UI-2025-000838
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-000838
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65205/2023
LP/08077/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 7 September 2026
Before
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HARRIS
Between
BQ
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms King of Counsel
For the Respondent: Ms McKenzie, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
Heard at Field House on 13 August 2026
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a citizen of China. He appeals with permission against the decision dated 28 November 2024 of First-tier Tribunal Judge Manyarara (“the FTTJ”) to dismiss his appeal on protection and human rights grounds.
2. The appellant accepts that his case is not one that engages the Refugee Convention and therefore relies on humanitarian protection and article 3 grounds only. The basis of the appellant’s case relevant to the grounds of appeal before me is that he is at real risk on return to China from loan sharks to whom he is indebted. The respondent disputes the credibility of this claim.
3. The FTTJ found the appellant was not credible in his account and therefore did not demonstrate he was at real risk from the loansharks as claimed. The FTTJ went on to find that, in the alternative of there being a real risk of the appellant being targeted by the landsharks, it was not demonstrated there was a lack of sufficient protection for him or that the appellant was at real risk from the loansharks throughout China and that internal relocation was unduly harsh
4. Before the FTTJ the appellant also argued he was at real risk from the Chinese authorities as a result of a land dispute but, as confirmed by Ms King for the appellant, the grounds of appeal do not challenge the FTTJ’s dismissal of that part of the appellant’s claim.
5. This appeal comes before me to decide whether there is an error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal requiring it to be set aside and remade.
The Grounds of Appeal
6. The appellant relies on three grounds of appeal
(i) When assessing credibility, the FTTJ failed to give proper consideration to material evidence capable of supporting the appellant’s claim to be at real risk from the loansharks. The material evidence in question is documentation relating to ongoing travel to St Lucia once the appellant had journeyed to the UK.
(ii) When considering sufficiency of protection, the FTTJ failed to consider relevant country background evidence.
(iii) When considering internal relocation, the FTTJ failed to consider relevant country background evidence
Is there a material error of law requiring me to set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal?
Ground 1
7. This ground concerns documentary evidence produced by the appellant consisting of an itinerary printout showing the appellant having a flight to St Lucia on the day after when he is shown as flying into Heathrow and two letters, from the St Lucian Ministry of Labour and the St Lucian Immigration and Passport Office respectively referring to the appellant, among other Chinese nationals, obtaining work permits and permission to travel to the country.
8. It is Ms King’s submission that this is evidence consistent with the appellant’s account to which the FTTJ did not refer when making her decision on credibility and risk. There is no reasoning by the FTTJ on whether the evidence is significant or not. A holistic assessment of the evidence before her was required of the FTTJ. The appellant submits that, if considered, the evidence could have made the FTTJ to reach a different conclusion on credibility.
9. The respondent argues the FTTJ was clearly aware of the travel history of the appellant from what was in the respondent’s bundle and, in any event, this does not have the significance argued for by the appellant. The respondent submits that the FTTJ makes fully sustainable findings.
10. I note that in the FTT skeleton argument the appellant does refer to producing evidence which “proves consistency” for his claim. However, the appellant does not add any elaboration in the skeleton on what this consistency is capable of establishing as regard the credibility of the appellant’s claim to face real risk in China from loan sharks. Nor is it asserted, unlike in the grounds to this Tribunal, that this is evidence that “strongly corroborates” the appellant’s account of becoming indebted to the loan sharks. The FTTJ does not record that the appellant’s submissions before her contained such elaboration or assertion about strong corroboration and the grounds of appeal raise no issue about the FTTJ failing to record any such submissions.
11. In this context, I consider this weighs against faulting the FTTJ for failing to treat this evidence as potentially significant evidence needing to be expressly considered in order for there to be a proper assessment of the credibility of the appellant’s claim to be at real risk from the loan sharks in China.
12. The appellant has not disputed the FTTJ’s summary (at paragraph 52 of the decision) of his case as relied upon before her, which is that he took out the loan with assistance of a friend, who paid agents instructed to assist him with leaving China.
13. It was not the appellant’s case, as put to the FTTJ, that the loan sharks themselves made the arrangements for his travel. Given this, I am not satisfied any acceptance that there were arrangements for the appellant to travel to St Lucia gives any great support to there being any loan shark in China wishing to cause the appellant serious harm.
14. I consider that the real issue in this appeal does not concern whether or not the appellant was travelling to St Lucia but rather whether the appellant sourced funds from loan sharks to pay for his travel, who will now as a real likelihood cause him serious harm if he returns to China. This is what the FTTJ rightly focusses upon in her reasoning.
15. While the itinerary and St Lucia documentation supports that the appellant had arranged to travel on from the UK to St Lucia, it remains the word of the appellant alone that the funding of his trip involved loan sharks who now would target him with serious harm on return to China.
16. The FTTJ provides clear and detailed reasons at paragraphs 54 to 57 of the decision for rejecting the credibility of the appellant’s claim as regards the loan sharks. These findings, on matters which I consider central to the appellant’s claim, have not been challenged in the grounds of appeal.
17. In these circumstances, I consider the FTTJ has carried out a proper and well reasoned assessment of the credibility of the appellant’s claim to be at real risk from loan sharks in China. I am not satisfied that the FTTJ has made a material error of law as submitted by the appellant. Ground 1 is not made out.
Grounds 2 and 3
18. These grounds, which relate to the issues of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation, can be dealt with jointly and briefly.
19. As acknowledged by Ms King before me, both Ground 2 and Ground 3 fall away as issues where there is no credible real risk of the appellant facing serious harm from any loan shark in China.
20. Thus, given my finding on Ground 1 upholding as lawful the finding of the FTTJ that the appellant was not at real risk as claimed, I am not satisfied any material error of law by the FTTJ arises in her decision, as argued in either Ground 2 regarding sufficiency of protection or Ground 3 regarding internal relocation.
Notice of Decision
I dismiss the appeal of the appellant. The decision dated 28 November 2026 of First-tier Tribunal Judge Manyarara does not contain a material error of law and stands.
M Harris
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
1 September 2026