Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM
CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000897

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/60659/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 28 November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MANDALIA

Between

TAH
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation
For the Appellant: Ms H Cosgrove, Latta & Co Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr A Mullen, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Edinburgh Tribunal Hearing Centre on 14 August 2025
Decision and Reasons
Anonymity
1. This appeal concerns a claim for international protection. Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.”
Introduction
2. The appellant is a national of Iraq and of Kurdish ethnicity. He arrived in the United Kingdom on 25 July 2021 and made a claim for international protection on 27 July 2021. His claim was refused by the respondent on 2 November 2023. The respondent accepts the appellant’s nationality and ethnicity but rejects the appellant's claim that he will be at risk upon return because he will be targeted by the authorities in Iraq and or the family of a business partner because of a blood feud.
3. The appellant’s appeal against that decision was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) judge Montgomery (“the FtT judge”) for reasons set out in a decision dated 14 November 2024 (“the decision”).
4. The appellant claims the decision is vitiated by three errors of law; (i) the judge failed to properly consider and/or make clear findings as to the evidence from the Freedom and Human Rights Organisation (“FHROO”); (ii) the judge concluded the evidence of the appellant is “riddled with inconsistencies and implausibilities” as set out in the respondent’s decision whereas the respondent had only referred to one ‘inconsistency’ and the appellant had provided a largely consistent account of events; and (iii) the judge failed to properly consider the appellant’s evidence concerning the availability of an INID card. The judge proceeds upon the basis that in interview the appellant had claimed he has an INID and CSID card whereas at the hearing the appellant had claimed he does not have an INID. The appellant claims that is to ignore the amendments submitted to the respondent following the interview in which the applicant clarified that he did not have an INID card.
5. Permission to appeal was granted by Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Zucker on 20 March 2025. He said:
“As drafted, it is arguable with respect to the third Ground that the Judge was of the view that the change in evidence with respect to the documentation available to the Appellant occurred at the hearing rather than at some earlier time. If so, it is arguable that the Judge considered that there had been recent fabrication whereas there had arguably been a previous consistent statement i.e. that the Appellant did not have the documents which he had originally said he had. By analogy to section 6(1)(b) of the Civil Evidence Act 1995 it is arguable that the Judge should have given weight to the correction of his interview in advance of the hearing. It is further arguable that the Judge has made a separate finding on this point rather than consider the same in the context of the evidence as a whole thereby falling into error in a similar way to the error considered in the guidance of Mibanga [2005] EWCA Civ 367”
The Hearing of the Appeal Before Me
6. Ms Cosgrove submits there was a certified translation of a letter from the FHRO dated 20 November 2023 before the FtT. Ms Cosgrove referred me to a ‘screenshot’ taken of the website of FHRO that refers to a section “Search Legal Cases”. When one inserts the reference number set out in the letter from FHRO into the ‘search facility’ in that section of the website, there is reference to a complaint registered or recorded on 15 October 2023 by the appellant’s uncle. Ms Cosgrove submits there was therefore credible evidence before the FtT that the appellant’s uncle had recorded a claim that had been investigated by the FHRO as set out in the letter. The ‘search’ of the website leads to a page that includes confirmation of the report and a photograph of the appellant’s uncle. Ms Cosgrove submits that although a judge is not required to deal with each piece of the evidence, the judge here made only a brief reference to the letter from FHRO and without engaging with the evidence, concluded that the document appears to be ‘self-serving’ and placed ‘no weight’ upon that evidence. The judge did not make any clear finding on that evidence or the content of the report.
7. Ms Cosgrove submits the judge stated, at [41], that the appellant’s account is riddled with inconsistencies and implausibilities as set out in the respondent’s decision. However, as far as the credibility of the appellant is concerned, the respondent simply said that the appellant was “internally inconsistent and provided a lack of sufficient and specific details regarding how and when the van was loaded”, and there was a lack of detail and speculation on the part of the appellant in respect of other aspects of his account. Finally, Ms Cosgrove submits the appellant had clarified the answer recorded during his interview that he held both a CSID and an INID, prior to the hearing of his appeal in the corrections dated 4 October 2023 submitted to the respondent, prior to the respondent’s decision. Ms Cosgrove accepts that that error is not of itself material because the appellant had a CSID. If however, the appellant is at risk upon return because he is the subject of a blood feud, the availability of travel documents may be relevant to the question of internal relocation.
8. In reply, Mr Mullen acknowledges that the judge does not say whether FHRO is a bona-fide organisation. He submits there was no background information before the FtT regarding the organisation. Mr Mullen submits there remains in any event a question as to why, if it is a credible independent organisation, the FHRO would contact the appellant. The judge gives perfectly adequate reasons for attaching no weight to the report. The timing of the complaint was as the judge explained, suspicious, and the judge was entitled to have that in mind. The FHRO claims enquiries have been carried out but the weight to be attached to the evidence as a whole was a matter for the judge. Mr Mullen submits the judge does not expressly refer to the ‘inconsistencies and implausibilities’ in the appellant’s account but it is clear that the judge agreed and adopted the matters outlined by the respondent in her decision. The judge did not need to repeat those matters in the decision. The judge noted that the appellant has failed to provide a copy of the arrest warrant he claims has been issued against him. Finally, Mr Mullen submits that on any view, the appellant does not dispute that he has a CSID and the appellant will therefore not be at risk on return to Iraq on Article 3 grounds.
Decision
9. The judge summarised the core of the appellant's account at paragraphs [26] to [30] of the decision. The assessment of the risk upon return and the credibility of the claim advanced by an appellant is always a highly fact sensitive task. It is now well established that in cases such as the present where the credibility of the appellant is in issue, judges adopt a variety of different evaluative techniques to assess the evidence. The Tribunal will for instance consider: (i) the consistency (or otherwise) of accounts given to investigators at different points in time; (ii) the consistency (or otherwise) of an appellant's narrative case for asylum with his actual conduct at earlier stages and periods in time; (iii) whether, on facts found or agreed or which are incontrovertible, the appellant is a person who can be categorised as at risk if returned, and, if so, as to the nature and extent of that risk (taking account of applicable Country Guidance); (iv) the adequacy (or by contrast paucity) of evidence on relevant issues that, logically, the appellant should be able to adduce in order to support his or her case; and (v), the overall plausibility of an appellant's account.
10. The judge recorded at paragraph [37] of the decision that in a witness statement made in December 2021 (about 6 months after the events relied upon by the appellant), the appellant had made no mention of his uncle having been harmed in any way. At paragraph [38] the judge referred to the appellant’s witness statement dated 28 February 2024 in which the appellant claims, at paragraph [5] that he has ‘new evidence’ to support his claim. To put the judge’s consideration of the evidence in context, it is helpful to set out the appellant’s evidence in a little more detail. The appellant claims that in around December 2023 he received a phone call from FHRO in Kurdistan. When the appellant confirmed his identity the appellant was told that he could be provided with information which might be helpful to him. The appellant claims he was not familiar with the organisation and was told it was an independent human rights organisation who were not affiliated with the authorities or any party. The appellant was told the organisation tries to intervene in problems, investigates them and assists where they can. The appellant claims he was told that his maternal uncle had made a complaint to them because his life was under threat. The appellant states his uncle told them he was threatened by the family of the appellant’s ex business partner and was told to hand him over. The appellant claims his uncle provided FHRO with the appellant’s phone number in the hope that they could reach him on that number. The appellant states he was told that they had investigated the matter and although they could not do anything to assist his maternal uncle in resolving the matter, they could provide the appellant with a report about their investigation and their findings. The appellant agreed and provided them with the details of his solicitors. The appellant understands that a copy of the report is also available through the organisation’s website. The appellant claims he was told that his uncle had requested that the appellant do not make any contact with him or the rest of his family for the sake of their safety.
11. There is no doubt the judge was aware of the evidence that is said to come from FHRO. The judge refers to the evidence at paragraphs [38] to [40] of the decision. Although the judge does not refer at any length to the content of the report from FHRO, it is clear in my judgment that the judge was aware of the investigation carried out. The judge states, at [38]; “This group offered the appellant a report about their investigation”. The judge addressed the evidence at paragraphs [39] and [40] of the decision:
“39. Coincidences do happen, but some coincidences strain credulity to its limits. In this case, the appellant claims that on 15th October 2023, approximately two weeks prior to the decision refusing his claim, the appellant’s uncle went to an organisation in Kurdistan and lodged a complaint. This organisation then not only produces a report, framed in terms which appear designed to assist the appellant rather than obtain protection for his uncle, but actively seeks out the appellant to send the report to him.
40. I find that this is such an implausible scenario that it completely undermines the credibility of the report now relied upon. I accept that a document appears to have been sent from Kurdistan but consider it to be self-serving. Looking at all the evidence in the round, and having regard to Tanveer Ahmed, I find that that the appellant has failed to establish that the document is reliable, I place no weight upon the FRHO report.”
12. Ms Cosgrove referred me to the extracts from the website of FHRO and she submits that it is plain that a complaint was indeed made by the appellant’s uncle as he claims. That is undoubtedly correct but it does no more than establish that a complaint was indeed made by the appellant’s uncle in Sulaymaniyah on 15 October 2023. The extracts from the website that are relied upon by Ms Cosgrove say no more than that. Beyond the reference to a complaint having been recorded, there is no reference to any investigation having been completed by FHRO or of any report published by them.
13. The judge accepted a document appears to have been sent from Kurdistan. The judge was required to consider the ingredients of the story, and the story as a whole, against the available country evidence and reliable expert evidence. The weight to be attached to the evidence was a matter for the judge. There was no evidence before the Tribunal regarding the reliability of FHRO as a reputable independent organisation that carries out independent investigations into complaints. When considered in the context of the appellant’s evidence, there is nothing in the evidence that was before the FtT that undermines the conclusions reached by the judge and I am satisfied that here the judge relied on reasonably drawn inferences and not simply on conjecture or speculation in reaching the conclusion that no weight could be attached to the report. There is in my judgement no failure by the judge to engage with the evidence relied upon by the judge.
14. In any event, further careful scrutiny of the documents reveal a further unexplained anomaly that impacts upon the weight to be attached to the evidence. Looking at the documents in their untranslated form one can see that the heading refers to “Freedom & Human Rights Organizaiton” That appears to be consistent with the heading that appears on the website of the FHRO. However, the seal on the untranslated documents refers to “Freedom & Human Rights Organization” (my emphasis). It is difficult to think of any credible explanation as to why an organisation’s name would be spelt different on a stamp endorsed on a document to add to its authenticity as a document from that organisation to that, for example, used by the organisation in the header to its documents and on its website. Even if I had accepted that the judge failed to adequately consider the evidence that was before the Tribunal from the FHRO (which for the avoidance of doubt I do not), it is clear in my judgment that that would be immaterial to the outcome of the appeal.
15. I turn then to the second ground of appeal and the criticism made concerning the judge’s conclusion that the appellant’s account is “riddled with inconsistencies and implausibilities”. The judge, in effect, adopted the conclusions reached by the respondent. I have reminded myself of the restraint which an appellate body must exercise when considering an appeal against the decision of a specialist judge at first instance. Appellate Courts do not lightly interfere with findings of fact made by a trial judge. In Henderson v Foxworth Investments Ltd [2014] UKSC 41, [2014] 1 WLR 2600, Lord Reed (with whom Lords Kerr, Sumption, Carnwath and Toulson agreed) said at paragraph 67:
"in the absence of some other identifiable error, such as (without attempting an exhaustive account) a material error of law, or the making of a critical finding of fact which has no basis in the evidence, or a demonstrable misunderstanding of relevant evidence, or a demonstrable failure to consider relevant evidence, an appellate court will interfere with the findings of fact made by a trial judge only if it is satisfied that his decision cannot reasonably be explained or justified".
16. In her decision, the respondent addressed the credibility of the appellant. The respondent referred to the inconsistent account given by the appellant regarding the core of his account concerning the events leading to the van being loaded with illegal drugs by the appellant’s business partner. The respondent’s decision is poorly articulated and what are referred to as ‘inconsistencies’ are in fact aspects of the claim that are considered to be ‘incredible’. The respondent rejected the appellant’s claim that he had come to the attention of the authorities or that he is at risk upon return from the family of his business partner. The judge adopted the reasons given by the respondent in her decision and the judge was not required to set those reasons out in the decision. The Upper Tribunal is not entitled to find an error of law simply because it does not agree with the decision, or because the Tribunal thinks the decision could be more clearly expressed or another judge can produce a better one. Baroness Hale put it in this way in AH (Sudan) v SSHD at [30]:
"Appellate courts should not rush to find such misdirection simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently."
17. At paragraphs [42] the judge reached a clear conclusion that on the evidence before the Tribunal the appellant has failed to establish that there is an on-going blood feud between his family and another family. That was the issue at the heart of the appeal. The judge noted there was evidence in the form of an arrest warrant that should have been readily available to support the appellant’s claim and that it is surprising, in context, that it has not been provided. In MAH (Egypt)¸Singh LJ said, at [86]:
“It was common ground before this Court that there is no requirement that the applicant must adduce corroborative evidence: see Kasolo v Secretary of State for the Home Department (13190, a decision of the then Immigration Appeal Tribunal, 1 April 1996). On the other hand, the absence of corroborative evidence can, depending on the circumstances, be of some evidential value: if, for example, it could reasonably have been obtained and there is no good reason for not obtaining it, that may be a matter to which the tribunal can give appropriate weight. This is what was meant by Green LJ in SB (Sri Lanka) at para. 46(iv).”
18. The decision of the FtT judge must be read as a whole and it is clear that the judge has reached a decision upon the core elements of the claim, by reference to the evidence before the Tribunal, giving adequate reasons for the decision and conclusions reached. The focus should be on the way the judge performed the essence of their task. It s clear in my judgment that the judge reached a decision that was open to the FtT following an analysis of the claims made by the appellant. The Upper Tribunal should not overturn a judgment at first instance unless it really cannot understand the original judge's thought process when the judge was making material findings. The decision is to be read looking at the substance of the reasoning and not with a fine-tooth comb in an effort to identify errors.
19. I am satisfied that standing back, the judge's decision was based upon the wide canvas of evidence before the Tribunal. The conclusion that the appellant will not be at risk upon return to Iraq is a sufficiently reasoned decision that was open to the judge on the evidence before the Tribunal and the findings made.
20. Finally it is in my judgement clear that any error as to whether the appellant has both an INID and CSID or just a CSID is immaterial to the outcome of the appeal. There is an unchallenged finding at paragraph [46] of the decision that the appellant remains in contact with his family in Iraq. The appellant has failed to establish the core of his claim and in all the circumstances he will be able to return to his home and the support of his family in Iraq, as the judge found. The judge found, at [49], that on any view the appellant was in possession of a CSID card prior to his departure from Iraq and that the appellant would likely be able to obtain his CSID from his family in Iraq. The judge’s conclusion that the appellant could return to Iraq without facing a risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 is therefore in accordance with the relevant country guidance.
21. It follows that I dismiss the appellant’s appeal.
Notice of Decision
22. The appellants appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.
23. The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Montgomery dated 14 November 2024 stands.

V. Mandalia
Upper Tribunal Judge Mandalia

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

7 November 2025