Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-000833
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/58081/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

9th August 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DOYLE

Between

RM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr T Haddow, counsel, instructed by Maguire solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms E Blackburn, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Melville Street, Edinburgh, on 21 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The existing anonymity direction is maintained because this appeal arises from the appellant’s protection claim.
2. This is the re-making decision in the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his protection and human rights claims. It follows from the Upper Tribunal’s error of law decision (Upper Tribunal Judge Lodato), sent out on 12 May 2026, by which the decision of the First-tier Tribunal was set aside and the appeal retained in the Upper Tribunal.
Background
3. The appellant was born on 02/10/1994. He is a Kurdish citizen of Iran. The appellant claimed asylum on 09/09/2021.
4. The appellant claims to have a well-founded fear of persecution because of a combination of his ethnicity and political opinion. The appellant say he started working as a kolbar in his early teens. He smuggled alcohol, western clothes, kitchen white goods, and beauty products. Later he started smuggling KDPI materials. His caravan of smugglers was ambushed by the authorities. The appellant says he escaped but was identified. His home was raided while he was hiding in his uncle’s outhouse. After a few days he fled Iran. Since arriving in the UK, he has attended pro-Kurdish demonstrations and posted political comment on his Facebook page.
The error of law decision
5. The appellant claimed asylum on 09/09/2021. On 03/10/2023 the respondent refused the appellant’s protection claim. The appellant appealed, and in a decision dated 10/12/2024 the First-tier Tribunal dismissed his appeal. The appellant was granted permission to appeal
6. In a decision issued on 12/05/2026 the Upper Tribunal set the First-tier Tribunal’s decision aside. None of the First-tier Tribunal’s findings were preserved.
Issues in dispute
7. The Respondent accepts that the appellant is an Iranian Kurd who left Iran illegally.
8. The Respondent does not accept that the Iranian authorities have any interest in the appellant, nor that the appellant is a political activist who posts online. The Respondent believes the Iranian authorities know nothing about the appellant, so that the appellant can safely return to Iran.
Evidence and Submissions
9. I heard evidence from the appellant who adopted the terms of his witness statement before answering questions in cross examination. I then heard parties’ agents’ submissions.
Legal Framework
10. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, an appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden of proof is upon the Appellant. As per the decision in Karanakaran v SSHD [2000] 3 All ER 449 the single standard of proof is a reasonable degree of likelihood. I must determine whether it is reasonably likely that:
(a) Taking the claim at its highest, there is a Convention reason;
(b) Considering the credibility of the account, the Appellant fears persecution for that Convention reason;
(c) The Appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason;
(d) There would not be sufficient protection available; and
(e) The Appellant could not internally relocate.
11. To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds the Appellant must not be a refugee; they must show substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in their country of origin. The burden of proof rests on the Appellant.
Findings
12. (a) This case turns on credibility. The respondent compares the answers that the appellant gives in screening interview to the answers he gives in his asylum interviews. The respondent says that the appellant gives inconsistent and contradictory answers and so cannot be believed. The respondent looks at the appellant’s travel history and relies on section 8 of the Asylum & Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004.
(b) The accepted facts are that the appellant is a Kurdish Iranian who is a Sunni Muslim. It is an accepted fact that the appellant left Iran illegally.
(c) I have transcripts of the appellant screening and asylum interviews. Throughout his interviews the appellant gives a consistent account of becoming involved in distributing leaflets, partly because of his friendship and partly for money. It doesn't matter what the appellant's reasons for distributing leaflets were. The appellant gives a consistent account of carrying KDPI materials. The appellant's account was tested in cross examination, and no material inconsistencies occurred.
(d) The fact that the respondent thinks that the appellant is either naive or cynical is not a reason to disbelieve the consistent account that the appellant gives. I find that the appellant is a credible and reliable witness. His account is that he and his friends were caught red handed, and he managed to escape. It doesn't matter that the appellant has no real history of involvement in politics in Iran. The background materials disclose that simple possession of one KDPI leaflet is enough to make the authorities suspicious of a Kurdish man.
(e) The respondent complained that the appellant gives a lack of detail about his activities as a smuggler and about the friend who persuaded him to carry KDPI materials, but when I consider each strand of the appellant's evidence I find that he gives a consistent account of becoming a smuggler at 14 years old. It is beyond the dispute that the appellant is a Kurdish Iranian. The background materials confirm that the authorities would be interested in a Kurdish cross-border smuggler. The appellant gives a consistent account of carrying contraband goods which would attract the attention of the authorities.
(f) The appellant was a smuggler. That is enough to attract the interest of the Iranian authorities. The fact that he was carrying KDPI materials would simply increase the authorities’ interest. I find that the appellant gives a consistent account of the ambush of a caravan of smugglers. What the appellant says about Kurdish cross-border smuggling and the security forces ambushing a caravan of smugglers is consistent with what is found in the background materials.
(g) I find that the appellant gives consistent credible evidence. I find that the authorities have identified the appellant as an agent carrying leaflets for KDPI. The appellant’s account of a raid on his family home is consistent with background materials
(h) Since coming to the UK, the appellant says that he has attended five public pro-Kurdish demonstration, and has used his Facebook page to publish his criticisms of the Iranian regime. It is true that a lot of his Facebook posts are simply sharing anti regime sentiments sourced from elsewhere. The appellant is not the author of most of the contents of his Facebook account, but the appellant’s consistent evidence is that he has adopted an anti-regime stance. He might simply repeat other people's words, but those words are critical of the Iranian regime.
(i) The appellant has developed genuine political opposition to the Iranian regime. He is not an eloquent prominent politician, but he uses the words of others to spread anti regime sentiment and participates in public pro-Kurdish demonstrations in the UK.
(j) The appellant travelled across mainland Europe. The appellant didn’t claim asylum at the first opportunity. His credibility is damaged by the operation of section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004.
(k) The appellant’s credibility is damaged by his travel history, but the crucial core elements of his account remain clear and consistent.
(l) I am mindful of the guidance given in S v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1482.
(m) The respondent accepts that the appellant is a young male Kurd who left Iran illegally. I am mindful of the guidance given in SSH and HR (illegal exit: failed asylum seeker) Iran CG [2016] UKUT 00308 (IAC) and HB (Kurds) (illegal exit: failed asylum seeker) CG [2018] UKUT 430 (IAC). The Iranian authorities demonstrate that they want to speak to the appellant because they believe he is involved with the KDPI. The appellant therefore has the combination of ethnicity, illegal exit, and political interest.
(n) The Appellant does not have a passport. To be removed to Iran he will need to be issued with a laissez passer by the Iranian embassy in London. The embassy itself will “carry out security checks concerning the kind of activities the particular person has been involved in while out of Iran”: (SSH §7). It will also be aware of the fact that he is a failed asylum seeker: (SSH §6). Any information gleaned will be provided to the authorities in Iran ahead of his arrival. He will then be questioned on arrival : (SSH §9). The evidence of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) was that this questioning could take a few hours. Whilst the panel in SSH noted (§12) that the IOM were there concerned with voluntary returnees, there is no reason to believe that the scrutiny would be any less for an individual subject to forced return. Common sense suggests that in those circumstances the scrutiny would be greater.
(o) One of two things will happen following that initial round of questioning. Either the Appellant will be allowed to go on his way, or he will be transferred for a second bout of more intensive questioning, during which the likelihood of ill-treatment rises to a sufficiently high level to trigger the UK’s obligations under both the Refugee Convention and the European Convention on Human Rights.
(p) In SSH the Tribunal – there concerned with the relevance of illegal exit – thought the litmus test to be whether “there are any particular concerns arising from their previous activities either in Iran or in the United Kingdom” (at §23). In HB the panel, this time particularly concerned with Kurdish returnees, endorsed that approach, whilst asking decision makers to bear in mind that Kurds are subject to an additional, “heightened scrutiny”. The country guidance given in HB is that the authorities (i.e. the officer conducting that first round of questioning):
“…demonstrate what could be described as a ‘hair-trigger’ approach to those suspected of or perceived to be involved in Kurdish political activities or support for Kurdish rights. By ‘hair-trigger’ it means that the threshold for suspicion is low, and the reaction of the authorities is reasonably likely to be extreme”.
(q) Applying that guidance to this case, I find that this Appellant cannot safely be removed to Iran. He is a Kurd who left Iran illegally, and whose name has been associated with anti-regime activity. On arrival he is going to be questioned. Should he choose to conceal the fact that he has distributed leaflets, and he is discovered to have done so, the consequences would immediately be very serious. For that reason, it is far more likely that he will tell the truth and hope for leniency. Applying the combined guidance in SSH and HB however, there remains a reasonable likelihood that he will not be treated leniently.
(r) The background materials and the country guidance caselaw indicate that a Kurdish man who participated in anti-regime political activity is likely to be detained for the second round of questioning on arrival in Iran. It follows that his appeal must be allowed.
13. The Appellant has discharged the burden of proof to establish that he is a refugee.
Humanitarian protection
14. The appellant is a refugee. I cannot consider whether he qualifies for humanitarian protection.
Human rights
Article 3 ECHR
15. As I have found the appellant has established a well-founded fear of persecution, by analogy I find his claim engages article 3 of the Human Rights Convention because he would face a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment if he were returned to his country of origin.
Article 8 ECHR
16. I have found that the appellant is a refugee. For the same reasons, I find that there are very significant obstacles to the appellant’s reintegration into Iran. The appellant therefore meets the requirements of paragraph 276 ADE(1)(vi) (now appendix PL) of the rules.
17. Section 117B of the 2002 Act tells me that immigration control is in the public interest.
18. I have found that the appellant meets the requirements of paragraph 276 ADE(1)(vi) (Now appendix PL) of the rules. TZ (Pakistan) and PG (India) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 1109 tells me that where a person satisfies the Rules, whether or not by reference to an article 8 informed requirement, then this will be positively determinative of that person's article 8 appeal, provided their case engages article 8(1). As the appellant meets the requirements of paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi) of the rules, the respondent’s decision must be a breach of his right to respect for private life. The appellant does not claim that any other articles of the 1950 Convention are engaged.
19. The Decision appealed against would cause the United Kingdom to be in breach of the 1950 Convention.
20. I therefore find that this appeal succeeds on article 3 & 8 ECHR grounds.

Decision
1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 10/12/2024 was set aside by a decision of the Upper Tribunal issued on 12/05/2026
2. The decision in the appeal is remade.
3. The appeal is allowed on Asylum grounds.
4. The appeal is dismissed on humanitarian protection grounds.
5. The appeal is allowed on article 8 Human Rights grounds.

Signed Paul Doyle Date 28 July 2026
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Doyle