Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001066

First-tier Tribunal No: EU/52065/2024
LE/04436/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 10 November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE OWENS

Between

OHENEBA BOAKYE
(No ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Appeared in person with his father
For the Respondent: Ms Lecointe, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 24 September 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals with permission against a decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 6 December 2024 dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s decision dated 23 February 2024 refusing his application as a joining family member of Cleo Duncan-Williams under the EU settlement scheme.

2. The appellant is a 23 year old citizen of Ghana. He entered the UK as a visitor following a grant of leave to enter issued on 13 July 2023. On 12 January 2024 he applied under the EU settlement scheme as a “joining member of a relevant sponsor”.

3. His father married a Dutch national, Cleo Duncan-Williams on 18 November 2018 in Ghana and was subsequently granted an EEA residence permit. He was then granted pre-settled status on 28 February 2024 on the basis that he had retained rights of residence because of the marriage. The couple divorced on 4 February 2022.

4. The appellant’s application was refused because the respondent decided that the appellant had not provided any evidence that he was in a relationship with a “relevant sponsor” because he was not the child of the spouse of the relevant sponsor. This was because the appellant’s father was no longer married to Cleo Duncan-Williams, a Dutch national at the date of the application. The decree absolute is dated 4 February 2022 which was actually prior to the appellant’s entry to the UK.

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal

5. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is very brief. The appellant attended the hearing. He was represented by counsel and the Secretary of State also attended. The judge noted that the only issue was whether the appellant was entitled to pre-settled status under Appendix EU. The judge found that the appellant’s father had provided a decree absolute which confirms that his father’s marriage had ended and that his father had not provided evidence that he had retained rights of residence. The judge concluded that the appellant failed to demonstrate that he was a dependent relative of a relevant EEA citizen and does not meet the requirements of EU14A of the immigration rules. The appeal was dismissed.

The grounds of appeal

(1) The judge ignored evidence including the decree absolute and confirmation of the father’s pre-settled status under the EU settlement scheme.

The appellant’s father provided evidence that he had pre-settled status in the form of his biometric residence card and letter informing him that he had been granted status and the judge failed to engage with this evidence. The judge erred when he said that there was no evidence of his father’s status. The judge failed to exercise anxious scrutiny.

6. Permission to appeal was granted 4 April 2024 on the following basis:

“1. It is arguable that as set out in the grounds of appeal the judge did indeed fail to engage with the evidence that the appellant’s father had retained rights of residence.

2. However, it is not clear to me, given the appellant’s father is not an EEA citizen, how the appellant’s father’s possession of retained rights of residence assists the appellant. The appellant’s skeleton argument before the First-Tier Tribunal asserted that the refusal would result in the interference with the appellant’s father’s enjoyment of his rights under the Withdrawal Agreement. It is again not clear how either this is more than an argument under Article 8 ECHR (for which “new matter” the respondent refused consent), or is itself a ”new matter”.

3. Nevertheless, given the judge did not consider the argument that the appellant could succeed if his father did have retained rights of residence, I grant permission, reminding the appellant that of course he will have to show that the alleged error by the judge was a material one and I am directing that he explain this by way of skeleton argument at an early stage.”

7. From the wording of the grant, I infer that the judge granting permission doubted whether there was merit in the grounds and also believed that even if the judge had overlooked evidence this would not have changed the result of the appeal.

8. On 10 April 2025 the judge granting permission issued directions for the appellant to provide a skeleton argument explaining with reference to the “Withdrawal Agreement” how the alleged error by the judge was material.

9. There was no response to directions. On 15 September 2025, the appellant’s representatives emailed the Tribunal to state that they were no longer acting.

The hearing before the Upper Tribunal

10. The appellant appeared in person accompanied by his father. Ms Lecointe explained the basis of the refusal to the appellant. She explained that any rights that the appellant had under Appendix EU would be as a result as a relationship with an EEA national in this case his stepmother who was the Dutch national. Unfortunately because his father and step mother were divorced before he made the application, he no longer was a relative of an EEA national according to the definition in Appendix EU and therefore his application for pre-settled status could not succeed.

11. The appellant’s father explained that he wanted to bring his son to the UK earlier but there were financial constraints because of matters he was required to deal with in Ghana. He accepted that even by the time his son entered the UK that he was no longer married to the EEA national. I explained that in these circumstances the application could not succeed under Appendix EU even if the judge failed to acknowledge that the appellant’s father had pre-settled status. The appellant was not entitled to pre-settled status as the child of a person with pre-settled status. Unsurprisingly, the appellant and his father expressed their disappointment.

12. There was never any argument made before the First-tier Tribunal in the skeleton argument before the First-tier Tribunal that the appeal could succeed under the Withdrawal Agreement. There was no response to directions and I can find no obvious legal point which would assist the appellant in asserting that he has rights under the Withdrawal Agreement. In particular, by the date of the application the appellant was not dependent on the EEA national sponsor.

13. The appellant asked for the hearing at the Upper Tribunal to be adjourned so that he could instruct a lawyer to represent him. I considered the application. However I indicated that because there was no possibility of demonstrating that the judge had made a material error of law and that the decision was wrong, this would be a futile exercise, involving a waste of court time, not in the interests of good public administration and further a waste of money for the appellant and his father. I found for these reasons that it was both fair and in the interests of justice to refuse the application for an adjournment and I indicated this to the appellant.

14. I raise one further matter for the sake of completeness. In the appellant’s skeleton argument prepared by his representatives, it was asserted that the appellant has family life pursuant to Article 8 ECHR with his father because he has always been financially dependent on him and has close emotional ties to him. This was an argument which was not made in the original application. This meant that when the appellant sought to argue that the decision refusing his application would interfere with his human rights, this was a “new matter”. In the respondent’s review prior to the appeal, the respondent considered this issue. The respondent pointed out that the reference to Article 8 ECHR is a “new matter” and considered the issue in line with the guidance on “new matters” and consideration of human rights claims in Citizen’s rights appeals. The respondent clarified that the normal position was that where the respondent had not considered the “new matter” before the appeal hearing, a judge will not be able to consider the “new matter” unless the Secretary of State gives consent. In the review, the respondent made it very clear that the respondent did not give consent for the Tribunal to consider the “new matter”. There was therefore no error in the judge failing to consider whether the appellant has family life with his father. An application on the basis of an individual’s human rights needs to be made on a specific form. Any individual considering making an immigration application would no doubt benefit from receiving advice from a reputable and competent immigration advisor on the chances of success and merits of any such application before making it.

Notice of Decision

1. The appeal against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal is dismissed.

2. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing the appeal is upheld.

R J Owens

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

5 November 2025