Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001002

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/01060/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

7th July 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HANSON

Between

JH
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Selwood instructed by Wilsons Solicitors.
For the Respondent: Mr Diwnycz, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 2 July 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals with permission a decision of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the Judge’) who dismissed his appeal against the Secretary of State’s refusal, dated 16 February 2024 of his protection claim made on 13 February 2020.
2. The Appellant is a citizen of Iraq. The Judge refers to the Secretary of State’s factual summary at [3] of the determination.
3. The Judge, at [7], noted the Appellant did not attend the hearing although his representative did, and applied for an adjournment. Having heard submissions the Judge considered it was not unfair to the Appellant to proceed with the appeal in his absence as the Tribunal had taken reasonable steps to inform him of the hearing, he was aware that he had an appeal pending but had not maintained contact with his representatives, making it fair to proceed in his absence. The Judge also took into account the overriding objective and need to avoid delay and concluded it was in the interests of justice to proceed in the Appellant’s absence.
4. Having assessed the evidence that was available the Judge dismissed the appeal.
5. The Appellant sought permission to appeal which was refused by another judge of the First-tier Tribunal, but renewed to the Upper Tribunal, where permission was granted on 22 April 2025 in the following terms:
2. It is arguable that the First-tier Tribunal erred in refusing the Appellant’s adjournment request and that the refusal was materially unfair.
3. It is also arguable that the First-tier Tribunal’s treatment of the medical reports was flawed and/or that the Tribunal’s reasoning was not adequate to explain its conclusions on the medical evidence and its relevance to the issues in the case.
4. The Tribunal’s conclusions as to the availability of ID documentation appear to have been based on findings which were arguably infected by the errors asserted in grounds 1 and 2, and Ground 3 is also arguable.
5. Permission to appeal is granted on all grounds.
6. It is fair to say that the position as it is now understood is materially different from that known to the Judge. That is as a result of a considerable volume of work being undertaken by Wilsons Solicitors, including contact with the Appellant’s previous representatives, trying to get to the bottom of what happened.
7. The outcome of those investigations is that the reason the Appellant did not attend the hearing before the Judge was because he was unaware that there was a hearing. Had he done so he states he would have attended.
8. I have seen within the Appellant’s bundle communication with the First-tier Tribunal and there is nothing in the evidence as a whole to warrant a finding that the notice of hearing was not sent to the address specified for service in the normal manner by the Tribunal Administration.
9. Mr Selwood referred to a letter from the First-tier Tribunal addressed to both the Appellant and his previous representatives containing his previous residential address, indicating that the notices were sent to both.
10. The material from the Appellant’s representatives obtained by Wilsons Solicitors contains a statement that they advised the Appellant of the hearing by sending notice to him at the address they held for him, but that they heard nothing from him for quite a considerable period of time.
11. Had that been all that had been discovered then it is unlikely that fairness would be made out, if the reason the Appellant had failed to attend was because, despite receiving notice of the hearing, he could not be bothered.
12. The evidence from the Appellant, however, shows that for a considerable period of time he had been trying to make contact with his solicitor to provide details of his new residential address but without success. The Appellant’s witness statement speaks of his attending the representative’s officer and pressing the intercom button on the outside of the building but getting no response but subsequently becoming aware that his representatives had in fact moved premises. He speaks of telephone calls being answered by the receptionist but his being unable to speak to his nominated representative or make an appointment to see him and only being offered such an appointment a considerable time into the future. The Appellant also speaks of having lost the use of his phone and having to rely on his mother’s phone, which she eventually gave him, which meant that any text or other telephone communication would have failed if his previous representatives used his old number.
13. I need not set out in full the evidence that Wilson Solicitors have obtained as that is a matter of record, which raises a number of concerns about a number of issues, which are beyond the point that I must consider at this stage.
14. This is a protection appeal and the interests of justice require the Appellant to be able to attend the hearing to put his case forward and to enable the Secretary of State to cross examine him upon the merits of his claim.
15. Having considered the evidence as a whole it is clear that events occurred of which the Judge was unaware that contributed to the Appellant not attending the hearing for the simple reason that he was unaware of it.
16. I find on that basis, through no fault of the Judge, that there has been unfairness sufficient to amount to a material procedural irregularity, sufficient to warrant the determination being set aside with no preserved findings.
17. The appeal shall be remitted to the Bradford Hearing Centre to be heard afresh by a different judge.
Notice of Decision
18. Through no fault of the Judge, the First-tier Tribunal has been found to have materially erred in law.
19. The appeal shall be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal sitting at Bradford to be heard afresh by a different judge, de novo.

C J Hanson

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

2 July 2025