Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000862

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/58819/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 10th of June 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NORTON-TAYLOR
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LOKE

Between

MQ
(Anonymity Direction Made)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms H. Lynes, Counsel instructed by Wilsons Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms A. Nolan , Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on Tuesday 27 May 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
BACKGROUND
1. The Appellant appeals against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) dated 6 January 2025 (“the Decision”) dismissing his appeal against the decision of the Secretary of State dated 11 October 2023 refusing his application for asylum made on 24 October 2021.
2. The Appellant filed an application for permission to appeal with the FtT on 10 January 2025. This application was granted by the FtT on 17 February 2025.
3. The Grounds relied on by the Appellant can be summarised as follows:
Ground 1: The Judge failed to make findings on whether the Appellant held a genuine political opinion and would be forced to hide his political opinions on return.
Ground 2: The Judge mistakenly concluded that the Appellant’s CSID identity document could be replaced.
Ground 3: The Judge failed to consider relevant factors when consider the Appellant’s Article 8 claim.
Ground 4: The Judge unlawfully approached the issue of the Appellant’s credibility in that:
(i) The Judge required documentary evidence to corroborate a claim;
(ii) The Judge made medical findings without expertise;
(iii) The Judge failed to put adverse issues to the Appellant given he was a vulnerable witness;
(iv) The Judge failed to take into account Robinson obvious supporting information in the country background evidence.
4. In granting permission, First-tier Tribunal Judge Grimes stated:
“It is arguable, as contended in the grounds, that the judge made an error in her approach to documentation, referring to the appellant holding an INID at paragraph 13 and 68, and to the respondents acceptance that the appellant held a CSID at paragraph 69 before concluding that a relative could meet the appellant at the airport to provide the original CSID or a replacement [69].
It is further arguable that the judge failed to consider relevant factors when assessing he appellant's Article 3 and Article 8 claims.”
ISSUE
5. Our task is to determine whether the FtT made a material error of law. We are not determining the appeal against the decision of the SSHD. It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. It does not matter that we would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached, or is otherwise vitiated by some other identifiable error of law.
6. We remind ourselves of the following principles that the law says must apply when considering. We summarise those, having considered: KM v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWCA Civ 693 AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49, AA (Nigeria) v SSHD [2020] EWCA Civ 1296, MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 49 and Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464:
1. The First-tier Tribunal is an expert tribunal and an appellate court should not rush to find a misdirection an error of law merely because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently
2. The UT should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
3. The UT should not be astute to characterise as an error of law what, in truth, is no more than a disagreement with the UT's assessment of the facts.
4. Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the First-tier Tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account.
5. The UT is an appellate court and it is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the First-tier Tribunal judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that the First-tier Tribunal does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
6. Experienced judges in this specialised tribunal are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them without needing to refer to them specifically.
7. Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appellate court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.
8. Decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that the First-tier Tribunal has misdirected itself in law.
9. The focus should be on the way the First-tier Tribunal performed the essence of the task required
7. If we determine that the Decision does contain an error of law, we then need to decide whether to set aside the Decision in consequence. If we set the Decision aside, we must then either re-make the decision or remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to do so.
8. We had before us a bundle running to 315 pages (pdf) ([B/xx]) containing the documents relevant to the appeal before us, and the Appellant’s and Respondent’s bundles before the First-tier Tribunal.
9. Having heard from Ms Lynes and Ms Nolan we indicated we would reserve our decision and provide that in writing, which we now turn to do.
DISCUSSION
10. The grounds of appeal that we are concerned with are at B/13.
11. With respect of Ground 1, Ms Lynes submitted that the Judge failed to make findings with respect of whether the Appellant’s political beliefs were genuinely held, and if so, whether he would be forced to live discretely to avoid persecution; RT (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] UKSC 38.
12. There is nothing in the Appellant’s appeal skeleton argument at B/50 which indicates that this point, namely that the Appellant would be forced to hide his political opinions, was ever raised before the FtT. The skeleton argument primarily relies on the argument that the Appellant’s problems in Iraq before he left would bring him to the attention of the authorities. At [5] the skeleton argument further submits that the Appellant’s sur-place activities would place him at risk of persecution by the Kurdish authorities.
13. At [51-59] the Judge did not find the Appellant’s account of coming to the attention of the PML in his home area to be credible. With respect of his sur-place claim, the Judge found that the evidence of the Appellant attending demonstrations did not show anything other than the Appellant being one of many in a crowd. The Judge made findings on the issues that were raised before her. We note the authority of Lata [2023] UKUT 00163 (IAC) which indicates that the FtT is entitled to expect clarity of issues at an appeal hearing, and further outlines that the task of the judge is to deal with the issues that the parties have identified. A party that failed to identify an issue before the FtT is unlikely to have a good ground of appeal before the Upper Tribunal.
14. We are not persuaded that Judge erred in failing to make findings regarding the genuineness of the Appellant’s political opinion and whether he would be forced to hide his opinion to avoid persecution. Firstly that issue was simply not particularised before her. Secondly, even if the Judge were required to make such findings, it is a plain and sensible inference from her adverse credibility findings that such findings would have inevitably been in the negative, given the wholesale rejection of the appellant’s credibility in all other respects. We are satisfied that no error of law is made out in Ground 1.
15. With respect of Ground 2, Ms Lynes submitted that the Judge erred at [69] of the Decision when she found that the Appellant could replace his CSID. Ms Lynes also submitted that the Judge erred when considering that the identity document was an INID card, when the Secretary of State had accepted that it was a CSID document.
16. We observe that the parties provided very little assistance to the Judge, notwithstanding the potential significance of the ID document. Directions had been made prior to the appeal hearing for the Appellant’s solicitors to provide a translation of the document to the Tribunal and the Respondent. This direction had not been complied with (we record the fact that the appellant’s current solicitors were not acting at the time). Without translation, the ID document at B/306 is completely undecipherable and provides little or no clue as to its nature.
17. It was submitted by Ms Lynes that given the identity document was dated 6 April 2014, it could not be an INID card, as they were only issued after 2015. It is not apparently clear from inspecting the document that it was issued on 6 April 2014, or indeed that any such submission was made before her. It was further submitted by Ms Lynes that the document at B/306 is markedly different from the Appellant’s father’s INID card which can be found at B/299. This submission has some force, as both documents have a different format. However, again, there is no evidence that this was drawn to the Judge’s attention.
18. The Judge drew from the evidence she had before her. With respect to the documents, the Appellant himself had stated in an asylum claim form that the card was an INID card and that he had given his biometrics in Iraq. This was declared in terms at B/141. In his asylum interview at Q5 B/124 he had stated he could not provide the original of his INID document as it was just the picture he had provided. The Home Office refusal letter dated 11 October 2023 and the review dated 21 May 2024 make no specific findings on the document. A further review from the Home Office took place on 4 October 2024 which made no specific findings, but simply stated that the Respondent did not accept that the Appellant did not have access to his CSID or that he did not have his biometrics taken at an INID terminal.
19. The Judge in her findings stated at [68-69] of the Decision:
“68. The appellant has produced his father’s INID which was issued in June 2022 which demonstrates that the local office is now issuing these documents. He declared that he has an INID in Iraq and that he gave his fingerprints to the Iraqi authorities. He had also declared that he held an Iraqi passport. The appellant had not been found credible in his claim and he therefore has not established that he has lost contact with his family in Iraq. The appellant has shown that he is documented in his home area and the background material in the CPIN of October 2023 at 6.7.9 shows that documents if lost can be reissued.
69.The respondent accepted at the hearing through submissions that the appellant held a CSID. I find that, in the absence of any particular risk to the appellant that a relative could meet him at the airport to provide the original document or a replacement. The appellant had claimed that he was not in touch with his sister and parents since 2022 but he also had an uncle living in Daquq and there would likely be other extended family who could assist him.”
20. It was submitted by Ms Lynes that the Judge erred in finding that the document was an INID document. We do not consider that at [68-69] the Judge made any such finding. It seems to us, that in the absence of a properly translated document and in the face of contradictory evidence on the issue, the Judge was in difficulty drawing any conclusion on the nature of the identity document. The Judge was presented with two scenarios only; it was not suggested that the document was anything else other than either an INID or a CSID. In the circumstances she fairly considered both; the position were the identity document a copy of an INID, or a CSID. On the premise that the appellant had had an INID (based on his own evidence), he would plainly have been able to obtain a replacement.
21. Ms Lynes contended that the Respondent had conceded at the hearing that the document was a CSID. We note that at [69] the Judge refers to the Respondent accepting that the Appellant held a CSID during submissions. In the absence of any previous concession having been made or any statement from the individual who represented the appellant before the Judge (not Ms Lynes), and having not been invited to hear any audio tape of any part of the appeal hearing, it is unclear to us whether this was a concession made by the Respondent such as ought to have bound the Judge. In any event, however, the Judge referred to it and considered the position were the document a copy of a CSID (in the alternative to it being an INID).
22. Ms Lynes submitted that the Judge erred in considering that the Appellant could obtain a replacement CSID. The October 2023 CPIN; internal relocation, civil documentation and returns Iraq, that was in force at the time at para 3.3.4 states:
3.3.4 However, since the promulgation of SMO2, there are no longer any Civil Status Affairs (CSA) offices in Iraq producing and issuing CSIDs following the rollout of the INID system (see Annex E and Annex F). Nationals of Iraq are required to have biometrics taken (including a scan of their irises and fingerprints taken) in the initial application of an INID. Although CSIDs are no longer being issued, due to the delays in the rollout of the INID, CSIDs are still accepted as forms of identification at checkpoints, when obtaining other types of civil documentation and when accessing services. This development does not affect a person’s ability to return to Iraq but does affect their ability to travel internally as well as access services.
23. The background evidence indicates that the Appellant would be unable to obtain a replacement CSID. However, the Judge stated a relative would be able to meet the Appellant and provide his original or a replacement CSID. Ms Lynes’ submission to us regarding whether the Appellant could access his original CSID, was that the document was in his family home in Iraq. The Appellant was not in touch with his immediate family and there was no evidence that his uncle in Daquq had access to his original CSID. This submission overlooks the finding made by the Judge at [50] where she stated:
“50. The appellant said that he had a sister living in Iraq and his paternal uncle lived in Daquq – Q33. His parents had also lived in the village but he had no contact with them and did not know if they were still there. At the hearing he produced a letter from the Red Cross dated 21 August 2024 saying that his photo had been placed on the website. As the appellant has not been found credible in the core of his claim I do not accept the assertion that he is no longer in contact with his family.”
[Emphasis added]
Furthermore, the Judge reiterated this finding at [65] where she found that the Appellant had not established that he had lost contact with his family and he would have a love and support of his family upon return.
24. Any error made by the Judge in stating that the Appellant could have obtain a replacement CSID is not material, as the Judge’s findings that the Appellant was in contact with his family and that a member of the Appellant’s family could meet him with the original CSID are secure. We are satisfied no error of law is made out in Ground 2.
25. With respect of Ground 3, Ms Lynes submitted that when making Article 3 and Article 8 findings the Judge had no regard to the Appellant’s mental health, history or self-harm, the lack of community health care in Kirkuk and the fact the Appellant was a minority in that area.
26. At [60-65] the Judge made findings with respect of the Appellant’s mental health. The Judge’s finding that the Appellant’s mental health did not meet the standard prescribed in AM (Article 3 health cases) Zimbabwe [2022] UKUT 131 (IAC) is entirely in keeping with the evidence. Significantly, the Judge found at [65] that the Appellant would be returning to Kirkuk to his family who would support and care for him.
27. Regarding the Appellant’s returnability to Kirkuk, his employability, the level of care he could expect in Kirkuk and his position as a member of the minority; there is no evidence that any of these points were put before the Judge to support the Appellant’s Article 8 claim. The Appellant’s skeleton argument at [27-29] makes absolutely no reference to these points and simply relies on the Appellant having built a life in the United Kingdom since 2021 and that he is learning English. In fact, at [34] the Judge stated:
“34. I consider the background material relating to Kirkuk at the time of the incident in 2021. There was no reference to any specific background material in the skeleton argument or in submissions other than an extract from an online post relating to Hassan Plys.”
28. While the Judge’s consideration of Article 8 at [73-74] was brief, it is difficult to see what else there was before her that could have materially affected the outcome of the Appellant’s Article 8 claim, other than the Appellant’s medical issues, which she had already considered.
29. Ms Lynes submitted that although these issues had not been expressly brought to the Judge’s attention, having looked at the background material relating to Kirkuk the Judge ought to have also considered them regardless, as a matter of fairness. However, it is not for the Judge to trawl through the background material to find issues which may or may not relate to the Appellant. It was for the Appellant’s representatives to bring the relevant issues to the Judge’s attention. In any event, even if the Judge should have undertaken the work expected of the Appellant’s solicitors, there was no material error of law. The Judge had already made a clear finding that the Appellant would be returning to the support and care of his immediate family. The Judge was also well-aware that the Appellant had lived in Kirkuk as a Kurd until the age of 22 and was not required to have stated this in terms. Overall, we are satisfied no error of law is made out in Ground 3.
30. Ground 4 was split into four limbs. It was submitted on behalf of the Appellant that the Judge unlawfully required corroborative evidence at [38] and [46], when noting that there was no evidence that he owned land in Iraq and no evidence of any arrest warrant.
31. MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216 endorses the position that there is no legal duty to provide corroborative evidence. At this stage it is worth setting out the framework outlined in the Immigration Rules. Paragraph 339L of the Immigration Rules states that where a claimant’s account is not supported by documentary or other evidence, there will be no need for further confirmation when the following conditions are met:
(i) The claimant has made a genuine effort to substantiate their claim;
(ii) All material factors at their disposal have been submitted;
(iii) Their statements are coherent and plausible and do not run counter to available specific and general information relevant to their case;
(iv) They have lodged an asylum or human rights claim at the earliest opportunity unless they can demonstrate good reason for failing to do so;
(v) Their general credibility has been established.
At [76-77] of MAH the Court of Appeal expressly referred to and adopted para 339L, going through these five factors and finding each in favour of that appellant, before noting that the Upper Tribunal had nonetheless required corroborative evidence, which amounted to an error in law.
32. In this case, the Judge did not find all five factors in favour of the Appellant. The Judge noted that there was no evidence that the Appellant had made a genuine effort to obtain the evidence of land ownership or the arrest warrant. At [38] the Judge stated:
“38. The appellant’s evidence as to this land however is extremely vague- he did not say where it was and he failed to explain as to why he could not produce any evidence of it.”
33. The Judge further observed at [46] of the Decision that the Appellant had been able to obtain photographs of his father and his father’s INID card. Thus any evidence regarding the land ownership and the arrest warrant were on the face of it, to quote the terms of para 339L of the Immigration Rules, “material factors” at the Appellant’s disposal, and no satisfactory explanation regarding the lack of this relevant material had been given.
34. At [38-49] the Judge gave a variety of other reasons as to why she did not accept the Appellant’s account, including his inability to provide details regarding the whereabouts of the land owned, inconsistencies regarding dates, lack of any detail regarding his father’s treatment or welfare and lack of proper explanation as to how he lost contact with his family. It was plain that the Judge did not find that the Appellant’s general credibility had been established.
35. Ms Lynes pointed to the fact that the country background material indicated that obtaining documents regarding land ownership in Iraq was problematic and that disputes were commonplace. This may well be the case, however this was not the explanation given by the Appellant. It would have been inappropriate for the Judge to find that the Appellant had been unable to obtain documents due to the general difficulty in doing so, where this was not the oral evidence given by the Appellant himself. The Judge was plainly aware of the background material, at [37] of the Decision, the Judge accepts that it may well have been the case that the Appellant’s home area was under control of the PMF and any arrest warrant could have been issued. However, she then goes on to reject the account on credibility grounds.
36. The second limb of Ground 4 avers that the Judge unlawfully made medical findings that were not open to her. It was submitted in the grounds that the Judge made medical findings at [25] when stating that the Appellant did not show any signs of trauma. In our view this comment is taken entirely out of context. The Judge at [19] in terms stated that in light of the medical evidence the Appellant was going to be treated as a vulnerable witness. At [25] the Judge reminds herself of the Appellant’s vulnerabilities, and states that she “was satisfied at the hearing that the appellant was sensitively examined and that he did not exhibit any signs of trauma.” This comment is in the context of considering the Appellant’s ability to give evidence at the hearing, and not as a general observation on the Appellant’s medical condition, which she expressly accepted.
37. The grounds also submit that the Judge unlawfully found that the Appellant’s medical condition could have been attributed to his brother’s death. This ground is simply not correct. Dr Enache’s letter dated 22 November 2024 is at B/85, and on the second page of that letter Dr Enache stated:
“ Mr Qadr shared briefly that he began experiencing mental health difficulties in Iraq at the age of 13 after witnessing his brother’s death. He further shared that he has blamed himself for the death of his brother ever since, and still has a lot of re-experiences of the incident in the form of nightmares, flashbacks and intrusive memories. Mr Qadr shared that in addition to this incident, he experienced a violent encounter with authorities in Iraq in 2021, after which he felt forced to flee his country for his safety.”
Upon this evidence, the Judge was entirely correct to note that “a” cause of the Appellant’s PTSD was the Appellant witnesses his brother’s death, before reasonably concluding that this compromised the evidential weight of the Appellant’s diagnosis.
38. It was submitted by Ms Lynes that the Judge erred in para [39] of the Decision in speculating that the cause of the Appellant’s scarring could have been self-harming when this had not been put to the Appellant. The letter from the GP is dated 27 October 2023 and at B/60. It is an extremely brief letter which relevantly states:
“He showed me a scar on his forehead and a scar on his left hand at the base of his thumb attributed to being attack with a knife in Iraq. These scars are in keeping with this cause. I have not at this point examined him all over.”
39. At [39] of the Decision the Judge commented:
“The GP letter stating that he had scarring was not specific enough to assist as it only referred to the scars being in keeping with being attacked by a knife. The appellant had however disclosed that he had self-harmed and the examining doctor had not considered whether the scarring could have occurred from other sources.”
40. In our view the Judge made no positive or speculative finding that the scarring was caused by the Appellant self-harming. The Judge noted that the Appellant had disclosed he self-harmed, and noted that the letter had not considered any other sources of the scarring. The letter was very brief, did not purport to be Istanbul Protocol compliant, and the Judge was entirely entitled to find that it had shortcomings which affected the weight she could give it.
41. The third limb of Ground 4 complains that the Judge failed to consider the Appellant’s vulnerabilities and therefore failed to ensure that the concerns that led to adverse credibility findings were put to the Appellant. As already discussed, the Judge noted that the Appellant suffered from PTSD and emotional disabilities. The Judge indicated that she treated the Appellant as a vulnerable witness. There was no full medical report, or any concerns submitted before the Judge or before us that the Appellant was unable to give evidence at the hearing, or had specific difficulties when giving evidence. We have not been provided with any audio tape or transcript of the hearing to suggest that there were specific points where the Judge failed to ask appropriate questions, or where Appellant was unable to understand the questions asked.
42. Issues of credibility are first and foremost a matter for the Judge, and the Upper Tribunal should be slow to interfere with the Judge’s primary findings. The Judge was aware of the Appellant’s mental health issues, she accepted that he was a vulnerable witness. Looking at the Decision as a whole we are satisfied that the Judge took these issues into account when assessing his evidence. The Judge was entitled, nonetheless to find that his account was not credible.
43. The fourth limb of Ground 4 states that the Judge failed to take into account ‘Robinson’ obvious points in the country background information which assisted the Appellant. Ms Lynes specifically submitted that the Judge erred at [47] when finding that the Appellant’s claim to have gone to the police was not credible on the basis that country information indicated that it was highly unlikely there would be any recourse. It was open to the Judge to consider the Appellant’s claim in the light of the country background evidence which indicated that complaining to the police about the PMF, a group closely associated with the government, would have little effect.
44. The grounds complain generally that the Judge failed to consider the supportive country background material regarding land disputes and discrimination against Kurds. We observe that there is no evidence that this material was brought to the Judge’s attention. Ms Lynes riposted that there was no evidence that the material was not brought to the Judge’s attention. This overlooks the basic premise that it is for the Appellant to make out any claimed error in law. In any event and to the contrary, there are indications that this material was not brought to the Judge’s attention. The skeleton argument does not refer to any objective evidence to support the plausibility of the Appellant’s claim. We refer again to [37] where the Judge noted that there was no reference to any specific background material in the skeleton argument or submissions other than an extract from an online post.
45. Even though the country material referred to in the grounds does not seem to have been brought to the Judge’s attention at the hearing, the Judge at [37] accepted the general plausibility of certain aspects of the Appellant’s account but went onto reject that account as a whole on credibility grounds, which she was entitled to do. This indicates that she was nonetheless well aware of the country background material which lent support to the Appellant’s case.
46. Even if the Judge failed to consider points in country background material that may have been consistent with the Appellant’s claim, this far from being a ‘Robinson’ obvious error of law. It is not for the Judge to go through extensive country background material and pick out the points in the Appellant’s favour. We are satisfied that no error of law is made out in Ground 4.

NOTICE OF DECISION
The Appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.
The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Scott-Baker dismissing MQ’s appeal stands.

S Y Loke
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Loke
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

3 June 2025