Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001007

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/62837/2023
LP/08206/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

25th of September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANDES
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GRIMES

Between

SL
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr T Lester, Counsel instructed by Reiss Edwards Ltd
For the Respondent: Mr K Ojo, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 10 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant (. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant, a national of China, appealed to the Upper Tribunal, with permission, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal promulgated on 22 January 2025. In a decision dated 13 May 2025 (appended hereto) I decided that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal contained a material error of law for the reasons set out in that decision. I set the decision aside preserving the findings of fact set out at paragraphs 14 – 26 and the first sentence of paragraph 27 of the decision. The hearing was adjourned and the appeal came back for hearing on the remaking on 10 September 2025.
Background
2. As set out in the error of law decision, the Appellant entered the UK with entry clearance as a visitor on 23 January 2020. His leave was extended due to the Covid-19 pandemic and he claimed asylum on 3 August 2021. The Respondent refused that application on 21 November 2023. That decision is the subject of the instant appeal.
3. The Appellant's claim, in summary, as accepted by the First-tier Tribunal Judge, is that he was a business investor based in Shanghai and that he and a friend (ZY) invested in the company of another friend (ZC). As recorded by the First-Tier Tribunal Judge, the Appellant‘s understanding of the company was that it was an investment company, customers/clients pay money to the company and the company buys and sells shares in state-owned enterprises on behalf of their customers. In fact, it appears the First-Tier Tribunal Judge’s understanding was slightly wrong and the company was facilitating the collection of client funds on behalf of the state owned enterprises and the products being traded were futures contracts in those enterprises, rather than shares, but nothing (for the purposes of the asylum claim) turns on those differences. A customer suffered a financial loss and reported the matter to the police (she has relatives in the police force) and company assets were seized and the staff and two other shareholders (ZC and ZY) were arrested. The shareholders were charged with fraud and detained. The Appellant was advised by his lawyer that he was not at risk as he was not an employee or involved in running the business. The case went to trial and ZY was fined and sentenced to 6 years 3 months imprisonment and ZC was fined and sentenced to 5 years and 10 months imprisonment. The company’s bank accounts were frozen and confiscated and the Appellant’s bank accounts were also frozen and monies confiscated. The Appellant went to Cambodia, then Vietnam before entering the UK. He claims that the police visited the family home in China during 2021, 2022, 2023 and 2024 looking for him. In oral evidence he stated that the police visited the family home again in 2025 around Chinese New Year.
The hearing
4. In advance of the resumed hearing the Appellant's representative submitted a bundle of 551 pages. As that bundle did not contain the respondent's First-tier Tribunal bundle we also had before us the Appellant's composite bundle of 453 pages submitted for the error of law hearing. The Appellant's representative also submitted a skeleton argument.
5. The Respondent failed to comply with the direction to submit a review of the Appellant's additional evidence and skeleton argument, despite being granted an extension of time. Mr Ojo explained that he had been having technical difficulties over recent weeks and had not had the opportunity to consider the Appellant's skeleton argument and evidence until the morning of the hearing. We allowed him time to do so in advance of the hearing.
6. At the outset of the hearing Mr Ojo indicated that he agreed with the issues as identified in the skeleton argument. He stated that he would not concede the appeal but relied on the refusal letter. He did not cross-examine the Appellant and made no further submissions. He indicated that he did not challenge the expert’s expertise and that he had no specific submissions to make in relation to the expert report.
7. We heard oral evidence from the Appellant through an interpreter. He adopted his witness statement and answered a few questions put by Mr Lester. We heard submissions from Mr Lester. We reserved our decision which we now give with reasons.
The issues
8. As identified in the error of law decision and in the Appellant's skeleton argument, the issues to be determined are that of the risk on return to China in light of the findings up to the first half of paragraph 27 and whether the Appellant faces prosecution and, if so, whether that amounts to persecution. Still in issue is whether the Appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason or whether humanitarian protection is made out. Also in issue is whether returning the Appellant to China would breach his right to private or family life within Article 8 of the ECHR.
Findings
9. We have considered whether any prosecution taken by the authorities against the Appellant upon his return would amount to persecution.
10. We accept on the basis of the preserved findings and the Appellant's consistent evidence that the police continue to pursue the Appellant inquiring about him at his family home yearly.
11. It was accepted by the First-tier Tribunal Judge in paragraph 26 of the decision (as preserved) that the Appellant produced evidence on the practice of “Ocean/Deep sea fishing”, a practice whereby provincial authorities from poorer regions target wealthy businesses to extort funds for themselves. It is the Appellant's case that the company fell victim to this practice and led to the arrests and charges against his two partners (paragraph 16-17 witness statement dated 3 October 2024). In his report, the expert Mr Kurlantzick’s description of the practice known as deep sea fishing, distant water fishing or ocean fishing (paragraph 19-26 expert’s report) is consistent with the Appellant's evidence and he concludes that it is plausible that the Appellant was a victim of this practice We note the Appellant's consistent account that the court case was in Henan (a poorer inland province), when the company was based in Suzhou and seized a large amount of money from the Appellant's account. We are satisfied on the basis of this evidence that the Appellant’s company was the victim of this practice as a result of which his two business partners were arrested, detained, charged and convicted.
12. Mr Lester submitted that in these circumstances there is a real risk that the Appellant will face a corrupt prosecution. In his submission a corrupt prosecution, against the Appellant, who had no involvement in the running of the company (as set out in the preserved finding at paragraph 15 of the First-tier Tribunal decision) would not be a legitimate process.
13. We note the expert’s opinion that it is likely that the Appellant will have been monitored in the UK (paragraph 45) and that, as a result, he is likely to fare poorer on return (paragraph 46). We take account of the expert’s opinion that the Appellant is likely to be detained at the airport or after arrival for a trial in Henan province (paragraph 59) and is likely to be detained for a lengthy period without trial by way of punishment (paragraph 60). We note the expert’s opinion that the Appellant would not get a fair trial, particularly in circumstances where the case involves a person connected to the authorities in a province looking to jail people from coastal provinces and take money from them (paragraph 62). We note that the record of the verdicts and sentencing process on the Appellant’s former colleagues is written in terms which suggests the Appellant is implicated and he has already had monies confiscated. The local authority which has, as we have found, been “deep sea fishing” is unlikely to want to let its prize catch go. We further take account of the expert’s opinion that the Appellant is likely to get the worst kind of treatment in prison (paragraph 64).
14. The expert report covers procedural issues in relation to the likelihood of the Appellant receiving a fair trial in the event that he is charged with similar offences to those faced by his partners. We take account of the expert’s opinion that the Communist party and local officials are likely to have influence in any trial (paragraph 32) and the Appellant is likely to face harsher punishment as the charges will be brought (via the compliant police) by officials (paragraph 37). The Appellant, as someone who is likely to face charges initiated by local officials and having left the country after the investigation began, is likely to face a more severe penalty as set out in paragraph 39 of the expert’s report:
“Xi Jinping also has made clear that there will be severe penalties for Chinese nationals who offended the authorities or powerful people with connections to the authorities. Xi also has fostered a climate of greater focus on Chinese nationals abroad who engage in anti-government activities, including even fleeing for fear they could not get a fair trial.”
15. We also take account of the CPIN China: Opposition to the state December 2023 at 12.1.2-12.1.3 which states that violations of due process are widespread in practice and that judges regularly receive political guidance on pending cases from national and local governments and the CCP, particularly in politically sensitive cases.
16. We consider it likely that the Appellant will not receive a fair trial as it is likely that the CCP and local officials will interfere in any prosecution against him as such prosecution would be considered to touch on politically sensitive issues or in the interests of local officials as set out in the CPIN as follows:
12.1.1 The DFAT report 2021 noted: ‘The Party and non-judicial authorities exercise direct influence in individual cases through Political-Legal Committees (PLCs) at each level of government. These Committees supervise and direct the work of courts and other legal institutions. They focus mostly on matters related to politics and political opinion, but can influence verdicts and outcomes, especially when the case is sensitive or important.’
12.1.2 The 2023 Freedom House report stated that:
‘Violations of due process are widespread in practice. Trials of human rights activists, religious dissidents, and other human rights defenders are routinely held in secret, with even family members being denied information or entry. While adjudication of routine civil and administrative disputes is considered more fair, cases that touch on politically sensitive issues or the interests of powerful groups are subject to decisive “guidance” from party political-legal committees.’
17. We are satisfied that the Appellant's departure from China in the circumstances described with the risk of charges like those made in relation to his partners, is likely to increase the risk that he would be perceived as having taken a political stand or to hold anti-state opinions on return in the context of any charges brought against him. The expert explains that the Appellant could be placed into a category of those who have engaged in anti-government activities.
18. Having considered all of the evidence before us we are satisfied that the Appellant faces a real risk of persecution rather than a simple prosecution in China on charges connected with the deep sea fishing investigation of the company of which he was a shareholder It is persecution rather than prosecution because the charges have been brought by a provincial authority to extort money from the company/its shareholders and senior employees and the Appellant is unlikely to receive a fair trial (the expert considers it would be a certain conviction) and is likely to face harsh conditions in detention.
19. We accept therefore that the persecution which the Appellant would face would be at least partly for his perceived political opinion and therefore for a Convention reason. Rather than take the charges against him meekly or bribe those associated with the local authority as he was expected to do he has instead challenged them.
20. Accordingly, we find that the appellant has discharged the burden on him to establish that he has a well-founded fear of persecution in China for a Convention reason.
Humanitarian Protection
21. In light of our findings above there is no need to make findings as to humanitarian protection.
Articles 2, 3 and 8
22. Articles 2 and 3 stand or fall with the asylum claim. In light of our findings above we are satisfied that if he returns to China, the appellant may be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment or face death in breach of Articles 2 or 3 of the ECHR and that there would be very significant obstacles to his integration in China in breach of Article 8.
NOTICE OF DECISION
The appeal on asylum grounds is allowed.
The appeal on human rights grounds is allowed.

A Grimes

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

22 September 2025

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001007

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/62837/2023
LP/08206/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
…………………………………

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GRIMES

Between

SL
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Ms A Childs, Counsel instructed by Reiss Edwards Ltd
For the Respondent: Mr K Ojo, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 29th April 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant (. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant, a national of China, appeals to the Upper Tribunal, with permission, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.
Background
2. The Appellant entered the UK with entry clearance as a visitor on 23rd January 2020. His leave was extended due to the Covid-19 pandemic and he claimed asylum on 3rd August 2021. The Respondent refused that application on 21st November 2023. The Appellant's appeal against that decision was dismissed First-tier Tribunal. The Appellant’s application for permission to appeal against that decision was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Turner on 26th February 2025.
3. The Appellant's claim, in summary, is that he was a business investor based in Shanghai and that he and a friend (ZY) invested in the company of another friend (ZC). The First-tier Tribunal Judge found that the Appellant ‘s understanding of the company was that it was an investment company, customers/clients pay money to the company and the company buys and sells shares in state-owned enterprises on behalf of their customers [15]. The Appellant claims that a customer suffered a financial loss and reported the matter to the police and that company assets were seized and the staff and two other shareholders (ZC and ZY) were arrested. The shareholders were charged with fraud and detained. The Appellant was advised by his lawyer that he was not at risk as he was not an employee or involved in running the business. The Appellant claims that the case went to trial and that ZY was fined and sentenced to 6 years 3 months imprisonment and ZC was fined and sentenced to 5 years and 10 months imprisonment. He claims that the company’s bank accounts were frozen and confiscated. The Appellant went to Cambodia, then Vietnam before entering the UK. He claims that the police visited the family home in China during 2021, 2022, 2023 and 2024 looking for him.
First-tier Tribunal decision
4. The First-tier Tribunal Judge dismissed the appeal, finding:
“27. On a holistic view and on the lower standard of proof, I find the Appellant’s evidence on the events in China, before and after the Appellant left China, to be reliable evidence and I find that the Appellant invested in a company and became the largest shareholder but was not involved with the company in any other manner. However, I am not satisfied that the company was not involved in any unscrupulous business, as detailed in the news articles and the sentencing judgment. Indeed, the Appellant’s involvement with the company was so minimal, the Appellant himself cannot say with any certainty that the company was not trading in the manner charged and in oral evidence, the Appellant stated that it was not clearcut if the company’s business was legal or illegal; the laws in China are not as well defined as in the UK.
28. The Appellant’s defence of being the largest shareholder and expecting a return in due course and yet pleading non-involvement in the company and ignorance of any fraud taking place is not for this Tribunal to determine; it is a matter for the Chinese courts to determine the Appellant’s culpability or to exonerate the Appellant during any prosecution the Appellant believes he will face on return to China.
29. I am not satisfied that the Appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm on return to China. I find that the Appellant fears prosecution and, on the evidence before me, I am not satisfied that the due process the Appellant fears in China is such that it crosses the threshold into persecution or serious harm. Accordingly, the Appellant’s protection claims fall to be dismissed.”
Grounds of appeal
5. It is asserted in Ground 1 of the Appellant's Grounds of Appeal that the Judge’s finding that the Appellant will face prosecution rather than persecution goes to an issue which was not before the First-tier Tribunal and should not have formed a basis for refusal. In Ground 2 it is asserted that, in finding that the Appellant would access “due process” in China in relation to the crime for which he has been accused, the Judge failed to take account of the background evidence as to whether the Appellant could access due process. It is contended that the Judge failed to determine whether any punishment would be persecutory and whether the Appellant would be at risk of persecution on return due to the nature of such punishment. It is contended that this is material because there was evidence before the Judge of the poor conditions in places of detention and it is asserted that such conditions could amount to persecution and/or a disproportionate punishment. It is contended in Ground 3 that the errors identified in the first two grounds infected the Judge’s Article 8 assessment as to whether there are very significant obstacles or insurmountable obstacles and the proportionality assessment. It is contended in Ground 4 that the Judge failed to consider whether the Appellant’s claim engages a Convention reason, which was in issue in the hearing.
6. The grant of permission was in the following terms:
“The grounds assert that the Judge erred in basing the determination on a factor not at issue in the appeal. The IJ concluded that the Appellant could access due process in China and that he would face prosecution rather than persecution. It is argued that this was not put in issue in the appeal. It is not an issue listed as live in the ASA nor the review and there is no schedule of issues in the determination. It is arguable that making this a significant basis for refusing the appeal without the Appellant having an opportunity to address it is procedurally unfair and an error of law.
It is further argued that the IJ failed to acknowledge the objective evidence that due process would be unavailable to the Appellant in China and further failed to consider whether any resultant punishment would amount to persecution. The determination is silent on both of these issues and as such is a further arguable error of law.
It is argued that the IJ fails to deal with the issue of whether the claim falls for a Convention reason. Once the protection claim was rejected, it is procedurally appropriate not to deal with matters that are not materially relevant.
It is argued that the failure to consider the above points has a bearing on the assessment of the Article 8 ECHR proportionality aspect. Any findings on these points are likely to be of relevance to obstacles to reintegration and proportionality and as such this is a further arguable error.
The Appellant has identified arguable errors of law and permission to appeal is granted. “
Discussion
7. At the hearing before me Mr Ojo accepted at the outset that all of the grounds have been made out. He accepted that the Judge did not engage with the evidence. He submitted that the decision should be set aside in its entirety and remitted to the First-tier Tribunal. On the other hand, Ms Childs submitted that the credibility findings should be preserved as they have not been challenged by the Secretary of State and are sustainable.
8. The Appellant, in the grounds of appeal, made no challenge to the Judge’s credibility findings. There was no cross-appeal and no Rule 24 response was submitted by the Respondent.
9. The Judge set out in the decision the oral and documentary evidence and the background to the appeal [13-26]. I am satisfied that the Judge did undertake some analysis of this evidence within these paragraphs including the finding at paragraph 15 as to the Appellant’s understanding of the company, an analysis of the Appellant’s oral evidence and the newspaper reports and other documentary evidence before reaching the conclusion in the first sentence of paragraph 27 that the Appellant's evidence of the events in China is reliable, finding that the Appellant invested in a company and became the largest shareholder but was not involved with the company in any other manner.
10. Although maintaining his concession that the grounds are made out, Mr Ojo maintained the Secretary of State’s position that the entire credibility findings are undermined by the matters complained of in the grounds. I disagree with that submission. I find that the Judge did undertake a proper analysis of the Appellant’s oral and documentary evidence before reaching the conclusion as to the Appellant’s involvement with the company in China. This finding has not been challenged by the Appellant or indeed by the Respondent. I am satisfied that these findings are adequately reasoned taking into account the evidence before the Judge.
11. In terms of the remainder of paragraph 27, Ms Childs accepted that the following sentence is unclear:
“However, I am not satisfied that the company was not involved in any unscrupulous business, as detailed in the news articles and the sentencing judgment.”
12. Ms Childs submitted that the remainder of paragraph 27 going into paragraphs 28 and 29 are the findings complained of in the grounds as they go to the Judge’s failure to analyse the issue of due process in terms of proceedings in China and the risk to the Appellant upon return to China.
13. In these circumstances I maintain the finding in the first sentence at paragraph 27 for the reasons et out above. It was accepted by both representatives that the second two sentences of paragraph 27 which go to the grounds and the matters complained of cannot stand. I therefore set aside the conclusions in that paragraph and paragraphs 28 and 29.
14. It was agreed by the parties that the findings on Article 8 stand or fall with the asylum issues and that these findings too have been infected by the Judge’s error in relation to the findings on due process.
15. In these circumstances, and in light of the fact that part of the findings are preserved, it is appropriate to re-make the decision in the Upper Tribunal. In advance of the hearing the Appellant’s representatives had made an application to adduce new evidence under Rule 15 seeking time to obtain an expert’s report. Accordingly I considered it appropriate to adjourn the re-making of the decision to allow time for the submission of the expert’s report.
Notice of Decision
16. The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal promulgated on 14 January 2025 involves the making of an error of law. I set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal, however I preserve the findings up to and including the first sentence of paragraph 27. The remaining two sentences in paragraph 27 as well as the findings in paragraphs 28 and 29 are set aside as are the findings on Article 8 in paragraphs 30-40.
17. The issues to be determined at the resumed hearing are the issue of risk on return to China in light of the findings up to the first half of paragraph 27 and whether the Appellant faces prosecution and, if so, whether that amounts to persecution. Still in issue is whether the Appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason or whether humanitarian protection is made out. Also in issue is whether returning the Appellant to China would breach his right to private or family life within Article 8 of the ECHR.
Directions
(1) By 8 July 2025 the Appellant must file with the Tribunal and serve on the Respondent any further evidence to be relied upon in the resumed hearing along with a skeleton argument dealing with the issues which remain and the evidence in that regard.
(2) By 22 July 2025 the Secretary of State must file with the Tribunal and serve on the Appellant a review of that further evidence identifying the remaining issues in dispute.
(3) The hearing will be relisted before Deputy UTJ Grimes on the first available date after 22 July 2025.
(4) A Mandarin interpreter is required.
(5) The hearing will take three hours.

A Grimes
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
13 May 2025