him by his uncle without his knowledge. Hussein places the burden of proof on the Appellant to rebut the presumption that a person who holds a genuine passport, apparently issued to him, and not falsified or altered, must be regarded as a national of the State that issued the passport.
29. The Appellant argues that the Judge should have had regard to other evidence before her which he argues shows that he has knowledge about Syria that he would not have if he were an Iraqi national. The fact that the Judge did not specifically refer to this evidence in the Decision is not a reason for this Tribunal to conclude that she overlooked it: Volpi at [2(iii)]. Her Honour was satisfied that the Iraqi passport in the Appellant’s name established that he is not a Syrian national.
30. The grounds of appeal, in expressing disagreement with the findings made by the Judge and claiming Her Honour should have given greater weight to evidence in the Appellant’s favour, do not demonstrate that the Judge’s conclusion on the Iraqi passport is ‘plainly wrong’.
31. The Judge’s findings are in accordance with the evidence and supported by adequate reasons. The Appellant has not established they are ‘rationally insupportable’. On that basis the appeal is dismissed.

Notice of Decision
32. The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of material errors of law. The Decision shall stand.

Dr Linda J Kirk
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

22 August 2025