Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM
CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000789

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/60661/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 8th of January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MANDALIA

Between

DRDA
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department

Respondent
Representation
For the Appellant: Mr T Jebb, counsel instructed by McIvor Farrell Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mrs R Arif, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Royal Courts of Justice (Belfast) on 17 September 2025
Decision and Reasons
Anonymity
1. This appeal concerns a claim for international protection and the best interests of children. Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.”
Introduction
2. The appellant is a national of Iraq. She left Iraq in September 2019 and having travelled through a number of countries she arrived in the United Kingdom and claimed asylum on 25 April 2022. Her claim was refused by the respondent on 25 October 2023. The appellant’s appeal against that decision was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) Judge Farrelly (“the judge”) for reasons set out in a decision dated 31 December 2024 (“the decision”).
3. The appellant claims the decision is vitiated by two material errors of law. First, the appellant claims the judge failed to properly examine documents relied upon by the appellant to support her claims. The appellant had provided a police report as evidence that her husband had been kidnapped, together with evidence of threats that she had received in the form of a letter from the ‘Islamic Resistance in Iraq’. There was also evidence from a Facebook account showing the appellant’s property had been attacked. The appellant claims the judge failed to have regard to that evidence and/or rejected the evidence without adequate reason. Second, the appellant claims the judge failed to properly assess the claim that she and her family have ‘converted to Christianity’. The judge failed to have regard to the fact that the ‘conversion’ had taken place before the respondent’s decision, placed undue reliance upon the fact that the appellant has not been baptised, and questioned the appellant’s knowledge of the faith without it having been suggested that she lacked knowledge.
4. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Austin on 7 February 2025.
The Hearing of the Appeal Before Me
5. Mr Jebb adopts the first ground of appeal as set out in writing and maintains that the judge failed to have regard to the evidence relied upon by the appellant to support her claim and gave inadequate reasons for his conclusion that only limited weight can attach to the documents. The focus of his submissions before me was the conclusion that the judge was not satisfied that the appellant has genuinely converted to Christianity as she claims.
6. Mr Jebb submits it was accepted by the Presenting Officer, as recorded in paragraph [24] of the decision, that if the appellant’s claimed conversion to Christianity is accepted, her claim should succeed. The appellant’s claim was supported by a letter from Reverand Anthony Devlin of the Parish of Saint Paul in Belfast that confirms the appellant and her children are currently “practising the faith within our church”. There were letters provided by each of the appellant’s children who refer to a change of religion from Muslim to Christianity.
7. Mr Jebb submits the judge accepted, at [39], that Reverand Devlin would have some knowledge of the family. He submits that at paragraph [40] the judge imposes a test or requirement that the appellant has been baptised, whereas the issue is whether the appellant has converted to the Christian faith as she claims. Mr Jebb accepts the only evidence there was before the FtT was the evidence of the appellant herself, the letters from Reverand Devlin and the children, and the letter from the school attended by the children. Mr Jebb submits there does not appears to have been any attempt to test the knowledge of the appellant of her faith and the judge did not reach any finding as to her knowledge. Mr Jebb refers to the decision of Sir Andrew Gilbart in SA (Iran) [2012] EWHC 2575 regarding the inherent difficulty in the assessment of whether a professed faith is genuinely held, and the decision of the Upper Tribunal in PS (Christianity – risk) Iran CG [2020] UKUT 46 (IAC) that the question whether someone is, or is not, a Christian is a matter of fact that is impossible to objectively verify. The Upper Tribunal said that at what point along the path an individual might become a ‘Christian’ is not clearly signposted. “There is certainly no theological consensus on the matter; baptism is an indicator, but it should not be regarded as determinative.”. Mr Jebb submits the question is not therefore whether the appellant has been baptised, but whether she has been practising her faith. Mr Jebb submits it is clear the judge imposed a test that the appellant would have to overcome to be considered a genuine convert. He erroneously placed weight on the fact that the appellant had not been baptised. Furthermore, the judge failed to have regard to the fact that the appellant’s conversion to Christianity took place before the respondent’s decision to refuse the appellant’s claim for asylum. Mr Jeb submits the ‘conversion’ was not considered by the respondent in her decision to refuse the claim as it had not been raised by the appellant in her initial claim. It would, Mr Jebb submits, be most unusual for an appellant to convert to Christianity for the purposes of bolstering his/her asylum claim, but not bring such a claim to the attention of the respondent before a decision is reached on the claim.
8. In reply, Mrs Arif submits the judge recorded, at paragraph [27] that the credibility of the appellant is central to the appeal and the need to consider all the evidence in the round. At paragraphs [28] to [30] the judge referred to inconsistencies in the claims made by the appellant. The judge referred to the documents relied upon at paragraphs [33] and [34] and it was open to him to attach little weight to the documents for the reasons that he set out. As far as the appellant’s conversion to the Christian faith is concerned, Mrs Arif submits the judge gave clear reasons at paragraphs [39] and [40] for rejecting the claim. The claim was not rejected solely because the appellant had not been baptised. There was no evidence before the FtT as to when the appellant and her children had started attending church and the evidence before the Tribunal was limited. The Judge was entitled to make the findings he did, and there is no material error in the decision. The criticisms made by the appellant amount simply to a disagreement with the conclusions reached.
Decision
9. I deal with the claim that the judge’s analysis of the documents is flawed so as to undermine his conclusion that only limited weight can attach to them. The judge summarised the appellant’s claim at, at paragraph [7] of his decision:
“She said her husband worked for the police force and was kidnapped in December 2018 and in March 2019 a ransom was sought which she could not pay. She said threats have been made to her father. She believes Shia militia are behind this and refers to Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq.”
10. At paragraph [17] of the decision the judge recorded that the papers before the Tribunal include documents said to be from the Najjaf Police Director and at paragraph [18], the judge referred to a “letter allegedly from the kidnappers” dated 23 January 2023. At paragraph [19] the judge also notes there is a series of photographs that in the appellant’s witness statement, she claims, were sent by her brother as evidence of someone firing at her parents’ house. The judge was plainly aware of, and had in mind, the documents relied upon by the appellant. The judge considered the claims being made by the appellant and referred to inconsistencies in the core of the appellant’s account. The inconsistencies outlined by the judge are not challenged. The judge then referred, at [33] to what is said to be an “Abduction report” recording a complaint on 22 August 2019. The judge said; “In considering this document I have had regard to Tanveer Ahmed”. At paragraph [34], the judge referred to the “warning letter” that is, as the judge had noted at [18], dated 23 January 2023. The judge set out his concerns regarding the documents.
11. The conclusion reached by the judge at paragraph [35] of the decision that he could attach only limited weight to the documents was one that was open to him. In Tanveer Ahmed v SSHD [2002] UKIAT 00439 the IAT confirmed that in asylum and human rights cases it is for an individual to show that a document on which he or she seeks to rely can be relied on and the decision maker should consider whether a document is one on which reliance should properly be placed after looking at all the evidence in the round. The judge carefully considered the two documents relied upon by the appellant in the round, and it was open to the judge to find that the documents now provided by the appellant are unreliable for the reasons he gave.
12. Although I accept that the judge does not refer to the photographs provided to the appellant by her brother, again, it is clear in my judgment the judge had those documents in mind in considering the core of the appellant’s claim. He had referred to them in paragraph [19] of the decision. The extracts from a Facebook account in the form presented and the photographs add nothing to the appellant’s claim given the inconsistencies in the core of her underlying account. The failure to make any further specific reference to that evidence was not therefore material to the outcome of the appeal.
13. I turn then to the second ground of appeal concerning the appellant’s conversion to Christianity.
14. There was very limited evidence before the FtT regarding this aspect of the appellant’s claim. The judge properly considered the letter provided by Reverand Devlin, which I have to say, was brief and quite vague. He did not attend the hearing of the appeal and so there was no opportunity for him to provide further evidence and or for his evidence to be tested. The judge however accepted, on the limited evidence before the Tribunal that the family is likely to have attended the local Roman Catholic Church. That is not to say there has been a genuine conversion to the Christian faith. The judge was right to say that the letter provided by Reverand Devlin does not say when the appellant started to attend church and what instructions she has been receiving. It was right for the judge to acknowledge, as he did, that the appellant had not been baptised. That was not imposing a test or requirement as Mr Jebb submits, but a demonstration of the judge having in mind factors that are capable of being relevant to the overall claim. As the Upper Tribunal said in PS (Christianity – risk) Iran CG, “… baptism is an indicator, but it should not be regarded as determinative.”
15. The judge was also right to say that the conversion is at a late stage. The letter provided by Reverand Devlin does not say when the appellant started to attend church and what instructions she has been receiving. The appellant made her claim for international protection in April 2022 and her claim was refused by the respondent in October 2023. In her witness statement dated 6 March 2024, the appellant claimed, at paragraph [16], that there is also an additional risk to her by virtue of the fact that she has converted to Christianity, without any further elaboration apart from her parents not being happy with her decision. The judge noted at paragraph [14] of his decision that in the skeleton argument of 6 March 2024 relied upon by the appellant it was said that the appellant has “recently” converted to Christianity (see paragraph [7] of the skeleton argument). Although the date around which the appellant started following the Christian faith is not set out in the evidence, I emphasise the use of the word “recently”, because it runs contrary to the submission made by Mr Jebb that the judge failed to have regard to the fact that the appellant’s conversion to Christianity took place before the respondent’s decision to refuse the appellant’s claim for asylum.
16. The judge also properly acknowledged that attempts at testing the appellant’s knowledge of Christianity is of limited benefit. It was for the appellant to establish her claim and on the limited evidence before the Tribunal and reading the decision as a whole, it was plainly open to the judge to conclude, as he did at paragraph [40], that he was not satisfied that the appellant has genuinely converted to Christianity. There was no error in the judge’s analysis or approach to the evidence.
17. It follows that I dismiss the appellant’s appeal.
Notice of Decision
18. The appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.
19. The decision of Judge Farrelly dated 31 December 2024 stands.

V. Mandalia
Upper Tribunal Judge Mandalia

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

4 December 2025