Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000877

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/66018/2023
LP/08750/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 15th February 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LODATO

Between

YQ
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Selway, counsel
For the Respondent: Dr Ibisi, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 13 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction and Background
1. I have decided to maintain the anonymity order originally made in these proceedings by the First-tier Tribunal because the underlying claim involves international protection issues in that the appellant claims to fear persecution or serious harm on return to Iraq. In reaching this decision, I am mindful of the fundamental principle of open justice, but I am satisfied, taking the appellant’s case at its highest for these purposes, that the potential grave risks outweigh the rights of the public to know of his identity.
2. This appeal came before me to be remade following the decision of a panel of the Upper Tribunal that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved a material error of law. No findings of fact were preserved, and it was confirmed that the only meaningful issue to be determined in deciding the underlying appeal was whether the appellant was a credible witness to a reasonable degree of likelihood.
3. The core factual narrative which underpins the appellant’s international protection claim is that he is at risk of honour-based violence because his stepmother and his stepsister conspired to falsely accuse him of sexual misconduct. This enraged his abusive father who is now determined to kill him to preserve the family’s honour.
Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
4. At the remaking hearing, I heard oral evidence from the appellant with the assistance of a Kurdish (Sorani) interpreter. I then heard oral submissions from both parties. I address any evidence and submissions of significance in the discussion section below.
Legal Framework
5. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, an appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden of proof is upon the appellant. As per Karanakaran v SSHD [2000] 3 All ER 449, the single standard of proof is a reasonable degree of likelihood. I must determine whether it is reasonably likely that the appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution.
6. To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds, the appellant must not be a refugee; they must show substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in their country of origin. The burden of proof rests on the appellant.
7. I have considered SMO, KSP & IM (Article 15(c); identity documents) Iraq CG [2019] UKUT 00400 (IAC) and SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 00110 (IAC) [‘SMO2’].
Discussion
8. In keeping with the error of law decision, the parties were agreed before me that the only meaningful issue to be determined in the proceedings was whether the appellant is a credible witness to a reasonable degree of likelihood about the events he claims put him in fear of persecution on return. It was not suggested that the appellant could turn to the Iraqi authorities or reasonably relocate to another part of Iraq to obviate any risks he might face if he were telling the truth to the applicable standard. While it was suggested that he would not have access to the required Iraqi civil status identification documents on return, it was recognised that this turned entirely on whether he was a credible witness in respect to his claims that he did not have actual or constructive possession of the documents which would be needed to redocument and was no longer in contact with his family in Iraq meaning that he could not count on their assistance in the redocumentation process.
9. The first point which must be made at the outset of assessing the appellant’s credibility is that he claims to have been a 17-year-old minor when the events which occasioned his departure from Iraq unfolded. It is important to keep in mind that an adult recalling events which he maintains occurred almost a decade ago when he was still a child may not be recalled with the same kind of accuracy as more recent events experienced as an adult.
10. An aspect of the appellant’s account which caused me concern were the circumstances in which he came to learn, through his mother, of the plot which was hatched between his stepmother and stepsister, F, to falsely accuse him sexually inappropriate conduct. He described how his father had married for a second time after his mother, his father’s first wife, became ill with a chronic illness. According to the appellant’s witness statements and oral evidence provided during re-examination, the appellant, his father, his mother, his father’s second wife, his three younger brothers, his younger sister and his stepmother’s two teenage daughters all shared a small home over two floors with a total of four separate rooms. He claimed that while he was out of the house at work selling vegetables, his mother overheard his stepmother and F discussing a plan to falsely accuse him of sexually assaulting F to cover-up the loss of her virginity to another man.
11. It struck me as very odd that such a conversation would be held within earshot of the appellant’s mother who he said was undertaking ablutions at the time. The conversation must have been loud enough to be projected from the upper floor, where the conversation was held, to the ground floor, where the appellant’s mother was performing her ablutions. This appeared to be a surprisingly cavalier way in which to forge a conspiracy to falsely accuse the appellant. When questioned about the surprising circumstances in which the plot came to be exposed, the appellant could offer no explanation as to why his stepmother and stepsister might be so careless to allow their plan to be revealed before it could even get started. Mr Selway argued at the conclusion of the remaking hearing that the appellant’s stepmother and her daughter may have engaged in ‘stage whispering’ with the intention that his mother would overhear and set in motion a chain of events to get the appellant out of the household. Firstly, as Mr Selway acknowledged, this was a speculation on his part and not founded on anything said by his client in evidence. Secondly, given what is widely known in this jurisdiction about the extreme dangers faced by women in Iraq whose honour is perceived to have been impugned, it would be an extraordinarily dangerous enterprise to allege sexual contact of this nature and hope that no suspicion would fall on the female said to have been sexually abused. If the plan was solely to invent a false narrative to be rid of the appellant, it was difficult to understand why the risk would be taken of possibly compromising F’s perceived honour in the process. All of this left me with real concerns about the plausibility of this sequence of events.
12. Another feature of the appellant’s narrative which caused me concern was how he came to be in possession of his passport and why he had such a document of which the only logical purpose could be international travel. The appellant’s case was that as soon as he learned of the plot from his mother, he hastily arranged to take refuge at his maternal uncle’s home where he remained in hiding for a couple of days during which time his father repeatedly visited demanding that his son be handed over. Once it became clear that his father was determined to seize his son, it was decided that the appellant must flee the country. He did so using his passport. The Greek authorities ultimately seized this document. A copy of the passport was provided and showed that it was issued on 29 July 2017 when the appellant was 17 years old. Under cross-examination, the appellant could not be certain about when he left Iraq, but he has always maintained that it was some time in 2017. He thought it may have been in Winter. The appellant has never explained why, as a 17-year-old child, it was felt to be necessary to obtain a passport for him. We know from SMO2 that CSID cards were necessary to function in Iraqi civil society in 2017 and there would seem to be no reason why a passport would be obtained unless there was an intention to travel abroad. It struck me as odd that the 17-year-old appellant found himself in an unheralded urgent need to leave Iraq and fortuitously had a passport issued to him a matter of months before. The circumstances in which the passport came to be in his possession were also troubling. Under my clarifying questions, the appellant confirmed that he did not take his passport to work with him on the fateful day on which he was forced to take refuge at his uncle’s home. He also clarified that his mother had not visited her brother during his stay. When I asked how he took possession of his passport, he explained that his uncle had visited his mother while he remained in hiding. Under re-examination he stated that there was “a problem” when his uncle retrieved the passport from the appellant’s mother. The difficulty with all of this was that it emerged for the first time during the remaking hearing. The appellant provided two detailed witness statements, a comprehensive account in a preliminary questionnaire and full answers to questions asked in his substantive interview. It was therefore difficult to understand how the appellant’s uncle’s visit to his mother had never come up before. It has never been explained why he had a passport at this time if it was not in contemplation that he would use such a document to travel abroad when it was issued in July 2017.
13. A further aspect of the appellant’s narrative account emerged during re-examination at the remaking hearing. He claimed that his father had travelled with supporters to Turkey to look for him. When he was asked how he discovered this, he indicated that one of the search party was, in fact, loyal to his maternal uncle who helped him to escape from Iraq. His uncle was therefore informed of the appellant’s father’s trip to Turkey to look for him. It struck me as extraordinary that the appellant had not thought to mention this important turn of events before in any of the various accounts he had provided in the past.
14. It appears to me that the appellant’s story evolved to a substantial degree over the course of the hearing which I found to be impossible to reconcile with anything other than an ever-shifting fabrication. I am unable to accept, even taking account of his immaturity when these events were said to have occurred, and keeping in mind the low standard of proof, that the appellant has told the truth about the events which surrounded his departure from Iraq.
15. I have considered the overall evidential picture and find myself unable to accept the appellant is credible to a reasonable degree of likelihood about what caused him to leave Iraq. I do not consider him to be a witness of truth, and I am unable to accept his evidence about losing contact with his family and that he cannot therefore access the documents and family support he would need to be redocumented on return.
Notice of Decision
On remaking, I dismiss the appeal on asylum, humanitarian protection and human rights grounds.

P Lodato

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

5 February 2026