Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case Nos: UI-2025-001061
UI-2025-001063
UI-2025-001062

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/02514/2024
PA/02516/2024
PA/02515/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 13th of May 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LOUGHRAN
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LAWRENCE

Between

AA
BO
TO
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellants
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellants: Ms B Efurhievwe, Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr S Walker, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 1 May 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellants are granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellants.
Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals with permission of First-tier Tribunal Judge D Hollings-Tennant against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Loughridge (‘the judge’) dated 15 January 2025.
Background
2. The appellant arrived in the UK on 24 March 2022 and claimed asylum on 12 December 2023. The appellant’s two children were dependent on her claim. TO, the appellant’s daughter, was born in 2018 and BO, the appellant’s son, was born in 2014.
3. The appellant asserts that she would be at risk on return from her late husband’s family due to being a widow and therefore being expected to marry her late husband’s brother in order to remain within the family. She also asserts that her daughter is at risk of FGM from her late husband’s family. The appellant states that she does not wish to marry her brother-in-law and that she has received threats from her family because of her defiance. She says that the family believe in traditional customs and that there have been difficulties ever since her daughter was born because she and her late husband refused to allow them to carry out FGM on their daughter. She says that her late husband always protected her and their daughter and that because his protection is no longer available both she and her daughter are at risk. The appellant also asserts a right to remain on Article 8 ECHR grounds on the basis of her and her children’s family and private life.
4. In a decision dated 23 May 2024 the respondent refused the appellant’s protection and human rights claim.
The appeal before the First-tier Tribunal
5. The appellant appealed against the refusal of her protection and human rights claim. Prior to the hearing the appellant provided an appeal skeleton argument which identified the issues the appellant considered the judge was required to determine.
6. The respondent did not provide a review of the appellant’s case, which would have addressed those issues because she did not receive the appellant’s skeleton argument in time.
7. The appeal came before the judge on 6 December 2024. The appellant was represented by Ms Efurhievwe of Counsel, and the respondent was represented by Ms Quartey, a Home Office Presenting Officer. The judge agreed to treat the appellant as a vulnerable witness.
8. The judge recorded the following as the agreed issues to be determined:
(a) whether the appellant is at risk on return from her late husband’s family because of her refusal to marry her brother-in-law; and
(b) whether the second appellant is at risk of FGM from the appellant’s late husband’s family;
(c) sufficiency of protection and internal relocation in respect of both issues; and
(d) Article 8 ECHR family and private life.
9. Notably the judge does not record that the matter of whether the appellant was a member of a particular social group was an issue she was required to determine. The appellant and her sister both gave evidence in English.
10. In a determination dated 10 December 2024 the judge allowed the appellant’s appeal. Having found the appellant and her sister to be entirely credible at [18] the judge went on to make the following findings of fact:
19. The Appellant and her late husband lived together in South Africa from 2011 onwards. Her late husband was already living there because of his work - he was an IT engineer and ran his own company. She moved there from Nigeria after they got engaged in 2011. They returned to Lagos in 2013 to get married. Their daughter was born the following year in South Africa - which was when problems began with her late husband's family by way of frequent phone calls from them demanding that they took their daughter back to Nigeria for FGM to be carried out. Initially her late husband did not tell her about these calls - but she had a direct conversation with her mother-in-law when their daughter was a few months old during which her mother-in-law shouted at her. Thereafter, the matter was frequently raised again by her mother-in-law with her late husband but she generally refused to speak to her mother-in-law directly.
20. In 2019 the Appellant's late husband travelled to Nigeria for business and took the opportunity to visit his family. He did not take the Appellant or their children because of the issue regarding FGM. Whilst he was away his younger brother - who also lived in South Africa and worked for his company - visited the Appellant with another man and attacked her. It was a violent and traumatic experience for the Appellant and only ended when a neighbour intervened. She has never fully recovered from the attack mentally. Her late husband confronted his mother about the attack but she denied any involvement. After the attack the Appellant had a security guard whenever she went out or was at home without her husband.
21. Thereafter, the Appellant never spoke again with her late husband's family and his contact with them reduced considerably. They visited Nigeria as a family for her father's burial in 2021 but did not inform her late husband's family and were there for only three days. Her mother had died when she was a child and she has no relatives in Nigeria.
22. In early 2022 the Appellant's late husband fell ill with motor neurone disease during a visit to her sisters here in the UK. His family believed that this was the Appellant's fault because he had turned his back on the traditional rituals of Nigeria. He did eventually agree to visit his family but they did not look after him particularly well and were angry that he had not taken the children with him. He died in the UK on 29 October 2023 and was buried here on 22 December 2023.
23. After the funeral the Appellant received a call from her brother-in-law. She confirmed that the burial had been completed. She also received several voicemail messages from him at that time. He asked when would she be going to Nigeria with the children to marry him - which is the expectation of her late husband’s family in accordance with Nigerian traditions. She did not specifically respond.
24. The issue of the Appellant going to Nigeria with her children resurfaced in late March 2024. Her brother-in-law called and left a voicemail message (page 70/146). She sent a text message in response (also page 70/146) in which she made it clear that she had no intention of going to Nigeria and asking to be left in peace. Her brother-in-law left another voicemail message on 13 April 2024 (page 71/146) containing abuse and threats. He called again on several occasions (pages 72/146 and 73/146) but she did not answer and then she blocked the number on 7 May 2024.
10. The judge found that the appellant could not access sufficiency of protection stating:
“29. With regard to sufficiency of protection, whilst the expert report by Ms Wilmot dated 24 July 2023 does not specifically address the individual circumstances of the Appellant it paints a bleak picture for victims of domestic violence and FGM obtaining protection from law enforcement agencies: “It is my assessment that Nigeria's law enforcement agencies are ill-equipped to handle cases involving family members, and at risk individuals have good reason to believe they will not be protected anywhere in the country. My data shows that in cases involving family members, intimate partners, or communities, police reject the majority of reports, recommending the matter be handled within the community, often with dire or even deadly consequences for women and children”. Ms Wilmot’s credentials are such that I place significant weight on her evidence and conclude that the Appellant and her daughter would not be able to avail themselves of protection against her late husband's family. This conclusion is very much in keeping with the objective evidence also relied upon by the Appellant.”
11. The judge found that would be unduly harsh for the appellant to internally relocate stating:
“30. Turning to internal relocation, whilst the Appellant and her children would theoretically have options in Nigeria other than her late husband's family - I find those options to be unduly harsh. The Appellant has no relatives or friends in Nigeria and would therefore be seeking to establish herself without any practical or emotional support and as a single mother with two relatively young children. She is likely to struggle to find accommodation and employment. The refusal letter - which is remarkably brief on all aspects of the claim - does not even appear to specifically consider this issue, let alone cite evidence supportive of internal relocation being realistic.”
12. Finally the judge summarised the answers to be considered under Section 32 of NABA at [31]:
“(a) the Appellant and her daughter both have characteristics which could cause them to fear persecution for reasons of membership of a particular social group – in the case of the Appellant a widow and in the case of her daughter a young female
(b) the Appellant and her daughter do in fact fear such persecution in Nigeria as a result of that characteristic.
(c) the Appellant and her daughter would be persecuted for a Convention reason on return
(d) there would be insufficient protection; and
(e) it would be unduly harsh for them to internally relocate.”
13. The judge also considered that the appellant’s daughter risk of FGM was a very significant obstacle to reintegration and the factors in favour of the appellant outweighed the public interest in removal and accordingly allowed the appeal under Article 8 ECHR.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
14. The respondent sought permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal on grounds, which can be summarised as follows:
Ground 1: Failing to take into account and/or resolve conflicts of fact or opinion on material matters.
The respondent submitted that the judge materially erred in law by failing to resolve a finding with regard to the third appellant’s protection claim. It was submitted that the third appellant was entitled to a finding on his own Convention reasons and the absence of such a finding was a material error of law.
Ground 2: Making a material misdirection of law on any material matter.
a. The respondent submitted that the judge materially erred by finding that the appellant is a member of a particular social group due to being a widow in Nigeria.
b. The respondent submitted that the judge failed to properly consider internal relocation and give adequate reasons why it would be unduly harsh for the appellant. In particular, it was submitted that the judge did not explain why the appellant could not find employment or accommodation and failed to explain why the appellant’s daughter would be at risk elsewhere in Nigeria.
15. The First-tier Tribunal granted permission on ground 2 only on 24 February 2025 stating:
“2. Ground [1] asserts the Judge erred in law by failing to make an explicit finding regarding the third Appellant’s protection claim. However, I do not consider this to amount to a material error. The third Appellant is a child who is dependent on his mother, the first Appellant, and would therefore fall to be granted leave to remain in line, as the Judge alludes to at paragraph [32]. It seems to me the third Appellant is unlikely to be concerned there was no specific finding on whether he falls within the Refugee Convention in his own right if he is granted leave in line. 3. Ground [2] argues that the Judge erred in finding the first Appellant falls within the definition of ‘particular social group’ because there was a failure to correctly apply section 33(4) of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. It is also argued the Judge failed to give adequate reasons for findings in respect of internal relocation. There is more merit in these assertions. The Judge does not appear to apply section 33(4) or make specific findings on that issue with reference to relevant country background information. Further, whilst the Judge refers to relevant factors in considering internal relocation, it is arguable there were inadequate reasons given the points highlighted in paragraphs 2(g) and (h) of the grounds.”
16. The respondent did not provide a response under Rule 24 of the Upper Tribunal Procedure Rules.
The Hearing and Discussion
17. At the hearing before us Mr Walker represented the Home Office and Ms Efurhievwe represented the appellant. We clarified that although permission had only been granted on ground 2 there were two issues for us to determine:
(1) whether the judge materially erred by finding that the appellant was a member of a particular social group;
(2) whether the judge gave inadequate reasons for his finding that it would be unduly harsh for the appellant to internally relocate.
2. Permission was not granted in favour of ground 1 and the parties agreed that it was therefore not necessary for us to determine.

Particular Social Group
3. At the outset of the hearing we indicated our concern that whether the appellant formed a member of a particular social group did not appear to be identified as an issue for the judge to determine. In the respondent’s refusal letter under the heading ‘Convention reasons that apply to your asylum claim – Section 33 of the Nationality and Borders Act’, the box Member of a Particular Social Group is ticked and Non-convention reason box is also ticked. It then states:
“Women who fear FGM form a particular social group as found in Country Policy and Information Note Nigeria: Female genital mutilation (FGM) July 2022 paragraph 2.3.1. You also fear being married back into your husband’s family, which would fall under a non-convention reason.”
4. We note that the Country Policy and Information Note, referred to in the respondent’s decision actually states the following at 2.3.1:
“Women and girls, including those in fear of FGM, form a particular social group (PSG) in Nigeria within the meaning of the Refugee Convention because they share an innate characteristic or a common background that cannot be changed, or share a characteristic or belief that is so fundamental to identity or conscience that a person should not be forced to renounce it and have a distinct identity in Nigeria because the group is perceived as being different by the surrounding society.”
5. Mr Walker rightly conceded that whether the appellant was a member of a particular social group was not in issue before the judge. The Practice Direction of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal states:
“1.1 A thread that runs through the entirety of the appeals process in the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal (the ‘Tribunal’) is the requirement that the parties identify, articulate, agree and then focus upon the principal controversial issues, or the disputed issues, thereby adopting an issues-based approach to the appeal.
[…]
1.3 The disputed issues represent the parameters, or scope, of the appeal and will operate as the foundation and structure for all judicial decisions. Subject to ‘Robinson obvious’ matters and the need for extra care when litigants in person are involved, judges should not be expected to infer issues which have not been clearly identified and articulated by the parties. The Tribunal will not tolerate a rolling consideration of issues and will not permit the issues to evolve at will for procedural advantage.”
6. The respondent was represented at the hearing before the judge and agreed to the issues in dispute. The respondent did not raise the issue of whether the appellant was a member of a particular social group and did not direct the judge to consider it. Accordingly we are satisfied that the respondent cannot raise it as an issue now and/or claim that the manner in which the judge addressed it was unlawful.
7. We note that the judge’s only consideration or reference to the issue of particular social group appears in their summary of the answers to the five questions required to be considered under Section 32 of NABA. We are satisfied that this indicates that the judge did not consider that it was in dispute and an issue for them to determine.
8. In any event, even if the judge did err in identifying the appellant’s particular social group as that of a widow we are satisfied that it is not material. It is clear from both the respondent’s refusal letter and her CPIN that the respondent accepts that the appellant is a member of a particular social group, i.e. women who fear FGM and/or women and girls in Nigeria. Accordingly we are satisfied that the judge did not materially err in law in her consideration of whether the appellant was a member of a particular social group.
Internal Relocation
9. Mr Walker stated that it was unfortunate that some of the evidence before the judge was not expressly covered in the judge’s decision, but that when he had reviewed that evidence it was difficult to see force in the respondent’s submission that the judge had erred by failing to give adequate reasons.
10. We are satisfied that the judge gave adequate reasons as to why he considered it would be unduly harsh for the appellant and her two children to internally relocate.
11. We note the Practice Direction from the Senior President of Tribunals: Reasons for decisions dated 4 June 2024 encourages “concise reasons” and notes that adequate reasons “may often be short”.
12. We are satisfied that in assessing whether or not it would be unduly harsh for the appellant to relocate the judge considered the appellant’s background, personal circumstances and the lack of support network available to her. The judge noted that the appellant did not have any friends or relatives and would therefore be seeking to establish herself without any practical or emotional support and as a mother with relatively young children.
13. The appellant gave detailed reasons in her witness statement as to why she would not be able to find employment and we note that the judge found her to be entirely credible.
14. We are satisfied that the judge’s reasons as to why it would be unduly harsh for the appellant to relocate are adequate, clear and appropriately concise. It is clear to the parties why the judge came to his conclusion.
Notice of Decision
15. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error on a point of law.
16. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal allowing the appellants appeal shall stand.

G. Loughran
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

7 May 2025