Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No:
UI-2025-001056, UI-2025-001058,
UI-2025-001059, UI-2025-001065,
UI-2025-001067, UI-2025-001068
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/57375/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 4th March 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUNDELL

Between

AV1, AV2 & AV3
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellants
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellants: Mr T Wilding of counsel, instructed by A J Jones Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr A Sheikh, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 16 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

The appellants were granted anonymity by the First-tier Tribunal, and it is appropriate for that order to continue in force because of the nature of this claim and the first appellant’s mental health problems. I therefore order as follows.

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellants are granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellants. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. On 24 November 2025, Upper Tribunal Judge Keith issued the Upper Tribunal’s first decision in this case. He decided that the First-tier Tribunal had erred in law in dismissing the appellant’s appeal on asylum grounds. He also concluded that the First-tier Tribunal had erred in law in allowing the appellant’s appeal on human rights grounds. He set aside the FtT’s decision to that extent, although he preserved certain findings made by that Tribunal. He ordered that the decision on the appeal would be remade by the Upper Tribunal. It was for that reason that the case resumed before me on 16 February 2026.
Background
2. I am able to take the following summary of the relevant background from Mr Wilding’s skeleton argument, which I have amended as necessary to prevent the identification of the appellants.
3. AV1 was born on 11 May 1993 in Diber, Albania. The area she is from is a traditional area in the north of the country. She has 2 children who are dependents on this claim, AV2 (aged 13) and AV3 (aged 9)
4. AV1’s father died when she was only 5 months old. She is an only child. After her father died she lived with her mother and her paternal grandparents and paternal uncle, ‘U’.
5. When AV1 was 18 months old her mother remarried. A was left with her grandparents and U who brought her up. She has not had any contact with her mother since then. She lived with her grandparents and U until she was 18. She left school at 14 and has no formal qualifications. She lived at home and helped with the housework.
6. In December 2007 she met her future husband (‘H’). He was about 10 years older than A and lived in Italy. His family were also from Diber. His aunt was a neighbour to A’s uncle. H had also grown up without a mother, and AV1 believed they shared that in common. H had a brother (‘B’).
7. H asked U to marry AV1 in 2009 when she was 16 years old. They became engaged in December 2009. AV1 accepted the proposal as she wanted her own family and believed she would have a good life with H.
8. They married in May 2011 after AV1 turned 18. She remained living with her family, but would visit H’s family where she was expected to help with chores. She was treated like a servant. AV1 put up with everything as she believed her future was with H in Italy. H had lived in Italy for a long time, after they married he applied for A to join him there.
9. On 14 August 2011 they had a traditional wedding party. On 2 September 2011 she joined H in Italy. She was allowed to stay there for 3 months without a visa. In November 2011 her visa was approved. She returned to Albania to collect it from the Italian embassy. She returned to Italy 2 weeks later to start to build a life with H in Italy. They had 2 children, AV2 born in November 2012 and AV3 born in August 2016.
10. B moved to Italy shortly after AV2 turned 1 in 2013. He later married and lived with his wife close to AV1, H and the children. H worked in construction, AV1 looked after the children.
11. When AV1 was pregnant with AV3, she discovered that H was seeing another woman and having an affair. She noticed a change in his behaviour. She found messages that he had exchanged with the other woman. H was violent towards her in this period despite her being pregnant. He pushed AV1 to have an abortion.
12. H had a house in Kavaje, which he had built. It was next door to his father. In November 2016, when AV3 was about 3 or 4 months old, H took AV1 and the children to the house in Albania. She stayed there supported financially by H. H remained in Italy living with the other woman. H’s father blamed her for the separation. He gave her a lot of trouble and accused her of dividing the family.
13. After 6 months or so, in May 2017 H returned to collect them and they returned to Italy. They resumed living there, but H would live with the other woman. He continued being violent towards AV1 and ill-treated her.
14. H was diagnosed with leukaemia in January or February 2018 when AV3 was only 18 months old. He had to stop work. He was treated by chemotherapy. He received disability living allowance and borrowed some money. AV1 looked after him. H’s father also joined them to help them in the months running up to H’s death.
15. H died in February 2019. His father wanted him to be buried in Albania. They returned to Albania, and H was buried a week or so after he died in February 2019. After the funeral, H’s father said that if she did not re-marry then H’s house would pass to them, however if she did re-marry then he would take the children away as he did not want the children raised by someone else.
16. AV2 and AV3 were too young to understand what was happening. They stayed in Italy with AV1’s sister-in-law, B’s wife. AV1 then returned to Italy and her children a day after the funeral in February 2019. After returning to Italy, AV1 started working in a restaurant and caring for an old lady.
17. In August 2019 at the restaurant she met a man called T. He was a regular customer. They started talking, and AV1 began to get close with him. They had coffee several times. They became friends. He said he was from Durres and was divorced. They began dating in early 2020.
18. In January 2021 her children went to visit B and his family as normal. AV1s step-mother was also there. AV1’s in laws discovered about her relationship with T. They decided that they would not allow the children to go back home with AV1. B was in agreement with his parents. AV1 went to their house to collect the children but she was not allowed in. They said she would never get them back as they would not allow them to be raised by another man.
19. In February 2021 she went to Albania to try and speak with her father-in-law, he said that there was no way she would get the children back. Whilst in Albania she tried to find a lawyer who could help. She had an appointment with them but was told that as the children were Italian residents they could not help with an Italian case. She returned to Italy 3 days later.
20. When she returned to Italy AV1 then sought help from an Italian lawyer but could not afford the fees. She did not report her in-laws to the police as she was trying to sort the situation out legally. She hoped to get a court order that did not allow her in laws to take the children.
21. T said he would help get them back. They had been dating for about a year by this stage. T said AV1 should go and see one of his friends in Milan who had links with a lawyer there. She was desperate to get the children back and she agreed.
22. She went to Milan in March 2021 with T. They went to his friend’s house and she was told they would see the lawyer the following day. That night her drink was spiked, when she woke up T was nowhere to be seen. AV1 was told that she had been sold to the man and she was to work as a prostitute. She screamed and refused to do so. The men beat her, and she was threatened that if she did not agree her children’s lives would be at risk.
23. AV1 was sexually exploited, and made to work in different houses with different men during the day, and she worked at 3-4 nightclubs at night. She worked with 4 other girls, supervised by 4 men from the gang, known to her only as W, X, Y and Z. She was forced into this situation from March 2021 to August 2022. During this time she had no contact with her children.
24. AV1 believes the traffickers have strong links with officials in Albania as some of the other girls did not have documents in Italy so were taken back to Albania. She heard that they had Albanian police officers as clients there. She also believes that the Italian police allowed the gang to operate with impunity.
25. AV1 escaped in August 2022 when she was taken to the house of an older man. He had too much to drink and fell asleep. She took this opportunity to take money from his wallet and run away.
26. She called a friend of hers, F, who took her to his house. He helped her to call her elder son. She spoke to her son and told him she had had some difficulties but wanted to meet them. She also said that his grandfather would not let her see him and his brother. She told her older son to say that an old family friend, F, was going to take them to the cinema. She believes that her in-laws were not suspicious because they had not heard from her for a while. They let her sons leave the house.
27. When she met them she left Italy with them. They went to Paris. From there they went to Calais and came to the UK in a speedboat. Her passport was taken from her. When she was in France she spoke to her in-laws and said she had taken her children. Immigration officers met her in the UK and took her and the children to a hotel until she could claim asylum.
28. Since coming to the UK, AV1 has been diagnosed with PTSD, depression and anxiety. She has asked for an appointment with a psychologist. By the time she obtained an appointment when she lived in Exeter she had been moved to London. She continues to suffer from poor mental health, suffers flash backs, low mood, poor sleep and anxiety. She struggles at night and sometimes sleeps no more than an hour a night.
29. After arriving in the UK, T contacted her over social media and told her that he knew where she was. She blocked him immediately, and closed her account. She changed her phone handset and her telephone number. She reported this to Migrant Help who told her if it happened again she should contact the police.
30. AV1 states that she has no family who could support her. She has had no contact with her mother since she was very young. She has no contact with her paternal family. U still lives in Diber to the best of her knowledge, but he has discovered about her relationship with T and will not accept her back.
31. AV1 had a screening interview on 2 October 2022. Her substantive interview was carried out on 2 February 2024. Her claim was refused on 29 February 2024. The respondent accepted that she had been trafficked for the purposes of commercial sexual exploitation. She did not accept that the appellant’s in-laws had kidnapped and held her children in her late husband’s house in Italy. In any event, she considered that the applicant was not at risk of re-trafficking, and that she might avail herself of domestic protection or internal relocation within Albania. She did not accept, therefore, that the appellant’s removal would be in breach of the Refugee Convention. Nor did she accept that the appellant’s removal would be contrary to the ECHR.
32. On 19 December 2025, it was accepted by the respondent on conclusive grounds that AV1 is a victim of trafficking.
Proceedings on Appeal
33. The appeal was heard by the FtT on 7 January 2025. The appellants were represented by Mr Wilding, as they before me. The respondent was represented by a Presenting Officer. The judge heard oral evidence from AV1 and submissions from both advocates before reserving her decision.
34. In her reserved decision, the judge accepted the entirety of the narrative I have set out above. She did not agree with the respondent that the applicant should have claimed asylum in France, and she did not consider there to be any difficulty in the account that the children had been kidnapped by the parents of her late husband: [14]-[15]. The judge did not accept that those who had trafficked the appellant within Italy would have sufficient resources or interest to trace her in Albania: [16]. She considered that the shelter accommodation and other provision which was made for victims of trafficking in Albania would be available to the appellants: [17]. The judge considered that recent improvements in policing in Albania would provide the appellants with a sufficiency of state protection: [18]. She therefore dismissed the appeal on asylum grounds.
35. At [20]-[22] of her decision, however, the judge explained why she had decided to allow the appeals on human rights grounds. She did so because she considered that there would be very significant obstacles to AV1’s reintegration to Albania. She founded that conclusion on the following factors:
(a) The 1st Appellant married very shortly after her 18th birthday; she has never lived independently in Albania;
(b) The 1st Appellant moved to Italy in 2011; Albania has not been her home for the last 13 years;
(c) The 1st Appellant is an acknowledged victim of trafficking, meaning that she is a vulnerable person who will mistrust and be fearful of others;
(d) The 1st Appellant suffers from Post Traumatic Stress disorder, which manifests itself in low moods, poor sleep, anxiety and flashbacks, all of which are likely to reduce the 1st Appellant’s resilience and make it more difficult for her to reintegrate in Albania;
(e) The 1st Appellant is a widow;
(f) The 1st Appellant’s extended family has broken off contact with her because she formed a relationship with a man after her husband’s death and thus she would be without family support on return;
(g) The 2nd and 3rd Appellants were born in Italy, have no experience of living in Albania and are accustomed to speaking with their peers in either Italian or English, so that the 1st Appellant would have the additional responsibility of supporting them in what would, for them, be a strange place.
36. Having so concluded in respect of the first appellant, the judge allowed the appeals of AV2 and AV3 because she concluded that their removal would be disproportionate to the legitimate aim of maintaining immigration control.
37. Both parties appealed to the Upper Tribunal and, as I have already recorded, both appeals were allowed. Judge Keith was careful to preserve that which had not been challenged, however. He specifically preserved the finding that the appellant’s credibility had not been damaged by her failure to claim asylum in France, and the finding that her children had been kidnapped by her parents-in-law. He also preserved the findings of fact which the judge had made at [22](a)-(g), which I have set out in full above.
The Resumed Hearing
38. I asked Mr Wilding and Mr Sheikh what papers I should have before me. There was Mr Wilding’s skeleton argument of 9 January 2026, the bundle which had been prepared for the hearing in front of Judge Keith (1623 pages), the bundle for the resumed hearing (73 pages), and the decision of Judge Keith. Mr Sheikh indicated that he would also be referring to the respondent’s Country Policy and Information Note (“CPIN”) on Mental Healthcare in Albania, version 3.0 (January 2025).
39. Mr Sheikh was content that the appellant should be treated as a vulnerable witness as a result of her mental health conditions and her accepted background. Mr Wilding sought no specific reasonable adjustments. Mr Sheikh helpfully indicated that he only had a few questions for the appellant.
40. Without objection from Mr Sheikh, I indicated to Mr Wilding that I was content to accede to his submission that the names of all dramatis personae in the claim should be anonymised so as to reduce the risk of “jigsaw” identification of the appellants. I have therefore used the abbreviations he used in his skeleton argument.
41. I heard brief evidence from the first appellant. She adopted the two statements she has made in connection with the proceedings and was cross-examined by Mr Sheikh before being re-examined by Mr Wilding. I also asked three clarificatory questions.
Submissions
42. I heard detailed and well-considered submissions from both advocates, who both made extensive reference to the documentary evidence and the background material in particular. Shorn of those references in the interests of brevity, the essence of the submissions was as follows.
43. Mr Sheikh submitted that the appellant would not be at risk in Albania. Her trafficking had taken place in Italy and there was insufficient evidence to show that the gang was active in Albania. Applying the list of factors in TD & AD (trafficked women) Albania CG [2016] UKUT 92 (IAC), the appellant would not be at risk of re-trafficking. There was potentially some family support available from her mother or her paternal uncle or the wider paternal side of the family. There was a sufficiency of protection in Albania. The shelters provided safety and support, including vocational training and healthcare for physical and mental health problems. The support described in the July 2024 Human Trafficking CPIN was to be considered alongside the January 2025 Mental Healthcare CPIN. Taken together, it was clear that there would be adequate safety and support for a family in the appellants’ position. There was no reason to think that the appellant’s return would be contrary to the UK’s obligations under the Refugee Convention, and there was no proper basis to conclude that there would be very significant obstacles to the first appellant’s reintegration. Her appeal fell to be dismissed on all grounds.
44. Mr Wilding relied on his detailed skeleton argument and submitted as follows. Judge Sullivan had appreciated the appellant’s apparent vulnerability and those findings had been preserved. It was clear when the evidence was taken as a whole that the appellant’s traffickers were part of a sizeable operation which operated in Italy and Albania and that they had links to the Albanian authorities. The background evidence showed that Organised Crime Groups (“OCGs”) had successfully infiltrated law enforcement agencies in Albania. That was particularly so in respect of frontline police officers. It was also to be recalled that H had contacted the appellant whilst she was in the UK, so there was evidently an extant interest in her. Mr Wilding submitted that the shelters were not a panacea for a person at risk from traffickers. Even if they protected an individual temporarily, it was difficult to find a place for more than year and the appropriate focus was on life outside the shelter. Once outside the shelter, the risk to the appellant would subsist, and she would in any event be at risk of trafficking by other groups as a result of her multi-faceted vulnerability and lack of support. Whether or not her removal would be in breach of the Refugee Convention, the appellant would experience very significant obstacles to integration on return to Albania.
45. I reserved my decision at the end of the submissions. I am grateful to Mr Sheikh and Mr Wilding for their comprehensive submissions.
Analysis
46. Although I was referred extensively to the current background material, neither advocate suggested that there were strong grounds supported by cogent evidence to depart from the extant country guidance in TD & AD. That guidance updated that which was given in AM & BM (trafficked women) Albania CG [2010] UKUT 80. The updated guidance is as follows:
(a) It is not possible to set out a typical profile of trafficked women from Albania: trafficked women come from all areas of the country and from varied social backgrounds.
(b) Much of Albanian society is governed by a strict code of honour which not only means that trafficked women would have very considerable difficulty in reintegrating into their home areas on return but also will affect their ability to relocate internally. Those who have children outside marriage are particularly vulnerable. In extreme cases the close relatives of the trafficked woman may refuse to have the trafficked woman's child return with her and could force her to abandon the child.
(c) Some women are lured to leave Albania with false promises of relationships or work. Others may seek out traffickers in order to facilitate their departure from Albania and their establishment in prostitution abroad. Although such women cannot be said to have left Albania against their will, where they have fallen under the control of traffickers for the purpose of exploitation there is likely to be considerable violence within the relationships and a lack of freedom: such women are victims of trafficking.
(d) In the past few years the Albanian government has made significant efforts to improve its response to trafficking. This includes widening the scope of legislation, publishing the Standard Operating Procedures, implementing an effective National Referral Mechanism, appointing a new Anti-trafficking Co-ordinator, and providing training to law enforcement officials. There is in general a Horvath-standard sufficiency of protection, but it will not be effective in every case. When considering whether or not there is a sufficiency of protection for a victim of trafficking her particular circumstances must be considered.
(e) There is now in place a reception and reintegration programme for victims of trafficking. Returning victims of trafficking are able to stay in a shelter on arrival, and in 'heavy cases' may be able to stay there for up to 2 years. During this initial period after return victims of trafficking are supported and protected. Unless the individual has particular vulnerabilities such as physical or mental health issues, this option cannot generally be said to be unreasonable; whether it is must be determined on a case by case basis.
(f) Once asked to leave the shelter a victim of trafficking can live on her own. In doing so she will face significant challenges including, but not limited to, stigma, isolation, financial hardship and uncertainty, a sense of physical insecurity and the subjective fear of being found either by their families or former traffickers. Some women will have the capacity to negotiate these challenges without undue hardship. There will however be victims of trafficking with characteristics, such as mental illness or psychological scarring, for whom living alone in these circumstances would not be reasonable. Whether a particular appellant falls into that category will call for a careful assessment of all the circumstances.
(g) Re-trafficking is a reality. Whether that risk exists for an individual claimant will turn in part on the factors that led to the initial trafficking, and on her personal circumstances, including her background, age, and her willingness and ability to seek help from the authorities. For a proportion of victims of trafficking, their situations may mean that they are especially vulnerable to re-trafficking, or being forced into other exploitative situations.
(h) Trafficked women from Albania may well be members of a particular social group on that account alone. Whether they are at risk of persecution on account of such membership and whether they will be able to access sufficiency of protection from the authorities will depend upon their individual circumstances including but not limited to the following:
1) The social status and economic standing of her family
2) The level of education of the victim of trafficking or her family
3) The victim of trafficking's state of health, particularly her mental health
4) The presence of an illegitimate child
5) The area of origin
6) Age
7) What support network will be available
47. Before I come to that list, I will give some thought to the risk which might present itself to the appellant from her original traffickers. Mr Sheikh submitted that the appellant would not be at risk from her traffickers on return to Albania. That submission was based on the fact that the horrific events endured by the appellant took place entirely in Italy.
48. As Mr Wilding submitted, however, the evidence shows that the traffickers were also operating in Albania. Like the judge in the First-tier Tribunal, I found the appellant to be a straightforward witness who sought to answer questions truthfully. Her evidence in the First-tier Tribunal was not considered to be inconsistent or problematic in any respect and I reached the same conclusion. I consider her to have told the truth. What she said about the men who had exploited her in Italy was that she was working as a prostitute with girls who had been brought to Italy from Albania by the gang. She said that they were exploited “over there and where we were”, by which she meant in Albania and in Italy. I accept Mr Wilding’s submission that the gang operated in both countries, moving women as they wished in order to expand their operation.
49. The appellant gave evidence that the gang had connections with law enforcement. She said that they had police officers within their client base. The appellant said that the gang would always threaten the girls and their children, and they said that they had “connections to the state authorities”. She has previously said the same thing, and I considered it likely that the gang had indeed said that to the appellant and their other victims. That might have been mere puff, said to scare the victims and prevent them from escaping. Or it might have been true. Given what is said in the background evidence about OCG’s successful infiltration of the Albanian police force, I consider it more likely than not that this particular gang, with its ability to traffic women from Albania to Italy for the purposes of sexual exploitation, does indeed have connections to the Albanian authorities.
50. It was also a part of the respondent’s case, from the refusal letter onwards, that the gang would have lost interest in the appellant. I agree with Mr Wilding’s submission, however, that the way in which the appellant was contacted by her trafficker after she had arrived in the UK suggests that there remains an interest in her. I see no reason why that interest would diminish over time. The appellant states that she had been “sold” to her traffickers. They therefore lost what they considered to be a chattel when she escaped, and there is every reason to think that they would like to regain the appellant and put her to work once again.
51. On return, the appellants would not be required to attempt to forge their own way in Tirana. It is clear from TD & AD, as it is from the background material to which I was carefully referred, that an accepted victim of trafficking such as the appellant would be placed in a shelter. Returnees are clearly triaged by way of a formal Needs Assessment so that they are offered an appropriate shelter. For a person such as the appellant, with mental health problems, dependent children, and an ongoing risk from her traffickers, the appropriate shelter is most likely to be the National Reception Centre for Victims of Trafficking, or “the Linza Centre” as it was called in TD & AD. That government-run shelter is constantly guarded and the Upper Tribunal noted at [95] of the country guidance decision that there was no evidence of women being abducted from shelters. At the end of that paragraph, it suggested that the evidence about re-trafficking “would appear to be confined to the risk once the VOT leaves the shelter.”
52. Mr Wilding originally suggested that the provision of a place of safety in the form of a state-run shelter was not relevant to the question of whether there is a sufficiency of state protection. That was only relevant, in his submission, to the question of internal relocation. On reflection, however, he was minded to accept that the provision of a shelter was probably relevant to both questions, and he therefore asked me to consider how long the appellant and her children would be supported and protected in a shelter such as the NCRVT.
53. Mr Wilding recalled that the country guidance suggested that “heavy cases” might be able to stay in a shelter for two years but he asked me to consider what was said in the Human Trafficking CPIN, which was that it was difficult to find a place in a shelter for a year. That was no doubt as a result of the funding constraints described in the same section of the same report. Considering the up-to date material against the rather tentative way in which Judges Dawson and Bruce expressed their conclusion about the likely length of stay in a shelter, I consider it likely that the appellants would be safe and supported within the Linza shelter for rather less than a year upon return, after which they would be required to establish themselves, with limited ongoing assistance from the Albanian authorities.
54. I have explained above why I consider that the appellant would still be of interest to her traffickers in Albania. I have also explained why I consider the respondent to be wrong in her submission that their operation is confined to Italy. But what is the likelihood that the traffickers would learn of the appellant’s return to Albania? Even if they have infiltrated law enforcement, it seems unlikely that they would learn of her location through the civil registration system, for the reasons given in another country guidance decision: BF (Tirana – gay men) Albania [2019] UKUT 93 (IAC).
55. But there is a quirk of Albanian society which must be recalled in this connection; relocation to another part of the country brings no guarantee of anonymity or a fresh start. As was explained at [165] of AM & BM:
Albania is a country with a small population (approximately three and a half million), that it is a society where there would be an attempt by those with whom the victims came into contact, either officially, starting with the border police or when they attempted to find work or merely acquaintances whom they would meet, to place them within their family context and to endeavour to find mutual acquaintances.
56. To similar effect was the evidence given in BF (Albania), summarised at [181] of that decision: “a person’s whereabouts may become known in Tirana by word of mouth”.
57. On trying to establish herself outside a shelter, after a year or so of being “cocooned”, as Mr Wilding put it, the first appellant would be required to engage with other people who would be interested to know where she was from, and to find mutual acquaintances. As a family unit, the appellants would stand out. The first appellant has not lived in Albania for years and will not be familiar with its social mores. The appellants’ sons have no familiarity with Albania and they end to speak Italian or English. It struck me that people in a new area would be particularly interested to learn about the appellants’ background. On asking those questions, they would learn that the first appellant was originally from Diber, which is also the home area of her late husband. In my judgment, there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that word would reach her traffickers by this route that she had returned to Albania, whereupon she would be at risk of re-trafficking or reprisal from that OCG. I accept Mr Wilding’s submission that the appellant’s fear of the original group is real, and that it will have an impact on her ability to participate in everyday life in Albania.
58. As Mr Wilding made clear, however, the risk to the appellant outside the shelters is not merely from the same OCG that trafficked her in the past; it is also from other such groups who continue to prey on vulnerable women inside and outside Albania. It was as part of that trade that the appellant was originally enslaved when she was at her lowest ebb, following the abduction of her children. The risk is to those in such positions of isolation and vulnerability, and the helpful list of factors in TD & AD serves to focus the mind on the extent of that vulnerability, so as to assess the risk of re-trafficking on return.
59. I consider the list of factors from TD & AD with paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules in mind, which provides:
The fact that a person has already been subject to persecution or serious harm, or to direct threats of such persecution or such harm, will be regarded as a serious indication of the person’s well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of suffering serious harm, unless there are good reasons to consider that such persecution or serious harm will not be repeated.
The Social and Economic Standing of the Family
60. At [19] of the reasons for refusal letter, the respondent noted that the appellant had work experience as a cleaner, home carer and working in a restaurant. Her late husband worked in the construction industry. Those vocations reflect the social and economic standing of her modest upbringing.
The Level of Education of the Victim and Her Family
61. The appellant was educated to secondary school level. She completed only eight years of education, which she discontinued when she was fourteen. She has no formal qualifications and she has never worked in Albania.
The VOT’s State of Health, Particularly Her Mental Health
62. The appellant has suffered extraordinary hardship in her 32 years. She was effectively abandoned by her mother, raised by relatives, widowed at a young age, lost her children to her in-laws, before being captured by traffickers and subjected to more than a year of forced prostitution. On managing to escape her captors, she and her children fled across Europe to the “Jungle” before being brought to the UK unlawfully by a group of Kurdish people-smugglers.
63. It is rather unsurprising, in the circumstances, that she has been suffering from documented mental health problems since before her substantive asylum interview. Her GP records were included in the bundle before the FtT and show that she was accepted to be suffering from depression, anxiety and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in 2023. By August 2023, the appellant was pressing her GP for therapy, having discovered that the medication on which she had been started (mirtazapine and promethazine) was making her vomit. Her medication was adjusted and she was seen by the primary mental health team in March 2024.
64. The more recent medical evidence in the additional bundle for this hearing shows that the appellant has continued to suffer from poor mental health despite the best endeavours of the NHS trust in East London, with whom she has now had eight sessions of therapy. She has a repeat prescription for Quetiapine and Sertraline but she states in her most recent statement that she is “desperately scared” of returning to Albania for the reasons I have considered above. The appellant came across as timid, cowed and submissive in the hearing. Her mental health is in a poor state despite the fact that she has now been in a safe country for three and a half years. That seems unlikely to improve if she remains in the United Kingdom. Given her legitimate fear of returning to Albania, I accept Mr Wilding’s submission that her mental health is likely to worsen in the event of a forcible return to Albania.
65. Mr Sheikh quite properly took me to the background material about the availability of mental healthcare in Albania, and I accept that the first appellant would be likely to receive mental health care in the Linza Shelter. I also accept that treatment for PTSD, depression and anxiety is available in Tirana outside the shelters. Given the limited success brought about by the appellant’s treatment in the UK, however, and given her fear of returning to Albania and the stigma around victims of trafficking and those with mental health problems, I very much doubt that this particular aspect of her vulnerability could be addressed in Albania to the point that she was able to provide for herself and her children.
The Presence of an Illegitimate Child
66. The second and third appellants are not illegitimate but their father has passed away and the appellant is genuinely in fear of their being abducted once more by her in-laws. That fear, and the fact that they have no real experience of living in Albania, would serve to heighten the first appellant’s vulnerability on return.
The Area of Origin
67. The first appellant is from Diber in Northern Albania. She has no experience of living in another part of Albania, and certainly no experience of living in Tirana. She would be in fear of returning to Diber because of the risk to her sons and she would be in fear of others learning of her origin for the same reason.
Age
68. The first appellant is thirty-two years old, and is still vulnerable to traffickers at such an age. Her children are thirteen and nine, wholly dependent upon her and unable to offer her any protection.
Support Network
69. This was the subject on which Mr Sheikh understandably focused his cross-examination. Whilst I was grateful that the evidence had been tested, I did not consider the exercise to have borne any real fruit. It was suggested to the appellant that she might turn to her mother for some assistance but she was astonished by that suggestion, reminding Mr Sheikh that her mother had walked out when she was a baby. I did not consider it remotely realistic to suggest that the appellant’s mother might be a source of support.
70. Mr Sheikh then submitted that the appellant could turn to her paternal uncle or to the paternal side of the family more widely. As Mr Wilding submitted, however, that submission overlooks the appellant’s evidence, which was accepted in the FtT, that she had been shunned by her uncle after striking up a relationship with T. That is unsurprising, given that the family is from the conservative north of Albania, and there is no reason to think that the appellant and her children would receive any support from her uncle or from the paternal side of the family. There is, in my judgment, no reason to go behind the preserved finding that the appellants would have no family support on return to Albania.
Conclusions – TD & AD risk factors
71. Drawing those threads together, I accept Mr Wilding’s oral submission that the appellants would be “incredibly vulnerable and isolated” on return. They would be assisted for a short period in the Linza shelter but would then be required to make their own way in Albania.
72. As was noted in TD & AD, at [105], the support available to a victim of trafficking is limited in terms of time and cost. Once a total of £2100 has been spent on support inside and outside the shelter, the victim must return to their family or set out on their own. It is only the latter option which is available to these appellants, and I do not accept that they would be safe once they had left the shelter. The first appellant and her children would be obviously different from other members of the population for the reasons I have given. She would be at risk from her original traffickers once her location was publicised in the way I have described above with reference to AM & BM and BF (Albania). More importantly, however, she would be at risk, and obviously so, from other traffickers as a result of her multi-faceted vulnerability. She would be unable, as a result of her genuinely held subjective fear and her recognised mental health problems, to navigate the challenges described at [109] of TD & AD. Whether in Tirana or elsewhere, that risk would be such that the appellant would be unable to access a sufficiency of protection from the Albanian authorities.
73. In the circumstances, having applied the country guidance to the particular facts of this appellant’s case, I find that she would be at risk in Albania and that she would be unable to receive a sufficiency of protection from the authorities. There is, in sum, no good reason to conclude that the persecution suffered by the appellant in the past will not happen again. The appeal is therefore allowed on asylum grounds. For the same reasons, I conclude that the appellant would experience very significant obstacles to her integration to Albania, and her appeal is also allowed on human rights grounds.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal having been set aside, I remake the decisions on the appeals by allowing them on asylum and human rights grounds.

Mark Blundell

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

23 February 2026