UI-2025-000790

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 16 Sep 2025
• Promulgation date: 6 Jan 2026
• Publication date: 22 Jan 2026
• Last updated on: 22 Jan 2026

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000790

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/56863/2023
LP/04190/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 6th of January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PINDER

Between

H L
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent


Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Woodhouse, Counsel instructed by SH Solicitors Ltd.
For the Respondent: Mr D Lawson, Senior Presenting Officer.

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 16 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. This is the re-making of the decision in the Appellant’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s refusal of his protection and human rights claims. This follows Upper Tribunal Judge Lodato’s and Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Iqbal’s (‘the panel’) earlier decision to set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the FtT’). The FtT decision had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds and was set aside because this contained material error(s) of law. The panel’s earlier decision (‘the error of law decision’) was promulgated on 1st August 2025 and a copy of this decision is annexed to this one.

2. Following a transfer order, I heard the re-making appeal on 16th September 2025.

3. I have maintained the Anonymity Order in favour of the Appellant. I continue to consider that, on the specific facts of this appeal, the maintenance of the integrity of the United Kingdom’s immigration system and the Appellant having raised a claim to international protection are such that an Anonymity Order is a justified derogation from the principle of open justice.

4. No findings of fact from the FtT decision were preserved by the panel following their decision of 1st August 2025.

5. A summary of the Appellant’s claim is set out in the panel’s decision at [1] and so I do not rehearse this here and I engage with further details as part of my assessment of the claim below.

6. The Respondent’s decision refusing the Appellant’s claims is dated 7th September 2023 and arises from the Appellant’s claim which he lodged in 2021. The provisions of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 on how to assess protection claims and appeals do not therefore apply to this appeal.

The evidence

7. I had before me a composite/trial bundle (‘TB’) of evidence of 184 pages, which collated the parties’ respective evidence before the FtT and brought this up to date for the proceedings in the Upper Tribunal. Neither party sough to adduce any further or updating evidence following the directions issued in the panel’s error of law decision. I have given careful consideration to all of the written materials contained in this bundle.

The hearing

8. Mr Woodhouse on behalf of the Appellant confirmed at the outset that a finding of fact was needed on the Appellant’s age, since this was central to the remaining issues in dispute and would arguably inform the approach to be taken to the Appellant’s evidence and its credibility. Mr Woodhouse was also able to confirm that the Appellant was seeking to pursue this appeal on the basis that a debt remained outstanding to money-lenders emanating from a debt owed by his own parents, whom had died when the Appellant was approximately 10 years old. The Appellant claims that he himself was forced to work by the same money lenders for a number of years after his parents died and that he was subsequently trafficked as a child, either by the same gang of money lenders or by others as a result of his vulnerabilities at that time. Mr Woodhouse submitted that the Appellant has not raised a claim of being at risk of re-trafficking more generally on return and he confirmed on behalf of the Appellant that the past events claimed, including having been trafficked as a child, were relevant to the issue of risk on return from the same money lenders.

9. At the outset, Mr Lawson was also able to confirm, on behalf of the Respondent, that he had attempted to ascertain whether there was any background information on the reliability of documents said to have been issued by the Vietnamese authorities. This was in reference to the Appellant’s birth certificate, which he has submitted in support of his claim to be born in 2004. Mr Lawson informed that he had not been able to locate any such background information and would therefore make submissions on this issue for me to consider the Appellant’s documentation in the round along with the other issues raised on the credibility of the Appellant’s account.

10. The Appellant attended the hearing and was the only witness to be called to give oral evidence. He was assisted by a Vietnamese interpreter and confirmed the truth and accuracy of his witness statement dated 23rd April 2024. The Appellant was asked some supplementary questions by Mr Woodhouse, with my permission, and was then cross-examined by Mr Lawson on behalf of the Respondent. There were no questions in re-examination of the Appellant from Mr Woodhouse.

11. Following the Appellant’s oral evidence, I heard legal submissions from both advocates, after which I confirmed that I would be reserving my decision. I have addressed both parties’ competing evidence and submissions below when setting out my analysis and conclusions.

The issues to be determined

12. As part of the Appellant’s appeal skeleton argument before the FtT, the Appellant accepted that his protection fell to be considered on humanitarian protection grounds since his fear arises from the claimed ill-treatment on return by money-lenders, namely non-state actors and which did not invoke a Refugee Convention reason or a characteristic protected by the same Convention.

13. Thus, the following legal issues require consideration and determination:

Humanitarian Protection / Article 3 ECHR

(a) Is the Appellant at risk of Article 3 ill-treatment from the moneylenders in his home area?

(b) If so, could he obtain sufficient state protection there?

(c) If not, would it be unreasonable/unduly harsh for him to internally relocate?

Article 8 ECHR

(a) In the first instance, are there ‘very significant obstacles to integration’ for the Appellant on return to Vietnam ?

(b) If not, does the Appellant’s claim in response to the Respondent’s decision engage the UK’s obligations under s.6 Human Rights Act 1998/Article 8 ECHR so as to mean that the Respondent’s decision amounts to a disproportionate interference with any rights established in the UK by the Appellant ?

14. As part of the above assessment, it is necessary for me to determine whether the Appellant was born in 2004 as claimed and whether he was forced to work and trafficked as claimed. Both of these aspects of the Appellant’s claim have been disputed by the Respondent.

Findings of fact and Conclusions

15. In reaching the findings of fact and conclusions set out below, I confirm again that I have very carefully considered the evidence as a whole, not simply that to which I have been specifically referred. I have asked myself, when considering the parties’ competing evidence as a whole, the question of whether it is reasonably likely that the material events relied on by the Appellant occurred.

The Appellant’s age

16. Before I turn to the more general challenges to the credibility of the Appellant’s account raised by the Respondent, I first address the issue of his age. This is because I consider the Appellant’s age will impact on how I am to approach his evidence on events leading to his arrival in the UK.

17. The way in which this has been assessed by the Respondent in her decision is as follows:

“You have provided your date of birth as 25 April 2004. You were served with Form IS.97M on 10 March 2021, which informed you that the Home Office does not accept that you are a child or that your date of birth is 25 April 2004 as you claim.
• You have submitted no credible evidence to demonstrate that you were under the age of 18 at the date of application as claimed.
• Therefore, as per the above, I am satisfied you are Son Hong Luu, 25 April 1995 and your nationality is Vietnam.”

18. Following the Respondent’s refusal decision, the Appellant submitted his birth certificate together with a letter from a friend of his dated 10th August 2024 (TB 109). The birth certificate appears at TB [107] and has been officially translated with the translation appearing at TB [106]. The translation confirms that the birth certificate is a copy from the birth registration record and the copy was issued and signed on 14th March 2023. The birth itself was registered on 16th June 2005. The translation also confirms that the document records the following details:

Name: (Appellant name - not detailed here for the purposes of anonymity)
Date of birth: 25th April 2004
Gender: Male Ethnic group: Kinh Nationality: Vietnamese

The document goes on to record the child’s place of birth (not detailed here for the purposes of anonymity) as well as the child’s address together with the names of the child’s parents, their respective years and places of birth and their place of residence. The informant as detailed in the certificate carries the same name as the child’s father.

19. The Respondent’s review dated 24th July 2024 is silent on the birth certificate and its translation.

20. Through his cross-examination of the Appellant and his oral submissions, Mr Lawson asked me to find that it is not credible that the Appellant’s friend would be able to obtain a copy of the Appellant’s birth certificate on the Appellant’s behalf. Nor that this could credibly be done, as confirmed by the Appellant in his oral evidence by just providing a ‘permission letter’, the Appellant’s name and the names of the Appellant’s parents. Mr Lawson emphasised that neither the Appellant nor his friend in his letter reasonably explained how the birth certificate copy was obtained.

21. Mr Woodhouse asked to me consider that the Respondent’s case that the Appellant was born in 1995 and not 2004 is not evidenced before me. It is not clear whether the Appellant was ever assessed by the Home Office and Mr Woodhouse submitted that the Respondent had not disclosed any decision to that effect or any case-working notes showing that decision-making. Mr Woodhouse submitted that the Appellant’s reference to having provided his friend with a permission letter and how they got back into contact, through Facebook, was plausible and reasonable. The Appellant’s friend explained in his letter that after re-establishing contact with each other over Facebook, the friend learnt of the Appellant’s difficulties and he helped the Appellant obtain a copy of his birth certificate, which may assist him in his “asylum process” in the UK (TB [109]).

22. As acknowledged by Mr Lawson, the Respondent has not placed before me any background information that supports the Respondent’s submission that I cannot place any weight, or that I can only place limited weight, on the Appellant’s birth certificate. Neither has she placed before me any information which supports her submission that it is not credible that the Appellant’s friend was able to obtain a copy of the Appellant’s birth certificate on his behalf.

23. The Respondent has not pointed to any aspect of the birth certificate that causes her concern. This document has been disclosed into these proceedings for over one year now. Had she wished to do so, she has had ample time to raise any such concerns and supporting evidence.

24. I have very carefully considered the parties’ competing submissions on this issue and I have considered the Appellant’s evidence of, and surrounding, his birth certificate very carefully. I take into consideration that in many countries it is relatively easy to obtain a copy of a birth certificate registration entry. After all, these are copies of the entry in a central registry. I do not consider it implausible therefore that the Appellant was able to instruct his friend to assist him in the way described by the Appellant in his evidence and by his friend in his letter.

25. In disputing the Appellant’s age, the Respondent specifically stated in her decision that the Applicant had not submitted any credible evidence to demonstrate that he was under the age of 18 at the date of the application as claimed. He has now done so and the Respondent’s reasons for disputing this document amount to mere assertions and are not supported by any background or other evidence.

26. As a result of the above, I am satisfied that the Appellant has placed cogent evidence of his age, in the form of a birth certificate issued by the Vietnamese authorities recording his date of birth as 25.04.2004. In the absence of any evidence from the Respondent to displace or otherwise undermine the weight that I can attach to this document and in the absence of any evidence as to why the Respondent states that the Appellant is approximately nine years older than he says he is, I am satisfied that the Appellant has demonstrated on the balance of probabilities that he was born in 2004 and that he is therefore 21 years old at the time of the hearing.

Credibility in general

27. In summary, the Appellant’s account of events prior to his leaving Vietnam are that his parents passed away when he was about 10 years old. This left him living with his grandmother, who took care of him initially. The Appellant stated that when his parents were still alive, they had borrowed “a huge amount of money from the money lenders” and had been unable to pay back that debt. The Appellant remembered that when he was still a child he used to see people coming to their home every day and threatening his parents. The Appellant explains that after his parents passed away the money lenders came back and threatened him and his grandmother. The Appellant said that the money lenders told him that because his parents were no longer alive he and his grandmother had to repay the debts of his parents. The Appellant then gave details of trying to earn enough money with his grandmother to finance their own living expenses and to try and repay the debts as well. He also claims to have been forced to work by the money lenders.

28. When the Appellant was approximately 14 years old, the Appellant claims that he was approached and offered employment across the city with “high pay”. The Appellant accepted this offer and explained that that is when he was kidnapped. The Appellant claims that he was brought to China, taken to a basement where he was locked in and made, during the daytime, to wash dishes and clean up in a kitchen. The Appellant gives details of how he was forced to do this work before he could get a little food. This is said to have happened for four to five months before the Appellant was taken from that place and given to other persons, who took him to work in various warehouses. The Appellant stated in his witness statement (para 8, TB [57]) that he “was enslaved by these people and (he) was assigned to load heavy materials every day.”

29. The Appellant was made to work like this for approximately one year further, when he was then moved location. When being transported to different locations and countries, the Appellant met other Vietnamese persons (from the same areas as his home area) in the truck and through them found out that since he had been taken, his grandmother had passed away and his house had also been seized as a result of the debt that was still owed. The Appellant was eventually taken to the UK and then claimed asylum.

30. The Respondent has challenged the overall credibility of the Appellant’s account relating to his parents’ loan from the money-lenders and the subsequent claimed trafficking that he was subjected to after his parents had died.

31. In her refusal decision, the Respondent has set out the following specific points in support of her position that the accounts provided by the Appellant are not credible (TB [122-123]):

(a) The account that the Appellant has given of him inheriting a loan taken by his “parents of an unknown amount on an unknown date and from unknown persons is inconsistent and lacks sufficient detail to be considered credible”;
(b) The Appellant has “provided vague, inconsistent information regarding their reasons for borrowing”;
(c) The Appellant’s “account of being approached by the money lender lacks sufficient detail and is further considered unreasonable that (the Appellant), a 10-year-old child would inherit this debt over (the Appellant’s) adult grandmother”;
(d) The Appellant’s “account of when (he) began working for these people and the treatment (he) received lacks detail and is inconsistent”;
(e) The Appellant’s “account of being offered a highly paid job by unknown people lacks detail and it is not considered reasonably likely that (the Appellant) would travel to a different country with so little information available to (him);
(f) “The account (the Appellant has) provided of (his) journey to China and subsequent exploitation lacks sufficient detail without reasonable explanation”;
(g) The Appellant has not provided any detail or explanation “as to why the traffickers moved (him) from China to Russia and (his) account is internally inconsistent”;
(h) The Appellant’s “account of his onward journey from Russia to the United Kingdom is internally inconsistent and lacks detail”.

32. The Respondent has included cross-references against each point, extracted above, which refer to the Appellant’s interviews with the Respondent. The Respondent does not otherwise offer any explanation or reason as to why she assessed a particular account to be vague or inconsistent.

33. The Respondent also invoked s.8 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004 as a result of the Appellant arriving in the UK having travelled through China, Russia, Poland and France and failing to claim asylum in any of those countries. The Respondent noted the Appellant’s explanation, which was that the Appellant could not claim international protection in those countries because he was being trafficked. The Respondent confirmed that she did not accept that explanation because she did not accept the Appellant’s claim to have been trafficked through Europe.

34. I will return to the s.8 credibility assessment as this is grounded in the same issues that the Respondent has raised in respect of the core of the Appellant’s account.

35. I remind myself that the issue of credibility of an account must always be assessed in the round, taking into account the indicators that weigh in favour of an appellant alongside those that weigh against them - KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 00491 (IAC), at [33-36].

36. Arising from my finding above, I am satisfied that the Appellant’s evidence of events that date prior to his arrival in the UK require a careful and nuanced assessment. This is because the Appellant was 16 years old when he entered the UK and 10 years when his parents passed away. The events therefore that the Appellant has relayed as part of his account all took place when the Appellant was a minor.

37. The Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010: Child, vulnerable adult and sensitive appellant instructs me that I am to determine the extent of an identified vulnerability, the effect on the quality of the evidence and the weight to be placed on such vulnerability in assessing the evidence before me, taking into account the evidence as a whole.

The loan of the Appellant’s parents

38. I have very carefully reviewed the Appellant’s answers at interview and his written evidence. The lack of knowledge of the Appellant concerning the loan that was taken by his parents, e.g. when this was taken, for how much and from whom, need to be considered in line with the Appellant’s age at the time. I do not consider therefore that as a 10-year old, the Appellant would have likely been privy to such information and I am satisfied that the Appellant has relayed all of the information that he had and in a way that is consistent with that of a young child’s understanding and the Appellant’s memories of the same.

39. It is also relevant to note that the background information concerning how the illegal loans of money are agreed to, strongly indicates power imbalances between the lender and the loanee and the terms and conditions, so to speak, are not usually written down – see para 2.4.5 of the Respondent’s CPIN ‘Vietnam: Fear of illegal moneylenders’ (‘the money lenders CPIN’) (TB [78]):

“People can borrow money from illegal moneylenders with very little collateral, sometimes just by using smartphones apps and identity cards. Interest rates are not usually written on loan papers making it hard for people to keep track of how much they owe and difficult to prove the loan or interest rate agreed as it is not documented. Interest rates are often extortionate and the loanee can be required to repay many times the value of the money they initially borrowed.”

40. The Appellant was clear in his interview answers that he did not ask the money lenders much, if anything, because he “did not dare”. The Appellant repeated this in cross-examination when he was asked how it was that he did not know the names of the money lenders, just that they were from the same province as him. The Appellant also disclosed that he was threatened and beaten every day. The Appellant also stated that he thought that the loan was taken out by his parents in order to finance their medical expenses. The Appellant’s account is that his parents died of cancer and so in that respect, that level of understanding and knowledge is in my view consistent.

41. This is also consistent with available background information as to how money lenders target certain persons with vulnerabilities – see para 4.1.1 of the money lenders CPIN (TB [83]):

“Viet Nam Net, an online news source, noted in 2019 that: ‘According to the [State Bank of Vietnam] SBV’s Banking Supervision Agency, loan sharks with exorbitant interest rates often targeted people with unstable incomes who lived in remote areas and need money for healthcare and food.’”

42. Similarly, I do not consider it implausible that the Appellant was not told how much was owed by the money lenders, who only threatened him and instructed him to work. This is all the more so considering the Appellant’s age at the time and the likely vast difference in positions and influence. The Respondent stated in her reasons for disputing the credibility of the Appellant’s account that it was not credible or plausible that his grandmother did not take over the debt. However, the Appellant was clear in his interview responses that the debt passed on to him and his grandmother. Furthermore, the background evidence available supports the Appellant’s claim to this effect – see para 4.7.2 (TB [90]):

“Diplomatic sources told the UK Home Office FFT that: ‘If they take out a loan it is a loan for the family. We do occasionally receive anecdotal reports where someone does something in the UK and the family here get harassed.’”

43. The Appellant was cross-examined by Mr Lawson on his interactions with the money lenders and whether he or his grandmother had asked the money lenders how much was owed. The Appellant remained consistent that he was not told the amount because of his age. Mr Lawson asked the Appellant how he could be expected to pay the loan back if he did not know the amount that was owed. The Appellant answered that the money lenders just wanted him to work for them to reduce the debt. I find that this is entirely plausible considering the vulnerabilities that the Appellant presented with and the likely ease that this would have been exploited by the money lenders. It is also consistent with the background evidence available as to how the money lenders operate.

44. For the above reasons, I am satisfied that the Appellant has given a consistent and credible account of what happened following the death of his parents, including that he was exploited by the money lenders as a result of his parents’ outstanding debt. I consider that the Respondent’s concerns as summarised at para 31(a)-(d) are addressed when considering, as I have done above, the relevant background evidence and the Appellant’s age at the relevant times.

The Appellant’s claim to have been trafficked from his province in Vietnam and eventually to the UK

45. I next consider the Appellant’s claim to have been deceived when offered work across the city for a high income. I have summarised this aspect of the Appellant’s claim at paras 28-29 above.

46. The Respondent has rejected this aspect of the Appellant’s claim not finding it plausible that the Appellant would travel to a different country with so little information available to him. On my finding that the Appellant was the age that he claimed at the time, namely around 14 years old, I do not find this implausible. It is also well-established that assessments of plausibility are generally unhelpful as these often entail subjective assessments and/or cultural and socio-economic assumptions. The Appellant has been consistent in describing a difficult child-hood, particularly after the death of his parents, and having been forced, at this point, to work in difficult conditions by the money lenders for approximately 3-4 years. This taking place alongside threats and ill-treatment. I consider it plausible within this context that the Appellant thought that he could find a solution through the work that he had been offered and promised and that he was taken advantage of once again because of his age and other vulnerabilities.

47. The Respondent also stated that she found the Appellant’s account of his journey to China and his subsequent exploitation to lack sufficient detail. I have very carefully reviewed the Appellant’s interviews with the Respondent and his written and oral evidence and I do not find that this was lacking in sufficient detail. The Respondent did not give reasons for that conclusion and this was not elaborated upon by Mr Lawson at the hearing either.

48. The Respondent was also concerned that the Appellant had not provided any detail or explanation as to why the traffickers would move him from China to Russia. I do not consider that this is fair since the Appellant cannot be expected to know the reasons for the traffickers’ operations and decisions.

49. With regards to the further two reasons given by the Respondent, which relate to purported inconsistencies in the Appellant’s account of being moved and eventually taken to the UK, the Respondent has not particularised what those inconsistencies are. Neither has Mr Lawson made any further submission on this issue.

50. Thus, in light of the above, I consider that the Respondent’s concerns as summarised at para 31(e)-(h) are addressed when considering, as I have done above, the Appellant’s age and vulnerabilities at the relevant times. I also consider that the Appellant’s account of having been exploited, ill-treated and threatened, is consistent with the background evidence, which details the following of note:

• Illegal moneylending is reportedly widespread (CPIN para 2.4.4, TB [78]);
• Where people find themselves unable to repay loans to money lenders with links to criminal gangs, they can be subject to harassment threats, kidnapping and violence. Creditors also sometimes harass family members and the person’s employer in an effort to make the person repay the debt, using threats to company reputation, damage to property and physical harm to them and their families as a way of eliciting co-operation (CPIN para 2.4.7, ibid.);
• Illegal moneylending is often linked to migration, so where there are indicators of trafficking, decision makers should refer to the country policy and information note on Vietnam: trafficking (CPIN para 2.4.8, ibid.).

51. The links between money lenders and traffickers is also addressed at para 4.6.1 of the money lenders CPIN, which states as follows (TB 89):

“A 2019 article on the Electronic Immigration Network website notes that: ‘…Loan sharks are closely connected to trafficking victims and often act as migration brokers. Traffickers frequently take advantage of debt bondage to control their victims, as trafficked person are lured with promises of economic opportunity. Traffickers also threaten families back home to ensure the victims continue to cooperate.’”

52. In light of the above, I am satisfied that the Appellant was trafficked as claimed, namely he was recruited through deception when aged 14 years old, and forced to work for those who trafficked him without pay through coercion, threats and violence.

Risk on return

53. The Appellant did not argue that he is a member of a Particular Social Group and I note the Respondent’s position on this in the refusal decision and the relevant CPIN at para 2.3.1. The question before me is therefore whether the Appellant will face a real risk of serious harm sufficient to qualify for Humanitarian Protection.
54. The Respondent’s primary position is that the Appellant would face no such risk because she did not believe the Appellant’s account that he has become responsible for his parents’ debt and that they, and as a result the Appellant, have failed to re-pay this. It follows from my findings above that the Appellant would be returning as someone who has failed to re-pay an illegal loan and who has already been ill-treated for such non-repayment. It is also relevant that the Appellant either escaped the money lenders when he was 14 years old having been taken advantage of by others or was subsequently trafficked by the same money lenders outside of Vietnam to China and Russia and subsequently taken to the UK.

55. Para 339K of the Immigration Rules applies and states as follows:

“The fact that a person has already been subject to persecution or serious harm, or to direct threats of such persecution or such harm, will be regarded as a serious indication of the person’s well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of suffering serious harm, unless there are good reasons to consider that such persecution or serious harm will not be repeated.”

56. The Respondent’s position in the CPIN is that in general, the treatment of persons who fail to re-pay illegal loans is not sufficiently serious by its nature and/or repetition, or by an accumulation of various measures, to reach the high threshold of ‘serious harm’ necessary to qualify for Humanitarian Protection. I am satisfied from the serious harm that the Appellant has already been subjected to, that he is at real of being subjected to the same on return to his home area by the money lenders and/or criminal gang that they are affiliated with.

Sufficiency of protection

57. The Respondent’s position is that the Appellant is now an adult and would be able to avail himself of the protection of the authorities and benefit from sufficiency of protection on return.

58. It therefore falls to me to decide whether the Appellant could safely return to his home area in Vietnam, taking into account his mental health (in light of the Appellant suffering from depression) and vulnerabilities and how that would impact upon his ability to access support and protection.

59. I do not accept that the Appellant would be adequately protected by the authorities in his home area. Whilst I acknowledge that the Appellant has been absent for approximately 6-7 years and is now 21 years old, the Appellant has experienced significant serious harm over a sustained period of time from the age of 10 years old. The Appellant was clear of the money lenders’ threats to him at the time if he, as a child, reported any harm to the authorities. The Appellant has been diagnosed with depression and anxiety and is a highly vulnerable individual having been trafficked and harmed as a child. I do not find it likely therefore that he would seek the protection from the police or other authorities if the money lenders and/or traffickers located him.

Internal relocation

60. As for whether the Appellant would be located if he went to another part of Vietnam, the evidence does not suggest that the money lenders and/or the traffickers, would know that the Appellant had returned to Vietnam. The Appellant has been absent for approximately 6-7 years and on his own evidence, he has not received or is not aware of any threats being made to him by the money lenders/traffickers since arriving in the UK.

61. However, I am now persuaded that the Appellant has made out that it would unduly harsh and unreasonable to expect him to relocate internally in Vietnam. The Appellant does not have any relatives remaining in Vietnam. He lost his parents and after the Appellant left Vietnam, his grandmother has also since died. The Appellant’s account of his past experiences having ultimately been accepted, to the lower standard of proof, I am prepared to accept that the burden of proof has been discharged to that lower standard in this respect too, in light of the evidence before me.

62. I accept that there is no family or other support network available to the Appellant on return. The Appellant has been consistent throughout that both of his parents and subsequently, his grandmother have passed away. The Appellant has no siblings and has not been living in Vietnam since he was 14 years old.

63. As for the support available in general from wider community/ies in Vietnam, I have regard to the CPINs. At para 4.1.12 of the trafficking CPIN, it is confirmed that access to government-run services and shelters are unlikely to be available to victims of trafficking who are returning from the UK as they would not be in receipt of a “victim’s certificate”. Reintegration and support services may however be available to them through NGOs who may be able to provide services including shelter, reintegration assistance and vocational training programmes. The section in the same CPIN on NGO support and services details however that the support available to men is “very limited” (see para 11.3.4).

64. The evidence is that the Appellant does not have any particular skills which would enable him to find work in Vietnam and he has in effect, never had to fend for himself. The Appellant’s vulnerabilities arising from his past experiences and his subjective fear of being found by the money lenders/previous traffickers is also a relevant factor, which would likely in my view impact upon his ability to establish himself.

65. Considering all matters in the round, taking account of the Appellant’s past experiences, his vulnerabilities, his mental health and his current lack of a support network in Vietnam, I conclude that it would be unduly harsh to expect the Appellant to relocate to another part of Vietnam and to re-establish himself there. I am satisfied that he would face unduly harsh circumstances if he had to relocate to a part of the country with which he was unfamiliar and where he had no ties and that to require him to do so would be unreasonable.

66. Accordingly, I find that the Appellant is entitled to Humanitarian Protection and I allow his appeal on that basis.

The Appellant’s Article 8 ECHR claim

67. I consider the Appellant’s claim under Article 8 ECHR in the alternative and I am satisfied that my findings above apply and are relevant to the assessment to undertake as to whether the Appellant also meets the requirements of the Immigration Rules, which were brought into force to give effect to a person’s rights established and protected under Article 8 ECHR.

68. For the avoidance of doubt, I have also reminded myself of the relevant authorities, which include but are not limited to Parveen v the Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 932, Sanambar v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] UKSC 30 and Kamara v Home Office [2016] 4 WLR 152 at [99]-[101].

69. For the reasons set out above relating to the Appellant’s past ill-treatment when in Vietnam by the money lenders following the death of his parents, the Appellant being trafficked from Vietnam to several other countries and eventually to the UK, and the Appellant’s continued vulnerabilities as a result of those experiences, coupled with a lack of support and/or family network, I am entirely satisfied that the Appellant would encounter ‘very significant obstacles to integration’ on return to Vietnam.

70. Accordingly, the Appellant’s appeal also falls to be allowed under Article 8 ECHR on the basis that the Appellant meets the requirements of the rules requiring him to demonstrate ‘very significant obstacles to integration’ on return to Vietnam, which in turn renders the Respondent’s decision a disproportionate interference with the Appellant’s rights established under Article 8 ECHR.


Notice of Decision

71. The decision of the FtT dated 10th December 2024 did involve the making of a material error of law and has been set aside, pursuant to the panel’s decision dated 1st August 2025.

72. I re-make the decision by allowing the Appellant H L’s appeal against the Respondent Secretary of State’s decision of 7th September 2023 on Humanitarian Protection and Article 8 human rights grounds.


Sarah Pinder

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

15.12.2025


IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000790

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/56863/2023
LP/04190/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
1.08.25
…………………………………

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LODATO
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE IQBAL

Between

HL
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr S Woodhouse, Counsel, SH Solicitors Limited
For the Respondent: Ms A Ahmed, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 12 June 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The appellant is a citizen of Vietnam who made an application for asylum on 9 March 2021. His claim was based on the fact that his parents had borrowed money. He was 10 years of age when they passed away. He claims the debt was passed to him and his grandmother and he was forced to work for the lender. The appellant claims he was offered a highly paid job in or around 2017 and was taken to China where he was forced to work in a restaurant and then trafficked from there to a number of countries before reaching the UK. The appellant’s fear was that he would be beaten and killed by the money lenders or, in the alternative, by the people who forced him to work in relation to the unpaid debt of his deceased parents.
2. This application was refused by the respondent on 7 September 2023 and the appellant appealed this matter to the First-tier Tribunal. The appeal was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal Judge Groom (‘the judge’) in a decision dated 10 December 2024, following a hearing on 5 December 2024. Permission to appeal was sought by the appellant and granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Loughran on 8 April 2025.
The First-tier Tribunal Judge’s Decision
3. The appellant was represented by Counsel at the hearing. The judge considered the credibility of the appellant’s account in Vietnam, noting the respondent accepted the appellant’s name and nationality, however that his date of birth was in dispute [12]. It was noted the appellant claimed his date of birth was 25 April 2004 and the judge considered the evidence in support of the appellant’s claimed date of birth, namely a birth certificate. At [17] the judge concluded:
“I do not accept it is likely that the appellant does not know how his friend was able to obtain an official document, relating to his birth, particularly, when the appellant says he knows where the friend obtained the document from.”.
4. The judge went on to consider that neither the appellant’s evidence nor his friend’s letter explained the process to obtain the document or why it had been obtained in 2023 but not sent to him until 2024 and there was nothing to say there had been any delay with postage, for example. The judge therefore concluded at [18]:
“On balance, having considered the documentary evidence and the oral evidence of the appellant on this point, I do not accept that the appellant has been able to establish the provenance of the birth documentation that he has provided, and I therefore attach little weight to it.”
5. With reference to the claim that the appellant’s parents had borrowed money in Vietnam, the judge did not find it credible that he was unable to say how much was borrowed or, even after being approached about the debt, he made no enquiry as to how much money had been borrowed [19]. The judge recorded the appellant was unable to name any of the money lenders who had approached him and whether they had links with the authorities in Vietnam [20]. It was noted that the appellant’s oral evidence, that he worked for money lenders for around three to four years, whilst in Vietnam, was considered and it was noted, when cross-examined, he was unable to provide any details about them or whether they were linked to those from whom his parents were said to have borrowed money [21]. At [22] the judge considered the appellant did not know who had taken the family home away and was unable to provide detail of those people who had threatened to take the family home previously or whether he had attempted to approach the authorities for assistance on that occasion [22]. The judge’s conclusions at [23] were therefore that:
“Considering the evidence in the round, I am unable to accept the appellant’s claim that his parents borrowed money, and he became responsible for the debt and therefore fell under the control of money lenders. The appellant’s evidence regarding the debt or the people to whom the debt was said to be owed was lacking in detail. If the appellant’s parents died when he was around the age of 18 and he and his grandmother had been pursued for that debt since, it would reasonable to expect the appellant to have been able to provide some further knowledge or detail as to who these people are and what influence they have in Vietnam …”
6. At [24], the judge having considered the CPIN: Vietnam: Fear of illegal moneylenders January 2023, that in general there was effective protection and that there was no evidence that the appellant had sought assistance from the authorities in regard to treatment from the money lenders. The Judge, at [25], was not satisfied with his claims to have been trafficked given his evidence about his travel to the UK and further taking into account Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004, at [26], the judge found the appellant’s claim was undermined given his failure to have passed through a number of countries without seeking protection in deemed safe countries. At [27], the judge therefore concluded to the lower standard that there were no grounds for believing he would face a real risk of serious harm in the country of origin.
7. In relation to Article 8 issues and whether there were very significant obstacles to integration, the judge noted that the appellant, through the letter from his friend in Vietnam, demonstrated he retained links to Vietnam. He had sufficient language skills to interact with the general population in Vietnam and that given he had demonstrated an ability to adapt to life in another country, of which he had no prior knowledge, then he would be returning to a country with which he was familiar, having only left Vietnam in 2019. As such the judge concluded there were no very significant obstacles to his integration [28 – 30]. The judge was further not satisfied that the appellant’s removal could be said to be disproportionate considering Section 117 of the 2002 Act.
Grounds of Appeal
8. The grounds make the following points. First, that it was arguable that the judge failed to make findings on a matter in issue, namely the age of the appellant. Second, that the judge, having identified the correct standard of proof at [10], failed to apply it to the appellant’s circumstances as demonstrated by references made in the decision at [17] and [18]. Third, that the judge had failed to consider the appellant’s claim to have been trafficked through a number of countries and on to the UK in his consideration of whether the appellant’s failure to claim protection in those countries should undermine his claim.
Grant of Permission
9. The Upper Tribunal granted permission on 8 April 2025 noting that the grounds disclosed arguable errors of law and therefore permission was granted on all grounds. A Rule 24 response was served by the respondent on 28 April 2025, in which they maintained the judge had not erred and that in relation to ground 1, age did not form part of the schedule of issues agreed in the appellant’s skeleton argument. In any case the judge had provided adequate and substantial reasons for rejecting the appellant’s age as a credible explanation for the lack of detail in his evidence. Further, that the question of the appellant’s precise date of birth was immaterial given the FtT Judge assessed the credibility of the appellant’s overall account by taking his claimed age at the time of the relevant events into consideration, as evident at [23].
10. In relation to ground 2, it was noted that when the determination was read as a whole the judge had correctly applied the lower standard of proof, as confirmed at [23] and [27] and therefore the appellant’s grounds in isolating and mischaracterising the two paragraphs, which concerned the issue of the appellant’s documentary evidence, relating to date of birth, was immaterial to the core of the claim.
11. In relation to ground 3, it was noted that by failing to consider whether the appellant had been trafficked when determining whether he could have sought asylum in the safe third country was no more than a disagreement with the judge’s findings, which were clearly reasoned, as seen at [25] and [26], particularly that the appellant’s credibility was fundamentally undermined and the judge was therefore entitled to take into account the appellant’s failure to seek protection when the opportunities were available. It was considered that the grounds did not disclose a material error of law.
The Hearing
12. At the error of law hearing, we heard submissions from Mr Woodhouse and Ms Ahmed, all of which are a matter of record. Mr Woodhouse relied on the grounds of appeal and further submitted that the judge had failed to make any findings in relation to the appellant’s age, despite making a number of findings about the documents such as his birth certificate produced in relation to his age. In relation to ground 2, Mr Woodhouse pointed to the fact that the judge had erred on two occasions in relation to the standard of proof to be applied, at [17] using the term ‘likely’ and at [18], using the term “on balance”. In relation to ground 3 Mr Woodhouse submitted that on the Appellant’s account to have been trafficked, s.8 matters would not be considered relevant. We sought clarification from Mr Woodhouse as it appeared at [26] the judge had raised s.8 as a matter when considered with all the other evidence as further undermining the appellant’s claim, rather than a discrete issue. Mr Woodhouse agreed against this background that the real issue was whether ground 1 was made out.
13. On behalf of the respondent Ms Ahmed relied on the Rule 24 and submitted that the appellant had failed to raise age as an issue as part of the schedule of issues in the appeal skeleton argument therefore contrary to the guidance given in Lata [2023] UKUT 00163. We noted that Lata did not require each discrete element of a broad credibility issue to be raised and Ms Ahmed acknowledged the appellant had raised this, at [19] of the ASA, under the guise of ‘age assessment & age dispute’. In any case, Ms Ahmed submitted that the judge had assessed the evidence though the lens of a 10-year-old as seen at [23] of her findings.
14. In relation to ground 2, she highlighted that it was clear at [11] and [27] the judge had made the correct self-direction and the decision had to be read as a whole.
15. In response, Mr Woodhouse stated that a fair-minded reader would not be able to determine the relevant standard of proof. However, we highlighted that the challenge was in relation to whether the judge had misdirected himself in law rather than whether he had given adequate reasons. Mr Woodhouse agreed and accordingly, at the end of their submissions, we reserved our decision.
Discussion
16. We note, as has been highlighted above, that the judge clearly set out that the appellant’s age was in dispute (see [12] – [13]) and noted that the appellant had produced a birth certificate in support. Whilst the judge went on to find, from [14] – [18], that she was not satisfied with the provenance of the birth documentation, what she did not go on to do was to make a determinative finding in relation to the appellant’s age.
17. Additionally, we note [23], where the judge considered the appellant’s evidence noting that his parents had died when he was around the age of 10 and against that background went on to conclude that ”it would reasonable to expect the appellant to have been able to provide some further knowledge or detail …”. Nowhere within this finding however, is it evident that judge has accorded the appellant, the relevant benefit of doubt before reaching his findings on the appellant’s lack of knowledge as per the guidance from the Upper Tribunal in KS (benefit of doubt) [2014] UKUT 00552. We note particularly at [99] the Upper Tribunal held:

Whilst we have declined to follow Mr Bazini’s view that the liberal application of TBOD is a cardinal principle, we would concur at least that a child-sensitive application of the lower standard of proof may still need to be given to persons if they are recounting relevant events that took place at a time when they were minors or were even younger minors.

18. We remind ourselves of the need to exercise appropriate judicial restraint before concluding there has been a material error in the judge’s decision, however, when we consider the fact that it is unclear whether the judge gave the appellant the relevant benefit of doubt together with the fact that there was no substantive finding on the appellant’s age we are satisfied that the judge’s approach is flawed such that it discloses a material error of law.

19. In relation to the second ground, whilst Mr Woodhouse conceded that the use of the word “likely” at [17] in itself could not demonstrate that the wrong standard of proof had been applied. However, when considering the issues that arise in ground 1 together with the conclusions drawn by the judge in relation to the birth certificate at [18] in using the term “on balance”, we are satisfied that the judge did not have in mind the correct test to be applied when assessing the evidence produced by the appellant as to his age.
20. We need not go on to consider ground 3, given we are satisfied that there is a material error in the judge’s decision .
Disposal 
21. The starting point is that the underlying appeal should be remade in the Upper Tribunal. It would not be appropriate to remake the decision without a further hearing as there remain matters of fact to be resolved. We see no reason to depart from the starting point identified at paragraph 7.2 of the Practice Statements of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC) that the decision should be remade in the Upper Tribunal.    
Notice of Decision  
The decision of the judge is set aside as it involved a material error of law. The decision will be remade in the Upper Tribunal at a resumed hearing.    
Directions:    
The matter is to be listed for 3 hours on the first available date. The hearing is to be listed at Birmingham.
Within 14 days of the resumed hearing, the parties must upload to CE-File and directly serve on the other party any further evidence they intend to rely upon.
A Vietnamese interpreter is to be booked for the hearing. 

S Iqbal

Deputy Judge Iqbal of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber


17th July 2025