Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000843

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/02185/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

15th July 2025

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NEVILLE

Between

B J
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr J Nappey, Senior Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: No attendance or representation

Heard at Field House on 11 July 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. This order does not apply to anything done by the appellant or done by another person with the appellant’s explicit consent.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal brought by the Secretary of State against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (FtT) promulgated on 15 January 2025, allowing the appeal of BJ, a national of India born in 1991, on humanitarian protection and human rights grounds.
2. While it is the Secretary of State who appeals to the Upper Tribunal, in this decision I shall refer to the parties as they were before the FtT. Protecting the appellant’s identity as a victim of sexual violence and maintaining the integrity of the United Kingdom’s system for granting international protection each justify derogation from the principle of open justice, and I make the anonymity order appearing above. The order is slightly modified from that usually made to ensure that the appellant can receive appropriate support.
Basis of claim and the FtT Appeal
3. The appellant entered the United Kingdom on 18 July 2022 and made a protection claim on 26 November 2022. That claim was refused by the respondent in a decision dated 29 April 2024, and her appeal to the FtT was heard on 13 January 2025. In its decision allowing the appeal, the FtT recorded the basis of the appellant’s asylum claim as follows: (I have masked some potentially identifying details)
13. … [The appellant] has been married twice and it is accepted that she was subjected to domestic abuse at the hands of both husbands. She has one daughter born in 2013 who is the child of her first husband, [her other] children sadly passed away when they were very young. None of this is subject to any challenge.
14. The appellant […] lived in [X] State with her first husband. Her evidence was that she lived in the city of [Q] with her second husband which is five or six hours away from where her parents live. She was married to her second husband [in] 2021, she remains legally married to him. In her witness statement she confirms that during the short marriage she was abused by her second husband, she says that she was raped and subjected to other behaviour which can be described as humiliating and degrading treatment which took place in front of her daughter. At the hearing the appellant’s oral evidence was that her second husband had also subjected to her to a physical assault in which he had hit her [with an object]. She said that she was cut and bruised and her face was swollen as a result. On this occasion she presented herself to the local police station. The police told her that she should take some time (a month or so) to consider whether she still wanted to be married to her husband or whether she wanted to separate. Her evidence was also that the police informed her that this was a family matter and that they could not help. Following this, the appellant took her daughter and moved to her parent’s property. When she left she received some threats from her husband on her phone but she blocked his number. She came to the United Kingdom on a visitors visa in order to attend a family event at a Church, after she had travelled to the United Kingdom her second husband started to make threats to her parents, he said that if she did not return to him he would take her daughter instead and he also called her daughter a derogatory name.
15. The appellant has not heard from her husband directly since leaving India but she has changed her mobile phone number. Her parents have been threatened by him, most recently two months ago, he has also followed her daughter home from school. Her oral evidence was that she does not know the details of every threat, she believes her parents do not tell her everything because of her medical conditions. The appellant said that she would not be able to move to a different area of India because she needs the support of her parents to manage her daughter, her evidence was that her parents could not move because they have health issues and they cannot protect her and her daughter. She acknowledged that her daughter had not been harmed or removed from the care of her parents in the time she has been in the United Kingdom.
4. In the refusal decision, the respondent had accepted that the core of the above account was true but refused the claim because the Indian authorities were willing and able to offer effective protection against the appellant being harmed by her husband. Evidence of services available in India, and particularly in the city of Y where the appellant’s parents live, was taken into account. Alternatively, the respondent considered that the appellant could reasonably relocate elsewhere in India, where her husband would be unable to find her. The respondent has never disputed that the appellant’s husband wishes to seriously harm her, nor that a real risk of such serious harm on return would entitle the appellant to a grant of humanitarian protection.
5. The FtT allowed the appeal. Not all the appellant’s evidence was accepted. The FtT found that some aspects of her account had been somewhat embellished to support her claim, namely the volume of threats to the appellant’s family in Y and a claimed fear that her husband might harass her by posting insulting pictures to social media. Nonetheless, the appellant’s core account of rape, abuse and a genuine fear of violence on return was accepted. The FtT also accepted that the appellant’s husband had visited Y and followed the appellant’s daughter, thereby discovering that the appellant is presently outside India.
6. Dealing with sufficiency of protection and internal relocation, the FtT noted the Home Office’s Country Policy & Information Note: women fearing gender-based violence, India, November 2022:
2.5.1 In general, the state is willing and able to provide effective protection. However, each case must be considered on its facts, with the onus on the person to demonstrate that they will not be able to obtain effective protection. Decision makers must take account of past persecution (if any) and past lack of effective protection. In each case, decision makers must identify whether attempts were made to seek protection and what the response of the authorities was.
[…]
2.5.4 Despite laws aimed at addressing gender-based violence, persistent gaps in enforcing the laws, relevant policies and guidelines aimed at justice for victims of sexual violence, persist. Access to protection can be affected by a woman’s status and where she lives, especially for those from Scheduled Castes (Dalit) and those in more rural areas, and women with disabilities. Some women and girls are reluctant to report, or discouraged from reporting attacks to the police, for fear of reprisals, being stigmatised or unsupported by the justice system…
7. The FtT also noted the refusal decision’s reliance on the remedies available under India’s Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005, and the Country policy and information note: actors of protection, India, June 2023:
2.1.5 Police effectiveness and conduct varies from state to state, although there have been improvements in police numbers in recent years, it is undermined by inadequate training and equipment, limited resources, and corruption. Police investigation can be obstructed by some police officers refusing to register victim’s complaints, insufficient training, outdated forensic and cyber infrastructure. Underprivileged groups are affected by limited enforcement of protective laws.
8. The FtT accepted that the appellant had previously visited and been rebuffed by the police and noted that this was consistent with the country evidence. It rejected the contention in the refusal decision that it was reasonable for the appellant to lodge a complaint against the police, try alternative police stations until one accepted her complaint, or seek other avenues of redress. In reaching that conclusion, the FtT took into account that the formal avenues of redress cited in the Actors of Protection CPIN were for serious police misconduct, and that according to the Gender-based violence CPIN such violence and rape was widespread despite the legislative changes cited by the respondent. Taking into account the appellant’s evidence of her mental health and her overall account and presentation, and that her distress during the hearing had been such that measures had to be taken under the relevant Presidential Guidance Note, the FtT described her “as a timid individual who finds it difficult, but not impossible, to stand up for herself”. It further observed:
34. The appellant has been through two terrible tragedies, the death of her two children. These events undoubtedly had an effect on her mental health and there was no challenge to her evidence that she suffers from depression, has difficulty sleeping and takes medication for this. In addition to this, the appellant has been subjected to domestic abuse at a serious level from not one but two individuals who she was married to and so from those who were supposed to take care of her. There can be no doubt that the terrible experiences suffered have contributed to her fragility and vulnerability.
9. There is no challenge to those findings, nor could one realistically be mounted; despite the appellant being unrepresented, the FtT clearly took great pains to ensure a sensitive, compassionate yet even-handed assessment of the appellant’s personal characteristics and circumstances. Having done so, and after having traversed the evidence on sufficiency of protection, including that set out above, the FtT concluded:
36. […] Having been told that this is not a matter for the police, it is in my assessment completely unrealistic to expect this fragile, vulnerable and timid appellant to demand to see a more senior or different officer, this would take strength that I find this appellant simply does not have. I find there would not be sufficiency of state protection due to a combination of the past failure to protect, combined with the particular characteristics of the appellant.
10. As to whether the appellant could relocate elsewhere in India, the FtT summarised the Gender-based Violence CPIN as providing that:
…in general, there are parts of India where it would be reasonable for a woman fearing domestic abuse to relocate and this is particularly the case for a woman without children who is able to access accommodation and support networks or, who is educated, skilled or wealthy enough to be able to support herself.
and, further:
The country guidance case of AR and NH (lesbians) India (CG) [2016] UKUT 66 (IAC) considered the position of internal relocation for gay women in India and held that for educated and therefore middle class woman an internal relocation was reasonable. However paragraph 2.6.5 of the CPIN states that “Single women, women with children or victims of domestic violence may find it difficult to relocate within India without the support or supervision of a male relative to access accommodation and services. However, this alone does not make relocation unreasonable or unduly harsh. Each case must be considered on its own facts.”
11. The FtT found that the appellant would not be able to support herself, had never lived independently, and would have to care for (or be separated from) her 11 year old daughter. It was accepted that the appellant’s parents have health problems and would not realistically be able to follow her elsewhere in India. Taking into account “the particular characteristics of the appellant which have a direct effect on her ability to manage in society”, the FtT found that internal relocation would be unduly harsh.
12. Having found that the appellant could not reasonably be expected to live anywhere but Y, that her husband would locate and harm her there, and that she could not access sufficient protection from the state, the FtT found that the appellant would face a real risk of serious harm on return to India and that she was eligible for a grant of humanitarian protection.
The respondent’s appeal
13. Dissatisfied at this outcome, the respondent appealed. The grounds of appeal are somewhat discursive but can nonetheless be fairly distilled into the following arguments, as developed during the hearing:
a. In finding that the appellant would be at risk in Y, the FtT failed to address the fact that the appellant appeared to have lived there safely for almost a year after leaving her husband;
b. Likewise, two years had elapsed since the threat described by the FtT and it should therefore have taken the risk as having diminished during that time;
c. In finding that the appellant’s personal circumstances prevented her from escalating a police complaint in order to access state protection, the FtT failed to consider whether she could be supported in doing so by her parents;
d. The FtT further failed to take into account that the approach to the police had been made in Q, where the appellant lived with her husband, and not in Y where she could live with her parents, undermining its finding that police protection could not be accessed there;
e. The finding that the appellant’s husband has no ties with the police was inconsistent with a previous acceptance that he had intervened in a previous police complaint;
f. The findings: at [33], that the appellant’s husband would learn of her return to Y and travel there to harm her; also at [33], that he has no reach or influence over the authorities; and at [30], he did not “regularly travel five or six hours to [her parents’] property” as claimed; were inconsistent;
g. The FtT did not deal with the appellant’s failure to provide screenshots of the threats she had received, which ought to have been taken as damaging her credibility;
h. There was an overall failure to properly assess the harm that the appellant would face in Y.
Permission was granted by a different FtT Judge.
The hearing
14. At the Upper Tribunal hearing, the respondent was represented by Mr Nappey, a presenting officer. The appellant did not attend, but a volunteer with local charity did attend to explain her absence. I was told that the appellant’s mental health had declined further since the hearing in January and that she could not face attending today. There was no suggestion that the hearing should be postponed so that the appellant could attend. I indicated that I would hear Mr Nappey’s arguments and then decide whether it would be fair to determine the appeal without having heard the appellant’s arguments. Aside from relaying that factual information, the volunteer made no submissions on the appellant’s behalf, and nor did she act as her representative. She did stay to make notes and report back.
15. The grounds had raised another complaint concerning the appellant’s evidence in cross-examination, but Mr Nappey sensibly confirmed that this was no longer pursued and I have not recorded it above. Mr Nappey also accepted that the grounds of appeal were limited to the issue of sufficiency of protection and did not challenge the FtT’s findings on internal relocation, notwithstanding a remark on that subject having been made by the permission judge.
16. A rule 24 response had been filed on the appellant’s behalf, but no copy had been served on the respondent. I allowed Mr Nappey time to read it and he confirmed that he could proceed. A witness statement had also been filed that describes some events since the FtT made its decision. I treated this as an application by the appellant under rule 15(2A), which I refused. The hearing today would be solely concerned with whether there was an error of law in the FtT’s decision, to which the evidence contained in the witness statement was irrelevant.
17. At the conclusion of Mr Nappey’s submissions I decided that no submissions were required from the appellant.
Legal Principles
Sufficiency of protection
18. There is no challenge to the FtT’s finding that the appellant’s claim does not engage the Refugee Convention. She therefore relies on the Immigration Rules:
327EA. Under this Part, a claim for humanitarian protection is a request by a person for international protection due to a claim that if they are removed from or required to leave the UK, they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm (as defined in paragraph 339CA) in their country of origin, and they are unable, or owing to such risk, unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country.
19. While there are a number of authorities that deal with when a person can avail themselves of their country’s protection, it is sufficient to set out the summary given in TD and AD (Trafficked women) (CG) [2016] UKUT 92 (IAC) at [114]:
114. […] Sufficiency of state protection means a willingness and ability on the part of the receiving state to provide through its legal system a reasonable level of protection from ill-treatment. The effectiveness of the system provided is to be judged normally by its systemic ability to deter and/or to prevent the form of persecution of which there is a risk, not just punishment of it after the event. Notwithstanding systemic sufficiency of state protection in the receiving state, a claimant may still have a well-founded fear of persecution if she can show that its authorities know or ought to know of circumstances particular to her case giving rise to her fear, but are unlikely to provide the additional protection her particular circumstances reasonably require.
Challenges to findings of fact
20. As observed by Carr LJ (as she then was) in Clin v Walter Lilly & Co [2021] EWCA Civ 136:
83. Appellate courts have been warned repeatedly, including by recent statements at the highest level, not to interfere with findings of fact by trial judges, unless compelled to do so. This applies not only to findings of primary fact, but also to the evaluation of those facts and to inferences to be drawn from them. […]
21. This applies to the FtT’s conclusion on the issue of sufficiency of protection, which required it to find the relevant facts and evaluate them in accordance with the correct legal principles. In applying that appellate caution I further bear in mind the ways in which Carr LJ held that it might be overcome:
85. In essence the finding of fact must be plainly wrong if it is to be overturned. A simple distillation of the circumstances in which appellate interference may be justified, so far as material for present purposes, can be set out uncontroversially as follows:
i) Where the trial judge fundamentally misunderstood the issue or the evidence, plainly failed to take evidence in account, or arrived at a conclusion which the evidence could not on any view support;
ii) Where the finding is infected by some identifiable error, such as a material error of law;
iii) Where the finding lies outside the bounds within which reasonable disagreement is possible.
86. An evaluation of the facts is often a matter of degree upon which different judges can legitimately differ. Such cases may be closely analogous to the exercise of a discretion and appellate courts should approach them in a similar way. The appeal court does not carry out a balancing task afresh but must ask whether the decision of the judge was wrong by reason of some identifiable flaw in the trial judge's treatment of the question to be decided, such as a gap in logic, a lack of consistency, or a failure to take account of some material factor, which undermines the cogency of the conclusion.
87. The degree to which appellate restraint should be exercised in an individual case may be influenced by the nature of the conclusion and the extent to which it depended upon an advantage possessed by the trial judge, whether from a thorough immersion in all angles of the case, or from first-hand experience of the testing of the evidence, or because of particular relevant specialist expertise.
22. Given that final mention of special expertise, I would add the well-known observation of Baroness Hale in AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49 at [30]:
It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently.
Analysis
23. I address each of the respondent’s arguments as summarised at [13] above, starting with:
a. In finding that the appellant would be at risk in Y, the FtT failed to address the fact that the appellant appeared to have lived there safely for almost a year after leaving her husband;
b. Likewise, two years had elapsed since the threat described by the FtT and it should therefore have taken the risk as having diminished during that time;
c. In finding that the appellant’s personal circumstances prevented her from escalating a police complaint in order to access state protection, the FtT failed to consider whether she could be supported in doing so by her parents;
24. They share a striking feature: there is no indication that they were ever raised before the FtT. As held in Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) India [2023] UKUT 163 (IAC):
33. It is important to appreciate that the parties can properly identify their case on appeal to their opponent and to the FtT at various procedural stages, including the filing of the ASA, the undertaking of a meaningful review, at a case management review hearing, at the commencement of a hearing when a judge requests clarification as to outstanding issues and during closing submissions. If by the conclusion of a hearing, a party has not asserted reliance on an issue, a judge can properly proceed on the basis that it is not a matter upon which they are required to reach a decision, though a judge will be aware of the likely lack of procedural and legal knowledge when an appellant represents themselves and of the incumbent requirement to apply anxious scrutiny in a protection appeal. The latter establishes a need for decisions to show by their reasoning that every factor which might tell in favour of an appellant has been properly considered. The application of anxious scrutiny is not an excuse for the failure of a party to identify through the available procedural requirements those issues which are the principal controversial issues in the case. Indeed, to the contrary, the procedural requirements should drive the parties to identify the principal controversial issues which in turn they consider that it is in the interests of their client for the FtT to apply anxious scrutiny in the determination of the case. At the stage of an appeal from the FtT to UTIAC, it should be rare indeed for there to be a point requiring anxious scrutiny (which is not Robinson obvious in the case of an appellant) to have illuded the reformed FtT appeal procedures. The procedures are specifically designed to ensure that the parties identify the issues and they are comprehensively addressed before the FtT, not that proceedings before the IAC are some form of rolling reconsideration by either party of its position.
34. We consider that there exists a duty upon the parties to identify relevant issues of their own motion. There is no place for hiding a jewel of a submission in the hope that it will purchase favour on appeal. A party that fails to identify an issue before the FtT that it subsequently asserts to have been essential for a judge to consider is unlikely to have a good ground of appeal before UTIAC. None of this is to say that a FtT judge is to entirely lack curiosity in relation to an aspect of a case that the judge requires further assistance with or which the judge considers should be examined as part of the evaluation of the case. Where, as here, a point has not been identified by the parties, and nor is it one which has independently drawn the attention of the judge, it is not an issue which can be appropriately raised for the first time in the context of an appeal to UTIAC.
25. Mr Nappey confirmed that no respondent’s review appears to have been conducted in this case. The purpose of such a review is described as follows in Lata, this passage referring to the Senior President of Tribunal's Practice Direction of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal and the President of the First-tier Tribunal's Practice Statement No. 1 of 2022, both dated 13 May 2022.
21. […] The latter confirms in mandatory terms the requirement placed upon a represented appellant to file an ASA, whether the appeal was brought online using MyHMCTS or not. Further, it details the mandatory requirement that the respondent undertake a meaningful review of the appellant's case, taking into account the ASA and appellant's bundle, and provide the result of that review. The respondent is to engage with the submissions made and evidence provided, and to particularise the grounds of refusal relied upon. The same meaningful review is to be undertaken in appeals where appellants are unrepresented and have served an 'appellant's explanation of case'.
26. In this case, the FtT confirms that the appellant’s explanation of case and bundle had never been sent to the respondent, but after a short break to consider them the presenting officer had confirmed that she was willing to proceed. It is likely that the requirement for a review had been formally waived by a judge or legal officer so that the case could be listed; I have no copy of any such direction, but in any event the FtT opted to continue without a review. That was plainly sensible, and avoided an adjournment and further delay. The presenting officer likewise acted with pragmatism and in accordance with rule 2(4) of the FtT’s Procedure Rules. Avoiding an adjournment was especially important given the appellant’s vulnerability and emotional state at the hearing.
27. However, none of this excused anyone from the duty described in Lata:
34. We consider that there exists a duty upon the parties to identify relevant issues of their own motion. There is no place for hiding a jewel of a submission in the hope that it will purchase favour on appeal. A party that fails to identify an issue before the FtT that it subsequently asserts to have been essential for a judge to consider is unlikely to have a good ground of appeal before UTIAC. None of this is to say that a FtT judge is to entirely lack curiosity in relation to an aspect of a case that the judge requires further assistance with or which the judge considers should be examined as part of the evaluation of the case. Where, as here, a point has not been identified by the parties, and nor is it one which has independently drawn the attention of the judge, it is not an issue which can be appropriately raised for the first time in the context of an appeal to UTIAC.
28. Had the presenting officer said, “I am ready to proceed today, subject to appealing your decision if something occurs to me later”, then that stance would have rightly been rejected and the hearing adjourned with directions requiring a respondent’s review. Yet this is, in essence, what the author of the respondent’s grounds seeks to do. If “a jewel of a submission” is missing from the FtT’s analysis and had been made, then this may be an error of law. Here, the respondent has done nothing to establish the second of those requirements. The presenting officer’s minute would have been available when the application for permission was made, and it is open to a party to simply assert in their grounds what was, and was not, raised at a hearing: Abdi v Entry Clearance Officer [2023] EWCA Civ 1455.
29. The points are not so obvious that the FtT was required to deal with any of them on its own initiative in order to reach a rationally supportable decision. Moreover, there is risk in assuming that just because a matter was not mentioned the FtT must have missed it. A representative may decide not to put a point because they know there is a good answer to it, or there may be other circumstances that would make it inappropriate. The FtT is not required to set out every single matter that was not argued, but to explain its decision on the principal issues of controversy that were: Practice Direction from the Senior President of Tribunals: Reasons for decisions.
d. The FtT further failed to take into account that the approach to the police had been made in Q, where the appellant lived with her husband, and not in Y where she could live with her parents, undermining its finding that police protection could not be accessed there;
30. I reject that the FtT missed that the first police complaint was made in Q; this is made clear in the FtT’s findings of fact at [14], as reproduced above. The FtT being aware of that fact, it must be assumed that it was taken into account unless the FtT’s reasoning shows otherwise.
31. The finding that the appellant could not access a sufficiency of protection cannot be read as dependent on the attitude in that particular police station in that particular town; the FtT’s assessment encompassed both the appellant’s experience of trying to obtain help once, and what the country evidence disclosed about the personal resources required to access such protection as is made available. The FtT was entitled to find that together they established that this appellant would be unable to access protection. This is the test summarised in TD and AD. Its full and detailed reasoning, including that I have already set out above, meets the standard set out in the Practice Direction:
5. Where reasons are given, they must always be adequate, clear, appropriately concise, and focused upon the principal controversial issues on which the outcome of the case has turned. To be adequate, the reasons for a judicial decision must explain to the parties why they have won and lost. The reasons must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the main issues in dispute. They must always enable an appellate body to understand why the decision was reached, so that it is able to assess whether the decision involved the making of an error on a point of law. These fundamental principles apply to the tribunals as well as to the courts.
32. I reject the respondent’s argument.
e. The finding that the appellant’s husband has no ties with the police was inconsistent with a previous acceptance that he had intervened in a previous police complaint;
f. The findings: at [33], that the appellant’s husband would learn of her return to Y and travel there to harm her; also at [33], that he has no reach or influence over the authorities; and at [30], he did not “regularly travel five or six hours to [her parents’] property” as claimed; were inconsistent;
33. The former argument is contained in the grounds but was not expressly pursued in Mr Nappey’s oral submissions. In any event, the claimed inconsistency does not exist on the face of the decision. It might be that the author was trying to draw attention to a claimed inconsistency in the appellant’s evidence, but such an argument would fail for the same reason as those at (a)-(c).
34. As to (f), no inconsistency arises. The reasons given at [33] are entirely cogent and internally consistent. The appellant’s husband having no reach or influence was the basis for finding that she could live somewhere other than Y without him finding out – this was ruled out by her personal circumstances and characteristics. The finding at [30] rejects that the husband has been making “regular visits” to Y; it was open to the FtT to nonetheless find that he had done so at least once and would do so again.
g. The FtT did not deal with the appellant’s failure to provide screenshots of the threats she had received, which ought to have been taken as damaging her credibility;
35. The FtT did deal with the failure to provide screenshots, recording the appellant’s explanation at [16] and rejecting it at [30]. This informed its rejection of the account of threats concerning social media.
h. There was an overall failure to properly assess the harm that the appellant would face in Y.
36. This simply presents unreasoned disagreement; further, nowhere in the refusal decision or before the FtT did the respondent dispute that the appellant was at risk of serious harm if she was unable to access a sufficiency of state protection or internally relocate. There is no error of law in the FtT having decided the issues placed before it.
Conclusion
37. None of the arguments put forward by the respondent establish an error of law by the FtT. Its consideration of this issue was correctly self-directed, clearly reasoned and dealt with the issues of controversy put forward by the parties. No FtT decision is required to exhaustively trawl through every argument that could conceivably be made. The decision that the appellant is entitled to a grant of international protection stands.
Notice of Decision
(i) The Secretary of State’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.
(ii) The decision of the First-tier Tribunal allowing the appeal on protection grounds stands.

J Neville
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

11 July 2025