Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001050

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/62677/2023
LP/1011/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 10th November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANDES

Between

CC
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Sepulveda, Solicitor, Fountain Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Arif, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 22 August 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is the remaking, under section 12 (2) (ii) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, of the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal (“the FTJ”) promulgated on 14 January 2025, dismissing the appeal of the appellant (a national of Iraq of Kurdish ethnicity, last resident in Mosul) against the respondent’s refusal of 15 November 2023 of his international protection claim made on 8 May 2021. The decision of the FTJ was set aside for error of law by decision of Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Stamp issued on 1 July 2025 (see annex attached). Some findings were preserved as I discuss below.
Anonymity
2. I continue the anonymity order. I consider that the public interest in maintaining confidence in the asylum system by ensuring vulnerable people are willing to provide candid and complete information in support of their applications outweighs the public interest in open justice.
The issues/the hearing
3. The appellant’s case before the FTJ was that he was at risk from ISIS, from the family of a woman with whom he had had a relationship, from his own family, and from the PMF/Hashd Al Shabi. The FTJ found the appellant not to be credible. On setting aside, the FTJ’s adverse findings as to risk in the appellant’s home area were preserved save whether the appellant had a well-founded fear of persecution from the PMF based purely on his religion as a Sunni Muslim and Kurdish ethnicity. In addition, whilst the FTJ’s findings that the appellant had either retained his CSID or could obtain one, that he could contact his family members, that he had a history of working in Iraq, no evidence he would be unable to access medication, and had shown considerable resourcefulness and resilience in his journey were preserved, the FTJ was found not to have addressed the relevant factors in country guidance about living conditions in the IKR or the ability to find employment.
4. The issues were therefore:
(i) Whether the appellant was at risk of persecution on return to his home area based on his religion and/or ethnicity;
(ii) If so whether relocation to the IKR would be reasonable and not unduly harsh.
5. The appellant was not called to give evidence.
6. Ms Arif relied on the respondent’s skeleton argument and submitted that the appellant had not shown past persecution because of his race or religion. She submitted that the background material did not evidence that hostile reactions towards those of Kurdish ethnicity were widespread. The appellant was an able-bodied male who had no issues working or living in IKR in the past, that his father had been a peshmerga might give him assistance in the IKR and he could take up the voluntary return scheme.
7. Ms Sepulveda relied on the skeleton argument. She submitted that the appellant said he had not found his mother when he looked in the refugee camps. He had raised specific problems with Hashd Al Shabi in his interview. She relied on the sources in the schedule of background material, that the appellant’s father had been peshmerga and that the appellant had not lived in Iraq for a long time, which would place him under suspicion.
8. I told the representatives at the hearing that as the CPINs were not very helpful, and as the background material in the appellant’s bundle quoted EUAA country guidance from 2022, I had looked at the most up to date 2024 reports from EUAA and I would refer to those when coming to my decision. The representatives agreed that was appropriate.
Discussion and findings
9. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, an appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason, in this case race and religion being the potential reasons. The burden of proof is on the appellant and as this application pre-dates the coming into force of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, the single standard of proof is the lower standard, which has been expressed as a reasonable degree of likelihood.
10. The appellant gave different reasons based on past events why he feared the PMF/Hashd al Shabi both in his witness statement before the FTJ and in his interview. In his witness statement he claimed to have had a relationship in 2010 with the sister of a PMF member, to have suffered abuse, including sexual abuse at the hands of her brothers and to have been rejected and abused by most of his family as a result. His answers in interview were far more general and did not mention any specific abuse. The appellant said (at qn 16 onwards of his second interview) that he would give 5/6 jars of honey (he was a beekeeper) to Hashd Al Shabi each year to live in peace. They were against Kurdish people and Sunni people, and they targeted families who had a link to peshmerga; the appellant’s father had been a peshmerga. His neighbourhood had been levelled to the ground and if he returned he would have to live in a tent as his land had been taken by Hashd al Shabi. They would want to harm him because he was Kurdish and his father had been working with the peshmerga. Both the peshmerga and Hashd al Shabi fought ISIS, but Hashd al Shabi did not like Kurdish people, you could only work for them and if you went against them they would kill you.
11. The FTJ found the appellant not to be credible, and he rejected the specific reasons given by the appellant in his witness statement relating to his claimed relationship. His findings were in general preserved. It was the appellant’s fear of the PMF based on his religion and race which the judge was found not to have considered.
12. The relevant paragraphs from the headnote of SMO & KSP (civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 00110 are in the context of Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive, but they merit quoting in full:
A. INDISCRIMINATE VIOLENCE IN IRAQ: ARTICLE 15(C) OF THE QUALIFICATION DIRECTIVE
1. There continues to be an internal armed conflict in certain parts of Iraq, involving government forces, various militia and the remnants of ISIL. Following the military defeat of ISIL at the end of 2017 and the resulting reduction in levels of direct and indirect violence, however, the intensity of that conflict is not such that, as a general matter, there are substantial grounds for believing that any civilian returned to Iraq, solely on account of his presence there, faces a real risk of being subjected to indiscriminate violence amounting to serious harm within the scope of Article 15(c) QD.
2. The only exception to the general conclusion above is in respect of the small mountainous area north of Baiji in Salah al-Din, which is marked on the map at Annex D. ISIL continues to exercise doctrinal control over that area and the risk of indiscriminate violence there is such as to engage Article 15(c) as a general matter.
3. The situation in the Formerly Contested Areas (the governorates of Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewah and Salah Al-Din) is complex, encompassing ethnic, political and humanitarian issues which differ by region. Whether the return of an individual to such an area would be contrary to Article 15(c) requires a fact-sensitive, “sliding scale” assessment to which the following matters are relevant.
4. Those with an actual or perceived association with ISIL are likely to be at enhanced risk throughout Iraq. In those areas in which ISIL retains an active presence, those who have a current personal association with local or national government or the security apparatus are likely to be at enhanced risk.
5. The impact of any of the personal characteristics listed immediately below must be carefully assessed against the situation in the area to which return is contemplated, with particular reference to the extent of ongoing ISIL activity and the behaviour of the security actors in control of that area. Within the framework of such an analysis, the other personal characteristics which are capable of being relevant, individually and cumulatively, to the sliding scale analysis required by Article 15(c) are as follows:
(i) Opposition to or criticism of the GOI, the KRG or local security actors;
(ii) Membership of a national, ethnic or religious group which is either in the minority in the area in question, or not in de facto control of that area;
(iii) LGBTI individuals, those not conforming to Islamic mores and wealthy or Westernised individuals;
(iv) Humanitarian or medical staff and those associated with Western organisations or security forces;
(v) Women and children without genuine family support; and
(vi) Individuals with disabilities.
6. The living conditions in Iraq as a whole, including the Formerly Contested Areas, are unlikely to give rise to a breach of Article 3 ECHR or (therefore) to necessitate subsidiary protection under Article 15(b) QD. Where it is asserted that return to a particular part of Iraq would give rise to such a breach, however, it is to be recalled that the minimum level of severity required is relative, according to the personal circumstances of the individual concerned. Any such circumstances require individualised assessment in the context of the conditions of the area in question.
13. The only factor listed at paragraph 5 of SMO particularly relevant to the appellant is (ii) that the appellant is a member both of an ethnic (Kurdish) and a religious group (Sunni Muslim) which is in the minority in the area in question and not in de facto control of that area.
14. The appellant relies on the country information in the evidence schedule. Source 1 is the EUAA country of origin information of 2022 relating to Iraq – actors of persecution and serious harm. The section on the PMF explains that the PMF can also be referred to as al-Hashd al Shaabi and they are a complex umbrella organisation consisting of many different militias. Since 2014 elements of the PMF have been engaged in unlawful killings, disappearances, extortion and revenge attacks while fighting against ISIL. They man checkpoints, engage in extortion, detain Sunni on false charges and smuggle weapons, force displacement of Sunni, turn Sunni mosques into headquarters and operate in Sunni areas against the will of the population. They are reported to have committed violence against ethnoreligious minorities, to be engaged in illegal income-generating activities, setting up of illegal checkpoints and causing displacement of minorities. They block returns, attempt to induce demographic changes and secure illegal economic benefits and confiscate property. The schedule refers to links to the EUAA 2022 targeting country of origin information but interestingly when those links are followed, they refer to the targeting of Christians, Turkmen and Yazidis rather than to those of Kurdish ethnicity and Sunni faith specifically.
15. The updated EUAA 2024 report on actors of persecution and serious harm (which I drew to the representatives’ attention) highlights the PMF’s dominance of the security sector in liberated governates and the expansion of their influence over the Iraqi state. The description of what they do is slightly different from the 2022 description. They are reported to have committed human rights violations against persons perceived to be affiliated with ISIL and have engaged in violence against ethnic and religious minorities (and the link to ethnic and religious minorities refers to Turkmen, Yazidis, Christians, Sabean-Mandeans and Palestinians). They have also targeted individuals perceived to transgress moral or religious codes and have reportedly also committed abuses such as violence against protesters. They have been reported to be involved in criminal activities such as smuggling goods and extortions.
16. There is also more recent information about the PMF in the EUAA country of origin information of 2024. The general country of origin information links to the security information which refers to the PMF (also known as Al-Hashd Al-Shabi) as being originally formed in 2014 to combat ISIL following the takeover of the city of Mosul. They are heterogenous in nature and although most PMF members are Shia Arabs, there are smaller militias made up of Sunni Arabs or smaller minority groups such as Yazidi, Christian, Shabak or Turkmen unis near the regions they live in. The Iraqi government has passed several bills aimed at officially bringing the PMF under government control and integrating them into the security forces. They however remained a highly autonomous entity and whilst the state budget allocate salaries to them, they sought to increase their gains by engaging in extra-legal and illegal activities such as creating military enterprises, seizing properties, imposing arbitrary taxes at checkpoints, smuggling goods, trading in scrap metal, kidnapping and extortion. They have dominated the security sector in the liberated governates such as Ninewa.
17. It is interesting to note that the EUAA country guidance on Iraq, whilst including Sunni Arabs as those who may be at risk because of perceived affiliation with ISIL and highlighting that Sunni Arabs who lived in areas under ISIL rule have been accused of siding with ISIL by PMF and using this as a pretext to unlawfully detain them “especially in Sunni majority governates such as Anbar, Salah al-Din, Kirkuk and Ninewa”, does not mention those of Kurdish ethnicity living outside the KRI as specifically at risk.
18. I have considered all the country information in the evidence schedule. Clearly the PMF engage in illegal activities, harassment and extortion and they do commit human rights violations. Their units are mostly Shia Muslim and as such they obviously have no affinity with a Sunni Kurd. Mosul is a Sunni Arab majority area (rather than a Shia majority area), but it is ethnically and religiously diverse; there are a significant minority of Kurds amongst the population. I do not doubt that the PMF are not particularly friendly towards Kurdish people in the area and there may be harassment and discrimination, but I am simply not satisfied even to the low standard applicable that a Kurdish man in his early thirties such as the appellant would be subject to persecution in Mosul from the PMF simply because of his race and religion. I consider if that were the case there would be more specific information available to that effect given the relatively large number of Kurdish people who have returned to the area after the fall of ISIL and given the significance of Mosul as a city in Iraq.
19. I cannot rely on what the appellant says even in his interview about past extortion from PMF. The appellant has been generally found not to be credible (see [36] of judge’s decision) and it is difficult to see how, as he left Iraq when ISIS invaded Mosul in 2014, he could have suffered extortion from the PMF/Hashd Al Shabi when they were only formed to combat ISIS following the ISIS takeover of Mosul (see [16] above). Of course there may have been other Shia militia active in the area before the invasion of ISIS, but even if the appellant was forced to give honey to one of these groups, there is a different organisation now, much time has passed and the situation in the area is not the same as it was before the ISIS takeover. I consider that the appellant would simply be in the same position as any other Kurdish person returning to Mosul after a lengthy period away. It is right that the FTJ did not rule out that the appellant’s father had been involved with the Peshmerga, finding only “the appellant had been inconsistent about his father’s and other’s ranks in the Peshmerga. If his father had been in the Peshmerga that would go to the appellant’s credit in Kurdish circles.” Nevertheless, the appellant has not suggested that he himself was involved with the Peshmerga. The only reference to Peshmerga in the schedule of background material is the reference to members of the Peshmerga being targeted by the PMF during the Iraqi takeover of the disputed territories from the KRG in October 2017. It does not indicate that the appellant would be subject to adverse interest from the PMF or more adverse interest because of his father’s role before ISIS took over. I appreciate it will be more difficult for the appellant because it is 11 years or so since he left Iraq, but he does not suggest that he is specifically at risk because he would be seen as Westernised or that he has lost his connections with the culture of his home area. Ms Sepulveda submits that not having been in Iraq for such a long time would place the appellant under suspicion, but I consider that as speculation. The appellant obviously fled Mosul, as did many others when ISIS took over. That he has been out of the country for such a long time can be explained because he had fled to Europe and evidently wanted to stay in Europe. I appreciate what he says about his family, but the FTJ found and those findings were specifically preserved, that the appellant had either retained his CSID or had the ability to obtain one and would be able to travel around and navigate checkpoints [39] and that he had family members in Iraq who he would be able to contact, for example through Facebook [38].
20. I am not satisfied therefore that the appellant would be at risk of persecution in his home area from the PMF/Hashd Al Shabi or that his return would breach Article 3 ECHR. I am also not satisfied that he would be at risk of indiscriminate violence on the sliding scale so as to be eligible for humanitarian protection. He does not qualify for international protection therefore.
21. In the alternative, and if I am wrong about the risk to the appellant in Mosul, I consider relocation to the IKR following the guidance in SMO. I refer to the extracts from headnote E which are quoted at [16] of the error of law decision (see annex attached). The appellant would not be at risk of ill-treatment during the security screening process as although Mosul was associated with ISIL, he could evidence having fled Mosul on the arrival of ISIS and having lived in Europe since then, with a father with at least connections to the Peshmerga. There is however nothing to indicate that the appellant has family members living in the IKR. There is nothing to indicate that he would be able to gain access to one of the refugee camps and he would have to support himself in an area with 70% unemployment by his own efforts topped up with the possibility of a grant under the voluntary returns scheme, which would give him access to £1500. The FTJ found that the appellant had shown resourcefulness and resilience in his journeys and there was limited evidence of medical needs. The appellant has worked as a beekeeper and could use the grant to acquire hives again, but although that will provide him with some income, it is unlikely to provide him with a great deal of income. Without family in the IKR it is difficult to see how he could make much use of his father’s connections to the Peshmerga; it is not as if they are recent.
22. Nevertheless, I consider the appellant would be able to access PDS rations. The section on the CPIN on internal relocation (section 9 of the October 2023 CPIN see in particular section 9.3 about Sulaymaniyah governate) explains that to obtain regular employment in the KRI a person must regularise their stay with the Asayish and transfer their housing card and once this has been transferred or issued, they can have access to regular employment and also transfer their PDS card. There are difficulties if a person originates from the disputed areas, but the city of Mosul is not in an area disputed between the KRI and the central government of Iraq. Whilst the appellant might have to resort to living in a critical shelter arrangement he would I find have access to basic necessities (and health services are available to all Iraqis in the KRI), through a combination of the income he can make for himself and PDS rations. Whilst his standard of living would be low, I find it would be reasonable and not unduly harsh; he would have access to the basic necessities of life in the same way as he would do in his home area.
23. If I am wrong therefore and the appellant would be at risk in his home area, it would be reasonable for him to internally relocate to the KRI.
Notice of Decision
On remaking, I dismiss the appeal.

A-R Landes

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

7 November 2025

Annex (error of law decision)

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001050

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/62677/2023
LP/10111/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

01/07/2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE STAMP

Between

CC
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms A Sepulveda, Solicitor, Fountain Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S Nwachuku, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House via CVP on 16 June 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Background
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, the decision of the First-tier judge Parkes dated 14 January 2025 on the basis that it contains an error of law. The judge had dismissed the appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his protection claim.
2. The appellant, born in 1994, is Kurdish and a citizen of Iraq. His protection claim was founded on a fear of ISIS and the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) following the invasion of his hometown of Mosul in 2014. The fear of persecution from ISIS was based on his father’s work for the Peshmerga, a counter revolutionary force and from the PMF on their targeting of Sunni Muslims and his relationship with the sister of a member of the PMF.
3. The appellant also claimed that he feared destitution and the inability to cross through check points to return to Mosul as he does not have a Civil Status Identification Document (CSID) or an Iraq National Identification Document (INID).
4. Following the rejection by the respondent of the appellant’s protection claim on 15 November 2023, the appeal was heard on 6 January 2025 by the judge who dismissed it based on ISIS no longer being operating in the location referred to by the appellant. In relation to the PMF, the judge did not find that the appellant’s evidence credible on either his father’s role in the Peshmerga or his relationship with the sister of a PMF member. In addition he concluded, looking at all the evidence, the appellant either retained his CSID or had the ability to find one and could safely return to his home area or relocate within the Iraqi Kurdish Region (IKR) .
5. The appellant sought permission to appeal on three grounds: (i) The judge had failed to consider whether there was a well-founded fear from the PMF based on his religion as a Sunni Muslim and his ethnicity as a Kurd, (ii) A failure to apply country guidance set out in SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15 ) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 00110 in relation to any relocation of the appellant to the IKR and (iii) the inadequate reasoning of the judge for his finding that the late disclosure of his relationship with the sister of a PMF member undermined his credibility.
6. Permission to appeal was partially granted on 27 February 2025 by First-tier Tribunal judge Monaghan on the following basis:
“…. The Judge has arguably erred in failing to consider the sliding scale assessment set out in the country guidance case law of SMO2 when considering the return of the Appellant to Mosul which is a formerly contested area. The Judge has also arguably failed to give sufficient reasons in relation to the Appellant’s religion and ethnicity and whether that profile would lead to risk on return of itself.
The Judge has arguably failed to apply the same country guidance case law sufficiently or at all in relation to internal relocation to the IKR.
Permission is refused on Ground 3. The Judge has made adequate findings in relation to the claimed honour crime and has not misdirected himself in relation to the late disclosure of the same.”
The Respondent’s concession at the hearing
7. Ms Nwachuku, on behalf the Secretary of State, having had a prehearing discussion with Ms Sepulveda, confirmed that the first ground set out in the permission to appeal was conceded on the basis that the judge at paragraph 10 of the decision had noted that the appellant had feared the PMF on the basis of his religion and ethnicity but in his findings he did not directly address this issue. The concession was made on the basis that the judge’s finding on all other material parts of the decision would be preserved and that the only issue for future consideration would be whether the appellant had a well-founded fear of persecution from the PMF based on him being a Sunni Muslim and a Kurd. No concession was being made in relation to the second ground of appeal. Ms Sepulveda made no separate representations on the concession or submitted preserved findings.
8. Having considered SMO & KSP and in light of the evidence before me, in particular, paragraphs 36 to 39 of the decision which contained the judge’s conclusions making no mention of any consideration based on the appellant’s religion or ethnicity, I consider the concession to be properly made and there is no proper basis for me to reject it.
Submissions
9. Ms Sepulveda referred to her grounds of appeal and submitted that, notwithstanding the concession, her second ground remained relevant if any rehearing did find that the appellant had a well-founded fear of persecution from the PMF which precluded any return to his home area, it would be necessary to consider whether the appellant could safely relocate to the IKR.
10. The judge had failed to apply the country guidance of SMO & KSP in assessing the reasonableness of relocation to the IKR. In particular, the appellant had no family in the IKR and referred to paragraph 32 of the headnote E of the case entitled “Iraqi Kurdish Region” which stressed the importance of a judicial consideration of the extent of assistance to be provided by family members. Similarly, paragraph 33 of that decision dealt with the lack of accommodation options in the IKR for those returning without family support and paragraph 34 with the challenging employment opportunities in the IKR. None of these matters had been considered by the judge. In paragraphs 38 and 39 of the decision which sets out the judge’s conclusions on the appellant’s ability to safely relocate within the IKR the principal focus was on identity documentation and his failure to make any effort to contact his family in his hometown and did not consider the absence of family in the IKR or the other criteria set out in SMO & KSP.
11. In terms of disposition, Ms Sepulveda submitted that any rehearing should be heard in this Tribunal given the limited nature of the issues to be considered. No observations were made on Ms Nwachuku’s submissions on preserved findings.
12. Ms Nwachuku submitted that given the judge’s findings on the appellant’s credibility in paragraphs 37 to 39 relating to his ability to work, his failure to attempt to contact his family in Iraq and his possession of a CSID or the ability to obtain one dealt with all the relevant issues set out in SMO & KSP. No evidence was put before the judge either in his witness statement or elsewhere which he should have taken into account in his conclusion that the appellant could not safely relocate to the IKR.
13. On disposition, Ms Nwachuku submitted that any rehearing should be retained by this Tribunal given the limited nature of the issues to be considered and that such a rehearing could be conducted by me as part of this decision without the need to hear further evidence. If an error of law was found on ground 2 then, again, any rehearing should be retained in the Upper Tribunal.
Analysis
14. In light of the concession made by the respondent on ground one of the appeal, I need only to determine whether the judge made a material error of law in relation to that set out in the second ground.
15. The judge’s conclusions on the ability of the appellant to relocate to the IKR were set out in paragraphs 38 and 39 of his decision:
“38. On this point there is the issue of the Appellant's identity documentation. The Appellant does have family members in Iraq. He maintains that he is not in contact but there is no evidence that the Appellant has even tried the Red Cross tracing service or similar organisations. Similarly the Appellant could approach members of the Kurdish diaspora for assistance. More straightforwardly he could return to Facebook and use that to contact his family members.
“39.Again taking all of the above into consideration I find that the Appellant either retained his CSID or has the ability to obtain one. He can return to Iraq or the IKR and has the ability to travel around and navigate any checkpoints that might be encountered. The Appellant can return to his home area or he can relocate within the IKR.”
16. SMO & KSP sets out the factors that a judge needs to take into account as to whether
it is safe and reasonable for a Kurd to be relocated to the IKR in paragraphs 26 to 34 of headnote E.
“27. For an Iraqi national returnee (P) of Kurdish origin in possession of a valid CSID or Iraqi National Identity Card (INID), the journey from Baghdad to the IKR by land is affordable and practical and can be made without a real risk of P suffering persecution, serious harm, or Article 3 ill treatment nor would any difficulties on the journey make relocation unduly harsh.
28. P is unable to board a domestic flight between Baghdad and the IKR without either a CSID, an INID or a valid passport. If P has one of those documents, the journey from Baghdad to the IKR by air is affordable and practical and can be made without a real risk of P suffering persecution, serious harm, or Article 3 ill treatment nor would any difficulties on the journey make relocation unduly harsh.
29. P will face considerable difficulty in making the journey between Baghdad and the IKR by land without a CSID or an INID. There are numerous checkpoints en route, including two checkpoints in the immediate vicinity of the airport. If P has neither a CSID nor an INID there is a real risk of P being detained at a checkpoint until such time as the security personnel are able to verify P’s identity. It is not reasonable to require P to travel between Baghdad and IKR by land absent the ability of P to verify his identity at a checkpoint. This normally requires the attendance of a male family member and production of P’s identity documents but may also be achieved by calling upon “connections” higher up in the chain of command.
30. Once at the IKR border (land or air) P would normally be granted entry to the territory. Subject to security screening, and registering presence with the local mukhtar, P would be permitted to enter and reside in the IKR with no further legal impediments or requirements. There are no sponsorship requirements for entry or residence in any of the three IKR Governorates for Kurds.
31. Whether P would be at particular risk of ill-treatment during the security screening process must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Additional factors that may increase risk include: (i) coming from a family with a known association with ISIL, (ii) coming from an area associated with ISIL and (iii) being a single male of fighting age. P is likely to be able to evidence the fact of recent arrival from the UK, which would dispel any suggestion of having arrived directly from ISIL territory.
32. If P has family members living in the IKR cultural norms would require that family to accommodate P. In such circumstances P would, in general, have sufficient assistance from the family so as to lead a ‘relatively normal life’, which would not be unduly harsh. It is nevertheless important for decision-makers to determine the extent of any assistance likely to be provided by P’s family on a case by case basis.
33. For Kurds without the assistance of family in the IKR accommodation options are limited:
(i) Absent special circumstances it is not reasonably likely that P will be able to gain access to one of the refugee camps in the IKR; these camps are already extremely overcrowded and are closed to newcomers. 64% of IDPs are accommodated in private settings with the vast majority living with family members;
(ii) If P cannot live with a family member, apartments in a modern block in a new neighbourhood are available for rent at a cost of between $300 and $400 per month;
(iii) P could resort to a ‘critical shelter arrangement’, living in an unfinished or abandoned structure, makeshift shelter, tent, mosque, church or squatting in a government building. It would be unduly harsh to require P to relocate to the IKR if P will live in a critical housing shelter without access to basic necessities such as food, clean water and clothing;
(iv) In considering whether P would be able to access basic necessities, account must be taken of the fact that failed asylum seekers are entitled to apply for a grant under the Voluntary Returns Scheme, which could give P access to £1500. Consideration should also be given to whether P can obtain financial support from other sources such as (a) employment, (b) remittances from relatives abroad, (c) the availability of ad hoc charity or by being able to access PDS rations.
34. Whether P is able to secure employment must be assessed on a case by-case basis taking the following matters into account:
(i) Gender. Lone women are very unlikely to be able to secure legitimate employment;
(ii) The unemployment rate for Iraqi IDPs living in the IKR is 70%
(iii) Paragraph cannot work without a CSID or INID
(iv) Patronage and nepotism continue to be important factors in securing employment. A returnee with family connections to the region will have a significant advantage in that he would ordinarily be able to call upon those contacts to make introductions to prospective employers and to vouch for him;
(v) Skills, education and experience. Unskilled workers are at the greatest disadvantage, with the decline in the construction industry reducing the number of labouring jobs available;
(vi) If P is from an area with a marked association with ISIL, that may deter prospective employers.”
17. The judge’s attention was directed to this case as part of the country information evidence schedule submitted by the appellant and the issue raised in paragraphs 25 and 26 of the appeal skeleton argument albeit the focus was primarily on the appellant’s inability to obtain a CSID or INID.
18. The judge, while not directly referring to SMO & KSP did address the issue of the CSID and found that the appellant either had retained his card or had the ability to obtain one. Ms Sepulveda in her submissions, in my view wisely, was not attempting to challenge this element of the decision but focussed on paragraphs 32 to 34 highlighting the issues which should be considered in determining whether it was reasonable given, in particular, the lack of available accommodation and employment opportunities for a Kurdish national to be returned in the absence of family support.
19. The judge did consider, in paragraph 38, whether support could be obtained from the appellant’s family and concluded that he did not accept that this support was not available given any evidence that the appellant had attempted to contact them either through the Red Cross tracing service, Facebook or otherwise. This determination was, no doubt, relevant to his conclusions on the ability of the appellant to obtain a CSID and arrive safely in the IKR but it did not address the issue of living conditions or his ability to find employment there. There was no evidence before the judge that the appellant had any family members in the IKR and, in absence of any analysis of the considerations set out in paragraphs 33 and 34 of SMO & KSP the judge made a material error of law.
Disposition
20. I have reflected on the parties’ submissions as to the appropriate disposal. I was urged by both advocates to retain the appeal in the Upper Tribunal for remaking.
21. In determining this issue, I have applied the principles set out in AEB [2022] EWCA Civ 151 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC). I also carefully considered whether to retain the matter for remaking in the Upper Tribunal in line with the general principles set out in paragraph 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement. Taking into account the stances of the parties, the history of the case, the nature and extent of the findings to be made and paragraphs 7.2(a) and (b) of that Practice Statement I consider that it is appropriate to retain the matter in this Tribunal for rehearing and for the parties to have the opportunity to submit additional evidence.
Notice of Decision
The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Parkes dated 14 January 2025 involves the making of errors of law. I set aside the decision. I preserve the findings at paragraph 36 (save to the extent that any international protection is capable of being granted by reason of the appellant’s religion or ethnicity) and paragraphs 37, 38, 39 (save for the appellant’s ability to relocate within the IKR by reason of the matters unrelated to the appellant’s possession of a CSID) and 40.
Directions
1. Within 28 days from the date when this decision is sent, the appellant shall file with the Tribunal and serve on the respondent a consolidated bundle of all evidence on which he wishes to rely, together with a skeleton argument which is cross-referenced to that bundle.
2. Within 42 days of the date on which this decision is sent, the respondent shall file and serve a skeleton argument which is cross-referenced to the appellant’s consolidated bundle.
3. The appeal will be relisted for a resumed hearing in the Field House UTIAC before any available judge after 49 days from the date when the decision is sent with a time estimate of a half day. The appellant’s solicitors must notify the Upper Tribunal if an interpreter is required.

Mark Stamp

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

20 June 2025