Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000947

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/63878/2023
LP/05678/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 16th of September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEBEDE

Between

SH
(Anonymity Order made)

Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr M Hamid, instructed by Primus Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms R Tariq, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 4 September 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is the re-making of the decision in the appellant’s appeal, following the setting aside, in a decision promulgated on 24 July 2025, of the First-tier Tribunal’s decision which dismissed the appeal.
2. The appellant is an Iraqi national of Kurdish ethnicity from Dukan in Sulaymaniyah district in the KRI, whose date of birth is given as 1 January 1997. He arrived in the UK, illegally, on 7 March 2021, having left Iraq in December 2020. He claimed asylum on arrival and attended a screening interview on 10 March 2021. He completed an asylum claim questionnaire (ACQ) on 1 August 2023 and was interviewed about his claim on 23 November 2023.
3. The appellant’s claim can be summarised as follows. He claimed to be a member of the New Generation Party in Iraq and to have been arrested in March 2020 and detained for three days due to his political activities on Facebook before being released when his father paid a fine. He claimed that he helped to organise a demonstration for the New Generation Party on 8/9 December 2020 and that during the demonstration a high-level security officer, who was the brother of a high-ranking member of the PUK, was killed. The appellant claimed that it was discovered that he had organised the demonstration and his home was then burned down and he fled Iraq. He feared the family of the PUK leader as he had organised the demonstration where the PUK leader’s brother had been killed. The appellant also claimed to have been involved in sur place activities in the UK which had put him at risk on return to Iraq.
4. The appellant’s claim was refused on 1 December 2023. The respondent accepted that the appellant was of Kurdish ethnicity and a member of the New Generation Party but did not accept his claimed problems due to being a New Generation Party member. The respondent considered that the appellant’s account was implausible and inconsistent with external information. The respondent did not accept that the appellant was at risk on return to Iraq and considered that the low level nature of his sur place activities would not have given rise to any adverse interest in him. The respondent did not accept the appellant’s claim to have lost contact with his family in the KRI and considered that he would be able to access his original CSID through his family or that they would be able to assist him in obtaining a replacement document. The respondent considered that the appellant’s removal to Iraq would not breach his human rights.
First-tier Tribunal
5. The appellant’s appeal against that decision was heard on 29 October 2024 in the First-tier Tribunal. The judge did not accept the appellant’s account of the demonstration and of the threats he received and did not accept that he was at any risk on return to Iraq on such a basis. With regard to the appellant’s sur place activities in the UK, the judge had regard to photographs showing the appellant attending demonstrations in Manchester and noted that he was one of many demonstrators. The judge had regard to a letter of support from the Dakok Support Centre confirming the appellant’s membership of the organisation but noted the recent nature of that membership. The judge considered that the appellant had had no role in the demonstrations in the UK and that he had no profile of any significance in Iraq arising from his attendance at demonstrations and his Facebook activity. The judge considered that the appellant’s lack of documentation was not an impediment to his return. The judge did not accept that the appellant had lost contact with his family in Iraq and considered that he could contact them and have access to ID documentation with their assistance. The judge accordingly dismissed the appeal, in a decision promulgated on 17 November 2024.
6. The appellant sought permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal against that decision on two grounds: firstly, that the judge’s analysis of his political activity was limited and failed to consider the principles outlined in RT (Zimbabwe) & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] UKSC 38 and HJ (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 31, particularly with regard to the genuineness of his political activity; and secondly, that the judge had failed to properly consider the relevant feasibility of return and to engage with the relevant legal principles outlined in SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 00110.
7. Permission was refused in the First-tier Tribunal but was subsequently granted, on a renewed application, in the Upper Tribunal.
Upper Tribunal: Error of Law
8. The matter came before me on 15 July 2025 to determine the error of law issue. The appellant appeared without a legal representative and, whilst his representatives applied for an adjournment on the grounds that they were unaware of the hearing date (which the appellant denied), the appellant wished to proceed in their absence. The hearing therefore went ahead.
9. In a decision promulgated on 24 July 2025, I set aside the First-tier Tribunal’s decision, on a limited basis, in relation to the issue of risks arising from the appellant’s sur place activities in the UK, as follows:
“Mr Tan made a valiant attempt to support the judge’s findings and conclusions on the risk arising out of the appellant’s sur place activities but I was not persuaded that the judge’s decision was sustainable in that particular regard. I agree with the assertion in the grounds that the judge failed to engage with the principles in HJ (Iran) and RT (Zimbabwe), in that he failed to make any finding on whether the appellant was considered to hold genuine political beliefs which he would intend to express on return to Iraq. As the grounds identify at [4], the respondent accepted that the appellant was a member of the New Generation Party and, as such, it was not the case that he was considered to be a person with no prior political interests. The grounds suggest that it was also accepted by the judge that the appellant was detained in Iraq, but I do not agree that any such finding was made. The judge did not make any specific finding in that regard, although it appears that that formed part of the overall adverse credibility findings at [18]. In any event, it remained for the judge to make a finding, having considered the appellant’s sur place activities in the UK, on whether those activities were an expression of genuinely held political beliefs which he would intend to maintain in Iraq and the risks arising out of such activities in Iraq if they were continued there. Although the judge found the appellant’s activities in the UK were of a low level, he stopped short of addressing those issues. Likewise, he did not make any specific finding on the appellant’s activities with the Dakok Support Centre but merely commented at [20] on his membership being recent. Further, whilst the judge cited the case of XX (PJAK - sur place activities -Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT, he did not go on to engage in any analysis of the appellant’s Facebook activity or make any findings on how such activity would or would not give rise to a risk on return to Iraq. In the circumstances the judge’s findings on the appellant’s sur place activities are materially flawed and I set aside that part of the judge’s decision. “
10. I made it clear in my decision that the First-tier Tribunal’s findings in relation to the appellant’s experiences in Iraq and his reasons for leaving the country and in relation to any risks arising from that, as well as the findings relating to identity documentation, were all preserved. The decision was to be re-made solely on the issue of risk arising from the appellant’s sur place activities in the UK. The full error of law decision is annexed to this decision.
Upper Tribunal: Re-making the Decision
11. For the resumed hearing, the appellant’s representatives relied upon a composite bundle which consisted of the appeal bundles before the First-tier Tribunal for both the respondent and the appellant and additional evidence produced for the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal including a 1268 page bundle of Facebook data. No new evidence was adduced for the resumed hearing. I have read all of these documents and have taken all of them into consideration even if not specifically referred to.
12. The appellant gave oral evidence before me through an interpreter in the Kurdish Sorani language. The interpreter confirmed that they understood one another and I was satisfied that that was the case. The appellant adopted his witness statement as his evidence in chief and was cross-examined by Ms Tariq. When asked since when had he been politically active in the UK, he said that he attended his first demonstration in 2021, he believed in August 2021. He attended around 15 demonstrations, initially not through any particular organisation but later through Dakok. He said that he was a member of Dakok and was given different roles at the various demonstrations including security duties. He was also asked to speak publicly at one demonstration, most recently, last month. When asked why the letter from Dakok which he had produced did not refer to any role providing security, the appellant said that he carried out different tasks. On 5 August 2025 there was a demonstration in memory of Zardasht Osman who was killed by the KRG authorities. Another demonstration was in support of Shirwan Shirwani who was critical of the KRG, who had been in prison for many years and whose prison sentence had been renewed for another four years without any explanation or reason. The appellant said that he had been active on Facebook in the UK since about two to three months after his arrival here. His Facebook account was public. When asked if he had ever been threatened or received negative attention on his Facebook page the appellant claimed that he had been threatened but the person had deleted the message, although the second time he had managed to save it. He had received threats via audio and video and they had been included in his appeal bundle. The threats had been sent by the son of Hamza Sharasteni, a high ranking officer in his home area, who had been killed. His poster had been put up in Dukan in his memory after he was killed.
13. When re-examined the appellant clarified that the person who had been killed was Hamza Sharasteni. It was his son Bilal Hamza who had sent him the threatening message.
14. I then asked the appellant some questions. I asked him what he would do by way of political activities if he was to return to Iraq. His response was that it was certain that he would be killed if he went back, but if he was able to, he would like to speak out against injustice and to express what he thought was right, either through Facebook or by speaking to people on a one to one basis or by speaking out if there were several people.
15. Ms Tariq then had further questions for the appellant arising out of mine. In response to her enquiry as to whether he was politically active in Iraq, the appellant said that he was. He was a volunteer for the New Generation Movement and he would walk in front of demonstrations and design posters and help organise demonstrations for the party. He encountered problems as a result and was arrested and tortured, as he had mentioned previously. He did not have any evidence of that. He was also at a demonstration where everyone was arrested, beaten up and tortured. That was nothing new as it had been going on a long time. Two days previously a journalist had been shot and wounded. The KRG showed no mercy to anyone, just for saying something. He was arrested on 8 March 2020 and detained for three days. After he was released he continued to be called in and was belittled and threatened and warned. The last time that happened was in June or July. He did not do much after then as he was frightened and so became more passive, but then there were massive demonstrations in December 2020 all over the cities and towns. It was at the demonstration on 9 December that Hamza Sharasteni was killed. Last month the leader of the New Generation Movement was arrested. He was still in prison. The party had received 3000 votes from the public but the leader was given a six month prison sentence for no reason.
16. Mr Hamid did not wish to re-examine the appellant.
17. Both parties then made submissions before me.
18. Ms Tariq submitted that the respondent did not accept the material facts of the appellant’s case and did not accept his history. His sur place activities were therefore not accepted. It was not accepted that he had carried out activities or that he had a key role. However, if his account of attendances at demonstrations and activities for Dakok was accepted, it was not accepted that he undertook anything other than low level activities. The letter from Dakok made no reference to the appellant giving speeches. By the appellant’s own account, the demonstrations were memorials rather than political demonstrations. There was a lack of evidence confirming the appellant’s account of certain people being killed by the authorities. The same could be said of his Facebook activities, which were low level. Ms Tariq submitted that it was not accepted that the appellant had a previous political profile in Iraq. Whilst it was accepted that he was a member of the New Generation Party it was not accepted that he had problems because of that. It was not accepted that he had ever come to the attention of the authorities and it was not accepted that he had a profile which would have attracted attention. Ms Tariq relied on the guidance in XX (PJAK, sur place activities, Facebook) Iran (CG) [2022] UKUT 23. As to what the appellant would do on return to Iraq, he had not said that he would continue to post on Facebook and he could therefore delete his Facebook account. Even if his political activities were accepted, it was not accepted that they were at such a high level that the authorities would be aware of him. There was no reason why they would pick up on him on his return to Iraq.
19. Mr Hamid referred to the evidence of the appellant’s sur place activities and submitted that the appellant had given credible and consistent evidence and had been confident in his evidence. It was obvious from his Facebook activity that he held a political opinion against the regime and it was accepted by the respondent that he had been involved with the New Generation Movement in Iraq. The appellant was very active on Facebook, with over 5000 friends and he had openly and strongly voiced his opinion against the regime both in social media and at demonstrations. He was also involved with Dakok, and it was plausible that he had come to the attention of the authorities in the KRI. Mr Hamid made references to the background information in the respondent’s CPIN and also relied on the case of WAS (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 894. It was plausible that the appellant would be of interest to the authorities if he was returned on a temporary travel document and it was highly likely that he would be picked up. The appeal should therefore be allowed.
Analysis
20. At [14] to [18] of its decision, the First-tier Tribunal considered the appellant’s account of threats received from the son of Hamza Sharastini following the death of his father at a demonstration which took place on 8 and 9 December 2020 in Dukan. The judge attached little weight to the threatening messages which had been produced by the appellant in his bundle, and rejected his claim to be at risk on return owing to an association with the death of Hamza Sharastini. Those findings were not challenged and were preserved in my error of law decision. The appellant gave further evidence about the incident before me when questioned by Ms Tariq, with no objection from Mr Hamid, and he repeated the account but confirmed that there was no evidence of the incident. In the absence of any further evidence about the demonstrations and the death of Hamza Sharastini, and given the lack of evidence of the appellant’s Facebook account in Iraq through which he claimed to have received the threats, I see no reason to go behind the preserved findings in that regard. The concerns of the First-tier Tribunal Judge at [15] to [17] in regard to the lack of evidence have not been addressed and I reach the same conclusions as the judge.
21. The First-tier Tribunal Judge made no findings on the appellant’s account of being arrested in March 2020 and detained for three days due to his political activities on Facebook. However, as I said in my error of law decision at [16], that account appeared to have been rejected as part of the judge’s overall adverse credibility findings, which have been preserved. In any event the appellant has now had plenty of opportunity to provide evidence of that Facebook account and his claimed social media activity in Iraq, but has not done so. I note, furthermore, that in his screening interview, the appellant made no mention of being detained when asked at question 3.1 why he had come to the UK and when asked at 4.1 to explain the basis of his claim, and that at question 5.4 when asked if he had ever been detained in any country for any reason, he said no. In the circumstances, it is again the case that no reasons have been given nor evidence produced to justify reaching a conclusion different to that of the First-tier Tribunal.
22. It remains the case, therefore, that the only part of the appellant’s claim in regard to his experiences and activities prior to leaving Iraq that has been accepted is his claim to be a member of the New Generation Movement, a claim that the respondent accepted in the refusal decision.
23. Turning, therefore, to the appellant’s sur place activities in the UK, there are two questions to be asked. Firstly, whether the nature of the appellant’s activities are such that they would have already come to the attention of the authorities in the KRI and would therefore cause him to be at risk on return as a result. Secondly whether he is a person with genuinely held political views who would wish to engage in political activities in Iraq which would put him at risk, namely the “HJ (Iran)” issue.
24. With regard to the first issue, I do not accept that the appellant’s activities would already have brought him to the adverse attention of the KRG. He is not a person who has been accepted as being previously politically active in Iraq. Other than being a member of the New Generation Movement, it has not been accepted that he was politically involved to any extent such that he had a profile or had become known to the authorities/ the KRG. There is no reason why they would be actively monitoring his social media or looking out for him. Even accepting, in line with the guidance in WAS (Pakistan), that there may be some generalised degree of surveillance by the KRG authorities, there is nothing in the evidence to suggest that the appellant’s activities would have given rise to any particular interest.
25. The Facebook posts the appellant produced in his original appeal bundle date back to March 2021, shortly after he arrived in the UK, and are mostly untranslated. It cannot be ascertained what they say, and in any event, they appear largely to be re-posts of political articles and posts. The subsequent bundle produced before the First-tier Tribunal consists of 1268 pages and was referred to by the First- tier Tribunal Judge at [14] of his decision. They include photographs and untranslated articles, largely illegible due to the size, up to page 542 of the consolidated bundle. Pages 543 to 559 appear to be extracts from articles and again are largely untranslated. The same can be said of the posts from pages 600 to 627 which, again, are largely untranslated, and from page 668, again largely translated but otherwise consist of reports of events and shared posts. Some refer to participation in rallies in the UK but it is not clear if they refer to the appellant’s own participation. I note that a post on 16 October 2024 at page 545 refers to demonstrations against the Iranian Republic. Further, the dates do not appear to coincide with the demonstrations referred to in the Dakok letter or to the demonstrations referred to in the appellant’s witness statement, although the appellant made clear in his statement that not all were listed. I have considered in particular the extensive references made by Mr Hamid within the posts, from page 545 to 1613 of the bundle. I cannot see that there is anything in the appellant’s Facebook account which suggest that he holds any particular profile and I agree with Ms Tariq that the posts show, at best, low level political interest and activity. There is no evidence to suggest that any of the appellant’s social media has already brought him to the adverse attention of KRI authorities and I do not accept that it would lead to any particular interest in him.
26. As for the evidence of the appellant’s attendance at demonstrations, those are limited. The appellant’s own evidence before me was that he had attended about 15 demonstrations in the UK. His evidence in his statement was that it was over 20 demonstrations. In any event that is not a significant number over four and a half years since his arrival in the UK. The pictures of him attending demonstrations shows that he was one of many participants. There is nothing in the photographs to show that he played any significant role at the demonstrations or to suggest that he would have drawn attention to himself as a political activist.
27. With regard to the appellant’s involvement with Dakok, the letter from Dakok states that he became a member in March 2024. The letter provides limited information about his involvement and refers to him simply as a participant in events. There is nothing in the letter supporting the appellant’s claim to have made a speech at a demonstration, and there is certainly nothing to suggest that he would have been anything other than one out of many attending who would not have stood out or been particularly visible. The appellant did not suggest that he held any particular role in the organisation.
28. In the circumstances I find no evidence suggesting that the appellant would have come to the attention of the KRG authorities as a result of any involvement in activities in the UK, or that even if his limited activities were known (which I do not accept) that they would have given rise to any adverse interest or any risk of harm on return to Iraq.
29. I turn next to consider the risks to the appellant arising from activities in which he would wish to engage in Iraq, namely the “HJ (Iran)” issue. I accept from the evidence before me that the appellant does hold genuine political beliefs. It is accepted that he was a member of the New Generation Movement in Iraq and therefore his involvement in political activities in the UK is not without context. His oral evidence before me was persuasive to the extent that I accept he has a genuine interest in the social and political situation in the KRI and advocating for the rights of the Kurdish people. I accept that the appellant’s activities in the UK, namely his involvement with Dakok and his attendance at memorials, meetings and gatherings, as well a few demonstrations, have not been opportunistic, although I consider that the extensive nature of his re-posting on Facebook may well have been undertaken with a view to increasing his profile. I accept it is reasonably likely, in such circumstances, that the appellant would wish to continue to be politically involved to an extent in the KRI. Nevertheless, unlike the situation in Iran, there is nothing in the country guidance or the country background evidence to suggest that that alone would be sufficient to put him at risk of persecution in the KRI. His activities have always been at a low level, both in Iraq and in the UK. It is open to the appellant to close down his Facebook account, in accordance with the guidance in XX (PJAK, sur place activities, Facebook) Iran (CG) [2022] UKUT 23 at paragraphs 5 and 6 of the headnote, to avoid any future problems, but in any event I do not accept that his posts would attract any significant interest if his account remained open. His posts, albeit prolific, do not show him to be a significant activist. He has never held any significant profile or involved himself in anything other than low-level activity in the UK and there is nothing in the evidence before me to suggest that he would undertake activities in Iraq which would bring him to the attention of the authorities or which would lead to any adverse interest in him by the KRG authorities.
30. The background country evidence upon which the appellant relies is limited. The only country evidence to which I was referred was the Home Office CPIN ‘Opposition to the government in the Kurdish Region of Iraq (KRI) version 3.0 of July 2023. I have had careful regard to that document. I note the statement in the Executive summary, that:
“Higher profile activists and those with a previous history of organising protests and demonstrations as well as journalists, particularly those with no links to the KRG parties, would be more likely to be at risk of mistreatment and arrest.
The evidence is not such that a person will be at real risk of serious harm or persecution simply by being an opponent of or having played a low level part in protests against the KRG that took place in August and December 2020 or any subsequent political activity. “
31. At section 3.1.2, the report continues as follows:
“The evidence is not such that a person will be at real risk of serious harm or persecution simply by being an opponent of, or having played a low level part in protests against the KRG. Despite evidence that opponents of the KRG have been arrested, detained, assaulted and even killed by the Kurdistan authorities, there is no evidence to suggest that such mistreatment is systematic. The instances of mistreatment are small in relation to the vast numbers who attended the protests. Additionally, there is no evidence to suggest that the KRG have the capability, nor the inclination, to target individuals who were involved in the protests at a low level. As such, in general, a person will not be at risk of serious harm or persecution on the basis of political activity within the KRI. The onus is on the person to demonstrate otherwise.”
32. Mr Hamid relied upon section 3.1.3 of the report. However that refers to those at higher risk being individuals with higher profiles and journalists, as stated in the sections quoted above, neither of which apply to the appellant. The same can be said of the other sections upon which he relied, 14.1.6 to 14.1.20, which again refer to those of a higher profile and to significant political activists being at risk. In so far as the extract quoted above refers to the onus being upon the person to demonstrate that they would be at risk despite the general position, the appellant has failed to discharge that burden of proof, despite the lower standard of proof required.
33. In all the circumstances I do not find that the evidence demonstrates that the appellant would be at risk of persecution in the KRI. On the evidence available to me he has not shown, to the lower standard of proof, that he qualifies for status under the Refuge Convention.
34. For the same reasons, and given that there is no real risk of serious harm on return to Iraq, the appellant has failed to demonstrate any basis for being entitled to humanitarian protection.
35. Likewise, for the reasons given, the appellant’s removal from the UK would not lead to a breach of Article 3 of the ECHR. The issue of identity documentation has already been finally resolved in the error of law decision at [17], whereby the First-tier Tribunal’s decision, that the appellant was able to document himself and return safely to his home area, was preserved. That remains the case.
36. There being no other issues before me, the appeal must accordingly be dismissed.
DECISION
37. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal having been set aside, the decision is re-made by dismissing the appellant’s appeal on all grounds.

Anonymity
The anonymity order previously made is maintained.

Signed: S Kebede
Upper Tribunal Judge Kebede

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

5 September 2025

ANNEX

ERROR OF LAW DECISION

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000947

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/63878/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEBEDE

Between

SH
(Anonymity Order made)

Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: In Person
For the Respondent: Mr A Tan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 15 July 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is an Iraqi national of Kurdish ethnicity from Dukan in Sulaymaniyah district in the KRI, whose date of birth is given as 1 January 1997. He appeals, with permission, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s decision to refuse his asylum and human rights claim.
2. The appellant arrived in the UK, illegally, on 7 March 2021, having left Iraq in December 2020. He claimed asylum on arrival and attended a screening interview on 10 March 2021. He completed an asylum claim questionnaire (ACQ) on 1 August 2023 and was interviewed about his claim on 23 November 2023. His claim was refused on 1 December 2023.
3. The appellant claimed to be a member of the New Generation Party in Iraq and to have been arrested in March 2020 and detained for three days due to his political activities on Facebook before being released when his father paid a fine. He claimed that he helped to organise a demonstration for the New Generation Party on 8/9 December 2020 and that during the demonstration a security officer, who was the brother of a PUK leader, was killed. The appellant claimed that it was discovered that he had organised the demonstration and his home was then burned down and he fled Iraq. He feared the family of the PUK leader as he had organised the demonstration where the PUK leader’s brother had been killed. The appellant also claimed to have been involved in sur place activities in the UK which had put him at risk on return to Iraq.
4. In the decision refusing the appellant’s claim, the respondent accepted that the appellant was of Kurdish ethnicity and a member of the New Generation Party but did not accept his claimed problems due to being a New Generation Party member. The respondent considered that the appellant’s account was implausible and inconsistent with external information and that the documents upon which he relied were not reliable. The respondent did not accept that the appellant was at risk on return to Iraq and considered that the low level nature of his sur place activities would not have given rise to any adverse interest in him. The respondent did not accept the appellant’s claim to have lost contact with his family in the KRI and considered that he would be able to access his original CSID through his family or that they would be able to assist him in obtaining a replacement document. The respondent considered that the appellant’s removal to Iraq would not breach his human rights.
5. The appellant’s appeal against that decision was heard on 29 October 2024 in the First-tier Tribunal. The judge did not accept the appellant’s account of the demonstration and of the threats he received and did not accept that he was at any risk on return to Iraq on such a basis. With regard to the appellant’s sur place activities in the UK, the judge had regard to photographs showing the appellant attending demonstrations in Manchester and noted that he was one of many demonstrators. The judge had regard to a letter of support from the Dakok Support Centre confirming the appellant’s membership of the organisation but noted the recent nature of that membership. The judge considered that the appellant had had no role in the demonstrations in the UK and that he had no profile of any significance in Iraq arising from his attendance at demonstrations and his Facebook activity. The judge considered that the appellant’s lack of documentation was not an impediment. The judge did not accept that the appellant had lost contact with his family in Iraq and considered that he could contact them and have access to ID documentation with their assistance. The judge accordingly dismissed the appeal, in a decision promulgated on 17 November 2024.
6. The appellant sought permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal against that decision on two grounds: firstly, that the judge’s analysis of his political activity was limited and failed to consider the principles outlined in RT (Zimbabwe) & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] UKSC 38 and HJ (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 31, particularly with regard to the genuineness of his political activity; and secondly, that the judge had failed to properly consider the relevant feasibility of return and to engage with the relevant legal principles outlined in SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 00110.
7. Permission was refused in the First-tier Tribunal but was subsequently granted, on a renewed application, in the Upper Tribunal.
8. The appeal then came before me on 15 July 2025.
9. At the hearing, the appellant appeared without his appointed legal representatives, Primus Solicitors. He advised me that they had, this morning, told him that they could not attend the hearing to represent him. He believed that that was because he was unable to pay the relevant fee. He said that his solicitors were fully aware of the hearing date and had previously assured him that they would instruct counsel to attend. He was therefore surprised when they told him that they would not be attending. In the circumstances I asked the court clerk to contact the solicitors and enquire as to why they were not in attendance or alternatively, as to why they had not come off the record as representing the appellant. I put the appellant’s case back to the end of the list to await a response.
10. Having received no response, and in the absence of any objection from Mr Tan to the hearing being adjourned in the interests of fairness, I advised the appellant that I was content to adjourn the proceedings to another day to enable him to seek alternate representation. However the appellant made it clear that he wanted the appeal to proceed without legal representation and confirmed that that that remained the case after I explained in detail what the proceedings involved. Mr Tan agreed that, given the appellant’s clear instructions, the appeal ought to proceed. Mr Tan then made his submissions before me, which were translated by the court interpreter in the Kurdish Sorani language.
11. At that point, and prior to the appellant replying, a letter was received by email from Primus Solicitors advising that they had not been aware of the hearing date and requesting an adjournment of the proceedings. That was explained to the appellant who maintained that he had sent the notice of hearing to the solicitors and had discussed it with them, so that they were “one hundred percent aware of it” and they had told him that they would be attending. He was again offered an adjournment but again maintained that he wanted the appeal to proceed today and did not want to wait for another day. He then replied to Mr Tan’s submissions, with the assistance of the interpreter.
12. As for the substance of the submissions, it was the respondent’s case that the judge had made no errors of law in his decision. Mr Tan submitted that there had been no challenge in the grounds to the judge’s adverse findings at [14] to [18] of the decision and that the judge had noted the limited evidence of sur place activities and had considered the relevant legal authorities in that regard. Mr Tan submitted that the judge’s findings were sufficient to cover the two relevant aspects, namely whether the appellant was already at risk in terms of being identified by the Iraqi authorities and whether he would be at risk if he conducted the same level of activities in Iraq. He submitted that the judge’s conclusion that the appellant would not be at risk on return was consistent with the CPIN, considering his low level of involvement in activities. The judge was aware of all the issues, as set out at [13] of his decision and it was to be assumed that he had read all the evidence and was fully aware of the issues and the relevant caselaw. With regard to the second ground concerning documentation, Mr Tan submitted that the appellant’s family members could help him with his ID documentation. The CPIN in the appellant’s appeal bundle “Iraq: Internal relocation, civil documentation and returns” dated October 2023 gave a range of methods by which a returnee could be verified on return. Mr Tan also referred to the appellant’s ACQ which, at page 701 of the stitched bundle in the First-tier Tribunal, confirmed that the appellant had been issued with an INID card in Iraq. He relied upon section 6.7.9 of the CPIN which confirmed that an INID could be renewed in the UK, a matter to which the judge had not specifically referred, but which nevertheless showed that there was no material error of law in his decision in relation to risk on return on the documentation issue.
13. In response, the appellant said that his solicitors had only provided bits of the evidence showing his activities in the UK, but that there was a lot more evidence. He had been to over 20 demonstrations over more than four years and had a large Facebook profile with over 5000 friends. The appellant also referred to events which had occurred in the KRI two days ago where a protester had been killed in his area. I reminded the appellant that at this point I could only consider the judge’s decision on the evidence which was before the First-tier Tribunal.
14. I advised the parties that I was satisfied that the judge had erred in law in regard to his findings on sur place activities and that I would set aside his decision to that extent, although I did not consider the second ground to have been made out. I advised the parties that I would prepare a decision setting out my reasons and would have the appeal listed for a resumed hearing for the decision to be re-made in that respect.
15. I set out below my reasons in full. However I would first make clear that I carefully considered the fairness of proceeding in the absence of the appellant’s solicitors and concluded that no unfairness had arisen. As mentioned, the appellant was offered an adjournment of the proceedings several times but he made it absolutely clear that he wanted the appeal to proceed today. All stages of the proceedings were clearly explained to him through the interpreter and he had a full opportunity to address the Tribunal. I am satisfied, in accordance with the guidance in Nwaigwe (adjournment: fairness) [2014] UKUT 418, that the hearing was entirely fair.
16. Mr Tan made a valiant attempt to support the judge’s findings and conclusions on the risk arising out of the appellant’s sur place activities but I was not persuaded that the judge’s decision was sustainable in that particular regard. I agree with the assertion in the grounds that the judge failed to engage with the principles in HJ (Iran) and RT (Zimbabwe), in that he failed to make any finding on whether the appellant was considered to hold genuine political beliefs which he would intend to express on return to Iraq. As the grounds identify at [4], the respondent accepted that the appellant was a member of the New Generation Party and, as such, it was not the case that he was considered to be a person with no prior political interests. The grounds suggest that it was also accepted by the judge that the appellant was detained in Iraq, but I do not agree that any such finding was made. The judge did not make any specific finding in that regard, although it appears that that formed part of the overall adverse credibility findings at [18]. In any event, it remained for the judge to make a finding, having considered the appellant’s sur place activities in the UK, on whether those activities were an expression of genuinely held political beliefs which he would intend to maintain in Iraq and the risks arising out of such activities in Iraq if they were continued there. Although the judge found the appellant’s activities in the UK were of a low level, he stopped short of addressing those issues. Likewise, he did not make any specific finding on the appellant’s activities with the Dakok Support Centre but merely commented at [20] on his membership being recent. Further, whilst the judge cited the case of XX (PJAK - sur place activities -Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT, he did not go on to engage in any analysis of the appellant’s Facebook activity or make any findings on how such activity would or would not give rise to a risk on return to Iraq. In the circumstances the judge’s findings on the appellant’s sur place activities are materially flawed and I set aside that part of the judge’s decision.
17. As for the second ground of challenge in relation to identity documentation, the judge’s findings at [23] are brief but do not give rise, in my view, to any material error of law. Although the judge did not specifically cite SMO and KSP (Civil status documentation, article 15) (CG)) Iraq [2022] UKUT 110, he considered the relevant issues arising out of that case and his decision was not inconsistent with the guidance therein. The judge rejected the appellant’s claim about threats and incidents arising out of the alleged shooting of the brother of a PUK leader and he did not accept that the appellant had lost contact with his family. As such, and given that the appellant’s initial evidence had been that he had left his identity documents in Iraq, the judge was entitled to conclude that the appellant could retrieve his documents from his family in Iraq. In any event, as Mr Tan pointed out, the appellant’s own evidence was that he had had an INID card in Iraq. I note that that was indeed confirmed by the appellant in his screening interview at section 3.2 where he stated that he was fingerprinted for his ID card and in his ACQ where he specifically referred to having an INID. The appellant has therefore already had his biometrics taken in Iraq. As such, as Mr Tan submitted, the CPIN report upon which the appellant relied before the First-tier Tribunal confirmed that he could renew his INID from the UK if it was considered to be lost. In the circumstances it was entirely open to the judge to conclude that the appellant would have the necessary documentation in Iraq to enable him to return to his home area and that he would not be at risk on that basis.
18. As Mr Tan properly observed, the appellant’s grounds do not seek to challenge the judge’s findings at [14] to [18] in regard to the appellant’s account of problems arising out of demonstrations in December 2020. Those findings were properly open to the judge and are therefore preserved, along with the judge’s findings in relation to the appellant’s identity documents.
19. I therefore set aside the judge’s decision in relation to the issue of risks arising from the appellant’s sur place activities in the UK. I preserve the findings otherwise made in relation to the appellant’s experiences in Iraq and his reasons for leaving the country and in relation to any risks arising from that, and I preserve the findings relating to identity documentation. The decision will be re-made at a resumed hearing in the Upper Tribunal on the sole issue of risk arising from the appellant’s sur place activities in the UK. The hearing will take place on a date to be notified to the parties.
20. There remains, however, some lack of clarity about the status of the appellant’s representatives. The appellant’s understanding was that Primus Solicitors were aware of the hearing, having discussed the matter with him on more than one occasion, but were unable to represent him at the hearing today because of funding issues. In their letter of 15 July 2025 the appellant’s solicitors have, however, advised the Tribunal that they were unaware of the hearing, having not received a notice of hearing. According to the Tribunal’s records, the notice of hearing was sent to the solicitors on 29 May 2025 by email to the email address provided at section 3 of the IAUT1 form, ‘Application for permission to appeal’ (at section 3.5) in the contact details for the appellant’s legal representatives. I note that that is the same email address to which the grant of permission was sent on 11 March 2025, and which the appellant’s representatives confirmed in their letter of 15 July 2025 that they had received themselves before contacting the appellant. In order to resolve this lack of clarity, the following directions are made:
Directions for the appellant’s representatives:

No later than 7 days from the date these directions are sent out, the appellant’s solicitors are to:

• confirm to the Upper Tribunal their full email address for service of documents
• confirm whether they continue to represent the appellant and, if they do not, provide formal confirmation of withdrawal.

In addition, I make the following Directions for the resumed hearing:

No later than 7 days prior to the date of the resumed hearing:

• Should the parties seek to rely upon any further evidence not previously before the First-tier Tribunal, that evidence shall be filed with the Upper Tribunal and served upon the other party in an indexed, consolidated bundle, together with any relevant application under Rule 15(2A) of the Procedure Rules.

Signed: S Kebede
Upper Tribunal Judge Kebede

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

16 July 2025