Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-000985
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/56872/2024
LP/13241/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 12 March 2026

Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WALSH

Between

MEK
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S Panagiotopoulou, Counsel, Instructed by Montague Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr B Hulme, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 12 December 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This is the re-making under section 12 (2) (b) (ii) of the Tribunals, Courts, and Enforcement Act 2007 of a First-tier decision dated 14 January 2025 set aside with preserved findings by the Upper Tribunal in a decision promulgated on 21 August 2025.
2. The re-making hearing was initially listed before us on 28 October 2025. We were compelled to adjourn that hearing as the appellant’s solicitors failed to request a Turkish interpreter and sent their updating evidence and skeleton argument filed with the Tribunal on 27 October 2025 to the wrong Home Office email address. It was therefore necessary to adjourn to afford the respondent an opportunity to consider the new material and to ensure the attendance of a Turkish interpreter.
Anonymity Order
3. The First-tier Tribunal made an anonymity order in this appeal, maintained by this Tribunal, because the appellant has made a claim for international protection. No party asked for this to be set aside and we consider it appropriate for that order to continue because the public interest in the UK’s compliance with its international obligations and in the confidentiality of the asylum system outweigh the public interest in open justice in this case.
Background Facts
4. The background to the appeal is set out in the Upper Tribunal’s decision of 21 August 2025 appended below. In summary, the appellant, a Turkish national of Kurdish ethnicity, claimed to have a well-founded fear of persecution owing to his ethnicity and actual or imputed political opinion. There are two limbs to his claim. The first is based on his past persecution in Turkey as an active member of the HDP. The second is based on his engagement with pro-Kurdish activities in the UK.
5. The following facts were accepted by the FtT:
a. The appellant is of Turkish nationality;
b. The appellant is of Kurdish ethnicity;
c. The appellant’s area of origin is Southeast Turkey;
d. The appellant was a low-level member of the HDP;
e. The appellant’s claimed fear is for a Refugee Convention reason, namely, political opinion; and
f. The appellant has a subjective fear of persecution.
6. The FtT made adverse credibility findings in relation to the appellant’s account of events in Turkey. The FtT accepted the appellant had attended demonstrations in the UK but did not find that the appellant’s sur place activities would bring him to the adverse attention of the Turkish authorities and found no credible evidence that the Turkish authorities have monitored the protests attended by the appellant. The FtT found that the appellant’s activities in the UK were contrived to bolster his asylum claim and were not genuinely motivated.
7. Permission to appeal was granted on the single issue of the appellant’s sur place activities, no error having been found with the FtT’s credibility findings in relation to events in Turkey. The Upper Tribunal found that the judge had made a material error of law by failing to consider the evidence that the Turkish authorities monitor diaspora opposition, as well as the online publication of an article containing a video and photograph of the appellant participating in a protest in the United Kingdom.
8. The Upper Tribunal directed that the appeal be reheard at the Upper Tribunal, only in relation to the risk arising from the appellant’s activities in the United Kingdom. The Upper Tribunal preserved the FtT’s findings in relation to the appellant’s motivation for his UK-based activities and in relation to events in Turkey.
Appellant’s updating evidence
9. As referred to above, the appellant sought to rely at the re-making on a supplementary bundle of 149 pages. This consisted of a witness statement from the appellant dated 20 October 2025; a translated letter from the appellant’s father dated 17 October 2025; documents supporting the father’s identification; four social media screenshots; and additional, more recent country information.
10. As the respondent was able to file a response to the supplementary bundle prior to the resumed re-making hearing, we decided to it was in the interests of justice to admit the supplementary bundle.
11. In his witness statement, the appellant states that on 20 August 2025, his family home was raided and his father was taken to the local police station. There, his father was shown photographs of the appellant at a protest in the UK. The police accused the appellant of involvement with the PKK. His father was released after he was asked to sign a statement he was not allowed to read. He said his father fears that the document he signed made false accusations against the appellant. He told the appellant he should not return to Turkey. As a consequence, fearing for his family’s safety, he no longer attends demonstrations but does share posts on Instagram.
12. The father’s letter states that the police conducted raids in their neighbourhood on 20 August 2025, targeting families on whom they had records. The family house was ransacked and the father was asked to attend the police station. At the police station the appellant’s father was asked about the appellant’s whereabouts and address in the UK. The police showed him photos of the appellant attending some protests and engaging in “illegal propaganda” and being involved with an “illegal organisation.” Before his release he signed a statement drafted by the police that he was not allowed to read. The letter states that upon his release he phoned his son and told him what had happened and advised him to be careful as it appeared that his activities in the UK were being monitored by the police.
13. The four Instagram posts relate to individuals in Turkey about which the appellant was asked in cross-examination, which we discuss below.
14. The independent country evidence consists of human rights reports from Amnesty International, the US State Department, Stockholm Center for Freedom, and reports from the Nordic Monitor regarding the surveillance undertaken by the Turkish authorities of opposition abroad.
Issues for Determination
15. The issues for us to determine are:
a. Would the appellant’s sur place activities come to the attention of the Turkish authorities as a result of their monitoring of opposition activities abroad?
b. Has the appellant already come to the attention of the Turkish authorities?
c. If not, would the appellant come to their adverse attention as part of the returns process or on return?
Legal Framework
16. Because the appellant claimed asylum after 28 June 2022, the framework for this appeal is established by the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. We will therefore apply two different standards of proof in our decision. With regard to whether the appellant has a characteristic that could cause him to fear persecution for a Refugee Convention reason and whether he does in fact fear such persecution, the standard is the balance of the probabilities. Put simply, the first question we must answer is whether the appellant’s account of his political activities and of what has happened to him and his family more likely than not to be true. Once we have decided that question, we must assess the risk on return to the appellant to the lower standard of proof. This means deciding whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the appellant would face persecution on return to Turkey. The burden of proof rests on the appellant.
17. We had regard to the principles governing the assessment of credibility well- established by a long line of authorities: MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216, SB (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA 160 and KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 00491 (IAC).
18. We applied the guidance in WAS (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 894 at [87] that in a protection claim, adverse credibility findings on one aspect of a witness’ claim cannot be generalised to all of their evidence. Credibility is not a “seamless robe”.
19. We took into account the principle in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688 at [37] and WAS (Pakistan) at [84], affirming YB (Eritrea) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 360, that a tribunal must not impose an unrealistic evidential burden on an appellant who relies on sur place activities as it is unlikely for an asylum seeker to be able to produce direct evidence of covert surveillance by a foreign state.
20. Notwithstanding the May 2025 announcement of the PKK disbanding, we were not invited to depart from the existing country guidance. Therefore, in accordance with the principles in Roba (OLF - MB confirmed) Ethiopia CG [2022] UKUT 00001 (IAC), the relevant country guidance in this appeal remains IK (Returnees - Records – IFA) Turkey CG [2004] UKIAT 00312 and IA HC KD RO HG (Risk-Guidelines-Separatist) Turkey CG [2003] UKIAT 00034.
21. We additionally had regard to the guidance in BA (Demonstrators in Britain- risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 for general guidance about how to assess the risk arising out of sur place activities.
The Hearing
22. The documents before the Tribunal were as follows:
a. The Upper Tribunal Bundle (UTB) (304 pages)
b. The Upper Tribunal error of law decision dated 21 August 2025
c. The appellant’s supplementary bundle (SB) (149 pages) filed on 27 October 2025
d. The appellant’s skeleton argument (7 pages) filed on 27 October 2025
e. Respondent’s skeleton argument (8 pages) filed on 9 December 2025
23. Additionally, we were referred to the respondent’s Country Policy and Information Notes (“CPINs”) on Turkey: PKK, Version 6.0 (July 2025); Kurds, Version 5.0 (July 2025); Military Service, Version 4.0 (July 2025); People’s Democratic Party/Green Left Party (HDP/YSP), Version 5.0 (October 2023) and the Report of a Home Office Fact Finding Mission- Turkey: Kurds, the HDP and the PKK (October 2019).
24. The appellant had the benefit of a Turkish interpreter. It was confirmed at the outset of the hearing that they understood one another.
25. In his witness statement dated 20 October 2025 the appellant refers to the remaking hearing as having been “remitted to be heard ‘de novo.’” We therefore confirmed that the appellant understood we were only going to hear evidence related to his activities in the UK.
26. The appellant adopted his witness statements dated 9 July 2024, 26 July 2025, and 20 October 2024. He was cross-examined by Mr. Hulme who focused his questions on the evidence in the supplementary bundle.
27. Asked to explain the delay in providing the letter from his father, the appellant said his father, who is illiterate, frail and aged had to be persuaded to write it. When challenged as to how his father wrote the letter if he was illiterate the appellant stated his father dictated the contents to his sister who actually wrote it. His sister had not provided a statement because the issues did not concern her.
28. The appellant was asked how the letter came to be written and said that when his father returned home after his release, he had the appellant’s sister write it. His father knew what to say in the letter as he knew there was a real risk to the appellant given what the police had told him. The appellant did not accept that the letter was written solely to support his claim.
29. When asked why the letter is dated October but refers to events in August the appellant stated that it took time for the letter to arrive. Pressed further about that two month gap, the appellant was not able to offer an explanation saying only it was what his father had told him. He said his father sent the letter to his address by “cargo”, meaning by post. His father did not know the name of the “illegal organisation” in the UK that the appellant was accused of being linked to, because the appellant had not told him. He said his father knows the names of organisations in Turkey but not in the UK and this protest was not related to the HDP.
30. Mr. Hulme put to the appellant that his decision to post on social media was inconsistent with his decision to stop attending demonstrations for fear of repercussions for his family. In response the appellant stated that he considers his Instagram posts to be harmless [SB 12-15]. The appellant was then asked about the posts. The appellant said that the post at [SB14] is about a young person who had been killed and whose father, when he sought justice for her, was threatened by the state. The post at [SB 12] is of Selahattin Demirtaş, the imprisoned leader of the HDP. The appellant could not explain why there were was no date on the posts saying only that is how Instagram works. The time at the top is the time of the screenshot taken of the post. He could not explain why there are no “likes” or comments but he said he does not look at the likes. The appellant confirmed it was his account as the small image at the top is a photo of him and the name is a shortened version of his name.
31. The appellant was asked by Mr. Hulme why there were no statements from the family members who he said in his asylum interview take part in protests in the UK. The appellant responded that he did not think there was a need for such statements and he did not know how or why they would support him.
32. The appellant was taken to the photos of himself at demonstrations in the UT Bundle. He identified himself in the photograph at [UTB 224] of the combined bundle. He was asked about “tcs Britain” which appears at the bottom of the page. He responded that it was connected to the Kurdish Community Centre. He said there is a large Kurdish population in the UK and people are afraid because of images sent to the Turkish authorities. He then said that his paternal uncle had photos shared with the (Turkish) state and although he is a British citizen he cannot travel to Turkey. When asked by Mr. Hulme why he had not mentioned this before the hearing he said he became aware of this when his uncle’s mother died. His uncle told him about the photo and the appellant advised him he should not go to Turkey. The photo was related to the raid on Kurdish Community Centre in Haringey. The appellant did not know how or when the photos came to the attention of the authorities in Turkey but thought it might be the end of November 2024.
33. The appellant stated that he had not undertaken military service and his father gets regular notifications to send him for service. No evidence was produced to support this but he was not challenged further.
34. The appellant stated that he had surrendered his passport to the Home Office.
35. In response to clarifying questions from us, the appellant said he had the phone call with his father the second day after his father’s release. He said his father just wanted “the state” to know he was worried for him. When asked why, if he had the conversation with his father the second day after his release, it took so long for the letter to be written and received, the appellant then said the letter was sent following other conversations.
36. The appellant thought the conversation with his uncle may have been in November 2024. His uncle’s mother died a week after the raid on the Kurdish Community Centre. He was asked whether the appellant told his uncle not to go to Turkey or if his uncle told him he could not go. The appellant stated that his uncle said he could not go and the appellant effectively reinforced that. The appellant could not remember the date of the last demonstration he attended but believed it was a month before his father was arrested. The appellant accepted there was no other evidence in the bundle of his attendance at other demonstrations but he had sent papers from the Kurdish Community Centre confirming his participation in activities of the community centre to his solicitor.
37. On re-examination, the appellant said that the police raid on the KCC was common knowledge in the UK. He had heard about it on WhatsApp. He thought the Turkish authorities were behind the raid, because the police were speaking Turkish. He clarified that the evidence from the KCC that he had given to his solicitors consisted of an undated membership card and a letter saying that he was “part of certain activities in the KCC” but not specifying a time period.
38. Mr. Hulme invited us to dismiss the appeal. He adopted and expanded on the submissions in the respondent’s skeleton argument, drawing our attention to a number of factors which the respondent argues undermines the appellant’s credibility. Emphasis was placed on the emergence of the appellant’s account about his uncle in this hearing and the absence of a statement from the uncle; a lack of specificity in and inconsistencies between the appellant’s account and his father’s letter about the father’s encounter with the Turkish police; the implausibility that the police would not have named the PKK as the organisation his son was associated with; and the inconsistency between the appellant’s expressed worry for his family in Turkey and his continuing to post on social media.
39. We were urged by the respondent to attach little weight to the appellant’s Instagram posts in the absence of the download of the appellant’s Instagram account in accordance with the guidance in XX (PJAK-sur place activities-Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 00023.
40. Mr. Hulme also argued that little weight should be placed on the country information addressing the Turkish authorities’ surveillance of the diaspora. Whilst the respondent’s skeleton argument called into question the reliability of the Nordic Monitor in particular, Mr. Hulme focused his submissions on the relevance of the material to the appellant, arguing that most of the reports relate to Gulenist and journalists and are not relevant to the appellant. The respondent does not accept that the appellant has sufficiently evidenced any risk arising from the online publication of his attendance at a demonstration as there remains no evidence about the platform on which it was published nor its reach and no evidence that the appellant would be identified.
41. It was submitted by Mr. Hulme that the appellant would not appear on a “blacklist” as there would be nothing recorded against him in government databases. The appellant would therefore not be subjected to the enhanced questioning described in IK [83, 86] and was not at risk of persecution or serious harm.
42. Ms. Panagiotopoulou developed her submissions in line with appellant’s skeleton argument. She firstly invited us to conclude that any inconsistencies between the appellant’s evidence and his father’s letter were semantic or attributable to the father’s age and illiteracy. She accepted that the appellant had not previously referred to his uncle’s situation but argued that it did not inevitably follow that the account was not true. She submitted that it was not relevant that his uncle had not provided a statement.
43. Ms Panagiotopoulou focused her main submissions on the likelihood that the appellant would come to the attention of the Turkish authorities given their surveillance of the diaspora, the known risk factors associated with the appellant, and the appellant’s attendance at demonstrations, particularly the protest at Amnesty International reported by ANF, a news agency linked to the PKK.
44. Ms. Panagiotopoulou did not accept that the country information relates only to surveillance of Gulenists or journalists, submitting the reports demonstrate the Turkish authorities’ interest in opposition abroad generally. Ms Panagiotopoulou acknowledged the disbanding of the PKK but submitted that it is to be inferred from the CPIN: Turkey, PKK (July 2025) (paragraphs 13.2, 13.2.21, 13.1.4, 13.3) that it is premature to conclude that there is real change on the ground. She submitted that the appellant’s evidence is in line with the country information and as such had demonstrated a real risk of persecution and/or serious harm.
45. We advised the parties that we would reserve our decision.
Discussion and Findings
Would the appellant’s sur place activities come to the attention of the Turkish authorities as a result of their monitoring of opposition activities abroad?
46. We do not accept the respondent’s submissions that the country information adduced by the appellant is unreliable and/or irrelevant to the appellant. Whilst Nordic Monitor and Stockholm Center for Freedom are outlets are clearly opposed to the Turkish regime and some reports are based on anonymous sources, we observe that human rights reporting routinely and necessarily relies on unnamed, confidential sources. We find that the reporting in the Nordic Monitor and Stockholm Centre for Freedom is consistent with the Erdogan regime’s well-documented intolerance of dissent [SB 16-23, 27, 50] and its targeting of political opponents in the diaspora, as reported by Human Rights Watch [UTB 115]. Accordingly we find that the Nordic Monitor and (for the avoidance of doubt) the Stockholm Centre for Freedom are sources upon which we can place some weight.
47. We also find that the country information demonstrates surveillance of dissent among the diaspora is not limited to the Gulenists or journalists. The Stockholm Center for Freedom report on Human Rights in Turkey: 2024 in Review, published in March 2025, for example, reports surveillance undertaken of protests against the Turkish government in the US, France and Germany. Among groups targeted in Germany are those sympathetic to the PKK and the protest in France was not exclusively pro-Gulenist [SB 136, see also SB 75].
48. As will be seen, we find significant the reporting on repression, censorship and monitoring of the media and the internet by the Turkish authorities [Human Rights Watch UTB 117-121; USDOS SB 26-29; Freedom House SB 50-52]. We note in particular the report from Free Web Turkey cited by Freedom House that in September 2024 that “some 14,000 online news articles and 197,000 websites were blocked in 2023” [SB 51].
49. The appellant bases the sur place element of his protection claim on both “real world” and online activism.
50. The online aspect of his claim has arisen since the error of law hearing. The only evidence of it is four Instagram posts. We accept these posts are in a shortened version of the appellant’s name and there is a small icon containing his photograph. The posts are anti-government and pro-HDP. As such it is difficult to understand why the appellant would describe them as “harmless” save to explain away the apparent inconsistency with his decision to stop protesting, as discussed below.
51. There are only four posts and as submitted by the respondent, the appellant did not download his account information and the screenshots of the posts do not show “likes,” “shares,” or “comments.” For reasons we set out more fully below, we do not consider the appellant to have a profile such that he would be the subject of targeted social media surveillance. Given the lack of evidenced online presence and his limited profile we do not find it reasonably likely that the Turkish authorities would be aware of the appellant’s Instagram posts. We further find that as he began posting only after the error of law hearing, the posts are a further attempt to bolster his asylum claim.
52. The evidence of the appellant’s “real world” activism is photos and screenshots as follows:
a. 12 June 2024: A still photograph of the appellant with others holding a banner calling for freedom for Abdullah Ocalan. The typed label describes this as having taken place on 12 June 2024 in Westminster [UTB 221].
b. 25 June 2024:
i. A screenshot of a reel, described as a protest on 25 June 2024. In evidence the appellant identified himself holding a sign bearing Ocalan’s name. “tcs.britain” appears at the bottom of the screenshot [UTB 224].
ii. A printout from an ANF report of a protest on 25 June 2024 outside Amnesty International’s office in London in which the appellant is seen in front holding, a banner calling for Ocalan’s release [UTB 213-215]. There appear to be links to Facebook and Twitter. The following page suggests there is a video accompanying the story. The appellant is not named in the article.
iii. A screenshot of a post by ANF in Turkish [UTB 217]; the translation appears at [UTB 216]. The appellant appears in the photograph in the post. The caption below the photo says “the event was led by the London Jiyan Women’s Assembly and the Revolutionary Youth Movement in front of Amnesty Internationals building in London.
c. 20 July 2024: A “selfie” photograph labelled as being from a protest in Edmonton on 20 July 2024 against “Turkish government attacks on Kurds in Turkey”. [UTB 222].
d. 20 March 2024: two still photographs of the appellant with others labelled as celebrating Newroz Eve at the Kurdish Community Centre [UTB 218-219].
e. Undated: a still photograph of the appellant holding a flag bearing Ocalan’s name and two photographs of him with others at a gathering in a park [UTB 302-304]. These follow a covering letter from his solicitors, dated 14 January 2024, which appears to describe these as photographs of the appellant “attending activities in the UK on behalf of the Kurdish Community Centre.”
53. Apart from the screenshots and print out of the ANF article of the 25 June 2024 protest, the evidence of the appellant’s attendance at other events appears to be personal photographs of which there is no evidence of distribution.
54. However, the protest at the Amnesty International Office on 25 June 2024 was clearly a higher profile event covered and reported by ANF, a well-known news agency considered to be “close” to the PKK (CPIN: Turkey: PKK [8.2.2]).
55. Given the clear evidence of monitoring of online media by the Turkish authorities and the source of the article being linked to the PKK, we find that it is reasonably likely that the Turkish authorities would have been aware of the protests on 25 June 2024. Whether the appellant was identified at the time the Turkish authorities became aware of the protest is a separate question addressed below.
56. For the avoidance of doubt, our finding on the surveillance regime of the Turkish authorities was based solely on the country information. We took no account of the appellant’s evidence about his uncle’s photograph being shared with the Turkish authorities, which we do not accept.
57. This account was raised for the first time and evolved during cross-examination as the appellant attempted to explain the absence of evidence from family members. It was significantly lacking in important detail, not least the time at which he became aware of his uncle’s predicament. Given the relatively short passage of time since the raid on the Kurdish Community Centre1 and the significance of such news in the family we find that it is not unreasonable to expect the appellant to provide far more detail about when he became aware of the situation.
58. We do not accept the appellant’s explanation for failing to raise this matter earlier. The appellant has been represented throughout and it would have been an obvious event to include in his evidence before the FtT. We find that the appellant invented this story in the course of his evidence before us.
Has the appellant already come to the attention of the Turkish authorities?
59. We do not accept the appellant’s assertion that the Turkish authorities showed the appellant’s father a photograph of him at a demonstration (or demonstrations) in the UK. Whilst we accept appellant’s father signed the letter in Turkish, we do not accept the content of that letter and place no weight upon it.
60. The reasons for our findings are as follows. The appellant repeatedly contradicted himself trying to explain the delay in providing the letter. He first claimed it took time to persuade his father to write it. That account sits uneasily with his evidence that his father wanted the state to know his son was at risk. The appellant later said his father had his sister write the letter upon his release from custody. He also gave inconsistent evidence about which phone call generated the letter. The appellant then suggested that the delay arose because the letter took some time to reach his home. That cannot be correct: the letter is dated 17 October 2025, which is the same date on which the appellant states in his witness statement of 20 October 2025 that he received it. We are satisfied that the appellant fabricated this account in response to the error of law decision in order to bolster the remaining aspect of his claim.
61. Would the appellant otherwise have come to the attention of the Turkish authorities already by virtue of their monitoring of diaspora activities? We remind ourselves of the difficulty in evidencing covert surveillance by a foreign state: MH. However, we observe that the appellant is not named in either of the ANF reports of the 25 June 2024 protest. He is one of a large crowd with no particular identifying features in the tcs.britain Instagram post. He has no relevant history in Turkey and has not claimed or evidenced a prominent role in the Kurdish community in the UK. There is no clear evidence of how many demonstrations the appellant has attended or how often. Consequently, we find that the appellant does not have a profile which would have attracted the adverse attention of the Turkish authorities.
Would the appellant come to the adverse attention of the authorities on return or as part of the returns process?
62. We find that it there is a reasonable likelihood that the appellant will be sent for non-routine questioning at the airport police station upon being returned to Istanbul airport. This follows from the likelihood that the appellant will be identified as not having undertaken his military service as well as the likelihood that he will be returned on an emergency travel document and identified as a failed asylum seeker: IK [81, 82]. We also take account of additional risk factors in IA applicable to the appellant, namely his Kurdish ethnicity and his origins in Southeast Turkey. We find on the basis of these identity markers that it is reasonably likely that the appellant will be asked whether he had contact with any illegal organisations in the UK (IK [84]), which we find would include his participation in pro-Ocalan demonstrations.
63. How should the appellant be expected to respond to such questioning? As established in HJ Iran v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 31, an appellant cannot be expected to suppress a genuinely held characteristic or belief including, as per RT (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] UKSC 38, political neutrality, which is protected by the Refugee Convention. To do so “would be to defeat the very right which the Convention exists to protect”: HJ at [82].
64. The UT in XX at [98] to [102] sets out the approach to be taken by decision makers as to whether a person can be expected to volunteer having a previous Facebook account which we find applies by extension this case to the appellant’s Instagram account and his participation in pro-Ocalan protests.
65. At [100] the UT states:
“Decision makers are allowed to consider first, what a person will do to mitigate a risk of persecution, and second, the reason for their actions. If the person will refrain from engaging in a particular activity, that may nullify their claim that they would be at risk, unless the reason for their restraint is suppression of a characteristic that they have a right not to be required to suppress, because if the suppression was at the instance of another it might amount to persecution. It is difficult to see circumstances in which the deletion of a Facebook account could equate to persecution in this sense, because there is no fundamental right protected by the Refugee Convention to have access to a particular social media platform, as opposed to the right to political neutrality.”
66. It was a preserved finding from the First-tier Tribunal that the appellant’s activism in the UK was not genuinely motivated. We have similarly found the appellant’s Instagram posts were a further attempt to bolster his claim. Additionally, we note the adverse credibility findings made by both the First-tier Tribunal and by us as set out above.
67. We therefore find that it is reasonable to expect the appellant to delete his Instagram account in accordance with Headnote 9 of XX and to withhold or if necessary lie about his participation in demonstrations in the UK. This is because the appellant’s political activities in the UK did not express a genuinely held political belief and therefore do not engage any fundamental rights. That would shut down any potential link between the appellant and the protest on 25 June 2024 and or any other connection with any pro-PKK affiliation in the United Kingdom.
68. For the avoidance of doubt there is no conflict here with the finding in IK that the appellant could not be expected to lie [86] as the appellant in IK was found to have been credible as to past events and to hold genuine political beliefs.
69. We found at [61] above there is no other basis on which the appellant’s sur place activities would come to the attention of the authorities. As we have found that it can be reasonably expected that the appellant will not disclose his activism in the UK, we find that the appellant’s activities in the UK would not lead to the enhanced level of questioning at which a real risk of persecution arises: IK [79]. We therefore find that it is not reasonably likely that the appellant would be at risk of persecution on the basis of his sur place activities.
70. Accordingly we dismiss the appeal.

Notice of Decision
71. The appeal is dismissed.

M. Walsh

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

10 March 2026

ANNEX
(Error of law decision)

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-000985
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/56872/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE FARRELLY

Between

MEK
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Sophie Panagiotopoulou BL instructed by Montague Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr B. Hulme, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 25 June 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify him. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The First-Tier Tribunal made an anonymity order in this appeal, and we have considered whether it is appropriate for that order to continue pursuant to Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 (as amended). Having taken into account Guidance Note 2022 No.2: Anonymity Orders and Hearings in Private, we are satisfied that it is appropriate to make such an order because the appellant has made an application for international protection and we consider that the UK’s obligations towards applicants for international protection and the need to protect the confidentiality of the asylum process outweigh the public interest in open justice at this stage in the proceedings
2. The appellant is accepted to be a Turkish national, born in 2001 and to be of Kurdish ethnicity. He entered the United Kingdom by air on 22 May 2022 and claimed asylum on the 14th of October 2022.
3. The appellant’s claim was based upon his ethnicity and political opinions. He said he had been a member of a Kurdish left-wing party, the HDP and had come to the adverse attention of the Turkish authorities on two occasions. The first was on the 15th of August 2021 when he had been attending a Kurdish festival. He said he was mistreated by police officers and detained overnight. The second occasion was on the 25th of March 2022. This time he was detained for three days. He said he was released with a reporting requirement, and he was to act as an informer. Rather than do this, he went to Istanbul before fleeing from there to the UK. He said that since coming to the United Kingdom he had taken part in various protests in support of Kurdish rights. His identity was accepted and the respondent considered him to be a low-level supporter of the HDP.
4. His claim was refused on the 27th of February 2024. His account of events in Turkey was not considered credible. It was not accepted he had been politically active there and his claim of encounters with the police was not believed. The respondent was of the view that his activities in the United Kingdom would not place him at risk on return.
5. His appeal was heard remotely at Manchester on the 14th of January 2025. The parties were represented. It came before First-tier Tribunal Judge Beg who dismissed it. The judge did not find the appellant’s account to be credible, rejected his account of past events in Turkey and did not see any risks for him on return because of his activities here.

The Upper Tribunal.
6. On a renewed application, permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal was granted solely on the issue of his sur place activities. Permission was refused on the various other grounds advanced in respect of his claims of past events in Turkey. Consequently, we are looking at a relatively narrow issue. The appellant had argued that his activities in the United Kingdom would have brought him to the adverse attention of the Turkish authorities.
7. The appeal was opposed by the respondent. There was a rule 24 response. Reference is made to paragraph 16 of the determination where the judge said they had considered all the documents provided and to paragraph 48 where it was found that the appellant did not have any political profile in Turkey. Paragraph 49 referred to his sur place activities and concluded whilst he was a low-level supporter of HDP and attended some demonstrations and meetings in the United Kingdom, he was not of adverse interest to the authorities.
8. Ms Panagiotopoulou BL referred us to the photographs of the appellant in the stitched bungle at pages 213 and 224. She made the point that if the demonstration were small then it was even more likely the appellant would be identified. She also submitted there was credible evidence of online activity by the appellant. She said that the First-tier Tribunal judge failed to have regard to country information in assessing his sur place activity.
9. In response, Mr Hulme in line with the rule 24 response contended all the documentation was referred to by the judge at paragraph 16 of the determination. He pointed out the appellant was not named in the photographs or items referred to. He referred to paragraphs 47 and 48 of the determination where the judge found that the Turkish authorities did not monitor the protests and the appellant was at best a low-level supporter of the HDP with no profile.
Consideration.
10. In deciding whether the Judge’s decision involved the making of a material error of law, we have reminded ourselves of the principles set out in a long line of cases, including Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201, at [26], Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74, at [50] and [51], Gadinala v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1410, at [46] and [47], and Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, at [2-4] and of the danger of not looking at the evidence, and the reasoning, as a whole. We bear in mind the Court of Appeal’s guidance in Ullah [26] (i) that the Upper Tribunal should not rush to find an error of law simply because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently.
11. First-tier Tribunal Judge Beg deals with sur place activities at paragraph 33 onwards. The judge cites Article 5 of the Qualification Directive 2004/83/EC, whereby a well-founded fear of persecution may be based upon events after the applicant left their home country. She then cites YB (Eritrea)[2008] EWCA Civ 360, quoting Sedley LJ to the effect that where objective information shows the suppression of political opponents by a particular government, it required little or no evidence or speculation to arrive at a strong possibility that its foreign legations film or photograph demonstrators and have informants amongst the expatriate organisations and that the real question in most cases will be what follows for the individual claimant. She further quoted his observation that, “If, for example, information reaching the Embassy is likely to be that a claimant identified in a photograph is a hanger-on with no real commitment to the oppositionist cause, that goes to the issue flagged up by art 4(3)(d) of the Directive.” The judge did not quote art 4(3)(d) of the Qualification Directive. It states that the assessment of an asylum claim includes taking into account
“whether the applicant’s activities since leaving the country of origin were engaged in for the sole or main purpose of creating the necessary conditions for applying for international protection, so as to assess whether those activities would expose the applicant to persecution or serious harm if returned to that country”
12. We note that by the time of the appellant’s asylum claim, the Qualification Directive had ceased to have effect in the United Kingdom, but the appellant has not raised any complaint in this regard.
13. The appellant’s evidence before First-tier Tribunal Judge Beg was that the HDP do not have a branch in the United Kingdom. He attended meetings at the Kurdish community centre where he would be updated on events and received WhatsApp messages of events taking place in the United Kingdom. He provided a photograph where he could be identified with a small group of young people on the 25th of June 2024. This related to a dossier being handed to a representative of Amnesty International. He was unable to explain the content of the dossier or what Amnesty International is and the judge concluded he was there to bolster his asylum claim. The Judge described the contents of photographs of the appellant at four other events in the UK. She noted that several involved the appellant holding banners of the PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan, and observed that he had never claimed to support the PKK such that the reasons for supporting Ocalan in this way were “unclear”.
14. Judge Beg referred to the CPIN report of October 2023 which said that low level members and supporters of the HDP may be targeted. The judge then turned to the country guidance decision of IK (returnees – Records-IFA) Turkey CG [2004] UKAIT 312 and listed a number of the risk factors set out therein. We note IK was given in the context of the PKK ceasefire ending. It refers to Turkey's attempts at joining the EU and its measures to address human rights problems. The decision explained the computerised GBT system covering outstanding warrants and restrictions. This was accessible to security at Istanbul airport and elsewhere.
15. The risk factors comprised a broad-spectrum requiring evaluation on the specific facts. Relevant was past arrest and detention, Kurdish ethnicity, whether the individual was asked to be an informer and their actual or perceived activities abroad.
16. Judge Beg concluded that the appellant’s activities in his home country would not have resulted in him coming to adverse attention. His claim of being detained was not credible nor was it likely that the authorities genuinely believed he was a supporter of the PKK or an active member of the HDP. The appellant has not been granted permission to challenge these findings.
17. At paragraph 47 the judge accepted the appellant had attended demonstrations in the United Kingdom in support of Kurdish rights. However, the photographs provided suggested those demonstrations were “low-level” and only involved a small number of protesters and the judge found this would not place him at risk on return.
18. The judge said there was no credible evidence the Turkish authorities had monitored those events. The judge concluded by finding that the appellant did not have a political profile in Turkey and at most was a low-level supporter of the HDP who had attended “some demonstrations and meetings in the United Kingdom organised by the Kurdish Community Centre”. The judge did not find he was of adverse interest to the authorities. On return his ethnicity will be evident from his identity card but that would not result in him being taken for further investigations.
Discussion
19. There is a single issue from the grant of permission: did the judge materially err in dealing with the appellant’s sur place activities? It is our conclusion that, in what is otherwise a very carefully considered determination, a material error of law in relation to how the judge dealt with this aspect has been demonstrated. We find the judge failed to adequately factor into the risk assessment the evidence of monitoring and then the fact that one of the demonstrations was reported in an online publication.
20. The country information was that opposition abroad is monitored by the Turkish regime. The judge does not refer to the evidence that one of the demonstrations he attended was published in an online publication including a video of his participation. At paragraph 47 the judge stated there was no credible evidence the Turkish authorities monitored the protests which it was accepted the appellant attended in the United Kingdom. However, there is objective evidence of monitoring by the authorities, including of social media activity. It had been established that the appellant had engaged in sur place activities. Our conclusion therefore is that the judge’s assessment is flawed in a material way.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-Tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error of law requiring it to be set aside. The remaking is only in relation to the risk arising from the appellant's activities in the United Kingdom. The findings in relation to the appellant’s motivation for those activities are preserved, as are the findings in relation to events in his home country.
The appeal is adjourned for re-making at the Upper Tribunal.

Directions
The following directions apply to the future conduct of this case:-

(1) The resumed hearing will be listed at Field House, on a date to be fixed, reserved to Upper Tribunal Judge Ruddick with a time estimate of [3] hours.
(2) If any party wishes to adduce any further evidence, this must be served in electronic format on the other party and the Upper Tribunal at least 10 working days before the next hearing, accompanied by an application made pursuant to rule 15(2A) of the Tribunals Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008.
(3) Any skeleton arguments must be served in electronic format on the other party and the Upper Tribunal at least 5 working days before the next hearing.
(4) If the appellant or any other witness wishes to give oral evidence, they must provide a witness statement capable of standing as evidence in chief, to be served in accordance with direction [2] above, and must state if an interpreter is required, and if so in which language.

FJ Farrelly Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

21 August 2025