Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-000870
First-tier Tribunal No: RP/50060/2024
LR/00069/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 3rd of June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PINDER

Between

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

N M A
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S Simbi, Senior Presenting Officer.
For the Respondent: Mr J Wilson, Solicitor, Refugee and Migrant Centre.

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 13 March 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This is the re-making of the decision in NMA’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision of 6th March 2024 to revoke his refugee protection status. This decision follows the earlier decision of Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Solanki to set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the FtT’), because this contained material errors of law. That decision had allowed NMA’s appeal on humanitarian protection grounds. Judge Solanki’s decision (‘the error of law decision’) setting aside the FtT’s decision was promulgated on 23rd January 2026.
2. Following a transfer order, I heard the re-making appeal on 13th March 2026.
3. I have maintained the Anonymity Order in favour of the Appellant. I continue to consider that, on the specific facts of this appeal, the maintenance of the integrity of the United Kingdom’s immigration system and the Appellant having raised a claim to international protection are such that an Anonymity Order is a justified derogation from the principle of open justice.
4. As NMA’s appeal was first allowed by the FtT, it is the Secretary of State who applied and was granted permission to appeal in this Tribunal. The Secretary of State therefore became the Appellant in this Tribunal. For ease of reference however, and with this decision concerning the re-hearing and re-making of NMA’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s revocation decision, I will refer to the parties as they appeared below. Thus from now on, I will refer to the Secretary of State as the Respondent and to NMA as the Appellant.
5. As was recorded at para 31 of the error of law decision, the focus for the re-making hearing in this Tribunal is whether the Appellant can relocate, namely to Port Sudan, having regard to his particular circumstances and the country situation. Judge Solanki also recorded at para 30 that the findings of fact reached by the FtT would be preserved, save for those at [86]-[89], [92]-[93] and [96] of the decision.
6. The Respondent’s decision revoking the Appellant’s refugee status is dated 6th March 2024.

The hearing
7. The Appellant attended the hearing and was assisted by a court interpreter in the Arabic (Sudanese) language. The Appellant was able to give oral evidence – he adopted as his evidence his witness statement dated 6th March 2026 together with his statement prepared for the appeal at first instance in the FtT. The Appellant was then duly cross-examined by Ms Simbi on behalf of the Respondent. There was no re-examination of the Appellant by Mr Wilson.
8. Following the Appellant’s oral evidence and both parties’ respective legal submissions, I confirmed that I would be reserving my decision. I have addressed both parties’ competing evidence and submissions below when setting out my analysis and conclusions.

The evidence
9. I had before me the consolidated bundle (‘TB’) prepared, filed and served by the Secretary of State in advance of the error of law hearing on 9th October 2025, consisting of 143 pages. This included the parties’ respective evidence admitted into the proceedings before the FtT.
10. Following both parties being directed to file and serve any updating evidence and skeleton arguments, the Appellant filed and served a further witness statement and three medical letters, one of which was issued by his GP on 17th February 2026. The Respondent did not seek to rely on any further documents in evidence and both parties submitted a skeleton argument each.
11. I have given careful consideration to all of the written materials before me and to the parties’ written and oral submissions. I do not summarise the contents of the evidence and submissions separately but refer to these, where necessary and relevant, in my analysis below.

Factual Background and Procedural History
12. The background and procedural history is well known to both parties and so I do not rehearse this in any detail in this decision. It is also summarised in detail by the FtT at [4]-[16] of that decision and by Judge Solanki at [4]-[9] of her decision.
13. In essence and in so far as is relevant to the re-making of this appeal, the Appellant entered the United Kingdom in June 2022 and claimed asylum. He was granted refugee status on 23 August 2022 until 27 August 2028 as a citizen of Eritrea, which was his claim at the time. On 8 September 2023, the Appellant applied for a transfer of conditions and declared to the Respondent that he was a citizen of Sudan and so needed this transfer of conditions. He states that he admitted to having deceived the Respondent as to his nationality, because he feared at the time of being killed if returned to Sudan. He also states that he subsequently felt remorse about this, particularly after the death of his mother and the disappearance of his family including his maternal aunt. I note that the FtT found at [60] that there was some credence to the Appellant’s explanation as to why he did not initially disclose his true nationality.
14. Upon the Appellant’s application in 2023, the Respondent referred the Appellant’s claim to the UNHCR in January 2024 on the basis she was considering revoking the Appellant’s refugee status, relying on para 339AB of the Immigration Rules. As summarised above, on 6th March 2024, the Respondent made a decision to revoke the Appellant’s refugee status.
The Respondent’s decision of 6th March 2024
15. In her decision, the Respondent accepted that the Appellant is Sudanese. She also recorded at paras 27 and 29 that if the Appellant would be returned to Sudan, the Appellant would still face a risk of persecution. This was because of the Appellant’s illegal exit and not having completed his military service. The Respondent went on to consider at para 30 of her decision that the provisions contained in para 339AB applied to the Appellant as he had not been honest when he initially claimed asylum in the UK having presented himself as an Eritrean national, when in fact he is Sudanese. The Respondent then stated as follows in conclusion at paras 31 and 32 of her decision:
“31. An assessment of protection needs under Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive must take place if a person is unable to establish a need for refugee protection or subsidiary protection under Article 15(a) or 15(b) (Article 2 and 3 of the ECHR).
32. On the 13/06/2012 the Home Office published a statement of proposed changes to the consideration of Article 8 rights under the ECHR. These changes were adopted by Parliament and became part of the Immigration Rules on the 09/07/2012, as indicated by paragraph 326B. From the 09/07/2012, a person’s Article 8 rights, inclusive of any proportionality assessment, will be considered within the Immigration Rules. You have not provided evidence of Family and Private Life, therefore this has not been taken into consideration.”
16. The Respondent submitted, in both her decision and her review of 17th September 2024, that her position to consider revoking the Appellant’s status on grounds of deception was supported by the UNHCR, who stated as follows (as extracted by the Respondent at para 22 of her decision):
“Based on (the Appellant’s) own admission, UNHCR acknowledges that (the Appellant) misrepresented material facts of his asylum claim, namely by providing an incorrect nationality and/or ethnic origin. Therefore, it appears that there is ground for cancelling (the Appellant’s) status. UNHCR acknowledges that (the Appellant’s) misrepresentation included stating that he relocated from Eritrea to Sudan at the age of 4.”
17. The Respondent acknowledged “the situation in Khartoum” at para 17 of her review but she essentially reserved her position on risk on return to Sudan, until the Appellant’s evidence had been tested at the appeal hearing. She also submitted that there was no evidence to demonstrate that the Appellant could not feasibly return to a different part of Sudan.
18. The Appellant appealed the Respondent’s decision to the FtT on Refugee Convention, humanitarian protection and human rights grounds. The FtT dismissed the Appellant’s appeal under the Refugee Convention but allowed this on humanitarian grounds instead. Following the error of law hearing, Judge Solanki found that the FtT had materially erred in law in their consideration of the humanitarian protection grounds and those findings were set aside.

Findings of fact and Conclusions
19. As was identified by Judge Solanki at the end of her error of law decision, the sole issue that I am to resolve between the parties is whether or not it is reasonable to expect the Appellant to internally relocate to Port Sudan. That was therefore the focus of the written and oral submissions before me and of the Appellant’s oral and written evidence.
20. I first consider whether a return to Port Sudan would be deemed to entail indiscriminate violence and/or a more generalised state of risk for the Appellant.
Port Sudan, in general
21. The Respondent relied on the updated Country Policy and Information Note (‘CPIN’) on ‘Sudan – Security situation’, Version 2.0, published in January 2025 and the information provided by the International Organisation for Migration (‘IOM’) as part of their ‘Sudan Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) programme’. The Respondent submitted that the CPIN assessed Sudan’s conflict as highly dynamic and severe in multiple regions, including in Khartoum and its hinterlands, Darfur, Kordofan, Al Jazirah, Sennar and White Nile. However, the information contained in the CPIN differentiated areas by intensity and concluded that Kassala, Red Sea - which includes Port Sudan - Northern Blue Nile, Gedaref and River Nile did not exhibit a level of indiscriminate violence such that there is a general, real risk of serious harm simply by being present in those areas.
22. At para 4 of her skeleton argument, Ms Simbi on behalf of the Respondent submitted that Port Sudan (in the Red Sea State) was expressly identified as an area of relative stability when compared to the worst‑affected regions (see para 4.1.1 of the CPIN). She submitted in conclusion that the CPIN did not therefore support a blanket proposition that relocation to Port Sudan was per se unduly harsh under Article 15(c) or other equivalent humanitarian protection standards. She addressed that the enquiry properly needed to focus on the Appellant’s individual characteristics, circumstances and practicalities, instead of following a presumption of general risk.
23. The Appellant did not seek to argue that there is either indiscriminate violence or a more generalised state of harm that would place the Appellant at risk if he was expected to internally relocate/return to Port Sudan. Mr Wilson’s submissions on his behalf, both in writing and orally, focused on the Appellant’s own ability to live on such an internal relocation and the prevailing economic and social conditions and standards of living in Port Sudan.
24. Accordingly, in absence of any other country guidance telling me otherwise and on the evidence presented to me as part of these proceedings, I find based on the CPIN evidence relied upon by the Respondent that there is no generalised risk of indiscriminate violence to the Appellant on any return and internal relocation to Port Sudan. I next assess the circumstances specific to this Appellant.
Is an internal relocation to Port Sudan unreasonable for the Appellant
25. As noted above, it has been found that the Appellant cannot return to Khartoum, where he originates from because of the real risk of his suffering serious harm/indiscriminate violence there as a result of the on-going conflict - see [83]-[85] of FtT decision which has not been challenged by the Respondent. This continues to be in line with the Respondent’s CPIN ‘Humanitarian Situation’, which states as follows at para 3.1.1:
“3.1.1 The humanitarian situation varies from state to state. Conditions in the centre, south and west of the country – specifically in Khartoum, Darfur and Kordofan as well as Gezira and Sennar, where fighting is concentrated – are likely to be so severe that there are substantial grounds for believing that there is in general a real risk of serious harm as set out in paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules/Article 3 ECHR.”
26. The Respondent maintains that the Appellant can be returned directly to Port Sudan since the airport there continues to function – see paras 4.1.1-2 of the ‘Sudan: Security Situation’ CPIN:
“4.1.1 A person may be able to return to areas in eastern Sudan, such as Port Sudan in Red Sea state, where there is not a general risk of indiscriminate violence, which are largely controlled by the SAF. Whether this is possible will depend on the person’s individual circumstances, including any affiliation with armed groups in opposition to the SAF and ethnic origin (see Geographic scope of the violence).
4.1.2 The only functional civilian airport operating international flights is Port Sudan Airport. Land travel is restricted by insecurity, road closures and Page 9 of 56 checkpoints. Overland travel from, into or across areas where there is ongoing conflict and in which there is a general risk of serious harm – namely Khartoum, Darfur, Kordofan, Al Jazira and Sennar - is unlikely to be safe. Each case will need to be considered on its facts, taking into account the person’s background and living conditions in the area of relocation (see Freedom of movement).”
27. In support of his appeal, the Appellant reminded me of the guidance handed down by the House of Lords in the case of Januzi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 5, in which Lord Hope stated at [47]:
“The question where the issue of internal relocation is raised can, then, be defined quite simply. As Linden JA put it in Thirunavukkarasuv Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993) 109 DLR (4th) 682, 687, it is whether it would be unduly harsh to expect a claimant who is being persecuted for a Convention reason in one part of his country to move to a less hostile part before seeking refugee status abroad. The words “unduly harsh” set the standard that must be met for this to be regarded as unreasonable. If the claimant can live a relatively normal life there judged by the standards that prevail in his country of nationality generally, and if he can reach the less hostile part without undue hardship or undue difficulty, it will not be unreasonable to expect him to move there”.
28. With regards to his own circumstances, the Appellant raised the following in support of his position:
(a) The Appellant does not have any family, or anyone else known to him living in Port Sudan;
(b) He would be unable to find employment as he has no contacts there and has a medical condition that limits his ability to work;
(c) He is uneducated;
(d) As a result of the above, he would also be unable to access adequate housing;
(e) Thus, the Appellant would be forced to seek support as one of the many thousands of internally displaced persons (‘IDPs’) in Port Sudan. In this respect, the Appellant relies on data from the IOM confirming that as of February 2024, there were 249,555 such IDPs seeking refuge in the Red Sea State with the majority of them located in Port Sudan. This means that support, access to essential services such as health-care, food and other utilities, as well as employment opportunities, are scarce.
29. In support of his submissions on the lack of employment, housing and other services available to the Appellant, the Appellant relied on extracts of articles, included in Mr Wilson’s skeleton argument, which confirm an increase in living costs in Port Sudan as a result of the number of internally displaced persons there.
30. Those sources included a study by Professor El-Hag, articles authored by Amar Jamal, an article in the International Journal of Financial, Administrative and Economic Sciences entitled ‘Echoes of the Sudan war and its social and economic repercussions on the city of Port Sudan’, another article titled ‘Conflict and Displacement in Sudan: Health challenges, socio-economic strain, trauma, and coping mechanisms among internally displaced persons in Port Sudan shelters’, published in ‘Medicine (Baltimore)’.
31. I have not been able to place much weight on the information retrieved from these sources and extracted by the Appellant’s legal representatives. This is because the primary sources, or links for the same, had not been provided. This was raised by Ms Simbi in her skeleton argument, which was filed and served on or around 11th March 2026, namely two days before the hearing. I raised this with Mr Wilson at the outset of the hearing but he confirmed that he was not in a position to rectify this and he asked me to consider the extracts included in his skeleton argument.
32. The Appellant did also rely on passages from the Respondent’s CPIN ‘Sudan: Humanitarian Situation’ published in February 2024. These included the following:
• Para 3.1.6 - “The World Food Programme estimated that approximately 19 million (40%) of the population are acutely food insecure, with the levels of insecurity highest in West Darfur (64%), West Kordofan (64%), Blue Nile (57%), Red Sea ((56%) and North Darfur (54%).”
• Para 14.5.1 - “The OCHA SSR 17 August 2023 stated: ‘While the conflict has affected health services in states directly impacted by the fighting, states that have not witnessed active conflict are also suffering from the lack of supplies, especially as newly displaced people are arriving from conflict areas. Currently, an estimated 11 million people in Sudan need urgent health assistance, including about 4 million children and pregnant and breastfeeding women who are acutely malnourished, and more than 100,000 children under the age of five with severe acute malnutrition (SAM) with medical complications who need specialized care at stabilization centres.”
33. In light of the background evidence available, Mr Wilson submitted that the Appellant, if returned to Port Sudan, would face extremely harsh and traumatic conditions, which would also be made worse since the Appellant will not have any family or friends to support him there. It was submitted that the Appellant will be at a real risk of suffering destitution, homelessness, lack of food, water and power, and lack of access to medical care. He submits that this would be unduly harsh, judged by the standards that prevail in Sudan.
34. The Appellant has also asked me to consider the volatility of the situation. Specifically, I note what is recorded at para 3.1.2 of the Respondent’s ‘Humanitarian Situation’ CPIN:
“Conditions decrease in severity with distance from the active hostilities. In general, they are unlikely to breach Article 3 in the east of the country, including Red Sea, River Nile, Kassala, and Blue Nile states, where fighting has been less intense. However, the situation remains volatile with fighting spreading to the east. Each case must be considered on its individual facts, with the onus on the person to demonstrate that they face a real risk of serious harm.”
35. Specifically with regards to the Appellant’s own circumstances, it was emphasised on his behalf that he has no family members, friends or other persons known to him in Port Sudan. Thus, he has no existing support network here. In addition, as a result of the injury he sustained prior to coming to the UK and subsequent surgery on his hand, his ability to work is limited.
36. The Respondent has also recorded at para 3.1.4 of the ‘Humanitarian Situation’ CPIN the International Monetary Fund’s data reporting that the inflation rate has risen from 138.8% in 2022 to 256.2% in 2023 and that the unemployment rate has risen from 32.1% in 2022 to 45% in 2023.
37. The Respondent submitted that economic hardship and market pressures generally, without more, do not meet the Januzi threshold of “unduly harsh”, particularly where there is no evidence that the Appellant faces targeted persecution in Port Sudan or that standard life‑supporting services are wholly unavailable.
38. The Appellant’s evidence not to have an existing support network in Port Sudan or the Red Sea area was not challenged by the Respondent. I accept that this is the case therefore, particularly with the Appellant originating from Khartoum. Nor was his evidence challenged that he had not practiced any other work, other than driving a ‘tuktuk’ when in Sudan after that.
39. The Appellant confirmed that he had surgery on his hand when in the UK. This too is confirmed by the medical letters submitted in support of his appeal. The Appellant stated that his hand has not improved much as he still cannot open it fully. The Appellant demonstrated this at the hearing showing his hand in a half-opened fist position. He stated that, as a result, he could still not drive a ‘tuktuk’ now.
40. The medical evidence submitted and relied upon by the Appellant in relation to his hand includes the following information:
(a) The Appellant’s GP confirmed on 17th February 2026 that the Appellant underwent surgical intervention, including a left hand anti claw procedure and a “Burkhalter opponensplasty”. Further, that the Appellant remains under the ongoing care and review of the plastic surgery team and that further assessment and/or additional treatment may be required depending on his clinical progress.
(b) The Appellant’s Consultant Plastic, Hand and Peripheral Nerve Surgeon wrote two letters to the Appellant following two consultations on 12th May 2025 and 31st March 2025. Those consultations were post-surgery, which had taken place on 14th February 2025. The Consultant Surgeon described the progress made post-surgery, encouraging the Appellant to use his hand more routinely, and noting in the May 2025 letter that the Appellant’s hand is maintaining glass holding position with good flexion cascade. The Surgeon added that “(h)yperextension at MCPJ has resolved with increase in grip strength now. (The Appellant) can make a full fist with some maintaining opposition.” The Surgeon confirmed wanting to see the Appellant in clinic in three months’ time.
41. The Appellant has not sought to disclose any further letters from his surgery medical team and so I do not know what the Surgeon assessed, or indeed advised or recommended, following the clinic follow-up that would taken place in or around August 2025, or indeed thereafter. Nevertheless, I accept that the Appellant remains under the ongoing care and review of the plastic surgery team, as stated by the Appellant’s GP.
42. From the medical evidence summarised above, whilst I note that the Appellant told me and demonstrated during the hearing that he cannot open his hand fully and that he continues to experience difficulties with using his hand normally, this is not confirmed in the medical evidence submitted. It is likely that the Appellant is still recovering the full use of his hand following the injury sustained and his surgery – he has not yet been discharged from the surgical team’s care. However, the Appellant has not submitted evidence to confirm that he cannot drive a motorbike/tuktuk or any other form of occupational health evidence corroborating the Appellant’s evidence.
43. I am not therefore in a position to find that the Appellant cannot drive a tuktuk as claimed but I am prepared to accept that he may not have yet re-gained, or may never re-gain the full use of his hand. Further, that he may subjectively lack confidence in using his hand and in its strength. It is common for persons who undergo surgery to their bones and/or tendons and/or ligaments, particularly after sustaining a traumatic injury, not to make a full recovery in the sense of re-gaining their pre-traumatic injury mobility and ability.
44. I remind myself that the guidance in Januzi requires me to consider whether the Appellant can live a relatively normal life, which is to be assessed against the standards that prevail in the Appellant’s country of nationality generally. The test of reasonableness involves consideration of all the relevant circumstances looked at cumulatively. In Januzi, Lord Bingham summarised the correct approach to the problem of internal relocation. He stated, at [21], that:
“The decision-maker, taking account of all relevant circumstances pertaining to the claimant and his country of origin, must decide whether it is reasonable to expect the claimant to relocate or whether it would be unduly harsh to expect him to do so (...) There is, as Simon Brown LJ aptly observed in Svazas v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] 1 WLR 1891, para 55, a spectrum of cases. The decision-maker must do his best to decide, on such material as is available, where on the spectrum the particular case falls (…) All must depend on a fair assessment of the relevant facts.”
45. Lord Bingham returned to the test of reasonableness in AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees intervening) [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678. He stated, at [13] that “the test propounded by the House in Januzi was one of great generality, excluding from consideration very little other than the standard of rights protection which an applicant would enjoy in the country where refuge is sought.”
46. The stringency or rigorousness of the reasonableness test is not to be underestimated – see [13], ASJ (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 282; [60]-[62], SC (Jamaica) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 15 and [67], Januzi.
47. As noted by the Court of Appeal in ASJ (Somalia) at [28] onwards, there is a danger of overanalysing and over-refining the relevant test:
“As Lord Bingham observed in relation to questions of internal relocation in AH (Sudan) at paragraph 5, “the difficulty lies in applying the test, not in expressing it”.
48. In answering that question, I must have regard to all the relevant circumstances of the Appellant. It is a holistic assessment, including all relevant considerations.
49. I have regard to the conditions generally in Port Sudan as far as the current conflict is concerned. The Upper Tribunal concluded at [30] in the last country guidance decision concerning Sudan, AAR & AA (Non-Arab Darfuris - return) Sudan [2019] UKUT 282 (IAC), that “(t)he situation in Sudan remains volatile after civil protests started in late 2018 and the future is unpredictable”. As we know from the Respondent’s CPIN and current affairs, the situation has drastically deteriorated in several parts of Sudan. As I have noted above, the Respondent’s CPIN also records the situation is volatile in the East of the country as well, where Port Sudan and the Red Sea state are located.
50. The Executive Summary of the ‘Security Situation’ CPIN states that “(t)he situation in Sudan remains volatile and the intensity and spread of the conflict prone to change. Even where there is not in general a real risk of serious harm due to indiscriminate violence, a person may still face a real risk.” This is also paraphrased at para 3.1.2 and separately, replicated in UNHCR’s position as recorded at para 10.1.4 of the same CPIN, with the latter detailing the following (my emphasis):
“The September 2024 UNHCR Sudan situation update stated:
‘The security situation across Sudan remained highly volatile (…)’”
51. Having taken into account all relevant considerations, I consider that this volatility, coupled with the Appellant’s own particular circumstances as considered above, does render any expectation that the Appellant can return to Port Sudan, as an internal relocation from Khartoum where it is accepted that he would suffer serious harm/indiscriminate violence, is unduly harsh and unreasonable.
52. The Appellant is not educated (see [59] of FtT decision), and his only work to date has been to drive a ‘tuktuk’. Thus, I am satisfied that he is not likely to be able to support himself through employment, or any self-employment, on any return to Port Sudan. This is as a result of both his own circumstances and the general conditions there also. The former includes the Appellant not having any connection of his own to that area, not having worked in any other capacity but a ‘tuktuk’ driver and not being educated. The latter includes significantly difficult economic conditions, as demonstrated by the Respondent’s own background evidence – see IMF figures summarised at para 36 and the information contained in the Humanitarian Situation CPIN as extracted at para 32. It is clearly reported that the Red Sea State is one of the areas worst affected in food insecurity terms at 56% according to the World Food Programme.
53. It is also clearly recorded at para 3.1.2 of the same CPIN that the situation remains volatile in the east of the country, where “fighting has been less intense” and this includes the Red Sea area. This is because fighting has been spreading to the east – see para 34 above. The Appellant’s understanding of the situation in Port Sudan was also consistent with this: he stated in evidence that he was aware that the airport in Port Sudan had recently been hit and there had been a fire that affected flights. I also note para 16.1.4 of the ‘Security Situation’ CPIN records the European Union Aviation Safety Agency stating that there is a continued possible threat to civil aviation, as at 31st July 2024 with such a threat being valid until January 2025.
54. I do not consider that any possibility of initial financial support from the IOM as part of the Respondent’s/the Respondent’s partners’ return schemes would alleviate the risks that stem from the current volatility and the continued high influx of IDPs into the Port Sudan area. There is no real prospect of the Appellant securing access to a livelihood on return to Port Sudan – he has no family or other support in Port Sudan, he has no relatives abroad who would be able to support the Appellant via remittances or similar, and the Appellant has little prospects of earning a living for himself considering the type of occupation he previously undertook, his own concerns of being able to drive a ‘tuktuk’ when still being impacted by his injury and surgery and his lack of education. He has no meaningful resources of his own here in the UK. The Appellant will instead face the prospect of living in circumstances falling below that which would be reasonable for internal relocation purposes.
55. I have reminded myself again that the unreasonableness/unduly harsh test is a stringent and rigorous one. I consider, for the reasons above, that this test and its threshold are met. This is particularly so in (but not limited to) the context of the continuation of the conflict in Sudan and its spread, with Port Sudan also being deemed volatile.
56. For all the reasons, considered cumulatively and holistically, I am satisfied that it is unreasonable and unduly harsh to expect the Appellant to relocate to Port Sudan while he is unable to return to Khartoum. On this basis, NMA’s appeal against the Secretary of State for the Home Department’s decision of 6th March 2024 falls to be allowed on humanitarian protection grounds.

Notice of Decision
57. The decision of the FtT dated 23rd December 2024 did involve the making of material error(s) of law and has been set aside, pursuant to the decision of Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Solanki dated 23rd January 2026.
58. I re-make the decision by allowing NMA’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision of 6th March 2024 on humanitarian protection grounds.

Sarah Pinder

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

15.05.2026