Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000796

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/09067/2019

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

21st May 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BULPITT
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SMEATON

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

MW
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr K Ojo, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Ms S Ferguson, Counsel instructed by Freemans Solicitors

Heard at Field House on 23 April 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is an appeal brought by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, in respect of a decision by First-tier Tribunal Judge Beach (the Judge). Although it is the Secretary of State who brings the appeal, for the sake of clarity, in this decision we shall refer to the parties as they were in the First-tier, where the Secretary of State was the respondent and MW was the appellant.

2. The Judge made an anonymity direction preventing the reporting of any information which might lead to the identification of the appellant. Because the appeal raised issues about the appellant’s safety, and lest anything is said or done in these proceedings which might give rise to a risk to the appellant, we maintain that direction.

Summary

3. The appellant is a Ugandan citizen who has been granted indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom having been resident in this country since he arrived aged six years old. He has committed criminal offences receiving various criminal sanctions, including, in May 2017, a sentence of 18 months imprisonment for being concerned in the supply of cocaine and heroin. As a result of his offending the respondent decided to deport the appellant who in response, raised protection and human rights claims to remain in the United Kingdom. Those claims were refused by the respondent on 7 May 2019 and the appellant appealed against that decision to the First-tier Tribunal. While his appeal was outstanding the appellant raised a second protection claim which was considered and also refused by the respondent on 28 June 2023 in a supplementary decision. The appellant’s appeal to the First-tier Tribunal was extended to include an appeal against that supplementary decision to refuse his protection claim.

4. The Judge heard the appellant’s appeal on 28 November 2024 and issued a decision allowing it on 8 January 2025. The Judge found that the appellant was disqualified from protection under the Refugee Convention or from receiving Humanitarian Protection, because he constitutes a danger to the community. The Judge found that the appellant had not established his claim to be at risk in Uganda and accordingly the Judge dismissed the appellant’s protection appeal. There has been no attempt to appeal against that decision. The Judge went on however to allow the appellant’s human rights appeal, having found that the appellant benefitted from an exception to the public interest in the deportation of foreign criminals sentenced to less than four years imprisonment, that has been prescribed by Parliament.

5. The respondent was granted permission to appeal against the Judge’s decision by another First-tier Tribunal Judge on the basis it was arguable that the Judge erred in law when considering whether the appellant benefitted from Parliament’s exception to the public interest in deportation. Having heard the submissions of both parties, we indicated our conclusion that the Judge did not err in law and that there was no legal basis for interfering with the Judge’s decision. We informed the parties that we would be dismissing the respondent’s appeal. Our reasons for that conclusion follow.

Background

6. The appellant is forty four years old. He came to the United Kingdom from Uganda with his mother and brother when he was six years old. He was granted exceptional leave to remain in the United Kingdom along with his mother and brother, which was subsequently extended and then in 1996 he was granted indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom. He made an application to naturalise as a British citizen but that application was refused because by then he had been convicted of criminal offences. Whilst he was settled in the United Kingdom therefore, he remained a Ugandan citizen.

7. By the time of the hearing before the Judge the appellant had been convicted of forty two criminal offences committed between 29 October 1998 and 25 April 2024. In March 1999 he was sentenced to two years and three months in a Young Offenders Institute for offences of robbery and possessing a blade. In December 2001 he received a sentence of two months’ imprisonment for deception offences. In December 2008 he was sentenced to three years and six months imprisonment for offences of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and robbery. At that time the respondent considered but decided not to pursue deportation against the appellant, issuing him with a warning instead. In May 2014 the appellant received a suspended sentence of imprisonment for possessing a controlled drug with intent to supply it to another. In April 2017 the appellant was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment for being concerned in the supply of Heroin and Crack Cocaine. Following this sentence the respondent commenced deportation proceedings against the appellant.

8. The respondent wrote to the appellant informing him that he was liable for deportation on 13 June 2017, the appellant responded raising a protection claim asserting that he feared ill-treatment in Uganda because of his family’s political background, and a human rights claim that deportation was incompatible with his private and family life established during his time in the United Kingdom. The respondent refused those claims in a decision dated 7 May 2019 in which she concluded that the appellant was excluded from refugee protection, disbelieved the appellant’s account about his family’s political history and the events he said occurred in Uganda, concluded that the appellant’s depression and diabetes can be adequately treated in Uganda, concluded that the appellant cannot benefit from either of the two exceptions to the public interest in deportation prescribed by Parliament and concluded that deportation was a proportionate interference with the appellant’s private and family life.

9. As well as appealing against that decision to the First-tier Tribunal, the appellant also raised a new protection claim, this time asserting that he is gay and that he has a well-founded fear of ill-treatment in Uganda because of his sexuality. The respondent interviewed the appellant concerning his latest claim, but refused it in a supplementary decision dated 28 June 2023 in which she said she did not accept that the appellant is gay as he claims, and maintained her previous conclusions about the appellant’s protection and human rights claims. The appeal to the Judge was therefore against the respondent’s two decisions in which she refused his protection and human rights claims, with the appellant continuing to argue that he had a well -founded fear of persecution in Uganda both because of his family’s political history and because of his being a gay man, and continuing to argue that deportation would be incompatible with his right to respect for his private and family life in the United Kingdom.

The Judge’s Decision

10. As she was required to do, the judge began her assessment by considering at [32] – [45] of her decision whether the appellant was excluded from refugee protection or from receiving humanitarian protection because he constitutes a danger to the community of the United Kingdom. At [44] the Judge concluded that the appellant had not rebutted the statutory presumption that he does constitute such a danger, and at [45] she concluded that therefore the protection appeal must fail on refugee and humanitarian protection grounds. The Judge recognised however that she would still need to consider the merits of the appellant’s protection claim in order to decide whether his return to Uganda would be incompatible with Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights which prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment.

11. At [46] – [51] the Judge considered and discounted the appellant’s claim that he feared ill-treatment in Uganda because the current President of Uganda is opposed to the appellant’s family and because he is a member of the minority Acholi tribe, finding at [51] that the appellant had not shown he is at risk as a result of any family political connections and at [52] that the appellant had provided no evidence that members of the Acholi tribe are at risk of persecution in Uganda.

12. At [53] – [66] the Judge considered the appellant’s claim that he feared ill-treatment in Uganda because he is gay, but found at [66] that the appellant’s account of his sexuality contained a number of unexplained inconsistencies and concluded that the appellant had not shown that he is gay and therefore that he was not at risk on this basis.

13. For all these reasons the Judge dismissed appellant’s protection appeal. The appellant has not challenged that decision so his protection appeal remains dismissed.

14. The Judge then turned her consideration to the appellant’s human rights claim that his deportation would be incompatible with his right under Article 8 of the Convention to respect for his private and family life. The Judge considered this claim under two sub-headings – “Private life exception” and “Family life exception” which refer to the two exceptions to the public interest in deporting foreign criminals sentenced to less than four years imprisonment, that Parliament has prescribed in section 117C of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

15. So far as is relevant, the terms of section 117 of the 2002 Act are:

117C Article 8: additional considerations in cases involving foreign criminals
(1) The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest.

(2) The more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest in deportation of the criminal.

(3) In the case of a foreign criminal (“C”) who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires C's deportation unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies.

(4) Exception 1 applies where—

(a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C's life,

(b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and

(c) there would be very significant obstacles to C's integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.

(5) Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C's deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.

16. Dealing with Exception 1 identified by s117C(4) of the 2002 Act under the heading “Private life exception”, the Judge records that it was agreed that the appellant met part (a) of the criteria, having been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of his life, but she records that the remaining two criteria in (b) and (c) of Exception 1 are disputed.

17. At [68] the Judge considers whether the appellant is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom. The Judge records that the appellant arrived in the United Kingdom aged six, that he was educated in the United Kingdom, worked as a hairdresser, electrician and in a recruitment agency. The Judge also notes that the appellant maintains relationships with numerous family members and friends in the United Kingdom. The Judge then balances those features tending to suggest the appellant is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, against the appellant’s offending history which indicates that he is not, including the fact his offending continued despite being warned about the possibility of deportation, that the offending was motivated by drug use and his associations with pro-criminal peers. The judge then concluded:

…..The appellant’s last drugs conviction was in 2021 which is supportive of his contention to have stopped using drugs. It is a concern that, in 2024, the appellant was awaiting sentencing for burglary and theft but offending behaviour is not the only factor to be considered when considering whether an individual is socially and culturally integrated into the UK. The appellant’s last prison sentence was in 2016, he has lived in the UK for almost 40 years, his family members are in the UK and he has studied, worked and formed familial and social relationships in the UK. I find that the appellant is socially and culturally integrated into the UK.

18. At [69] – [77] the Judge considers whether the appellant would face very significant obstacles to reintegration in Uganda, noting at [70] the guidance provided for interpreting that phrase by the Court of Appeal in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813 and in CI (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 2027.

19. In her consideration of the “very significant obstacles to integration” question the Judge records at [69] the appellant’s young age when he left Uganda, his lengthy stay in the United Kingdom since then and his evidence that his last visit to Uganda was in the 1990s. The Judge goes on in the same paragraph to state:

“The appellant’s account is that he has no family members in Uganda and this was not directly challenged by the respondent in cross-examination. The appellant is clearly a resourceful individual; he was able to adapt to life in the UK and has coped with periods of time in prison but he would be returning to a country where he has not lived for almost 40 years, where his last visit was some 30 years ago and where he has no family or social connections”

20. The Judge then considered the evidence about appellant’s health and the impact that would have on his ability to integrate in Uganda. That evidence included a report from Dr Khisty which stated that the appellant’s mental health would be adversely affected by his return to Uganda as a result of trauma he had suffered when abducted there as a child. Dr Khisty diagnosed the appellant as suffering from PTSD. The Judge also records that the appellant has been diagnosed with diabetes for which he takes medication and an opioid dependency.

21. At [74] of her decision the Judge records the following:

The main concern with regard to the appellant relocating to Uganda is the length of time which he has been away from the country coupled with his vulnerability as an individual suffering from PTSD with a history of drug and alcohol abuse and the lack of support in Uganda. I accept that the appellant’s family are all in the UK; he has been consistent in stating that throughout and a number of family members have provided witness statements confirming this. The appellant is engaging with services in the UK to address his substance misuse and expressed an interest in October 2024 in residential rehabilitation suggesting an individual who understands the necessity to address his issues. However, at this stage, he remains an individual with PTSD which has not been addressed and which has been exacerbated by his substance misuse who would be returning to a country where he has not lived since he was 6 years old and where he has no family support, no accommodation and no employment. Even in the UK, where there are support systems in place, the appellant has struggled to engage with employment and to access the support required to address his PTSD. He has family members who are supportive of him in the UK but there was no evidence before me to show that they had the financial means to provide him with a regular income to find accommodation and pay for essential needs in Uganda. The appellant may be eligible for payments under the facilitated returns scheme but given he is subject to deportation proceedings and has criminal convictions he may well not be entitled to this.

22. At [75] and [76] of her decision the Judge records the appellant’s evidence and the evidence of Dr Khisty that the appellant would struggle to access mental health support in Uganda and Dr Khisty’s assessment that a return to Uganda is likely to “have a number of detrimental effects to the appellant’s mental health causing a deterioration in his mental health, a risk of traumatisation and a likelihood of failing to engage with mental health and support services.”

23. The Judge then states her conclusion that the appellant would face very significant obstacles to integration in Uganda at [77] of her decision:

I find that it is more likely than not that the appellant would struggle mentally on his return to Uganda, that he would have a real lack of emotional support to assist him in reintegrating and that his mental health will impact on his ability to find employment, accommodation and forge links in Uganda. Taking account of all of the evidence, I find that the appellant would face very significant obstacles in reintegrating into Uganda.

24. The Judge’s finding that the appellant met each of the criteria of Exception 1 to the public interest in deportation of foreign criminals prescribed by Parliament in section 117C(4) of the 2002 Act was dispositive of the appeal. For completeness however, the Judge did go on to consider whether the appellant met the criteria of Exception 2 to the public interest in the deportation of foreign criminals set out in section 117C(5) of the 2002 Act – the “family life exception”. The Judge identified that the appellant has four children in the Unted Kingdom aged between ten and seventeen plus two stepchildren, but concluded that the effect of the appellant’s deportation would not be unduly harsh on any of those children. The Judge’s consequent finding that the appellant did not meet the criteria of Exception 2 has not been challenged and we need say no more about it.

25. The Judge then recorded her decision that whilst the appellant’s protection appeal was dismissed, his human rights appeal was allowed “on Article 8 grounds”.

The appeal to the Upper Tribunal

26. The respondent was granted permission to appeal against the Judge’s decision on two grounds by First-tier Tribunal Judge Parkes who misunderstood the appellant’s immigration history when doing so, suggesting the appellant has previously had a protection appeal dismissed.

27. In ground one it is argued that the Judge erred in her assessment of whether the appellant was socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom because she “failed to have regard to the fact that social and cultural (sic) requires a person to be a law-abiding citizen” and she “failed to have regard to the fact that social and cultural integration, having been acquired, may be lost due to a person’s adverse behaviour”

28. In ground two it is argued that the Judge failed to give adequate reasons for her finding that the appellant would face very significant obstacles to integration in Uganda and that when making that finding the Judge failed to consider the appellant’s employment history, work experience and the emotional support he would receive from family in the United Kingdom.

29. The appellant served a response to the respondent’s appeal in accordance with rule 24 of The Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 in which he argued that the question of social and cultural integration is an assessment for the tribunal and that the Judge did give careful consideration to all the evidence including the evidence of the appellant’s offending when undertaking that assessment. Pointing to [69]-[77] of the Judge’s decision the appellant’s response also argues that the Judge’s finding that the appellant would face very significant obstacles to integration on return to Uganda is adequately reasoned with detailed reasons being given for the finding, which were supported by the evidence.

30. In his oral submissions Mr Ojo focused on the complaint about the Judge’s assessment of whether the appellant would face very significant obstacles to integration in Uganda. He argued that there were inconsistencies in the appellant’s evidence about his family and that in view of those inconsistencies, plus the fact the appellant was found to be deceitful in his protection claim, the reasons given by the Judge for her finding that the appellant would face very significant obstacles to integration were inadequate. In relation to ground one, Mr Ojo asserted that the Judge did not adequately consider the appellant’s criminality when assessing whether he was socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom.

31. In response, Ms Ferguson relied on the rule 24 response and maintained that the Judge engaged with all the issues and made findings that were open to her and which were adequately explained.

Our Analysis

Ground One – socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom

32. At [51] of his judgment in SC (Jamaica) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 15, Lord Stephens (with whom Lord Reeds, Lord Lloyd -Jones, Lady Arden and Lord Hamblen agreed) identified that the question of whether a foreign criminal is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom is to be determined in accordance with common sense, adding:

Furthermore, I agree with the formulation of the question at para 77 of CI Nigeria that a judge should simply ask whether, having regard to his upbringing, education, employment history, history of criminal offending and imprisonment, relationships with family and friends, lifestyle and any other relevant factors, the individual was at the time of the hearing socially and culturally integrated in the UK.

33. We agree with Ms Ferguson, that this is precisely what the Judge did in her assessment of this question at [68] of her decision. In that paragraph the Judge has regard to the fact the appellant was brought up in the United Kingdom having arrived aged six, his schooling in the United Kingdom, his time at College and his work as a hairdresser, electrician and at a recruitment agency. The Judge also in that paragraph considered the appellant’s relationships with friends and family in the United Kingdom. The Judge balanced these factors which pointed towards integration against the appellant’s criminal history noting that the appellant’s offending had continued even after being warned about the possibility of deportation. The Judge then gives reasons for her ultimate conclusion that the appellant is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom by reference to his progress working with the Southwark Substance Misuse team “CGL” to address his offending, which was caused in part by drug use, the length of his stay in the United Kingdom and the relationships he has maintained in the country despite sentences of imprisonment.

34. The assertion in ground one that social and cultural integration requires a person to be a law-abiding citizen does not reflect the guidance provided by the Supreme Court in SC (Jamaica) or the guidance in the judgment in CI (Nigeria) which the Supreme Court specifically approved. That guidance makes clear that offending is one of a number of factors to be considered when assessing integration. In this way the assertion in the grounds suggests an overly simplistic approach to what is an evaluative assessment that should reflect all the evidence.

35. In CI (Nigeria) Lord Justice Leggatt recognised at [61] that in principle criminal offending and time spent in prison are relevant as indicators that the person lacks (legitimate) social and cultural ties in the United Kingdom, but he went on to note at [62] that:

Clearly, however, the impact of offending and imprisonment upon a person’s integration in this country will depend not only on the nature and frequency of the offending, the length of time over which it takes place and the length of time spent in prison, but also on whether and how deeply the individual was socially and culturally integrated in the UK to begin with. In that regard, a person who has lived all or almost all his life in the UK, has been educated here, speaks no language other than (British) English and has no familiarity with any other society or culture will start with much deeper roots in this country than someone who has moved here at a later age. It is hard to see how criminal offending and imprisonment could ordinarily, by themselves and unless associated with the breakdown of relationships, destroy the social and cultural integration of someone whose entire social identity has been formed in the UK.

36. The respondent goes on in ground one to place reliance on the decision of the Court of Appeal in AM (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 774, and suggest that the Judge failed to consider that the appellant’s behaviour meant that he had lost social and cultural integration. This again demonstrates a simplistic and prescriptive approach to the assessment that was required which is inconsistent with the guidance in SC (Jamaica) and CI (Nigeria). At [74] of CI (Nigeria) Lord Justice Leggatt pointed out that the finding that the appellant in AM (Somalia) was not socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom was not based on AM’s criminal offending and time spent in prison alone, but on the basis that there followed a period of many years during which AM had effectively dropped out of society with no social or other ties in the United Kingdom. Lord Justice Leggatt went on to state at [76] that, while offending can result in loss of social and cultural integration:

…. To determine whether this was the effect of CI’s offending and imprisonment it would be necessary to assess whether or to what extent his criminal behaviour and time spent in detention did in fact disrupt or destroy his social and cultural ties in the UK. That in turn would require some consideration of CI's current situation to see whether, for example, he has maintained relationships with members of his family, has other social relationships, has accommodation, has found or looked for work, has avoided reoffending and has engaged in any activities of a positive nature following his release from custody.

37. We are satisfied that, no doubt aware of this guidance from Lord Justice Leggett (the Judge refers to CI Nigeria at 70 of her decision), the Judge undertook just such an assessment at [68] of her decision.

38. In our judgment therefore the Judge’s evaluative assessment of whether the appellant was socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom was unimpeachable, weighing all the relevant evidence, applying the appropriate legal principles and reaching a conclusion that was clearly and adequately explained. There is no suggestion that that conclusion was one no reasonable Judge could have reached and therefore there is no lawful basis for interfering with it.

Ground two – very significant obstacles to integration

39. The assertion made in ground two is that the Judge failed to give adequate reasons for her conclusion that the appellant would face very significant obstacles to integration in Uganda. We remind ourselves that the purpose of the duty to give reasons is, in part, to enable the losing party to know why he has lost and also to enable an appellate tribunal to examine the reasons in case some error of approach has been committed, and that the requirement to give adequate reasons is not a counsel of perfection (see MD (Turkey) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWCA Civ 1958.

40. We have no hesitation in concluding that the reasoning of the Judge at [69] – [77] is adequate both to enable the respondent to understand why the Judge concluded that the appellant will face very significant obstacles to integration and to enable this tribunal to examine the Judge’s decision for errors of law. Contrary to the suggestion in the grounds of appeal, when assessing the obstacles he would face to integration, the Judge did expressly consider the fact the appellant “is clearly a resourceful individual” (see [69]), she also expressly considered the support the appellant would receive from his family in the United Kingdom at [74]. The Judge can further be assumed to have taken into consideration her findings from earlier in the decision that the appellant has worked and therefore gained work experience while living in the United Kingdom.

41. In explaining her decision the Judge appropriately self-directs herself about what integration means in this context by reference to the cases of Secretary of State for the Home Department v Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813 and CI (Nigeria). She then carefully analyses the evidence about the obstacles to integration the appellant will face, weighing the various factors involved, before explaining her conclusion that the obstacles to integration will be very significant, principally on the basis of the appellant’s lengthy absence from Uganda, his lack of support in Uganda and his vulnerability as a result of his mental ill-health and trauma suffered when previously in Uganda as a child. When the paragraphs are read fairly and with care it cannot sensibly be said that the Judge has failed to adequately explain why she reached the conclusion she did.

42. In his oral submissions, without seeking to amend the grounds of appeal, Mr Ojo sought to expand the complaint made in ground two to include a suggestion that the Judge failed to engage with inconsistencies in the appellant’s evidence about his family and that the appellant might have family in Uganda who would help him to settle in that country. As we stated during the hearing, we considered these arguments to amount to an impermissible attempt to deviate from the permitted grounds of appeal and to relitigate the appeal. The time for challenging the appellant’s claim to have no remaining family in Uganda was at the hearing before the Judge. However, in contrast to Mr Ojo’s submissions to us, the Judge records at [69] of her decision that the appellant’s account about having no family members in Uganda was not directly challenged by the respondent in cross examination. To quote Lord Justice Lewison at [114] of Fage United Kingdom Ltd v Chobani United Kingdom Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 5, the hearing before the Judge was not a dress rehearsal but was the first and last night of the show. The respondent cannot now try to pick holes in the appellant’s evidence having failed to do so before the Judge.

43. In any event, it is clear from a fair reading of the Judge’s reasoning at [69] – [77] that she did engage with the issue of whether the appellant would have support available to him in Uganda, referring to the appellant’s evidence about his father at [71] of the decision and acknowledging an apparent contradiction in the evidence. At [74] the Judge explains her finding based on all evidence, that the appellant’s family is all in the United Kingdom and that he has no family support, accommodation or employment in Uganda. There has been no suggestion that these were irrational findings and there is no legitimate basis for interfering with those findings.

44. In our judgment therefore the Judge appropriately analysed the evidence before her and gave reasons for her conclusion that the appellant would face very significant obstacles to integration in Uganda which were clearly adequate. In these circumstances the second ground of appeal does not identify any error of law in the Judge’s decision.

Conclusion

45. In section 117C(4) of the 2002 Act Parliament has pre-determined that there is no public interest in deporting a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to less than four years imprisonment where that person (a) has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for more than half his life, (b) is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and (c) would face very significant obstacles to integration in the country to which they would be removed. As Lord Justice Underhill explained in a passage of HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 1176 which was subsequently approved by the Supreme Court when it considered the same case, the effect of the two Exceptions in section 117C is that:

Parliament has pre-determined that in the circumstances there specified the public interest in the deportation of medium offenders does not outweigh the article 8 interests of the foreign criminal or his family: they are, given, so to speak, a short cut.

46. The task of the Judge was to consider the evidence and assess whether the appellant fulfilled the three criteria in Exception one so that it applied to him. Contrary to the assertions made by the respondent, the Judge did exactly that, applying the relevant law and reaching conclusions that were adequately explained. There has been no suggestion that the Judge’s findings were irrational and in all the circumstances there is no lawful basis for interfering with her decision.

47. In the light of the Judge’s conclusion that the appellant met the criteria of Exception One, Parliament has pre-determined that the public interest in his deportation is outweighed and the appellant’s appeal was bound to succeed.

Notice of Decision

The Secretary of State’s appeal is dismissed.

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error of law and therefore stands.

Luke Bulpitt

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

19 May 2025