Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001081

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/55502/2022; IA/05791/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 9th of December 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PINDER

Between

P Y T
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Briddock, Counsel instructed by Milestone Solicitors.
For the Respondent: Mr J Nappey, Senior Presenting Officer.

Heard at Field House on 6 August 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. This is the re-making of the decision in the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s refusal of her protection and human rights claims. This follows my and Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Graves’ earlier decision to set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the FtT’). The FtT decision dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on protection grounds and was set aside because this contained material errors of law. Judge Graves’ and my earlier decision (‘the error of law decision’) is appended to this decision as a separate annex.
2. Following a transfer order, I heard the re-making appeal on my own on 6th August 2025.
3. I have maintained the Anonymity Order in favour of the Appellant. I continue to consider that, on the specific facts of this appeal, the maintenance of the integrity of the United Kingdom’s immigration system and the Appellant having raised a claim to international protection are such that an Anonymity Order is a justified derogation from the principle of open justice.
4. As was recorded at para 41 of the error of law decision, the sole issue for me to determine is whether the Appellant has a viable internal relocation option in Kuala Lumpur. This is because the Respondent accepts (as she also did before the FtT) that, as a lesbian Buddhist woman of Chinese ethnicity, who lives her sexual orientation openly and would wish to do so on return, the Appellant would face persecution if she returned to her home area in Malaysia, a small town in Johor. The Respondent proposes instead that the Appellant return to Kuala Lumpur and internally relocate there.
The evidence
5. Prior to the hearing on 6th August 2025, both parties filed and served their respective skeleton arguments and a composite bundle of evidence of 725 pages. In addition to these documents, I also admitted into evidence the Respondent’s Country Policy and Information Note (‘CPIN’) on ‘Malaysia: Sexual orientation and gender identity or expression’, published in July 2024 and a schedule prepared by those representing the Appellant extracting relevant parts of the background evidence relied upon. I have given careful consideration to these written materials.
6. The Respondent’s decision that is the subject of these proceedings is dated 1st June 2022. This is the second set of proceedings considered by the Upper Tribunal as the initial FtT decision dismissing the Appellant’s appeal was successfully appealed by the Appellant in October 2023. Following this decision, that FtT decision was set aside and the matter was remitted to the FtT to be heard afresh in 2024.
The hearing
7. The Appellant attended the hearing but did not give oral evidence. This was because the salient aspects of her subjective claims have been accepted by the Respondent. The issues that I had to determine, as summarised at para 4 above, turn on the assessment of background information and evidence.
8. At the outset of the hearing, I clarified with Mr Nappey the Respondent’s submissions at paras 9 and 10 of the Respondent’s skeleton argument, which stated as follows:
“9. (…) The SSHD respectfully requests that (the unreported case of SW (Malaysia) (UI-2021-001366)) case is not taken into consideration in the remaking. (…)
“10. The SSHD is not making an application to rely on TSW but is merely making a point that SW Malaysia should not be relied upon at the remaking hearing.”
9. I was unsure what the Respondent meant by those submissions, in light of the fact that the ability of the Appellant to rely on this unreported decision was addressed by the FtT, which following consideration of Practice Direction para 8 (as it then was), granted permission to the Appellant to do so. Thus, the unreported decision of SW (Malaysia) had already been admitted into evidence by the FtT and the Appellant had permission to rely on this. There was no basis before me to interfere with this. Mr Nappey confirmed that this was indeed correct and he clarified that the Respondent would ask me not place much weight on this decision when resolving the issues in dispute since other decisions of the Upper Tribunal had reached different conclusions. I confirmed that this was a position the Respondent was entitled to take.
10. I otherwise clarified with Mr Briddock, who had also cited several other unreported decisions of the Upper Tribunal at para 16 of his skeleton argument, whether he was making an application to cite these together with SW (Malaysia). Mr Briddock confirmed that he was not seeking to make such an application but was instead seeking to illustrate that the Tribunal had in those decisions reached the same conclusions as the Tribunal in SW (Malaysia). Mr Briddock explained that he was mindful that SW (Malaysia) was a decision promulgated in 2022 and it was perhaps necessary to bring matters up to date. In this respect, Mr Briddock also referred in fairness to a different unreported decision at para 17 of his skeleton argument, in which the Upper Tribunal reached a different conclusion, namely that the appellant in that appeal would not be at risk in Kuala Lumpur.
11. In light of the above and both parties referring to unreported decisions in similar cases to this Appellant, I confirmed that I would take judicial notice that the Upper Tribunal had determined protection appeals from appellants, who are lesbian Buddhist women, in both directions. In other words, some appeals have been allowed and some appeals have been dismissed. This is not controversial since each appeal is to be determined on the facts and evidence before the Tribunal in each of those proceedings and for the avoidance of doubt, I have done the same in these proceedings.
12. I now set out below a summary of both parties’ respective submissions.
13. Mr Nappey relied on the Respondent’s refusal decision of 1st June 2022 and the Respondent’s review (undated). He also addressed me briefly on para 8 of the Respondent’s skeleton argument, which stated as follows (not authored by Mr Nappey):
“As UTJ Bruce commented at [30] of YMKA and Ors ('westernisation') Iraq [2022] UKUT 16 “It cannot be said that the contracting states agreed to offer a protected and unfettered right to enjoy one’s life in the way that one would like: there is no human right to listen to a particular kind of music, drink alcohol or to wear jeans. A claim based simply on such matters could not, under the Convention, succeed…” The wish to kiss openly clearly comes within this analysis. The requirement to abide with societal norms in expressing one’s romantic affection in public cannot it is submitted trigger convention rights.”
Mr Nappey accepted that kissing another person is not the same as wearing jeans and Mr Nappey did not seek to make any further submissions on this point.
14. Mr Nappey took me through the sections of the CPIN which confirmed that pride and other types of rallies take place in Kuala Lumpur, that there are LGBT+ clubs and other LGBT-friendly venues available in Kuala Lumpur and that the city is more tolerant towards members of the LGBT community compared to the rest of Malaysia. Mr Nappey also relied on background evidence to show that there are support services and community groups who serve – so to speak – members of the LGBT community, albeit not provided by the government. Focusing on the criminalisation of gay relationships, Mr Nappey emphasised that the number of prosecutions had gone down and this was indicative of an improved picture within Malaysia and specifically within Kuala Lumpur.
15. Mr Nappey concluded his submissions arguing that the Appellant was not otherwise known to the authorities thus far and would therefore be able to return to Kuala Lumpur as a safe place for her to live in. The Appellant would not be at risk of persecution there and for the same reasons, it would be reasonable to expect her to relocate there.
16. Mr Briddock’s primary submission was that the Appellant would still be at risk of persecution/serious harm on any return to Kuala Lumpur and in the alternative, even if she could not demonstrate such a risk of persecution there, it would not be reasonable to expect her to internally relocate to Kuala Lumpur.
17. In respect of the risk of persecution and/or serious harm, Mr Briddock reminded me that the Respondent accepted that there was no sufficiency of protection in Malaysia and that this did not exclude Kuala Lumpur. Similarly, for the criminalisation of gay relationships, which applies through the application of various offences throughout Malaysia, this is not limited to Sharia law and which does not exclude Kuala Lumpur either.
18. In response to the Respondent’s reliance on statistical data of relevant prosecutions, Mr Briddock submitted that a decline in numbers could also indicate changes in behaviour as opposed to the authorities deciding to tolerate what would otherwise be deemed to amount to a criminal offence. In Mr Briddock’s submission, there was no way of knowing what had caused the decline but his proposition was more likely in light of the continued government rhetoric against persons who identify as LGBT+ and the continuing background evidence which supported the Appellant’s claim. Applying the HJ (Iran) test would lead me to find that the Appellant had a well-founded fear of persecution on return to Kuala Lumpur, as well as to her home area. This was particularly so because she would be “visible” in terms of openly expressing her sexual orientation.
19. Mr Briddock’s submissions on the risk of persecution/serious harm and the lack of sufficiency of protection were also reasons for me to find that internal relocation would not be reasonable for this Appellant. Those were also reasons that were endorsed by the Upper Tribunal in the unreported decision of SW Malaysia and I was asked to adopt the same reasoning.
20. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision.
Findings of fact and Conclusions
21. In reaching the findings of fact and conclusions set out below, I confirm again that I have very carefully considered the evidence as a whole. As I have recorded above and in the earlier error of law decision, there is no material dispute as to the essential factual matrix in this case. The core issue relates to the Appellant’s situation on return to Kuala Lumpur, which I must assess on the lower standard of proof – this being a protection claim that does not fall for consideration under the newer provisions of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022.
22. The Appellant is lesbian, also Buddhist and of Chinese ethnicity. She would wish to live openly as a lesbian in Malaysia, and has expressed a genuine fear of doing so on her account of the risks from either the state or Malaysian society as a whole. None of this has been disputed by the Respondent, who also accepts that the Appellant would be at risk if she were to return to her home area, Johur in the South of Malaysia.
23. I am required to take into consideration any factors relevant and as stipulated under s.8 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004. Section 8 was invoked by the Respondent as a result of the Appellant arriving in the UK in March 2018 but not claiming asylum until December 2018. The Respondent considered that this and the lack of a reasonable explanation from the Appellant engaged s.8 since this amounted to conduct that was designed or likely to obstruct or delay the handling or resolution of the claim or the taking of a decision in relation to the Appellant.
24. In light of the aspects of the Appellant’s claim that have been accepted by the Respondent, and which relate to the core of the Appellant’s account, as summarised above, any damage to the credibility of the Appellant’s account arising from the application of s.8 of the 2004 Act does not in fact have much, if any, bearing on the issues that I need to resolve. Neither did Mr Nappey suggest otherwise. There is otherwise nothing further before me, which requires any additional adverse credibility considerations pursuant to s.8.
25. My assessment below is predicated on the approach set out in HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 31, with particular reference to the step-by-step test elucidated at [35] and [82]. The factual questions relating to the Appellant’s sexuality and what she would wish to do on return, but for a fear of harm, are not now in dispute.
26. An additional important point arises from the Supreme Court’s judgment, namely the extent of the ability to live openly which is protected by the Refugee Convention. In this regard, I have directed myself to [76]-[78] of Lord Rodger’s judgment:
“76. The New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority observed in Re GJ [1998] (1995) INLR 387, 420 that "sexual orientation is either an innate or unchangeable characteristic or a characteristic so fundamental to identity or human dignity that it ought not be required to be changed" (emphasis in the original). So, starting from that position, the Convention offers protection to gay and lesbian people – and, I would add, bisexuals and everyone else on a broad spectrum of sexual behaviour - because they are entitled to have the same freedom from fear of persecution as their straight counterparts. No-one would proceed on the basis that a straight man or woman could find it reasonably tolerable to conceal his or her sexual identity indefinitely to avoid suffering persecution. Nor would anyone proceed on the basis that a man or woman could find it reasonably tolerable to conceal his or her race indefinitely to avoid suffering persecution. Such an assumption about gay men and lesbian women is equally unacceptable. Most significantly, it is unacceptable as being inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the Convention since it involves the applicant denying or hiding precisely the innate characteristic which forms the basis of his claim of persecution: Atta Fosu v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2008 FC 1135, para 17, per Zinn J.
77. At the most basic level, if a male applicant were to live discreetly, he would in practice have to avoid any open expression of affection for another man which went beyond what would be acceptable behaviour on the part of a straight man. He would have to be cautious about the friendships he formed, the circle of friends in which he moved, the places where he socialised. He would have constantly to restrain himself in an area of life where powerful emotions and physical attraction are involved and a straight man could be spontaneous, impulsive even. Not only would he not be able to indulge openly in the mild flirtations which are an enjoyable part of heterosexual life, but he would have to think twice before revealing that he was attracted to another man. Similarly, the small tokens and gestures of affection which are taken for granted between men and women could well be dangerous. In short, his potential for finding happiness in some sexual relationship would be profoundly affected. It is objectionable to assume that any gay man can be supposed to find even these restrictions on his life and happiness reasonably tolerable.
78. It would be wrong, however, to limit the areas of behaviour that must be protected to the kinds of matters which I have just described – essentially, those which will enable the applicant to attract sexual partners and establish and maintain relationships with them in the same way as happens between persons who are straight. As Gummow and Hayne JJ pointed out in Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration (2003) 216 CLR 473, 500-501, para 81:
"Sexual identity is not to be understood in this context as confined to engaging in particular sexual acts or, indeed, to any particular forms of physical conduct. It may, and often will, extend to many aspects of human relationships and activity. That two individuals engage in sexual acts in private (and in that sense 'discreetly') may say nothing about how those individuals would choose to live other aspects of their lives that are related to, or informed by, their sexuality"
In short, what is protected is the applicant's right to live freely and openly as a gay man. That involves a wide spectrum of conduct, going well beyond conduct designed to attract sexual partners and maintain relationships with them. To illustrate the point with trivial stereotypical examples from British society: just as male heterosexuals are free to enjoy themselves playing rugby, drinking beer and talking about girls with their mates, so male homosexuals are to be free to enjoy themselves going to Kylie concerts, drinking exotically coloured cocktails and talking about boys with their straight female mates. Mutatis mutandis – and in many cases the adaptations would obviously be great – the same must apply to other societies. In other words, gay men are to be as free as their straight equivalents in the society concerned to live their lives in the way that is natural to them as gay men, without the fear of persecution.”
27. At para 7 of her skeleton argument, the Respondent emphasised the reminder Lord Hope gave at [15 ] of his judgment in HJ (Iran):
“The guarantees in the Universal Declaration are fundamental to a proper understanding of the Convention. But the Convention itself has, as the references in para 12 show, a more limited purpose. It is not enough that members of a particular social group are being discriminated against. The contracting states did not undertake to protect them against discrimination judged according to the standards in their own countries. Persecution apart, the Convention was not directed to reforming the level of rights prevailing in the country of origin. Its purpose is to provide the protection that is not available in the country of nationality where there is a well-founded fear of persecution, not to guarantee to asylum-seekers when they are returned all the freedoms that are available in the country where they seek refuge. It does not guarantee universal human rights. So the conditions that prevail in the country in which asylum is sought have no part to play, as matter of legal obligation binding on all states parties to the Convention, in deciding whether the applicant is entitled to seek asylum in that country: Januzi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 5, [2006] 2 AC 426, paras 16, 46. As Laws LJ said in Amare v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 1600, [2006] Imm AR 217 para 31:
“The Convention is not there to safeguard or protect potentially affected persons from having to live in regimes where pluralist liberal values are less respected, even much less respected, than they are here. It is there to secure international protection to the extent agreed by the contracting states.”
28. From this the Respondent relied on YMKA & others at para 8 of her skeleton argument, as can be seen at para 13 above. Mr Nappey did distance himself from the submission that kissing is by analogy the same as wishing to wear jeans. Nevertheless, the difficulty with the Respondent’s analysis in these passages of her skeleton argument is that she places no evidence before me that the societal norms in Malaysia expect or demand that no one kisses in public. The restrictions, as I will identify in more detail below, strictly concern the ability of persons to express their sexuality openly when they do not otherwise conform with a heterosexual norm. In light of this, the Respondent’s reliance on Lord Hope’s passage at [15] extracted immediately above is in not inconsistent with the passages from Lord Rodger’s judgment extracted at para 26 above.
Assessment of risk on a return to Kuala Lumpur
29. The background information clearly demonstrates that “same-sex sexual activity” remains illegal and, whilst prosecutions are low, the Malaysian authorities are unwilling to afford adequate protection. This is not limited to areas outside of Kuala Lumpur or limited to those subjected to Sharia law. I consider this to be a relevant starting point. The CPIN states as follows at paras 4.1.1-4.1.3:
“4.1.1 In general, the state is able but is not willing to offer effective protection. However, each case must be considered on its facts.
4.1.2 State authorities have been responsible for harassment, discrimination, and violence, towards LGBTI persons with reports of physical and sexual assaults by police. However, there is also some evidence of the authorities prosecuting the perpetrators of violence against the LGBTI community, although in many instances the police do not consider hate crime as a motive (see State attitudes and treatment).
4.1.3 Despite state actors insisting that the fundamental rights of LGBTI people are protected under the Federal Constitution, are treated equally, and have access to government services and assistance without discrimination, same- sex sexual activity remains illegal. LGBTI persons are arrested for offences related to their gender identity and/or expression, which particularly affect trans persons and Muslims. It would therefore be unreasonable to expect a person identifying as LGBTI to seek protection from the authorities (see State attitudes and treatment).”
30. The Executive Summary of the CPIN also explains as follows:
“Same-sex sexual acts are criminalised through the application of various offences under the penal code throughout Malaysia and under state Sharia laws, applicable to Muslims. There is no available data on the number of lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex (LGBTI) persons prosecuted for offences under the penal code although sources consider prosecutions to be rare. In general, LGBI persons are unlikely to be at risk of prosecution under the penal code, although if it were applied it would be disproportionate and discriminatory.
LGBI persons face harassment, arbitrary arrest and detention and police sometimes perpetrate and condone violence against individuals including in custody.”
31. The Respondent’s position, both in the CPIN and before me, is that in general, whilst LGBI persons face official discrimination, treatment by state actors is not sufficiently serious by its nature and/or repetition, or by an accumulation of various measures which is sufficiently severe to amount to persecution. Kuala Lumpur is also considered more tolerant of LGBTI persons and in general it would be reasonable for a person to relocate there. To support this submission, the Respondent heavily relied on the number of prosecutions of “unnatural sex” cases dropping to 10 in Kuala Lumpur in 2022 from 29 in 2020 – see CPIN para 8.5.5.
32. I do not consider that such a reduction in prosecutions can be explained by an increase in tolerance or acceptance of those who are perceived to partake in “unnatural sex”. This is not an explanation that is given anywhere in the CPIN and as Mr Briddock noted, such a reduction in prosecutions may also be explained by an increase in persons modifying their behaviours when in non-heterosexual relationships or relationships deemed or perceived to be non-conforming.
33. The Respondent also submits that there is active gay scene in Kuala Lumpur and that pride marches and other rallies take place. On closer consideration however of the relevant CPIN passages, this reveals that there appears to only be one gay club in Kuala Lumpur – the BlueBoy nightclub - and this was raided in 2018 – see para 3.1.17. Further, that the gay scene was more geared towards foreign tourists – see para 2.4.35 of the 2020 CPIN. The 2024 CPIN also extracts information from a travel website at para 8.3.1, which records that “(t)he scene is discreet, and venues changes quite often because homosexuality is still illegal.” There is also further comment extracted at para 8.3.3 that the current situation for “every day LGBTI Malaysians” is “regressing”. In my view, the reality is somewhat less sanguine that might appear at first glance and the background evidence extracted and relied upon by the Respondent.
34. With regards to protests and rallies generally being able to take place, as recorded at para 3.1.16 of the CPIN, I note in the same CPIN passage that the “organisers can be subject to harassment and police investigation” and that organisers of the Women’s Day March in March 2023 were also investigated by the police. Moreover, that following a Prive event in 2017 being cancelled due to religious complains, there have not been any further Pride events in Malaysia – see para 11.3.1.
35. Mr Nappey also submitted that para 3.1.8 of the CPIN supported the Respondent’s position because in “September 2023 Prime Minister Anwar stated Malaysia would never recognise LGBT rights but equally confirmed the government did not condone ‘excessive action or harassment’ of the community.” Mr Nappey emphasised excessive action or harassment not being condoned. The rest of that passage in the CPIN states as follows:
“Government rhetoric towards the LGB community is mixed. Several government officials, particularly from religious affairs departments, have publicly stated that the government does not recognise LGBT practices as lawful and that they are against Malaysia’s religious, moral and cultural norms. In January 2021 the deputy minister in the Religious Affairs department called for the enforcement of stricter punishments against LGBT people because they ‘need to be cured or corrected with the right approach and effort’. (…)”
36. Another example of the government’s position is recorded at para 3.1.17 of the CPIN:
“In August 2023 the government banned the possession of watches produced as part of a Pride collection. The offence carries a fine or a maximum custodial sentence of 3 years. Although sources indicate there have been seizures of the products, there are no available statistics to confirm whether there have been any arrests or prosecutions under the law (see Treatment of civil society, NGOs and LGBTI groups).”
37. It is unclear to say the least what is meant and understood by “excessive” and it is implied in the Prime Minister’s statement extracted at para 35 above that action or harassment would otherwise be condoned, as long as not ‘excessive’.
38. Mr Briddock also highlighted that in July 2023, the authorities cut short a music festival in Kuala Lumpur after the lead singer of British band The 1975 kissed a male bandmate during their performance in protest of the country’s anti-gay laws. The CPIN records at para 11.3.8 that “(f)ootage of the kiss was posted on social media and sparked a backlash in the country. Malaysia also blacklisted the group from the country.”
39. I accept that the capital is, in general terms, less conservative than other areas of the country. The CPIN states that “(w)ell-educated, wealthier LGBI people in urban areas are less likely to have to conceal their sexual orientation from their family and friends. KL society is generally more accepting of LGBI persons than it is in Sarawak, Sabah, or the Malaysian East Coast peninsula.” Nevertheless, this is in general terms only. In addition, whilst there is reference to not needing to conceal their sexual orientation as much in Kuala Lumpur, if well-educated and wealthy in urban areas, the specific context referred to is friends and family, not the wider society.
40. Furthermore, the assessment of risk cannot in any event be founded solely on the ability or otherwise of the Appellant to go to any particular club or venue or take part in a woman’s march. As Mr Briddock submitted on her behalf, she may not ever wish to do so and she would certainly not wish to be confined to expressing her sexual orientation in particular venues only. What she does wish to do, and which is not disputed, is to live as an openly gay woman and go about her daily business without fear of the authorities and/or society in general.
41. Specifically on the treatment of lesbians, para 8.3.3 of the CPIN states that “(i)n sources consulted (see Bibliography) CPIT could find no recent information on the treatment of lesbians specifically”. I am therefore to consider the background evidence as a whole, parts of which I have referred to and extracted above, when assessing the likely treatment of the Appellant, as a lesbian, on return to Kuala Lumpur.
42. I take account of the fact that the Appellant has not specifically been persecuted or the subject of other harm (actual or threatened) in the past. Therefore, paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules does not apply. I do also take into account however that the Appellant did not live her sexuality openly in her home area in Malaysia as a result of a fear of such treatment and the Respondent accepts that she would be at risk there should she live her sexuality openly there.
43. I take account of the fact that the Appellant would not be at risk in relation to Sharia law because she is not Muslim. I also accept that the risk of formal prosecution by the authorities is low.
44. As I have already set out above, the background information clearly demonstrates that the Malaysian authorities would be unwilling to afford adequate protection: 4.1.1-4.1.3 of the CPIN assessment and Mr Nappey did not seek to argue otherwise.
45. Bringing all of the above together and applying the background information to the particular facts of this case, in the context of the lower standard of proof, I conclude that the Appellant would be at risk on return to Kuala Lumpur as well. This is by virtue of a real risk of violence, harassment, discrimination, and degrading treatment by the state and/or a real risk of violence, harassment, discrimination, and degrading treatment by non-state actors against which there would be no sufficient protection.
46. This conclusion is based on the Appellant in principle living as an openly gay woman who is entitled, for example, to express affection towards a partner, but who would also be entitled to engage in a wider “spectrum of conduct going well beyond conduct designed to attract sexual partners and maintain relationships with them”, pursuant to Lord Roger at [78] in HJ (Iran). I am satisfied that, were the Appellant to engage in such conduct, she would be subjected to adverse treatment which, cumulatively, would reach the high threshold of persecution under the Refugee Convention and/or serious harm under Article 3. Further, that there is no sufficiency of protection, including in Kuala Lumpur.
47. In light of the above, when considering the available background information, the facts of the case, and the HJ (Iran) test, I conclude that the Appellant would be at risk of persecution contrary to the Refugee Convention and/or of serious harm under Article 3 in Kuala Lumpur were she to live as an openly gay woman. Her stated fear of living openly in order to avoid such problems does not of course defeat her claim under the Refugee Convention.
Internal relocation as a viable option
48. If I am wrong in my conclusion set out above on the risk in Kuala Lumpur, I conclude that it would in any event be unduly harsh for the Appellant to relocate there.
49. Mr Briddock did not seek to argue that the Appellant would not be able to secure employment on return and would not be able to support herself and live a reasonable standard of living in Kuala Lumpur. The Appellant does not ground her alternative argument on this basis and she is right not to do so. However, she argues that if she were to relocate to Kuala Lumpur, she would still have to conceal her sexuality and forgo her entitlement to live openly in the same way that heterosexual persons do, which is not reasonable and would be unduly harsh to expect her to do. This is pursuant to the well-established test as enunciated by the House of Lords in Januzi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 5.
50. If all of the adverse matters to which I have previously referred do not reach the threshold of persecution and/or serious harm, I am firmly of the view that, on a cumulative basis, they do go to demonstrate significant barriers to the Appellant’s ability to live a reasonable life in Kuala Lumpur. This is because, if she were to in fact live openly, those adverse matters would impede her ability to: find employment, access certain services including potentially housing, enter into and maintain openly gay relationships, and live day-to-day without experiencing regular abuse, harassment and/or prejudice.
51. In the scenario that the Appellant would have to conceal a core aspect of her identity, the type of life she would have to endure would be unduly harsh by virtue of the concealment itself.
52. In light of my conclusions above, the Appellant’s appeal must be allowed on Refugee Convention grounds and under Article 3 ECHR.
Notice of Decision
53. The decision of the FtT dated 10th May 2024 did involve the making of a material error of law and has been set aside, pursuant to the decision of Judges Pinder and Graves dated 19th June 2025.
54. I re-make the decision by allowing the Appellant PYT’s appeal against the Respondent Secretary of State’s decision of 1st June 2022 on Refugee Convention and Article 3 human rights grounds.

Sarah Pinder

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

07.11.2025

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001081

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/55502/2022; IA/05791/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

………19 June 2025………

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PINDER
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GRAVES

Between

P Y T
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Briddock, Counsel instructed by Milestone Solicitors.
For the Respondent: Mr E Tufan, Senior Presenting Officer.

Heard at Field House on 7 May 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the FtT/the Judge’). On 10th May 2024, the FtT dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision of 1st June 2022, in which the Respondent had refused the Appellant’s protection and human rights claim made on 5th December 2018.
2. We have maintained the Anonymity Order in favour of the Appellant. We consider that, on the specific facts of this appeal, the maintenance of the integrity of the United Kingdom’s immigration system and the Appellant having raised a claim to international protection are such that an Anonymity Order is a justified derogation from the principle of open justice.
Factual and Procedural Background
3. The Appellant is a national of Malaysia, who is 27 years old. She is a lesbian woman and before the FtT, the Respondent accepted that the Appellant would face persecution if she returned to her home area on the basis that she is lesbian. The Respondent’s position has always been that the Appellant can internally relocate to Kuala Lumpur – the Appellant is originally from a small town in Johor in the South of Malaysia. The sole issue for the FtT to determine therefore was whether it would be reasonable to expect the Appellant to relocate to Kuala Lumpur.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal
4. The Judge recorded at [5] that the Appellant had sought at first instance to rely on an unreported decision of this Tribunal, namely SW (Malaysia) (UI-2021-001366). This application was not opposed by the Respondent and the Judge also considered that the relevant requirements of the Practice Direction concerning citing unreported cases was satisfied. The Appellant was therefore duly permitted to rely on this decision. The Judge correctly noted that this decision was not country guidance – it was, and remains, unreported – and that the Judge was not obliged to follow it, nor to set out good reasons why they may not follow it.
5. At [5]-[15], the Judge considered the background evidence that was before them and made various observations on the same. At [16]-[17], the Judge considered whether the Appellant, as a lesbian woman, faces persecution in Kuala Lumpur. The Judge confirmed, after their consideration of the background evidence, that they did not accept that the Appellant would face such treatment in Kuala Lumpur. In summary, the Judge’s reasoning for this finding was that “there is a substantial difference between conservative rural areas and a metropolitan city of almost 8 million people such as Kuala Lumpur”. The Judge added at [16] that the background evidence considered recognises that there are gay venues in Kuala Lumpur which would not exist elsewhere in Malaysia. At [17], the Judge turned to consider the principles contained in the well-established judgment of HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 31, but found that since the Appellant would not face persecution in Kuala Lumpur, she would not need to act discretely to avoid such treatment.
6. At [18], the Judge turned to the issue of internal relocation and directed themselves correctly to the principles contained in Januzi v SSHD [2006] UKHL 5 for an assessment of the reasonableness of the proposed internal relocation, requiring a holistic assessment and reference to an individual's personal circumstances. The Judge then considered at [19] that the Appellant was a young woman, who had come to the UK in March 2018 and who had claimed asylum approximately six months later. She had worked in Malaysia as a hair dresser and had worked in a kitchen here in the UK. She had originally come to the UK on a visit visa with a friend, who had subsequently returned to Malaysia. The Judge recorded that the Appellant had been able to establish herself in the UK, including the finding of accommodation, forming new friendships, relationships and finding employment. The Judge accepted that the Appellant would not be able to turn to her family for any assistance on a return to Malaysia – the Appellant remained in frequent contact with them but she had not told them of her sexual orientation. The Respondent had also accepted that the Appellant could not return to her home area, as briefly summarised above at para 3.
7. The Judge then summarised at [20] that the only points that the Appellant could identify in her favour in relation to difficulties in living in Kuala Lumpur were related to her sexual orientation. The Judge then returned to their observations on the background evidence, set out earlier in their decision, that there has been “rhetoric from the government of Malaysia against homosexuals and transgender people. This rhetoric was focused around the time when the new government came to power around 2018”. The Judge then observed that a lot of the background evidence was old, with most of the adverse events being from around 2018. The Judge found that in recent years there had been “little identified actions of the authorities against lesbians”. Further, that what had been identified had not happened in Kuala Lumpur and/or was as a result of a conservative Muslim approach and the Appellant was not Muslim. Such conservative Muslim approaches were more common in rural areas and Kuala Lumpur, as a cosmopolitan large and vibrant city, was not the same. The Judge added that it was not the case that Malaysia can be viewed as a society and government wholly hostile to homosexuality and instead that there were strong voices, including the Prime Minister’s daughter, speaking out and pushing for acceptance.
8. The Judge then considered CPIN extracts at [22]-[23] reporting on discrimination, stigma and abuse faced by lesbians in Malaysia. Also noting, that the CPIN identified that attitudes amongst the rich and educated and in Kuala Lumpur were more accepting ([24]).
9. The Judge returned to the unreported decision of SW (Malaysia) at [25], stating that they did not find it helpful because it set out “quite generic statements that are not linked to a careful analysis of objective evidence and indeed there may well have been other or different or less objective evidence in that case”. The Judge concluded in the same paragraph that the evidence before them did not establish that it would be unreasonable for the Appellant to relocate to Kuala Lumpur: she would be able to find work, one of the background articles reported that there is a small but vibrant gay scene in Kuala Lumpur and if the Appellant wanted to she would be able to participate in this. The Judge then stated as follows:
“There is suppression in Malaysia of all sorts of things when compared with the United Kingdom, people are not as free as they are here too say or do what they want about a whole manner of things. This does not mean that there is persecution. However, I do not accept that the objective evidence establishes that it would be unreasonable for her to relocate to Kuala Lumpur. As Mr Briddock was careful to point out, HJ (Iran) does not require that the appellant would be able to live a life in Kuala Lumpur similar to the one she does in the UK.”
10. At [26], the Judge concluded that the Appellant would not face persecution and so would not face any risk of serious harm either. For those reasons, the Appellant’s claim for asylum, humanitarian protection and under Articles 2 and 3 ECHR had to fail.
11. The Judge briefly went on to consider the Appellant’s Article 8 human rights claim under para 276 ADE(1)(vi) of the Immigration Rules, i.e. whether there were very significant obstacles to her reintegration into Malaysia. In this assessment, the Judge took forward their findings on the Appellant’s protection claim and that she would not face persecution in Kuala Lumpur, making it reasonable therefore for her internally relocate there. The Judge directed themselves to consider whether or not discrimination in Kuala Lumpur is such that it would be a very significant obstacle. The Judge concluded that there was not much assistance in the background evidence: there was a reference to workplace discrimination but this tended more to transgender people. The Judge returned to their findings on Kuala Lumpur being different to other areas and that overall therefore, there were not very significant obstacles to her integration back in Malaysia.
12. Accordingly, the FtT dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds.
The Appeal Hearing in the Upper Tribunal
13. The Appellant was granted permission to appeal against the FtT’s decision by a different Judge of the FtT on 26th February 2025. The Appellant pursues three grounds of appeal, all of which attracted permission to appeal and which to a certain extent overlap with each other.
14. The first ground is that the Judge arguably erred in law by misunderstanding the key findings reached by the Upper Tribunal in the unreported decision of SW (Malaysia) and the rationale underpinning the Appellant relying on the same. The Appellant argues that the Upper Tribunal in SW (Malaysia) was only considering whether it would be unreasonable to expect the appellant in that case, also a lesbian Buddhist woman, to relocate to Kuala Lumpur - not whether the appellant in that case had a well-founded fear of persecution in Kuala Lumpur. The Appellant acknowledges that the Judge also addressed the decision in their consideration of internal relocation ([25]), but because it appears the Judge misunderstood what the Upper Tribunal was considering in that case, the Judge arguably erred as a result of that misunderstanding.
15. The second ground of appeal is that the Judge arguably erred by failing to consider the Respondent’s own evidence and position, contained in the relevant CPIN in force at the time of the hearing, that there is no sufficiency of protection. The Appellant argues that that was relevant to whether or not the Appellant faces a risk of persecution and to whether it is reasonable for her to internally relocate to Kuala Lumpur. The Appellant also argues that the Judge entirely failed to consider the issue of sufficiency of protection.
16. In her third and final ground, the Appellant argues that the Judge has conflated the issues of well-founded fear of persecution with reasonableness of internal relocation as far as these two assessments apply to Kuala Lumpur. The Appellant acknowledges that the Judge had addressed reasonableness at [25] but the Judge’s findings there are based, at least partly, on whether there is a risk on return. The Appellant submits that this demonstrates the conflation and has meant that the Judge has reached unsafe conclusions.
17. The FtT Judge in granting permission stated that it was arguable that the Judge may have misunderstood the relevance of SY (Malaysia). In response, the Respondent did not file and serve a Rule 24 reply.
18. At the hearing, both parties’ advocates made further oral submissions on each of the grounds of appeal pursued and Mr Tufan, on behalf of the Respondent, defended the FtT’s decision. At the end of the hearing, we were able to indicate to both parties orally, with brief reasons, that we were satisfied that the Judge had made material errors of law and that the FtT’s decision in respect of the Appellant’s protection claim should be set aside. The findings with regards to internal relocation and the conclusions on this issue taken forward in the Judge’s assessment under Article 8 also fell to be set aside.
19. We have provided our reasons for this in more detail below, when addressing the Appellant’s written pleadings and the parties’ respective oral submissions in our section ‘analysis and conclusions’. We have also included below directions for the re-making of the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision of 1st June 2022, to which both parties should have particular regard.
20. We also record briefly that the Respondent had not been served with a copy of the Appellant’s consolidated bundle filed in preparation of the hearing before us. Mr Tufan confirmed that he was nevertheless ready to proceed as he had been able to prepare for the error of law hearing with the necessary documents that were available to him separately. However, in relation to the re-making of the appeal, which the Appellant was keen to pursue on the same day if at all possible, Mr Tufan confirmed that he was not in a position to present the Respondent’s case as he had not had access to the Appellant’s evidence before the FtT and was not familiar with the new CPIN, upon which the Appellant was intending to rely.
21. For this reason, we agreed to an adjournment of the second stage in this appeal and for the re-making of the appeal to take place (in this Tribunal for the reasons set out below), most likely on submissions only, on a later date. We take this opportunity to remind those representing the Appellant that filing evidence with this Tribunal on the CE-file online portal does not constitute service on the Respondent, unlike the FtT’s online portal MyHMCTS – see para 7 of ‘Practice Direction for the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the Upper Tribunal: Electronic filing of documents online – CE-File’.
Analysis and conclusions
The Appellant’s first and third grounds of appeal
22. We address these two grounds of appeal together as these both concern the complaint of whether or not the Judge conflated the issues of well-founded fear of persecution in Kuala Lumpur with reasonableness of internal relocation to Kuala Lumpur.
23. As we have summarised above, the only issue before the FtT to determine was whether it was reasonable for the Appellant to relocate to Kuala Lumpur on return – the Respondent having accepted that the Appellant is a lesbian woman (para 57 of the Respondent’s decision) and the Respondent expressly raising that the Appellant would not be at risk should she relocate to Kuala Lumpur (paras 67-70).
24. In light of the Appellant’s primary case - that she would still be at risk on any internal relocation to Kuala Lumpur - we do not consider that the Judge erred in turning her mind first to the issue of risk of persecution in Kuala Lumpur for the Appellant. Mr Briddock did not suggest otherwise either.
25. Mr Tufan argues in response that the Judge clearly considered the decision of SW (Malaysia) in detail and the Appellant’s complaints amount to mere disagreements. Mr Tufan also submits that the Appellant’s challenges are in fact going to the rationality of the Judge’s findings and reasons and it cannot be said on any view that the Appellant can succeed on such a high threshold.
26. Having considered the parties’ competing submissions, we agree that when considering the issue of reasonableness of internal relocation and when assessing the Appellant’s reliance on the unreported decision of SW (Malaysia), the Judge did conflate the two issues. Having admitted and permitted the Appellant to rely on SW (Malaysia), it was incumbent on the Judge to address the issue raised by the Appellant. This was that the Upper Tribunal had previously found, on similar facts and evidence, that it would be unreasonable for a Buddhist lesbian woman to relocate to Kuala Lumpur. The key conclusions of the Upper Tribunal in SW (Malaysia) were as follows:
“38. Whilst there are a small number of bars in KL where the LGBTQ+ community can outwardly show their orientation, such as in the Blue Boy nightclub in Bukit Bintang and the iBlue bar in Taman Bukit Segar, the at times violent rhetoric accompanied by both the relevant Penal Code and discrimination are such that a member of the LGBTQ+ community may well possess a real, objectively justified concern as to the risks of their not discreetly engaging in a same-sex relationship. Whilst there may be more tolerance to the LGBTQ+ community in KL the appellant, like many in the community, will be required on a day-to-day basis to consider how each individual police officer or local authority official will consider outward exhibition of her sexual orientation. It may only require one police officer to take the view that an offence is being committed for her to experience real difficulties consequent to her sexual orientation. I am not satisfied that a simple arrest or her being noticed by officials in KL as to her being a lesbian would immediately lead her to have difficulties as extreme as being required to undertake gay conversion therapy. However, I accept that the fear of coming to the attention of the authorities and possibly at some point in time being required to undertake such treatment will prevent the appellant from leading the outward enjoyment of her sexual orientation she would wish to lead. I am satisfied to the requisite standard that the appellant wishes to live her life openly with a same-sex partner, but upon return to KL would feel forced to return to engaging in relationships discretely because of fear of future adverse actions by the Malaysian authorities. I accept that a material reason for her decision to act discretely on her return would be a fear of serious harm which would follow if she were to live openly as a lesbian.
39. I am mindful that I am required to consider the reasonableness of relocation and in those circumstances, I am satisfied that it would be unreasonable to expect the appellant to internally relocate to KL. In the circumstances the appeal is allowed on both Refugee Convention and human rights (article 3) grounds.”
27. At [25], where the Judge recorded having carefully reviewed SW (Malaysia), the Judge stated as follows:
“I have not found it helpful because it sets out quite generic statements that are not linked to a careful analysis of objective evidence and indeed there may well have been other or different or less objective evidence in that case. The evidence before me does not establish that it would be unreasonable for the appellant to relocate to Kuala Lumpur. I am not satisfied that she would not find work there because the objective evidence only set out that transgender people had been rejected for jobs because they were transgender and, as I have set out above, I do not accept that that is directly equivalent to lesbians. Therefore, I find that she would be able to find work, I have set out above a quote in one of the articles that there is a small but vibrant gay scene in Kuala Lumpur and if the appellant wanted to she would be able to participate in this. There is suppression in Malaysia of all sorts of things when compared with the United Kingdom, people are not as free as they are here too say or do what they want about a whole manner of things. This does not mean that there is persecution. However, I do not accept that the objective evidence establishes that it would be unreasonable for her to relocate to Kuala Lumpur. As Mr Briddock was careful to point out, HJ (Iran) does not require that the appellant would be able to live a life in Kuala Lumpur similar to the one she does in the UK.”
28. In our view, it is clear from the above passage that the Judge has limited their consideration of reasonableness of relocation to the Appellant finding work, to there being a small but vibrant gay scene (an issue to which we return as part of the Appellant’s second ground of appeal) and to the fact that the Appellant would not be able to live a life similar to the one she does in the UK but that this did not amount to persecution.
29. Whilst the Judge was not required to follow SW (Malaysia), a principle accepted by the Appellant both at first instance and before us, it was clear from the written and oral submissions before the Judge that the Appellant was seeking to rely on the unreported determination for the proposition that it is unreasonable to except a gay or lesbian person to internally relocate to Kuala Lumpur (para 11 of skeleton argument before the FtT). The Appellant had submitted that even if the treatment and discrimination did not amount to persecution, the Appellant would be still living in a country where her sexuality is criminalised and where, on her case, there is a high-level of discrimination and repression (para 10). The Appellant’s Counsel at first instance, also Mr Briddock, had cited paras 37-39 of SW (Malaysia) in his skeleton argument.
30. We are satisfied that the Judge has erred in her consideration of the Appellant’s submissions at [25]. Apart from a single reference to whether or not the Appellant would find work, there is no holistic assessment and reference to the Appellant’s personal circumstances compared to what would be reasonable for this Appellant if she had to relocate to Kuala Lumpur. There is no consideration of what the relocation to Kuala Lumpur would entail for the Appellant, who is originally from the South, the distance between the two areas in light of the Respondent accepting that she is at risk in her home area; and no engagement of whether she would seek to live her sexuality openly in Kuala Lumpur (outside of the small but vibrant gay scene identified by the Judge) and if not, why not. In the context whereby homosexuality is effectively criminalised in Malaysia (and not just under Sharia law) and background evidence supports a submission that there is societal discrimination, a much more nuanced assessment of reasonableness of internal relocation was required. Instead, we are satisfied that the Judge has likened the issue of internal relocation to that of persecution in Kuala Lumpur and has done so throughout the decision and through their specific consideration of SW (Malaysia).
31. As addressed above, we are not of the view that the Judge erred in addressing the issue of whether the Appellant also held a well-founded fear of persecution in Kuala Lumpur as this was an issue expressly raised, as her primary case, by the Appellant. We are satisfied however that apart from the consideration of employment, the Judge failed to consider whether any other treatment or experiences that the Appellant may face, which may fall below the threshold of persecution and/or serious harm, on an internal relocation to Kuala Lumpur, may nevertheless be unreasonable to expect the Appellant to live with. This is also demonstrated in our view by the Judge’s conclusion at [25]: “this does not mean that there is persecution”.
32. For the reasons above, we are satisfied that the Appellant’s first and third grounds of appeal succeed. Since the only issue that the FtT was required to determine was the issue of internal relocation, we are equally satisfied that this amounts to a material error of law sufficient to set aside the Judge’s decision.
The Appellant’s second ground of appeal
33. We address this briefly as we are satisfied that the first and third grounds of appeal are sufficiently material to warrant the FtT’s decision to be set aside.
34. The Appellant’s complaint under this ground is that the Judge arguably erred by failing to consider the Respondent’s own evidence and position, contained in the relevant CPIN in force at the time of the hearing, that there is no sufficiency of protection and that this is throughout Malaysia, not excluding Kuala Lumpur. The Appellant argues that this is relevant to whether or not the Appellant faces a risk of persecution in Kuala Lumpur and to whether it is reasonable for her to internally relocate there. Mr Briddock submits that the Judge’s determination that it is safe and reasonable to expect the Appellant to internally relocate to Kuala Lumpur cannot be properly made without taking into consideration the Respondent’s own position.
35. To this extent, there is overlap with the other grounds as the issue of sufficiency of protection was one of the key considerations taken into account by the Upper Tribunal in SW (Malaysia), as can be seen from the extracts set out above.
36. In response, Mr Tufan submitted that the Judge was entitled to find that Kuala Lumpur is an international city, with gay clubs and bars, and where the Appellant would not face a risk of persecution. Mr Briddock in reply noted that the background evidence shows that there is one gay bar, a male gay bar and one that is mainly for tourists.
37. It is well-established that the HJ (Iran) principles require an individualised and holistic assessment of how an appellant would behave on return and this is also relevant to the issue of internal relocation. Whether same-sex relationships are effectively criminalised in the country of return and whether there in fact sufficiency of protection is also highly relevant to that assessment as the two may inform a person’s likely behaviour. For this reason, we are also satisfied that in failing to take these issues into consideration, the Judge has also erred as argued under the Appellant’s second ground of appeal. For the same reasons as stated at para 32 above, this too is a material error of law.
38. In the circumstances, we are satisfied that the FtT has materially erred in law and the FtT’s decision to dismiss the appeal is therefore set aside pursuant to s.12(2)(a) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.
39. Both parties agreed that upon our indication that we would find in favour of the Appellant on the grounds pursued, it was appropriate for the Appellant’s appeal to be retained in the Upper Tribunal for re-making. Having considered and applied the guidance in paragraph 7 of the Senior President's Practice Statement as well as the guidance in AEB v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC), we are satisfied that retaining the appeal for re-making in this Tribunal is appropriate considering the limited nature of the remaining fact-finding that is required. As briefly recorded above, Mr Tufan was in difficulty with proceeding with the re-making of the appeal on the same day as a result of not having been served with the Appellant’s composite bundle. For this reason, we deemed it unfair to the Respondent to proceed with the re-making and we decided to adjourn this to a later date.
Notice of Decision and Directions
40. The decision of the FtT dated 10th May 2024 contained material errors of law and is set aside.
41. This matter is retained in the Upper Tribunal to determine the sole issue of whether the Appellant has a viable internal relocation option in Kuala Lumpur.
42. The Appellant agreed at the hearing to serve on the Respondent a copy of the consolidated bundle by 4pm on 9th May 2025.
43. The parties are to have particular regard to the remaining directions:

(a) The Appellant is to file on CE-file and to serve on the Respondent by e-mail at [~] a copy of her skeleton argument no less than 14 days before the next hearing;
(b) The Respondent is to file on CE-file and to serve on the Appellant, if so advised, a copy of her skeleton argument no less than 7 days before the next hearing;
(c) The appeal is to be re-listed for re-making, before UTJ Pinder and DUTJ Graves, with a time estimate of three hours, on the first available date in accordance with Appellant Counsel’s availability.

Sarah Pinder

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

06.06.2025