Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000794
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/00814/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 30 August 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANE

Between

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Appellant
and

ROLAND MATRAXHI
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr Terrell, Senior Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr Richardson

Heard at Field House on 25 April 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

1. I shall refer to the appellant as ‘the respondent’ and to the respondent as ‘the appellant’ as they respectively appeared before the First-tier Tribunal. The appellant is an Albanian national who claims to have entered the UK clandestinely in June 2018. On 29 December 2020, the appellant made an application for leave under the EUSS as the partner of an EEA national, which led to a grant of Pre-Settled Status valid from 23 May 2021 until 2 May 2026. On 15 June 2023, the appellant was convicted at Manchester City Crown Court for the index offences of conspire/produce controlled drug – Class B (cannabis); possess with intent to supply controlled drug – Class B (cannabis) & facilitate the acquisition/acquire/possess criminal property, for which he was sentenced to 54 months (4 years 6 months) imprisonment. On 26 July 2023, the appellant was served a Stage 1 letter advising of his liability to deportation, to which he responded on 2 February 2024. On 25 April 2024, a Stage 2 decision to deport was served on the appellant and the Secretary of State refused the appellant’s human rights claim. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal against the refusal of his human rights claim. By a decision promulgated on 31 December 2024, the First-tier Tribunal allowed the appellant’s appeal. The Secretary of State now appeals to the Upper Tribunal.

2. The Secretary of State grounds of appeal at 1[b] state:

From reading the FTTJ’s determination, it appears the appellant’s representatives conceded that the appellant could not satisfy either Exception 1 or 2 of section 117C, but submitted that when looking at the matters cumulatively the very compelling circumstances test was satisfied [34-35]. The SSHD reminds the Tribunal that this test requires especially compelling circumstances that go well beyond what would be necessary to make out a bare case of the kind described in Exceptions 1 and 2 – see paragraph 30 of NA (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department & Ors [2016] EWCA Civ 662. However, when considering the FTTJ’s conclusions it is submitted that they have failed to establish that such circumstances exists in the present appeal.

3. Section 117C(4-6) of the 2002 Act provides:

(4) Exception 1 applies where—

(a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C’s life,
(b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and
(c) there would be very significant obstacles to C’s integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.

(5) Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C’s deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.

(6) In the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2

4. The First-tier Tribunal judge found the appellant and his witness statement credible [57]. He found that the appellant was not, as he claimed, at risk in Albania on account of having failed to pay a debt [58]. The judge at [61-62] found:

I accept the submission of Mr Slatter that the family dynamics in this case are indeed “unusual”. I have accepted the evidence of Miss Mareno [the appellant’s wife] and I was particularly impressed with her straightforward and candid evidence. She is clearly intending on maintaining a loving relationship with the appellant, despite his criminal behaviour. She spoke candidly about not intending on moving to Albania and one of the reasons for not doing so was the close bond with her sister. Miss Mareno described her relationship with her sister as like a “twin”. There was no challenge to that evidence. Her evidence, which I accept, was that she followed her sister to the UK to be with her. They (the appellant, his wife, his brother and Miss Mareno’s sister together with the appellant’s niece) all live together and support each other. In the circumstances I have no hesitation in accepting that Miss Mareno will not seek to relocate to Albania. This in turn will have a significant impact upon the relationship with appellant. It is right to say that Miss Mareno is not seeking to choose her sister over the appellant. She has settled status in the UK, is working in a responsible and professional employment, and speaks fluent English. She speaks no Albanian save for a few words. She is financially settled in the United Kingdom.

It is important to note, and I accept, that Miss Mareno wants to maintain the relationship with the appellant. It was put to her that she could maintain that relationship by a variety of means to include modern forms of communication but also visiting the appellant in Albania. It is very likely that, all be it with good intentions, the relationship will dwindle away through no fault of Miss Mareno. She has no real ties in Albania safe for the appellant, does not speak the language and is not culturally or socially integrated. In the circumstances I find that there are very significant obstacles that would be faced by her in moving to Albania. Bearing in mind my observations, the respondent accepting a genuine and subsisting relationship, and my findings above, I also find it would be unduly harsh on Miss Mareno to relocate to Albania.

5. At [65], the judge found that the appellant himself could return to Albania, being able to ‘reintegrate within a reasonable time.’ However, he found that the appellant’s relationship with Ms Moreno would ‘‘go cold’ and dwindle away.’ The judge found ‘The risk of the relationship failing is high, as described by the witnesses, that the circumstances and factors are not only unduly harsh but higher still, hence very compelling circumstances.’

6. As the judge acknowledged, the appellant had been sentenced to more than 4 years in prison and must, as a consequence, prove that ‘very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2’ exist on the evidence. Mr Richardson, for the appellant before the Upper Tribunal, submitted that the judge’s decision was ‘generous but not perverse’.

7. The Upper Tribunal should hesitate before finding that the First-tier Tribunal, which is required to find facts robustly on the evidence, has given inadequate reasons. However, I find that the First-tier Tribunal did err in law for the following reasons.

8. First, I find that the judge has attached unreasonable significance in the context of a ‘very compelling circumstances’ assessment to the ‘unusual family dynamics’ of the appellant, his wife and her sister. I have no doubt that the appellant’s wife is close to her sister but they and the appellant are adults and the fact that they choose to live together is not unusual and, frankly, does not lift their circumstances on to a level which can reasonably described as ‘very compelling.’ As Mr Terrell, for the Secretary of State, put it, the appellant has a weak Article 8 ECHR claim (based on entirely normal relationships between adults with no especial links of dependency- see Kugathas v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 31) set against a very strong public interest in the deportation of the appellant (a foreign criminal sentenced to more than 4 years’ imprisonment). Nothing in the judge’s analysis comes close to explaining why, given that basis for the appeal, the appellant should have succeeded. The parties were entitled to know why the judge had reached the outcome which he did.

9. Secondly, I accept Mr Terrell’s submission that the judge too readily accepted Ms Moreno’s assertion that she would and could not relocate to Albania. The fact that she cannot speak Albanian is immaterial; she is a Portuguese national who has demonstrated that she can learn new languages (English, with which she communicates with the appellant). I again cite Kugathas in support of my finding that Ms Moreno’s unwillingness to part from her adult sister does not (at least on the First-tier Tribunal’s inadequate reasoning) constitute a very compelling circumstance which trumps the public interest in the appellant’s deportation. In short, the facts simply did not justify the outcome reached by the First-tier Tribunal judge.

10. Thirdly, I find that the judge wholly failed to explain ‘exactly what ‘strong ties’ [66] either the appellant or his wife have in the UK outside of their family life, with there being no independent witnesses or evidence to substantiate any integrative links that exceed the private life considerations within Exception 1’ [grounds of appeal at [1(f)]. The judge’s reasons in this regard are patently inadequate.

11. I set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. I have considered the matter of disposal. The judge’s finding that the appellant and the witnesses gave truthful evidence was not challenged by the Secretary of State whilst the appellant has not challenged the First-tier Tribunal’s rejection of his Article 3 ECHR claim. Mr Richardson did not submit that, should I find an error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s decision, I should need to receive evidence in addition that considered by the First-tier Tribunal before remaking the decision. I accept that the appellant, his wife and her sister continue to live together. However, given the reasoning which I have set out above, I do not accept that the appellant has shown the existence of very compelling circumstances which outweigh the strong public interest in his deportation. Accordingly, I find that I can remake the decision on the factual matrix I have outlined and I do so dismissing the appellant’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision dated 25 April 2024 on human rights grounds.

Notice of Decision

I set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. I remake the decision dismissing the appellant’s appeal on human rights grounds.

C. N. Lane

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated: 26 July 2025