Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case Nos: UI-2025-001046
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/01733/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 10th of July 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KHAN
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RIPLEY

Between

AM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Gajjar, Counsel, instructed by Imperium Chambers
For the Respondent: Ms Nolan, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 17 June 2025

ANONYMITY ORDER

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant.

Failure to comply with this Order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant appeals a decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 5 February 2025. Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Gillespie (“the Judge”) dismissed the appellant’s international protection and human rights appeal.
Anonymity Order
2. The Judge issued an anonymity order. Neither party requested that the order be set aside. We observe that the appellant seeks international protection and consider that his private life rights protected under article 8 ECHR presently outweigh the right of the public to know his identity as a party to these proceedings. The latter right is protected by Article 10 ECHR.
3. The anonymity order is detailed above.
Relevant Facts
4. The appellant is a national of Bangladesh. His asylum claim concerned his claimed involvement with the student wing of the BNP in Bangladesh, sustaining a serious injury in an attack by the Awami league in 2011 and then being detained for 2 months when he reported the attack to the police. He was released though payment of a bribe and an arrest warrant was then issued. Two politically motivated First Information Reports (FIRs) were also issued against him in 2012. He arrived in the UK with Tier 4 student entry clearance in 2012 and claimed asylum in 2019. He additionally relied on sur place political activities and a fear of return as a bi-sexual man. The respondent refused the application for international protection by a decision dated 23 November 2023.
First-tier Tribunal Decision
5. The appellant appealed the respondent’s decision to the First-tier Tribunal. The Judge applied section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004 and found that the appellant’s credibility was undermined by the ‘inordinate delay’ in the making of his asylum claim. The Judge found the appellant to be incredible in relation to his claim to be a bisexual man [28-30]. That aspect of the decision has not been further challenged. The Judge was not satisfied that, if the FIRs were reliable, that the present authorities in Bangladesh would be interested in pursuing these, due to the change of power and the removal of the previously governing Awami League, together with the passage of time. Further, if necessary, he would be able to successfully challenge those proceedings [ 27].
6. The Judge went on to consider whether there would be very significant obstacles to his integration in Bangladesh and stated at [31] & [32]:
“31. Mr Gajjar identifies two other issues to be weighed in the balance in assessing whether there would be very serious obstacles to his integration into Bangladesh: his political profile and the current turmoil in Bangladesh, and the fact that he has been in the UK for 12 years.
32. I have dealt with the political issues and so far as any political turmoil is concerned he is not in a materially different position to the rest of the 170 million people who live there…”
Grounds of Appeal
7. The appellant filed a notice of appeal advancing three grounds:
i. The First-tier Tribunal had been procedurally unfair in failing to permit the appellant’s advocate to make oral submissions and requiring these to be provided in writing after the hearing.
ii. The First-tier Tribunal had failed to adequately explain the finding that the inordinate delay went ‘beyond the statutory instruction contained in section 8 of the 2004 Act and the guidance in JT (Cameroon) v SSHD [2008] EWCA Civ 878’
iii. The First-tier Tribunal had made findings on the background country situation that were not supported by the evidence
iv. In finding that the appellant was not in a materially different position from the rest of the 170 million who lived in Bangladesh, the First-tier Tribunal had failed to engage with the appellant’s claimed history and in particular his substantial sur-place activities.
Grant of Permission
8. By a decision dated 5 February 2023, the First-tier Tribunal refused permission to appeal on all grounds. Pursuant to the appellant’s application to the Upper Tier Tribunal, permission was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Smith on 17 April 2025 on ground (iv) only.
9. The respondent subsequently filed a Rule 24 response dated 13 May 2025. This relied on passages in the First-tier Tribunal decision. The response argued that the Judge considered the appellant’s political profile in the round when assessing risk on return and that the changed political landscape countered any risks the appellant might face on return. The respondent submitted that the determination, when read as whole, did not give rise to any error of law.
Discussion
10. Mr Gajjar relied on the lack of findings in the decision regarding the appellant’s political role in Bangladesh, the action taken against him by the authorities and his sur-place activities as detailed as points (1)-(6) in the grounds of appeal and the skeleton prepared for the hearing.
11. Ms Nolan relied on the Rule 24 response, relying on the decision of Gabriele Volpi & Delta Ltd v Matteo Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 which concerned the importance of judicial restraint by appeal chambers. She drew attention to the detail set out in the decision as to the appellant’s claimed history including the references in paragraphs 22-23 and the reference in paragraph 31 to the appellant’s political profile. She relied on passages in the CPIN on the Political Situation in Bangladesh dated December 2024.
12. Mr Gajjar made further submissions on the CPIN and the background evidence.
Error of Law
13. We accept that the Judge is not required to set out the evidence or the findings on every single issue in detail. However, he is required to make clear findings on the central issues relevant to the appeal: Shizad (sufficiency of reasons: set aside) [2013] UKUT 85 (IAC). The respondent had disputed the level of the appellant’s political activity in Bangladesh. Ms Nolan submitted that in paragraph 4 of the post hearing submissions, it was argued that it did not matter whether the appellant’s political activity rendered him high or low profile, he would still be at risk. However, we do not accept that the submission absolves the Judge of any requirement to find relevant facts. The Judge does not state whether he accepts that the appellant has been detained and faced persecution, relevant for the potential application of paragraph 339K. The Judge also failed to make a finding on the appellant’s claimed significant sur-place activity.
14. Ms Nolan further argued that the Judge had considered this and was only stating, at paragraph 32, that that his political profile did not make a material difference within the context of the current political turmoil. We accept that that conclusion was open to the Judge, but he has failed to set out what he found the appellant’s political profile to be.
15. The appellant has provided evidence of considerable sur-place activity, summarised in the post hearing submissions as:
His posts are clearly significant. A political post he wrote on 24 August 2023 received 12,000 likes, had 602 comments and was shared some 190 times [AB/88].1 He has posts photographs of his protests that have received considerable interest. For example, in January 2024, his post about a BNP demonstration received 271 likes and was shared 19 times [AB/120].2 In another example, he posted his attendance at a rally in Parliament Square on 4 October 2022 that received 224 likes [AB/158].3 It must be emphasised these are just examples of the various posts and interactions available in the bundle. He can be seen at the front of many of the picket lines and it is clear throughout the papers that his profile is “public” meaning it is open to be viewed by anyone without having to be connected to him.”
16. In omitting to address these activities, we are not satisfied that the Judge has made adequate findings on the core parts of the appellant’s claim. However, as confirmed in R (Iran) [2005] EWCA 982, in order to comprise an error law, the failing to resolve conflicts of fact must concern material matters.
17. We note the passages in the CPIN relied on by Ms Nolan and the lack of contrary evidence filed by the appellant to show that he would remain at risk following the fall of the Awami League party. The December 2014 CPIN was published after the First Tier Tribunal hearing but before promulgation of the decision. We are satisfied that it provides relevant and reliable evidence of the country situation at the appropriate time. Paragraph 3.1.1 of the CPIN records:
Leaders, members, and supporters of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) party and their auxiliary (student and youth) organisations are unlikely to face persecution or serious harm from the state.
18. Permission has not been granted on point (iii) concerning the country situation. At the First Tier Tribunal hearing the appellant provided documentary evidence to support his claims concerning his political activity. He also relied on video evidence showing the degree of disorder and the lack of a fully operational government. The appellant did not provide country material to show that, following the fall of the Awami League, his claimed political profile would put him at risk. At the error of law hearing, Mr Gajjar has instead, relied on the use of the term ‘unlikely’ in the CPIN and argued that this passage and the evidence in the CPIN do no resolve the issue, as they concern risk on a balance of probability, rather than to the lower standard.
19. However, the appellant did not provide evidence to substantiate the argument that there remained a risk to the lower standard since the fall of the Awami League, arising from his sur-place or other BNP activities. He did not argue a risk from non-state agents, although the CPIN similarly states that such a risk is unlikely (paragraph 3.2.2)
20. In the absence of such country evidence, we are not satisfied that the appellant can show that the Judge erred in finding that he was not at risk to the lower standard, even if the appellant’s BNP political activity in Bangladesh, detention and substantial sur-place activity was accepted and taken at its highest.
Notice of Decision
21. The appellant’s appeal is dismissed
22. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge did not involve the making of an error of law so the decision stands.

F Ripley
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

8 July 2025