Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001084

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/54097/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

22nd May 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS

Between

J A
(ANONYMITY ORDER continued)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Moksud, instructed on behalf of the appellant
For the Respondent: Mr Diwnycz, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard on 19 May 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the determination of the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Saffer) promulgated on 8 January 2025. By its decision, the Tribunal dismissed the appellant’s appeal on all grounds against the Secretary of State’s decision dated 26 June 2023 to refuse his protection and human rights claim.
2. The FtTJ did make an anonymity order, and no grounds were submitted during the hearing for such an order to be discharged. Anonymity is granted because the facts of the appeal involve a protection claim and that his rights protected under Article 8 outweigh the right of the public to know his identity as a party to these proceedings, the latter being protected by Article 10 of the ECHR. The anonymity order is detailed above.
The background:
3. The factual background is summarised in the decision of the FtTJ between paragraphs 6-24 and is taken from various sources of evidence as follows. The appellant is a national of Pakistan. The appellant claimed that he had met his wife in Pakistan in a shopping place where they would exchange numbers, and they wanted to marry. She was scared to tell her family and they went against them and married in 2005 or 2006. He did not know how the family found he and his wife, but they attacked his family. They said if he did not divorce his wife they would harm his family. The appellant relied upon incident on 6 February 2007 where they found him, took his wife back and kidnapped him (on the day of his birthday) between 3 and 5 PM and tortured him and he was held 16 – 18 hours. During that time he was shot .he was rescued and taken to a hospital. They found out that he was alive and started looking for him again. A friend helped him get a passport and he applied for a visit visa to the UK, which was granted, and he entered the UK between the 22nd and 24th of April 2007. He claimed that he had received threatening calls, as had his wife A in the UK and that he was in fear of his ex-relatives if he returned to Pakistan whom he claimed to be influential and had connections. The appellant stated that he had applied for permission to stay in 2009 to be with his girlfriend who had returned to Hungary and then passed away. He had an appeal in 2019 against a refusal for permission to stay when it was refused. He married A in the UK. On 25 May 2022 he made a claim for asylum.
4. The Respondent considered his application and, in her decision letter dated 26 June 2023 refused the claim. Beyond accepting his nationality and identity and that he had been married to S, the respondent rejected his account of having problems from his ex-family and set out in the decision letter the inconsistencies in the account given by him concluding that it was not accepted that he ever had any problems with his ex-wife’s family and were he to return he would not face problems from them.
5. The respondent applied section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004 and that his behaviour met the relevant sections-that he had entered the UK on a visit visa when he had escaped problems in Pakistan but did not claim asylum. He arrived in the UK in April 2007 and claimed he travelled with the intention of escaping his problems in Pakistan and to claim asylum, but he did not claim even though he spoke to the Immigration Officer on arrival and having overstayed his visa he claimed asylum in May 2022 but failed to claim asylum before being notified of an immigration decision. The respondent also rejected his account that had established his ex-family members were influential or had any connections, and upon assessment of the background material relating to Pakistan found that there was sufficiency of protection for him and that he could internally relocate. The remainder of the decision letter dealt with Article 8 of the ECHR.
6. The appeal came before the FtTJ and although appellant was not represented at the hearing, the FtTJ had a bundle of documentation served on his behalf including a witness statement and an appeal skeleton argument (“ASA”). In a decision promulgated on 8 January 2025, the FtTJ dismissed the appeal having rejected his account that he had been credible in his claim to have been at risk in Pakistan on the factual basis as claimed. The FtTJ set out his findings of fact between paragraphs 26 – 33 and concluded that it was a claim that was “bereft of credibility”. He therefore dismissed the appeal.
7. The appellant applied for permission to appeal, based on 3 grounds. Permission to was refused by FtTJ Galloway on 14 February 2025 but on renewal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Lodato on 17 March 2025.
The hearing before the Upper Tribunal:
8. The hearing took place on 19 May 2025. The appellant was represented by Mr Moksud, of Counsel and the respondent by Mr Diwnycz, Senior Presenting Officer.
9. Mr Moksud indicated that he relied upon the grounds of challenge and the skeleton argument provided. Mr Diwnycz Senior Presenting Officer referred to the reply he had provided to the grounds of appeal under Rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 dated 14May 2025.
10. Dealing with the grounds, Mr Moksud relied upon the written grounds and referred to paragraph 26. He submitted that the FtTJ accepted that the appellant received a gunshot wound to his left upper arm and that he was admitted to the hospital on 06 February 2007 at 11 am and discharged on 09 February 2007. The FtTJ also accepts that there is a reasonable likelihood that he was correct in saying that he was kidnapped on his birthday.
11. However it is submitted that the FtTJ noted minor discrepancies at paragraph 28, and that based upon those he found that the claim was fabricated. Mr Moksud referred to the discrepancies which included whether the incident happened from 2006 to 2007. The grounds submitted that given the length of time since the incident, it was not appropriate for the FtTJ to undermine the appellant’s credibility as it is not a “memory test” ( paragraph 5 of the grounds).
12. Reference is also made to paragraph 28, and it is submitted that the FtTJ has failed to give adequate reasons for finding his claim was fabricated. It is submitted that a FtTJ is required to provide adequate reasoning for accepting or not accepting any relevant evidence before him/her as per MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216.
13. Dealing with ground 2, this challenges paragraph 29. The FtTJ required corroboration of evidence, which does not apply to the protection claim. There is no requirement to produce corroborative evidence supporting an asylum claim.
14. Ground 3 related to paragraph 27 of the FtTJ’s decision. It is submitted that at paragraph 27, the FtTJ notes that the appellant made a delayed claim seeking international protection. It is submitted that the FtTJ has attached more weight to the section 8 factor of delay in making an asylum claim, which is only one factor in the assessment of credibility as compared to a decisive factor. SM (Section 8: Judge’s process) Iran [2005] UKAIT 00116 (5 July 2005), held that section 8 in no way operated to deem evidence lacking credibility without a balanced assessment of the case as a whole. In JT (Cameroon) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 878, it was endorsed by the SSHD that s.8 should not be interpreted as affecting the usual standard of proof in an Asylum claim appeal.
15. It is submitted that the FtTJ’s attachment of too much weight to the section 8 delay factor resulted in a material error of law in assessing the credibility overall. Mr Moksud submitted that having found the core part of his claim to be credible and evidenced by the medical report, the FtTJ should not of added the issue of delay as the decisive factor in dismissing the appeal.
16. The grounds also submit that based upon the above submissions, the FtTJ’s adverse credibility finding in paragraphs 31- 34 are contaminated with material misdirection and material errors of law.
17. Mr Moksud submitted that the decision should be set aside as a result of the errors of law.
18. Mr Diwnycz relied upon the Rule 24 response. In respect of the characterisation of discrepancies in the appellant’s account as “marginal inconsistencies”, he submitted that is not a fair description of the evidence. The FtTJ accepted the appellant had been injured by a gunshot, as corroborated by the hospital evidence obtained for the appellant and adduced by him in support of his claim and appeal. However it is abundantly clear that the appellant claimed to have been kidnapped and tortured and shot on his birthday, in the afternoon. Mr Diwnycz submitted that paragraph 26 “is a model of clarity and reasoning”, and it is disingenuous to suggest that an event as momentous as being kidnapped and shot on an otherwise memorable day such as a birthday, can somehow outweigh independent evidence which shows the timing cannot have occurred as claimed.
19. It is further submitted that the findings of the FtTJ at paragraph 29 do not ostensibly ask for corroboration. They merely state the obvious, insofar as no other evidence of threats by telephone were adduced by the appellant. Given the provision of evidence regarding the gunshot injury, the Judge was entitled to remark on the absence of other evidence. The case of TK ( Burundi) v SSHD [2009] EWCA Civ 40 remains on point regarding the provision of corroborative evidence which may be easily obtained.
20. As regards the delay in making his claim for asylum, Mr Diwnycz submitted that it was open to the judge to assess the 15 year delay as “colossal“ and to find that it damaged his credibility. In summary, he submitted that the FtTJ gave adequate reasons for his decision and the grounds did not demonstrate any error of law in that decision.
21. Mr Moksud indicated that he did not wish to make any reply that he relied upon the grounds and his earlier submissions.
Discussion:
22. Before undertaking an assessment of the grounds, I take into account the following matters. First, I must read the decision of the FtTJ sensibly and holistically and exercise appropriate restraint before interfering with it. Secondly, a brief decision does not mean necessarily that it is erroneous in law. Thirdly, what is required in a decision will be case specific and will depend on the nature of the issue (s) in play.
23. The grounds advanced expressly challenge the decision on the basis of inadequacy of reasoning. As regards the provision of reasons, I take into account that there is a legal duty to give a brief explanation of the conclusions of the central issue on which an appeal is determined and what is said in Shizad (sufficiency of reasons; set aside) [2013] UKUT 85 (IAC) that “reasons need not be extensive if the decision as a whole makes sense, having regard to the material accepted by the FtTJ.” I further observe that the parties are aware of the evidence that has been presented before the FtTJ, both orally and in documentary form.
24. I remind myself of the decision in Volpi v Volpi ( supra) when reviewing a first instance judge's findings of fact as per Lewison LJ as follows:
"2. The approach of an appeal court to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled:
i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii) The adverb 'plainly' does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.
25. The written grounds of challenge and the submissions made by Mr Moksud seek to challenge the assessment of credibility made by the FtTJ in his decision. The skeleton argument filed for the hearing ( not by Mr Moksud but relied upon by him) seeks to challenge the decision on the basis that the FtTJ made a material error of law, “in finding fabrication in paragraph 28 following accepting the core of his claim of persecution at paragraph 28” ( see ground 1).
26. It is submitted that the FtTJ has accepted at paragraph 26 and (read with paragraph 24) that the appellant received a gunshot wound to his left upper arm and was admitted to hospital on 6 February 2007 at 11 AM and discharged on 9 February 2007. The grounds and the oral submissions proceed on the basis that the FtTJ accepted the court narrative of his account (see paragraph 5 of skeleton argument) but that the FtTJ’s assessment of credibility was based on minor discrepancies and therefore the judge was not entitled to regard the core of his claim as fabricated. In his oral submissions, Mr Moksud referred to the discrepancy in the date at paragraph 28 and that the judge accepted it could be a typographical error.
27. Having considered the decision of FtTJ Saffer in light of the evidence and the grounds I am satisfied that there is no error of law in the decision based on the grounds as advanced. It is trite law but a decision of a FtTJ should be read in its entirety and not by reference to paragraphs in isolation.
28. The grounds misread the decision of FtTJ Saffer. He found that it was reasonably likely that the appellant received a gunshot wound to his upper left arm and that he was admitted to hospital on 6 February 2007 at 11 AM and discharged on 9 February 2007. This was based on the documents provided as recorded by the FtTJ at paragraph 24 (and also see documents in bundle p10-12;p54CEF). The FtTJ stated that he had no reason to doubt the authenticity of those documents. Whilst the appellant’s account been that had been caused by 9 mm bullet, the FtTJ did not place any weight as to the apparent inconsistency between that description and the GP record ( 5/3/21) which referred to 12 bore? because there had been a question mark next to the entry in the GP’s note. The FtTJ’s findings of fact are entirely clear at paragraph 26. The FtTJ found as a fact that the appellant had suffered a gunshot wound but not that it was caused in the circumstances as claimed by the appellant; his account being that he had been kidnapped and tortured on 6 February 2007 by his ex-wife’s family members and/or others.
29. The FtTJ gave careful, clear and evidence based reasons for rejecting the appellant’s account of the events that he claimed had occurred. The FtTJ assessed his factual claim as to the circumstances in which the injury was caused. The appellant’s factual claim was that during his kidnap he was tortured where they took his nails out and burned his body and set fire to his body (see Q6 AI ;w/s paragraphs 10 and 13). However the FtTJ found that the appellant’s claimed factual account was not consistent with the medical evidence stating, “I do not accept that if he had any other injuries such as burn marks, it is reasonably likely the hospital in Pakistan in 2007 would have omitted them from the reports as there would be no reason for them to do so” ( see paragraph 26). This was a finding of fact entirely open to the FtTJ to make having heard the evidence of the appellant which he recorded at paragraph 22. The appellant’s explanation was also recorded by the FtTJ as follows: “the medical notes only referred to the gunshot wound they may just describe the main thing.” It is clear from the FtTJ’s analysis of the evidence that he plainly rejected the explanation and gave reasons for doing so.
30. Furthermore the FtTJ was entitled to rely upon a significant discrepancy in the appellant’s account. The FtTJ the appellant’s evidence as to the events on 6 February 2007 was recorded by the FtTJ as taken from his screening interview, the asylum interview and witness statement alongside oral evidence (see paragraph 9 – 21). In summary on 6 February 2007, which was his birthday, between 3 – 5 PM he was kidnapped and tortured and was held for 16 – 18 hours ( see paragraph 16 of the FtTJ’s decision; Q88). The FtTJ’s finding on the evidence ( including the me a medical report) was as follows:
“As he was admitted at 11 AM on 6th February with gunshot wounds, it is simply not possible that he was kidnapped that afternoon between 3 and 5 PM and kept for 16 to 18 hours by members of S’s family and shot during that period.”
31. Contrary to the grounds this was not a minor discrepancy but was one which undermined the appellant’s account significantly. The FtTJ considered whether there was any explanation for that discrepancy but found that there was no cogent evidence of memory loss and that the self-reporting was not independent medical evidence. This was a finding which was open to the FtTJ on the evidence. Further, he took into account the appellant’s evidence that the appellant was, “very clear that he was kidnapped on his birthday. He is not reasonably likely to have confused when his birthday was “ ( see paragraph 26).
32. The FtTJ also made other findings of fact concerning inconsistencies in the appellant’s account at paragraph 28. He identified 3 evidential discrepancies. Firstly, the appellant’s account as to whether it was he or his brother was shot ( see SI 3.1 which refers to his brother-in-law being shot). Secondly, the appellant gave discrepant evidence about the time he spent in hospital ( see paraph 10 of FtTJ’s decision taken with SI 3.1 as being 1 day and 1 night; (oral evidence recorded by the judge at paragraph 22 being in hospital 1 or 2 days and the medical report setting out 6 February 2007-9 February 2007). Thirdly, discrepant evidence was given about the composition of the group who he claimed had tortured him. Paragraph 10 recorded the evidence, SI 3.1 that it was 2 of the brothers-in-law and three others. The evidence at paragraph 16 ( AI Q 87) referred to one brother, a cousin and he did not know the names of the others and at paragraph 21 they were identified as her brothers and 3 other individuals.”
33. The FtTJ considered those inconsistencies in the evidence was entitled to consider them in the context of the claim and the significant discrepancy identified at paragraph 26 that it was not possible that he could have been kidnapped on 6 February 2007 between 4:57 PM and held and tortured for 16 to 18 hours and shot during that period if he be admitted to hospital at 11 AM on 6 February 2007 as the medical report recorded.
34. The FtTJ was also entitled to consider the issue of credibility in the context of the finding made at paragraph 27 that the appellant had entered the UK in 2007 on a visit visa and not only did he fail to claim asylum on entry but also in applications made in 2009 and 2019 and did not claim asylum until he was served with an immigration decision in 2022. The FtTJ described this as a “colossal 15 year delay in seeking international protection”. The FtTJ was entitled to make a finding that, “and failure to claim protection further undermines his credibility”.
35. I reject the submission made in the grounds ( Ground 3) and the skeleton argument paragraph 17 that the FtTJ placed too much weight on this factor ( see section 8 of the 2004 Act). The matter of weight is entirely a matter for the judge to assess. In JT (Cameroon) Lord Justice Pill described at [19] the danger of section 8 "distorting the fact finding exercise by an undue concentration on minutiae which may arise under this section at the expense of, and as a distraction from, an overall assessment. Decision makers should guard against that. A global assessment of credibility is required." At [21] Pill LJ said that section 8 "is no more than a reminder to fact-finding tribunals that conduct coming within the categories stated in Section 8 shall be taken into account in assessing credibility.... Where Section 8 matters are held to be entitled to some weight, the weight to be given to them is entirely a matter for the fact finder."
36. The issue of delay was a matter raised in the decision letter and expressly relied upon by the respondent in the review conducted as a matter relevant to the assessment of the appellant’s credibility ( see paragraph 9 of the Review). If the Judge had not considered all these relevant section 8 factors he would have been in error as there is a clear statutory duty to do so. There is no suggestion that any of the content of that paragraph was erroneous or contained irrelevant considerations. The FtTJ’s finding was also supported by the evidence. The appellant stated that when he came to the UK in 2006 it was not his intention to return to Pakistan ( see SI 3.1); he accepted that he spoke to the immigration officer on arrival but did not raises fears (Q68) and the FtTJ was entitled to consider the evidence (Q110) when asked if he was in fear of his life when he arrived in 2007. The FtTJ was also entitled to take into account that the appellant had contact with the Home Office in 2009, which appears to relate to an application to marry a woman from Hungary (Q111) and also 10 years later (Q113), as set out in the evidence recorded at paragraph 17 of the FtTJ’s decision, but that the appellant did not claim asylum until 2022 after he was served with an immigration decision. The FtTJ was therefore entitled to place weight on what he described as a “colossal” delay of 15 years before the appellant made his claim and the matter of weight to that factor was for the FtTJ to determine in the context of the case ( see Pill LJ at [21]).
37. It is further plain from reading the decision that this was not the only adverse finding of credibility nor was it the only reason for reaching an adverse credibility finding and as such the consideration of the section 8 factors formed part of a global assessment of the appellant's credibility. For those reasons ground 3 is not made out.
38. Dealing with ground 2, the ground seeks to challenge paragraph 29 of the FtTJ’s decision. That paragraph reads as follows, “There is no independent evidence of any threats or calls to him or family members in the absence of which he has failed to establish it is reasonably likely there have been any.”
39. Whilst the grounds and the skeleton argument refer to the point that corroboration is not required in an asylum claim, in the decision of MAH(Egypt) v SSHD[2023] EWCA Civ 216 the Court of Appeal considered the issue of corroboration in protection/asylum claims. The Court of Appeal set out at paragraph 86 as follows:
86. It was common ground before this Court that there is no requirement that the applicant must adduce corroborative evidence: see Kasolo v Secretary of State for the Home Department (13190, a decision of the then Immigration Appeal Tribunal, 1 April 1996). On the other hand, the absence of corroborative evidence can, depending on the circumstances, be of some evidential value: if, for example, it could reasonably have been obtained and there is no good reason for not obtaining it, that may be a matter to which the Tribunal can give appropriate weight. This is what was meant by Green LJ in SB (Sri Lanka) at para. 46(iv).
40. As Mr Diwnycz submitted whilst it is common ground that there is no requirement that an appellant must adduce corroborative evidence, the absence of corroborative evidence can, depending on the circumstances, be of some evidential value as recognised above. In my view, the FtTJ identified evidence which fell into this category. The appellant’s account was that he had been threatened by receiving telephone calls as had his wife A and that as a result she contacted the embassy (see paragraph 18 of FtTJ’s decision and Q6AI) and also in the witness statement calls are being made to her). The FtTJ’s finding was that the appellant had not provided any independent evidence or supporting evidence of any threats or calls and he was entitled to make that finding of fact where it was the appellant’s account there were others who had been threatened as we as himself and evidence in support could have been provided, notwithstanding that he had received calls himself of which there was no supporting evidence. Consequently the FtTJ did not make an error of law when reaching that finding of fact at paragraph 29.
41. Again, that was not an isolated finding of fact but one that should be considered in the light of the other findings of fact made and as summarised above, but also in the light of the finding of fact made at paragraph 31 where the FtTJ did not find that it was reasonably likely that the ex-in-laws would have any adverse interest in him as they wanted a divorce which is what he had given them.
42. Other findings of fact made on the assessment of the evidence are contained in paragraphs 31 and 32; that there was no independent evidence for the appellant’s account that the ex-in-laws had any connections/influence in Pakistan and the FtTJ was entitled to view this in the context of the factual claim that he was able to remain Pakistan following the incident, and able to leave Pakistan through the airport using his own passport (see paragraph 31).
43. The FtTJ’s overall analysis was that the appellant had failed to establish that it was reasonably likely that he was kidnapped and tortured by S’s family in February 2007 or at all (see paragraph 30) and when set against the finding made at paragraphs 28,29 and 31, the assessment made that he did not require state protection or internally relocate was an assessment open to the FtTJ to reach on the evidence. However, when taking into account the finding made at paragraph 31, that the appellant failed to establish that there was any adverse interest in him nor had he established any influence or connections, based on the background evidence which was set out in detail in the decision letter, the FtTJ concluded in the alternative that the state was willing and able to offer sufficient protection from persons fearing nonstate actors, that there is freedom of movement and given the size of Pakistan and the number of large cities, that the appellant could internally relocate. In view of the findings of fact made at paragraph 32 as to his health and those set out at paragraphs 36 and 37, those findings were also open to the FtTJ to make. The grounds do not challenge in substance that assessment and only do so on the basis of the other grounds being established ( see paragraph 8 of the grounds of challenge), which, for the reasons set out above fail.
44. In conclusion and when properly analysed, the grounds of challenge are not made out and amount to no more than a disagreement with the decision. When addressing the grounds advanced as to adequacy of reasons, adequacy means no more nor less than that. It is not a counsel of perfection, and it is not necessary to provide “reasons for reasons “. Still less should it provide an opportunity to undertake a qualitative assessment of the reasons to see if they are wanting, perhaps even surprising, on their merits. The purpose of the duty to give reasons, is in part, to enable the losing party to know why he or she has lost, and that has been done by the FtTJ in his decision.
45. Having considered the decision reached, the FtTJ was required to consider the evidence that was before the First-tier Tribunal as a whole, and he plainly did so by giving adequate reasons for his decision. He did not place too much weight on the issue of delay but was entitled to consider this issue in his over assessment of credibility.
46. Consequently for those reasons the appellant has not established that the FtTJ’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law, therefore the decision shall stand.
Notice of Decision:
The decision of the FtTJ did not involve the making of a material error of law and the decision of the FtTJ shall stand.

21 May 2025
Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds