Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000825

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/54054/2024
LP/02847/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 21 August 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’CALLAGHAN
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE COLE

Between

MD HASEM
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr S Karim, Counsel, instructed by Sarker Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr B Hulme, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 23 June 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant’s protection appeal was dismissed by a First-tier Tribunal Judge in a decision promulgated on 9 December 2024. The appellant now appeals to the Upper Tribunal.
Background
2. The appellant claims to be a stateless Rohingya Muslim from Myanmar. He first claimed asylum in 2014. This claim was refused, and he appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. His appeal was dismissed in 2015.
3. In November 2022 the appellant was convicted of money laundering and sentenced to 38 months imprisonment. The respondent informed the appellant of her intention to deport him. The appellant made representations which were treated as a protection and human rights claim.
4. The respondent refused the appellant’s claim by decision dated 2 February 2024.
5. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. The appeal was heard by First-tier Tribunal Judge Gibbs on 30 October 2024. The appeal was dismissed in a decision promulgated on 9 December 2024.
6. The appellant appealed and First-tier Tribunal Judge Saffer refused permission. The appellant renewed the application to the Upper Tribunal, and Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds granted permission on the following terms:
“1. I grant permission on both grounds. It is arguable as the grounds contend that FtTJ erred in law in his assessment of the issue raised in the ASA ( see paragraph 6) which was that the Appellant was stateless and that having taken steps to demonstrate that as set out in the relevant case law cited, the Respondent was required to undertake verification of the communication which purported to have come from the Bangladesh High Commission rather than assessing the weight attached to the document.
2. Ground 2 relies substantially on Ground 1 being established as it relies on the “ limbo point” as relevant to whether there were “ very compelling circumstances.””
7. Thus, the matter came before us to determine whether Judge Gibbs’ decision involved the making of an error on a point of law.
The Hearing
8. Mr Karim relied upon the grounds and the skeleton argument. His primary submission was that the principles enunciated in Ahmed (Documents unreliable and forged) Pakistan * [2002] UKIAT 00439 (hereafter Tanveer Ahmed) only apply to documents from overseas and not to documents originating from within the UK. Mr Karim submitted that the first step when assessing the reliability of documents was to decide whether the document came from a source which could be tainted. He submitted that the key document in this case (allegedly from the Bangladesh High Commission in London) proved that the appellant was not a Bangladesh national, and that the Judge had failed to adequately assess this document.
9. In relation to Article 8, Mr Karim submitted that the respondent had done nothing to re-document the appellant and had taken no steps to remove him. He submitted that the appellant remains in “limbo” and thus the Judge had not correctly assessed Article 8.
10. Mr Hulme relied upon the Rule 24 Notice. He submitted that the Judge had adequately dealt with all the issues before her. He submitted that there was no authority to support the appellant’s arguments regarding Tanveer Ahmed. He referred to QC (verification of documents; Mibanga duty) [2021] UKUT 33 (IAC) which he submitted supported his position. Mr Hulme submitted that the Judge had considered all the evidence in the round and made sustainable findings on the reliability of the document.
11. In relation to the “limbo” argument, Mr Hulme submitted that there is in fact no “limbo” point and that the appellant’s arguments are misconceived.
12. After hearing the submissions, we reserved our decision.
Discussion and Analysis
13. Prior to considering the grounds, it is helpful to detail more fully the chronology of this case:

i. 2007 – the appellant claims to have arrived in the UK
ii. 30 April 2014 – the appellant claims asylum
iii. 26 September 2014 - the appellant’s asylum claim refused
iv. 11 February 2015 –the appellant’s asylum appeal dismissed
v. 5 January 2017 – the appellant applies for stateless leave
vi. 18 May 2018 – stateless application refused
vii. 29 November 2018 – the appellant makes further submissions
viii. 24 July 2021 – the further submissions are rejected with no right of appeal
ix. 23 November 2022 – the appellant was convicted of money laundering
x. 20 March 2023 - the appellant was sentenced to 38 months imprisonment
xi. 24 May 2023 – the appellant claims asylum again
xii. 6 February 2024 – fresh asylum claim refused with right of appeal
14. The appellant’s first ground related to the Judge’s assessment of the letter dated 15 May 2017 purported to be from the Bangladesh High Commission.
15. The Judge referred to the decision from 2015 dismissing the appellant’s initial asylum claim in which the appellant was found to not be a credible witness and to have failed to prove that it is reasonably likely that he is a Rohingya from Myanmar. Then, in relation to the 15 May 2017 letter, the Judge stated:
“However, I remind myself that in accordance with AHMED (Documents unreliable and forged) Pakistan [2002] UKIAT 00439 it is for the Appellant to show that his documents are reliable. The Appellant has been aware of the respondent's concerns about the document and whilst it is true that the Respondent could have taken steps to verify the document I find that so too could the appellant, and that it was his burden to do so.”
16. The Judge made findings regarding the 15 May 2017 letter as follows:
“In my own view there are prima facie anomalies in the document which cause me concern. For example I find that it is not on headed paper and that the address in the letter is mistyped as “28 Q0ueen’s Gate” which is a very basic error. Further, the letter states that the appellant has provided a document that “reveals that you are a Myanmar national” but the appellant has not disclosed what document this was, and in any event if the appellant is a Rohingya Muslim from Burma he could not be in possession of such a document because such a person is not entitled to such nationality.”
17. The Judge thus concluded that “I am not therefore satisfied that this document carries sufficient weight to enable me to depart from the previous Judge’s findings. I am not therefore satisfied, even to the lower standard that the appellant is a Rohingya Muslim from Burma.”
18. The appellant submits that the Judge’s approach is fundamentally in error, particularly in relation to the burden of proof.
19. In the grounds, the appellant relies on the decision of the Court of Appeal in AS (Guinea) v SSHD & Anor [2018] EWCA Civ 2234 to support his argument that the Judge erred in her assessment of the 15 May 2017 letter.
20. Reliance is placed on paragraph 46 of AS (Guinea) in which Lord Kitchen stated:
“I accept without question that the 1954 Convention must be interpreted in light of its objectives and that the consequences of an error in the assessment of whether a person is or is not stateless may be serious. But it seems to me that the nature of the issue facing the adjudicator and the steps that an applicant needs to take in order to establish statelessness are generally very different from those that arise in relation to an application for recognition of refugee status. The steps necessary to establish statelessness will usually be steps that an applicant can readily take without any risk of harm. The applicant can gather together all reasonably available evidence about his or her identity and residence in the state in issue. Further, the applicant may make an application to the embassy or other representatives of that state for formal recognition of his or her status and may request the necessary documents to enable his or her return. If an applicant has made all reasonable efforts to gather the available evidence and has made an appropriate application which has been rebuffed or refused then the tribunal may draw appropriate inferences about the applicant's status. If an applicant is unable to take the necessary steps for good reason then, as the Secretary of State has made clear in his own policy instruction, he will assist the applicant and undertake research on his or her behalf and, if necessary, make the necessary enquiries with the relevant authorities. There is therefore no need to speculate as to whether a person is or is not stateless; that person's status can be ascertained.”
21. The difficulty with the appellant’s reliance on this authority is that it relates to consideration of applications under the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, whereas this is an appeal regarding the appellant’s claim for asylum under the Refugee Convention.
22. The Court of Appeal in AS (Guinea) highlighted the significant differences in a statelessness determination and the recognition of refugee status, including the different standards of proof.
23. Further, there is nothing in AS (Guinea) to support the appellant’s assertions that the respondent bears a legal obligation to undertake verification of the 15 May 2017 letter. It is of note that at paragraph 10 of the appellant’s skeleton argument highlights that the Court of Appeal rejected the notion that the burden of proof in statelessness case should be shared.
24. Thus, we conclude that AS (Guinea) has no specific relevance to the issues in this appeal.
25. In his oral submissions, Mr Karim (who had not drafted the grounds or skeleton argument) focussed on the argument surrounding the applicability of the Tanveer Ahmed principles to documents purporting to originate from within the UK.
26. Mr Karim relied upon paragraph 31 of Tanveer Ahmed to support his contention that the ratio of the decision only applied to documents originating from outside the UK. Paragraph 31 states:
“It is trite immigration and asylum law that we must not Judge what is or is not likely to happen in other countries by reference to our perception of what is normal within the United Kingdom. The principle applies as much to documents as to any other form of evidence. We know from experience and country information that there are countries where it is easy and often relatively inexpensive to obtain "forged" documents. Some of them are false in that they are not made by whoever purports to be the author and the information they contain is wholly or partially untrue. Some are "genuine" to the extent that they emanate from a proper source, in the proper form, on the proper paper, with the proper seals, but the information they contain is wholly or partially untrue. Examples are birth, death and marriage certificates from certain countries, which can be obtained from the proper source for a "fee", but contain information which is wholly or partially untrue. The permutations of truth, untruth, validity and "genuineness" are enormous. At its simplest we need to differentiate between form and content; that is whether a document is properly issued by the purported author and whether the contents are true. They are separate questions. It is a dangerous oversimplification merely to ask whether a document is "forged" or even "not genuine". It is necessary to shake off any preconception that official looking documents are genuine, based on experience of documents in the United Kingdom, and to approach them with an open mind.”
27. This paragraph focusses on the importance of viewing documents from countries other than the UK without any preconception based on experience of UK documents. However, it does not state that these considerations only apply to documents from outside the UK.
28. Pertinent to the issues raised in this appeal are paragraphs 35 and 36 of Tanveer Ahmed. These state:
“35…A document should not be viewed in isolation. The decision maker should look at the evidence as a whole or in the round (which is the same thing).
36. There is no obligation on the Home Office to make detailed enquiries about documents produced by individual claimants. Doubtless there are cost and logistical difficulties in the light of the number of documents submitted by many asylum claimants. In the absence of a particular reason on the facts of an individual case a decision by the Home Office not to make inquiries, produce in-country evidence relating to a particular document or scientific evidence should not give rise to any presumption in favour of an individual claimant or against the Home Office.”
29. The binding principles of Tanveer Ahmed (which is a Starred decision) are set out in paragraph 38:
“In summary the principles set out in this determination are:
1. In asylum and human rights cases it is for an individual claimant to show that a document on which he seeks to rely can be relied on.
2. The decision maker should consider whether a document is one on which reliance should properly be placed after looking at all the evidence in the round.
3. Only very rarely will there be the need to make an allegation of forgery, or evidence strong enough to support it. The allegation should not be made without such evidence. Failure to establish the allegation on the balance of probabilities to the higher civil standard does not show that a document is reliable. The decision maker still needs to apply principles 1 and 2.”
30. The Tanveer Ahmed principles were approved in QC. The headnote of QC states:
“(1) The decision of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal in Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 00439 remains good law as regards the correct approach to documents adduced in immigration appeals. The overarching question for the judicial fact-finder will be whether the document in question can be regarded as reliable. An obligation on the respondent to take steps to verify the authenticity of the document relied on by an appellant will arise only exceptionally (in the sense of rarely). This will be where the document is central to the claim; can easily be authenticated; and where (as in Singh v Belgium (Application No. 33210/11)), authentication is unlikely to leave any “live” issue as to the reliability of its contents. It is for the tribunal to decide, in all the circumstances of the case, whether the obligation arises. If the respondent does not fulfil the obligation, the respondent cannot challenge the authenticity of the document in the proceedings; but that does not necessarily mean the respondent cannot question the reliability of what the document says. In all cases, it remains the task of the judicial fact-finder to assess the document’s relevance to the claim in the light of, and by reference to, the rest of the evidence.”
31. In QC the Upper Tribunal reviewed relevant case law, including the Court of Appeal decision in PJ (Sri Lanka) v SSHD [2014] EWCA Civ 1011. One of the tasks undertaken by the Court of Appeal in PJ (Sri Lanka) was to consider Tanveer Ahmed in the light of the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Singh v Belgium (Application No. 33210/11).
32. The Court of Appeal in PJ (Sri Lanka) regarded Tanveer Ahmed as compatible with Singh v Belgium. The point made in Tanveer Ahmed that documents should not be viewed in isolation but considered in their entirety in connection with the rest of the evidence, was also approved.
33. Since its promulgation in 2002 there has been no suggestion by any court or tribunal that the principles of Tanveer Ahmed apply only to documents originating outside the UK. Understandably, the vast majority of documents considered in the case law do emanate from countries other than the UK. However, there is no such restriction on the application of Tanveer Ahmed principles; the principles apply to all documents submitted in support of a protection claim, whatever their origin.
34. These are the relevant legal principles to be applied to the consideration of the 15 May 2017 letter purporting to be from the Bangladesh High Commission. It is necessary to consider whether the Judge correctly applied these principles.
35. The appellant’s arguments before us focussed on the asserted obligation on the respondent to verify the 15 May 2017 letter, but this submission was not made with reference to the principles established in Singh v Belgium. This obligation only arises “where the document is central to the claim; can easily be authenticated; and where (as in Singh v Belgium (Application No. 33210/11)), authentication is unlikely to leave any “live” issue as to the reliability of its contents.”
36. We accept that this letter “can easily be authenticated.” There is no reason provided as to why the respondent could not have contacted the Bangladesh High Commission in London and asked them to confirm the veracity of the letter. However, this is not sufficient by itself to obligate the respondent to undertake authentication.
37. The appellant’s central claim is that he fears persecution in Myanmar because he is a stateless Rohingya. The 15 May 2017 letter does not assist the appellant with his claim.
38. The letter makes no mention as to whether the appellant is a Rohingya. Further, the letter does state that the appellant is “a Myanmar national.” If true, then this fatally undermines the appellant’s claim to be stateless (a claim placed front and centre of the appellant’s case to such a degree that it occasionally distracted from the fact that this is a protection claim).
39. Therefore, authentication of the 15 May 2017 letter is not central to the appellant’s claim to be a Rohingya, and authentication could undermine the appellant’s claim to be stateless. For these reasons, although it is perhaps surprising that the respondent chose not to authenticate the letter, there is no legal obligation on the respondent to verify the letter.
40. The Judge made no error of law in her consideration of the issue of the respondent’s obligation to authenticate the 15 May 2017 letter purporting to be from the Bangladesh High Commission.
41. However, even if there were an obligation on the respondent to verify the letter, this is not the end of the matter. The Upper Tribunal in QC considered the respondent’s obligation to verify documents, and in paragraph 27 interpreted paragraph 32 of PJ (Sri Lanka) in the following terms:
“The final sentence of paragraph 32 is of particular significance. If a tribunal concludes that the respondent has, exceptionally, become subject to an obligation to verify, but has not done so, the consequence for her will be that she is unable to contend that the document is not authentic. It will, nevertheless, be for the judicial fact-finder to decide, in all the circumstances of the case, and by reference to the totality of the evidence, whether the document is “reliable” as to both its provenance and contents. If the judicial fact-finder is so satisfied, this may, of course, prove to be determinative of the claim to international protection. But such a result will not necessarily follow. It all depends on the nature of the case being advanced and the fact-finder’s conclusions on the entirety of the evidence.”
42. In this case, the Judge decided “in all the circumstances of the case, and by reference to the totality of the evidence, whether the document is “reliable” as to both its provenance and contents.” The Judge made findings based on “the entirety of the evidence.” It is of note that the Judge’s factual findings regarding the letter have not been directly challenged by the appellant.
43. The Judge considered the reliability of the letter holistically. The appellant had previously been found to not be credible. The appellant has not provided the document referenced in the letter which apparently revealed that he is a Myanmar national; in fact, the appellant has not provided the form, documents or correspondence that he used to apply to the Bangladesh High Commission. The appellant’s statements provide no insight into the process which led to the claimed response from the Bangladesh High Commission. The Judge at paragraph 22 of her decision highlighted the “prima facie anomalies” in the letter.
44. Therefore, in conclusion, the Judge applied the correct legal principles to her assessment of the 15 May 2017 letter purporting to be from the Bangladesh High Commission, considered the reliability of the letter by reference to the totality of the evidence, and made well-reasoned and sustainable findings.
45. The appellant’s first ground is rejected.
46. The appellant’s second ground is that the Judge’s decision on Article 8 is vitiated for inadequacy of reasons.
47. The focus of the appellant’s submissions was that the Judge had failed to adequately engage with the claimed “limbo” situation of the appellant.
48. Mr Karim did not accept that the second ground was wholly reliant on the first ground, but he did acknowledge the two grounds did need to be read together.
49. The appellant relied upon his claim that the 15 May 2017 letter purporting to be from the Bangladesh High Commission showed that he had been refused a Bangladesh passport. It was asserted that this meant the appellant would remain in indefinite “limbo”. Obviously, the reliability of the 15 May 2017 letter lawfully rejected and so this issue falls away.
50. Mr Karim focussed on the claim that the respondent had made no attempts to re-document the appellant and had made no concerted effort to remove the appellant. It is of note that there is no evidence as to what (if any) efforts the respondent has made in relation to the appellant’s removal from the UK. It would be pure speculation to conclude that there had been no efforts made by the respondent to facilitate the appellant’s removal.
51. With reference to the chronology at paragraph 13 of this decision, there were in fact only limited periods where the appellant was removable. The appellant did not come to the attention of the respondent until he claimed asylum in April 2014. The appellant became appeals rights exhausted in relation to his initial asylum claim around the end of February 2015 (assuming the appellant made no challenges to the First-tier Tribunal decision). There was then a period of around 22 months when the appellant was removable. This lasted until he submitted his statelessness application on 5 January 2017. This application was refused on 18 May 2018. There was then a period of around six months before the appellant then made further submissions, which were refused on 24 July 2021.
52. Then the appellant was under investigation for the criminal offences for which he has been convicted. The offending was recorded as starting on 17 January 2021 and the appellant was sent to trial from in the Crown Court from Central London Magistrates Court on 16 March 2022. The Judges Sentencing Remarks detail that the appellant had been stopped by the police on 15 March 2022 and that he had been under surveillance for a period prior to being stopped.
53. The appellant was in custody from 16 March 2022. He made the current protection claim on 25 May 2023 whilst in prison.
54. It is difficult to assess but there is likely to have been a short period between the end of July 2021 and the start of the criminal investigation against him when he would have been removable.
55. The appellant has consistently claimed that the respondent has failed to take steps to facilitate the appellant’s removal over the last ten or more years. This is a bare assertion that is not based on anything other than pure speculation. There is no evidence as to what steps the respondent has taken. Furthermore, as detailed above, for most the last ten years the appellant has not been removable for a variety of reasons. There have been periods when there were no obvious barriers to removal, but these are not significant in the overall time the appellant has spent in the UK.
56. This is not a case where there is any evidence of sustained failed efforts to facilitate the removal of the appellant. There have been no failed removals of the appellant. There have been no failed emergency travel document interviews with the authorities of potential countries of removal.
57. In fact, there is no reliable evidence of the claimed “practical impossibility of removal due to Bangladesh's refusal to recognise” the appellant. The only evidence relied upon by the appellant is the 15 May 2017 letter purporting to be from the Bangladesh High Commission which has been rejected, and the length of claimed inaction by the respondent, which is nothing like as long as claimed.
58. The key case on the “limbo” issue is R (AM (Belarus)) (Respondent) v SSHD (Appellant) [2024] UKSC 13. The circumstances of the claimant in AM (Belarus) are far removed from those of the appellant. The claimant in AM (Belarus) had arrived in the UK in 1998. In 2001 he had been removed to Belarus and refused entry. He had had several interviews at the Belarussian Embassy which resulted in the Belarussian authorities refusing to accept him as a citizen of Belarus. The Supreme Court accepted that the claimant in AM (Belarus) was in ‘limbo’ status, but that this was not a breach of Article 8.
59. Therefore, in our judgment, this is not a case where there is (or has been) any “limbo” situation of an indefinite nature. The Judge’s conclusions on the “limbo” issue were correct.
60. The Judge dealt concisely with the Article 8 issue and whether the appellant had demonstrated that there were “very compelling circumstances” in his case. This is hardly surprising considering the factors put forward by the appellant in support of his claim under Article 8.
61. The key factor was the claimed indefinite “limbo” status. This was correctly rejected by the Judge.
62. The only other factor relied upon by the appellant was his length of residence in the UK. There was no suggestion that the appellant met the requirements of either Exception 1 or Exception 2 of section 117C of the Nationality Immigration & Asylum Act 2002. The appellant’s around 18 years unlawful residence in the UK does not come close to amounting to “very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2.”
63. The Judge focussed on the issues put forward by the appellant and dealt with them concisely. Her decision more than adequately dealt with the appellant’s claim under Article 8 and the Judge provided sufficient reasons for rejecting the claim.
64. The appellant’s second ground is rejected.

Notice of Decision

The First-tier Tribunal decision does not contain a material error of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing the appeal shall stand.
No anonymity direction is made.

C R Cole
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

5 August 2025