Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000992

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/50026/2024
LP/09896/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 16th February 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD

Between

DOM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr F Ahmed of Counsel instructed by Fountain Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mrs Abdulkarim, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 13 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
The parties may apply on notice to vary this order.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This is my oral decision which I delivered at the hearing today.
2. I am dealing with the remaking of the decision in respect of the Appellant’s appeal. I do so pursuant to section 12 (2)(b)(ii) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 of the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal which had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision to reject his international protection and human rights claim. The remaking decision requires me to consider matters with certain retained findings.
Background
3. The Appellant is a national of Iraq.
4. The matter had originally been considered by First-tier Tribunal Judge Codd (“the Judge”) who by way of a decision sealed on 18 December 2024 had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds.
5. The Appellant had sought permission to appeal which had been granted. An Error of Law hearing then took place before Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Chapman. She by way of a decision sealed on 28 November 2025 found that there was a material error of law in the decision of the Judge. She ordered that the matter remain here at the Upper Tribunal for remaking the decision.
6. At the hearing before me today I have been assisted by Mr Ahmed on behalf of the Appellant and also by Mrs Abdulkarim on behalf of the Respondent and I am grateful to them both for that assistance.
7. In respect of documents, I have had the benefit of the original error of law bundle comprising 419 pages along with references by the parties to some of the Respondent’s Country Policy and Information Notes, along with case law and to which I shall refer in due course. I also heard evidence from the Appellant. His evidence was provided via an interpreter.
8. This is a pre-June 28 June 2022 appeal and therefore section 32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 does not apply. Therefore, I remind myself that when assessing the evidence of this Appellant the lower standard of proof applies. Although no specific matters were raised by either party about vulnerability, I take into account that those who give evidence particularly through an interpreter invariably find it unusual, difficult or even uncomfortable to provide details about what occurred to them. I will make every allowance to the Appellant in respect of those matters.
The Error of Law Decision and the Original Decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge
9. The task before me is to consider what is set out by Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Chapman in her directions attached to her decision of 28 November 2025. She said:
“21. The following issues require findings of fact:
1. whether the fact the Appellant and his mother decided to leave the family home would have been considered a betrayal in Iraqi culture and that as his mother has passed away, the extent to which this may cause problems for the Appellant on return to Iraq;
2. whether it is reasonably likely that the Appellant’s father turned up at the place of his residence with his mother at 5am;
3. details of any relatives in Iraq;
4. the Appellant’s ability to obtain replacement identity documentation, in the form of a CSID or INID in light of the CG decision in SMO and KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 00110 (IAC)”.
10. To understand that task it is necessary to look at the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Codd dated 18 December 2024. The parties assisted me to go “longhand” through Judge Codd’s decision to see which parts were retained by Upper Tribunal Judge Chapman and which were not because that remained a little elusive.
11. The position in respect of the retained finding is as follows. Paragraphs 16 to 22 are retained findings. Paragraph 23 is said to be a “part issue” before me. The Judge did accept one aspect of it. Paragraphs 24 to 26 are not specifically referenced by Judge Chapman, but paragraph 28 is said to encompass these matters. Paragraphs 27, 28, 29, 30 are retained findings. Paragraph 31. Paragraph 32 is one of the matters that is before me in relation to the Appellant’s father’s influence and whether or not there was new evidence or further evidence unsettled previous findings. Paragraph 33 are retained findings. Paragraphs 35, 41 deals with redocumentation issues. Paragraph 37 did not contain findings. At Paragraph 40 the Judge had said, “The Appellant has not explained who his friend K is, or how he knew them. I am not satisfied with the Appellant’s explanation that he has no family whom he could contact. I think it more likely that his friend K is some form of relation”. This is one of the matters which was explored before me. Paragraph 41 deals with documents, the Family Book and the like, and whether the Judge had accepted the Appellant’s evidence that he simply does not remember these things. Finally in terms of the issue before me Mr Ahmed says that the Article 8 matter stands or falls with the rest of the claim.
The Evidence Before Me
12. It is necessary to consider the Appellant’s evidence. As I have explained, I had been provided with a 419 page bundle. No new documentation of any sort had been provided by the Appellant whether in the form of a witness statement or anything else. The Appellant gave evidence before me.
13. The Appellant had relied on his original witness statement which he adopted as being accurate and true. No further questions were asked in examination-in-chief, and Mrs Abdulkarim had then undertaken a cross-examination. I am going to summarise some of the evidence but I do not propose to give a full recital of everything that was said.
14. The Appellant explained that he had not spoken to his family members after he left Iraq and that included Kamran and Noor. He said he had not telephoned them. In relation to social media the Appellant was asked whether he had tried to find them via social media. The Appellant’s reply was “no”. He said, “I have not tried to find them because when I was back home, I did not have their social media accounts only their numbers”. The Appellant agreed that identity documents are very important. The Appellant was asked about his screening interview and he was taken to page 309 of the bundle. At page 309 he was asked the following question at section 6.3, “Do you intend to have additional documents sent to you from your home country? If yes, how long will it take you to obtain them and what language will they be in?” and the Appellant’s answer is recorded as “Yes, I’m not sure how long it will take me to get them” and then it says “Lang [which must mean language] – Kurdish”.
15. The Appellant was asked what documents he was referring to and said, “maybe it was just the CSID and national ID card”. The Appellant was asked whether it was intended for those documents to be sent to the United Kingdom, he said “yes”. He had been asked would he be able to provide those and he said “yes, I will try”. The Appellant was asked how he was going to get these documents from Iraq, the Appellant said through Noor and Kamran to get a new ID card and for the documents to be applied for. It was put to the Appellant “but you said you were not in contact with Noor and Kamran so how”. The Appellant said, “I will try”. It was put to the Appellant that in his screening interview he did not say he will ‘try’, but he had said ‘yes’. The Appellant said what I meant was “I will try and see if I can bring it that is what I meant”. The Appellant was asked whether there was any reason why he had not obtained those documents when he had said he would obtain. The Appellant said, “I could not get any contact with them so how will I contact them”.
16. The Appellant was asked about his witness statement at paragraph 25 where he had said:
“I can confirm that my CSID and INID were lost during my journey from Iraq to the UK. I realised I had lost these 2 documents when I was arrested by the authorities in an unknown country. I do not know what country it was, because I did not speak the language of the authorities and there was no interpreter. This was the same country where the authorities took my passport”.
17. The Appellant said it was correct that he had lost both of these documents. He was asked how then it was he was going to get a replacement for these documents. He said he thought he could get replacements and that is why he said it was ‘okay I will bring them’.
18. The Appellant was asked about his asylum questionnaire interview which appeared at page 315 of the bundle, and he was specifically asked about what he meant in relation to where he was fingerprinted. He was asked “Do you mean to say that they took all of the documents”. The Appellant said only the passport was taken by the authorities and that he had lost his CSID and INID. The Appellant was asked whether or not they were all stored together, and he said he did not know. The Appellant was asked how was it that he managed to keep his passport but lose the other documents. He said, “It was in the bag and maybe I dropped the other IDs and the others remained”. The Appellant was asked whether he asked for his passport back, he said he had but they said ‘they’ would not be able to return it.
19. The Appellant was asked whether he had brought anything else with him, to which he replied, ‘such as what?’, and he said ‘no’ it was only those items that he brought with him. It was put to the Appellant that he had lost the only things that he considered important to travel with. He said he had lost them but he did not know if they were important or not. The passport had been taken when he had been fingerprinted. The Appellant was asked why he would not ask Noor and Kamran to get ID cards and he said it was because the representative asked him to get them. He said it was important to have these documents so he could prove his identity. The Appellant said he had not sought to obtain these documents from the embassy in London, he said he had not asked because if one does not have the serial numbers then there cannot be replacements. He was asked whether this was something he checked directly, he said he had not but asked the Kurdish community and a friend. He confirmed he had not actually been to the embassy himself.
20. In re-examination in response to Mr Ahmed’s questions the Appellant said that he would not be able to get any assistance from his maternal or paternal uncle because of what had happened in Sulaymaniyah, and it was not a case that they, his uncles, would not help him at all, his paternal uncle was on his father’s side. People were after him, they were trying to kill him. As for contacting Noor and Kamran he said he tried to contact them but could not, he had their numbers. The Appellant said he had tried to put them on social media and he said he meant the telephone numbers in Kurdistan. He said when he had their numbers it was on the Kurdistan phone but he does not have their telephone number now. As to whether he tried to contact his friends via social media he said, for example, when he put in the name Kamran none of the names that came up were his friend. He said he had not tried to contact his friends through any organisation. In further questions arising from a point of clarification that I had raised, Mrs Abdulkarim asked how it was that there was an inconsistency between what the Appellant had said previously in relation to the Appellant stating that he had not tried to find them through social media but now that he said he had. The Appellant said there was no difference in what he was saying, he checked the profile photos of Kamran but none of them matched the Kamran that he knew. There were no questions arising thereafter from Mr Ahmed.
Consideration and Analysis
21. I heard extensive, helpful submissions in closing from both the parties thereafter.
22. I return to the issues which arise for consideration before me. It is worth setting them out again:
(1) Whether the fact that the Appellant and his mother decided to leave the family home would have been considered a betrayal in Iraqi culture, and that as his mother has passed way, the extent to which this may cause problems for the Appellant on return to Iraq.
(2) Whether it is reasonably likely that the Appellant’s father turned up at the place of his residence with his mother at 5 a.m.
(3) Details of any relatives in Iraq.
(4) The Appellant’s ability to obtain replacement identity documentation for a CSID or INID in the light of the country guidance case in SMO.
23. Mr Ahmed very helpfully took me to various other documents including Home Office guidance in respect of honour killings and honour-based violence in Iraq. It reads as an awful situation, in particular for women in Iraq. A summary of the position is that the local police in particular fail to take seriously the abuses including domestic abuse by husbands and males in that society. It is against that background I have to consider the issues in relation to whether what the Appellant says happened on the lower standard. In my judgment it is the case that the Appellant’s evidence in relation to what he says happened to his mother did occur. His father in a vengeful, retaliatory way, whether because of his mother dancing or because of his own insecurity or both, took the serious course of action which he did. It did not appear to the authorities to be unlawful because of the way of the so-called ‘honour’ works there. Therefore, I conclude that the Appellant’s mother leaving the family home would have been seen as betrayal by the Appellant’s father.
24. The next part of Judge Chapman’s directions invite me to consider whether because the Appellant’s mother has passed away and because of what occurred, the extent to which this may cause problems for the Appellant on his return to Iraq. Ultimately put another way, the issue which the Appellant’s father saw as a betrayal is no longer there because the Appellant’s mother is no longer alive. I therefore have to ask myself whether it would continue to be an issue for the Appellant.
25. Mr Ahmed reminds me I should, be inclined to accept the Appellant’s version of events. In support of that submission and in my judgment in view of the clear background material in relation to how women are treated and how the authorities do not take effective action, I conclude that there remains “a” risk to the Appellant. The extent of the risk is the real issue before me.
26. I therefore assess whether or not there continues to be a real risk, even if the Appellant was to relocate. What if, for example, there was a confrontation between the Appellant and his father after the Appellant’s father tracked down the Appellant? Would the Appellant face hardship? In my judgment in a direct conflict situation such as that, there might well be a real risk to the Appellant. As I say though, the real issue is whether the Appellant’s father would actually know that the Appellant is back in Iraq. Indeed, does the Appellant’s father have the ability to locate the Appellant. Even if he does, what is at his disposal to ‘do something’ about his son?
27. In assessing those matters, it is necessary to look to the retained findings which were previously made by the FTT Judge. The Judge said at paragraph 19, “I am not satisfied that the Appellant’s father worked for the Asayish”. The Judge referred to the Appellant’s inconsistencies and that there was a substantial change in the Appellant’s account and the Judge did not consider the Appellant’s account on this to be credible. This is a retained finding as the parties have agreed.
28. Later in the Judge’s decision there is similar sentiment about the ability of the father to actually to be able to find the Appellant. In my judgment it remains similar now. I have to assess whether the Appellant is at a real risk from his father.
29. The Appellant’s father’s reach or influence ties in with whether or not the Appellant’s father turned up at the place of his residence with his mother at 5am. This also ties in generally with the Appellant’s evidence about the details of his relatives in Iraq. It requires an assessment by me of what I consider about the Appellant’s evidence and I do so on the basis of the previous findings both favourable and adverse against the Appellant.
30. On the one hand there are the favourable findings that what occurred in relation to the Appellant’s mother was largely seen as in fact having occurred. I assess whether there has been exaggeration, or indeed simple lies from the Appellant who sought to for his own purposes develop a new narrative as to whether there remains a continuing risk to the Appellant on return to Iraq.
31. One matter which has concerned me about this Appellant’s case is the inconsistencies in relation to the Appellant contacting his friends Kamran and Noor who are in Iraq.
32. In my judgment the Appellant has not told the truth in relation to contacts with them and I take here the cross-examination skilfully undertaken by Mrs Abdulkarim in relation to the different sources of evidence provided by the Appellant in his screening interview, in his asylum interview and in his witness statement. I remind myself of the Court of Appeal’s decision in J (Afghanistan) and numerous Upper Tribunal decisions in respect of the purpose and scope of screening interviews, in short the case law says I should hesitate long before making adverse findings in relation to what may or may not have been said because it is ‘just a screening interview’.
33. In my judgment, however, the Appellant was asked in a very straightforward fashion whether he was going to be relying on further documents, he said ‘yes’. One then asks where and how he was going to get those documents. They would clearly need to come from Iraq. How would the Appellant be getting them and via whom? In my judgment it is clear that the only way the Appellant could do that is if he was in contact with others in Iraq. In my judgment it is abundantly clear that at the very least the two people that the Appellant has been in contact with throughout are Kamran and Noor. For the reason I am satisfied, indeed if it was necessary, I would say I am satisfied so that I am sure (which is not required) that the Appellant has available to him the contacts of Kamran and Noor in Iraq. The reason that the Appellant has not bothered trying to locate his friends in an active way in terms of social media is because it would fatally undermine his case.
34. The Appellant knew about these matters being live and important issues because Judge Chapman set them out. The Appellant has had the benefit of legal advice and representation.
35. The Appellant has remained legally represented, he told me he has a mobile phone, he told me he is on social media but I have no evidence whatsoever to suggest that those attempts at locating them have been in the negative. I am well aware that corroboration is not required in protection claims but this is such an easy aspect where evidence is clearly exceptionally simple to provide. This was recently dealt with by the Court of Appeal in in MAH (Bangladesh) and I am well aware that I cannot seek corroboration.
36. The failure by the Appellant to provide this basic information speaks for itself. The reason the Appellant has failed to provide that evidence is because it would show immediately that he is in contact with Kamran and Noor and indeed possibly with others. It would mean that his whole case has no merit.
37. The inconsistencies in relation to the way in which the Appellant sought to suggest that he did not say what was said and which is recorded in writing or that he said he would ‘try’ is simply are not made out by one sentence after the other in the Appellant’s oral evidence and when looking through the documentation. Put another way, the Appellant has been caught out, as was indicated previously by Judge Codd.
38. What is happening here is the Appellant is merely, as it were, making it up as he goes along. As Judge Chapman said at paragraph 19 it was not the Appellant providing clarification in relation to differences in the evidence, there was a substantial change in the narrative which Judge Codd did not find credible and that really continues to be the theme of the Appellant’s case. So, in the circumstances even if the Appellant has gone through the difficulties that he has with his mother and father, I conclude that he continues to have the ability to contact Noor and Kamran and that indeed he had done so. In the circumstances it is not necessary to decide whether or not the Appellant’s father turned up at his place of residence at 5am. because it is a separate issue but in my judgment because of the severe inconsistencies in the Appellant’s case and on the wholesale unreliability of it, I find against him in relation to whether or not his father turned up at his residence at 5am with his mother.
39. I am fortified in my view when considering paragraph 28 of Judge Codd’s decision which says that in his asylum interview at question 59 the Appellant said that he left with Kamran and another friend and they had gone to Baghdad where he was introduced to an agent as a smuggler. The Judge said “This appears that Kamran was involved in the transport and that this was not by smuggling himself into a lorry as claimed elsewhere”, and the Judge said at paragraph 29 that he did not find the explanation credible and that given the significant costs involved the exit from Iraq, it was pre-planned. Again, it shows in my judgment that the Appellant has had extensive assistance from Kamran and Noor and that it is difficult to envisage how and why all of a sudden that that contact would cease. The only reason it has purportedly ceased is to refute any ability to be able to obtain assistance with documentation.
40. Here I turn to the Upper Tribunal’s country guidance decision in SMO and KSP. In my judgment the Appellant clearly has available to him assistance from others to obtain his CSID or INID and that is through Kamran and Noor. If the Appellant really does not have those documents available for him in Iraq. I do not accept the Appellant’s evidence that somehow despite being of such importance that he lost those documents on his way to the United Kingdom and as Mrs Abdulkarim highlighted, they are all such important documents it is difficult to envisage how the ID documents were lost but the passport was not. The Appellant’s explanation today that maybe they fell out of a bag does not in my judgment wash with the rest of the Appellant’s evidence where he was asked if these documents were. I do not follow why the Appellant said ‘yes’, he would be relying on other documents if he did not have them available for him to obtain via his friends/family in Iraq.
41. What also concerned me in relation to the Appellant’s overall evidence was he is reluctant to indicate how extensive his understanding was from the Kurdish community in relation to what may or may not be required in terms of the ability to find others in Iraq. One the one hand the Appellant states that he trusts what he has been told by the Kurdish community but on the other hand, despite knowing others in the UK Kurdish community having successfully been in contact with people in Kurdistan, he has not used those sources to assist him in ‘finding’ Kamran and Noor or even other family and friends.
42. In my judgment a person genuinely concerned and worried about his friends and family and knowing of the requirement to assist the Upper Tribunal, those simple tasks would have been undertaken. For example, asking amongst the UK Kurdish community about his family and friends and maybe asking within the community. For example, “I hear you have been able to contact X or Y, can you please ask them whether they know Kamran, or Noor. This is where I last saw them. This is what they look like. Has anyone any knowledge of them?”
43. In my judgment the failure to provide such basic evidence indicates to me all that the Appellant is doing is covering up the truth.
44. In the circumstances I conclude that I have been told a pack of lies by this Appellant even when the basic risk that is referred to, the honour-based violence in respect of his mother is true.
45. The Appellant’s father is not part of the Asayish. No new or additional evidence has been provided to me today to contend otherwise. For the reasons I refer to, I consider the Appellant’s evidence to be exaggeration at best.
46. In my judgment, the Appellant will easily be able to get the assistance he needs in Iraq. He will also be able to get assistance from his friends and/or family. Whether in terms of getting them to send him his documents which still exist, but even if the documents do not exist, the Appellant will be able to get assistance to enter the IKR without any issue. The Appellant has failed to be truthful with the Respondent and with me.
47. I have considered paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules establishes an alleviating evidentiary rule for cases where an Appellant has established to the requisite standard that they have already been subject to persecution or serious harm, or to direct threats of such persecution or such harm. Such fact will be regarded as indicative of future risk, unless there are ‘good reasons’ to consider that such persecution or serious harm will not be repeated. In my judgment the serious issues that the Appellant’s mother suffered will not likely take place again because sadly she has died. Therefore, any consequential risk to the Appellant has fallen away.
48. The Country Guidance of SMO makes clear that the Appellant, as a fit young man will be able to access housing and employment, but even if he cannot, the Returns Package of at least £1500 will be a very large sum which will ensure that he is able to return and settle for several months which will enable him to seek work and accommodation, even if really does not have family and friends there.
49. Any risk from the Appellant’s father is virtually non existent because no sufficient evidence has been provided to show that the Appellant’s father has the means or influence to find the Appellant. Even if he did find the Appellant, the authorities, albeit not as good as in the UK, will be able to provide a sufficiency of protection. The honour based matters are severe against women, but not so much against their sons.
50. Further or alternatively, the Appellant as a young fit man will be able to reasonably internally relocate.
51. In the circumstances I conclude that the Appellant’s appeal on asylum, humanitarian protection and Articles 2, 3 and 8 must be dismissed.
Conclusion
52. In my judgment despite making every allowance for the Appellant and that the lower standard of proof is to be met, this is a claim in which I dismiss the Appellant’s account as wholly fanciful, clearly made up and that it must be dismissed on both protection and/or human rights grounds and in respect of humanitarian protection. The fear is that of non state actors.
53. In any event internal relocation for this Appellant involving non-state actors is a reasonable and viable option. He will be able to relocate safely and easily in my judgment. I am well aware of the decisions of the House of Lords in respect of internal relocation, including AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] 1 AC 678.
54. I have had in mind the case law in SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 00110 provides that it is necessary for an individual to have a CSID or an INID in order to live and travel within Iraq without encountering treatment or conditions which are contrary to Article 3 ECHR, for example at the checkpoints.
55. The Appellant is a fit, young man. I see no basis upon which it can be said he would not be able to secure a home, employment and safe passage on return. In any event, as is made clear in SMO (2), there is a returns package open to the Appellant. I do not accept the Appellant’s evidence, which are mere assertions in light of the background material and case law in any event. All he seeks to raise are matters that have been extensively dealt with in the Country Guidance which Country Guidance remains binding on me. I am aware that the Appellant may have limited education, but that is not unusual and of itself means little in terms of being able to live in Iraq or in the IKR.
56. The failure to deal with the evidence fully is that of the Appellant. He knew the case that he had to meet. The issues based approach to cases in the Immigration and Asylum Chamber is not new and there must be appropriate procedural rigour. There is not some form of rolling consideration of claims, even when the issues at stake are as serious as the ones that I am dealing with. Indeed, this is not the Appellant’s first appeal in any event.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contained a material error of law and was set aside.
I remake the decision.
I dismiss the appeal on asylum, humanitarian protection and human rights grounds.
The anonymity direction continues because the matter raises international protection issues.

Abid Mahmood

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

13 January 2026