The decision



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000969


First-tier Tribunal No: PA/66889/2023
LP/03994/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 4th of November 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE ANZANI

Between

QT
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms L. Franchina, Solicitor (Fountain Solicitors)
For the Respondent: Mr A. Tan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 16 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. I have decided to maintain the anonymity direction made by the First-tier Tribunal because the importance of facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the United Kingdom under the Refugee Convention in the circumstances of this case outweighs the principle of open justice.
2. The Appellant is a national of Iraq of Kurdish ethnicity.
3. The Appellant arrived in the United Kingdom (“UK”) on 13 April 2022 and claimed asylum upon arrival. The Respondent refused the asylum claim on 3 December 2023. The Appellant appealed this decision to the First-tier Tribunal, which dismissed the appeal by a decision dated 15 December 2024. The present appeal is brought against that decision.
4. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Ruddick on 17 April 2025.
The error of law hearing
5. The hearing was conducted via the Cloud Video Platform (CVP) and attended by representatives for both parties. At the outset, I confirmed that all participants could see and hear one another and the Tribunal.
6. Mr Tan, appearing on behalf of the Respondent, indicated at the outset of the hearing that the Respondent conceded the principal grounds of appeal advanced by the Appellant. He accepted that the First-tier Tribunal Judge (“the Judge”) had made several material errors in the determination. In relation to Ground 1, Mr Tan acknowledged that the Judge had reached conclusions regarding the Appellant’s presumed political beliefs without adequately considering the full body of evidence. As to Ground 2, he accepted that the Judge’s findings in relation to the actions of the Appellant’s father, failed to properly engage with the Appellant’s evidence. With respect to Ground 3, Mr Tan conceded that the Judge had not sufficiently assessed the subjective evidence presented by the Appellant.
7. I confirmed that I was prepared to accept the Respondent’s concession on all grounds, which I considered to be properly and responsibly made. Accordingly, I set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal in its entirety.
8. As to disposal, both Ms Franchina and Mr Tan agreed that the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a complete rehearing, given the extent of fact-finding required.
Findings and reasons
9. Although both representatives agreed that the decision should be set aside due to material error, it remains necessary to set out the precise reasons why the Judge erred and why none of the findings can safely be preserved.
10. The first ground of challenge relates to the Judge’s conclusion that it was implausible for the Appellant to have agreed to produce anti-KDP propaganda. The Judge described such conduct as “wholly implausible” unless the Appellant had been “desperate for money,” reasoning that the Appellant had been “brought up in the KDP” and taught its “rituals, customs, and goals.” However, there is no reference in the Appellant’s witness statements or asylum interview to support any assertion that he was raised within, or ideologically aligned with, the KDP. On the contrary, the Appellant’s evidence was that, although some relatives had fought against Saddam Hussein, he himself had no political involvement. He stated that he “went along with the ruling party” but did not “get involved in politics,” and that his decision to vote for the KDP was made solely out of familial and tribal expectation rather than personal conviction.
11. The Judge’s reasoning was therefore based on a series of speculative and unsupported assumptions about the Appellant’s cultural background and supposed political loyalties. In particular, the Judge appeared to proceed on the stereotypical premise that a young man of 20 or 21 would automatically adopt the political beliefs of his father and uncles. Such reasoning lacks any evidential foundation and fails to account for the obvious possibility that individuals, particularly those of the Appellant’s age, may develop political views and behaviours independent of their family’s affiliations. By substituting conjecture for analysis, the Judge fell into material error. The Judge’s findings on plausibility were not grounded in the evidence before the Tribunal and, as a result, his assessment of credibility was fatally undermined. This error permeates the decision as a whole and renders the Judge’s conclusions on credibility and risk unsafe. Accordingly, none of the findings can properly be preserved, and it is unnecessary to address the remaining grounds of appeal.
12. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is therefore set aside in its entirety pursuant to section 12(2)(a) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. Having regard to the guidance given in Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC) and given the nature and extent of fact finding required, the appropriate course is for the appeal to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a hearing de novo, with no findings preserved.
Notice of decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside in its entirety with no findings preserved.
The decision is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing before a judge other than First-tier Tribunal Judge I. D. Boyes.


S. Anzani

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

23 October 2025