Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case Nos: UI-2025-001085

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/56314/2023
LP/06277/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

5th November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEBEDE

Between

DS
(Anonymity Order made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms L Mair, instructed by The UK Law Firm
For the Respondent: Dr Ibisi, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 24 October 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is the re-making of the decision in the appellant’s appeal, following the setting aside of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal which dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s decision to refuse her asylum and human rights claim.

2. The background to this case is as follows.

3. The appellant is an Indian national born on 6 November 1992. She arrived in the UK in April 2012 on a student visa valid until 19 August 2013. She did not return to India after her visa expired and did not attempt to regularise her stay until 8 January 2022 when she claimed asylum. She attended a screening interview on 10 January 2022 and completed a preliminary information questionnaire on 4 March 2022. She then attended a full asylum interview on 25 April 2023. Her claim was refused on 31 August 2023 and she appealed against that decision.

4. The appellant claimed that after arriving in the UK her college closed down and she was unable to complete her studies. She contacted her mother as she wanted to return to India but her mother told her not to return as she had borrowed money from individuals to fund her journey to the UK and studies and she had been unable to pay them back. She feared that the moneylenders would cause her harm if she returned to India. The appellant claimed that she lost contact with her mother in 2017 and did not know if she was alive or dead. In 2018 she met a woman M who informed her that she could get her residency in the UK for £12,000 and she offered to work for M to make the payment. She worked for M in a warehouse for six months but did not receive any pay and M attacked her when she confronted her about that. After two to three weeks she was moved to work in a different location and was forced to work in a clothing factory for about 13 months. The man who ran the factory subjected her to sexual abuse five or six times. She managed to escape and met two men who offered to help her and advised her to claim asylum. She feared the individuals who abused her and forced her to work for them and she feared persecution as a victim of human trafficking.

5. The respondent, in refusing the appellant’s claim, accepted that she was a victim of modern slavery in the UK but did not accept that she faced issues in India due to moneylending and did not accept that she had lost contact with her mother. The respondent did not consider that the appellant would be at risk from the traffickers in India, as the experience happened whilst she was in the UK. The respondent considered that there was, in any event, a sufficiency of protection and internal flight alternative available to the appellant in India. The respondent had regard to the appellant’s mental health problems but considered that she would be able to access treatment in India.

6. The appellant’s appeal against that decision was heard by a First-tier Tribunal Judge on 12 November 2024. The judge had before her a psychiatric report from Dr Chandra Ghosh, a retired consultant forensic psychiatrist, which concluded that the appellant suffered from depression and quite severe PTSD from when she was raped, that she was suicidal and vulnerable, and that she was not able to cope with the stress of giving oral evidence in Court. The judge also had the appellant’s medical records giving details of her conditions of Crohns disease and tuberculosis, as well as mental health problems. In addition the judge had evidence to show that the appellant had been referred, in October 2021, to the National Referral Mechanism (NRM) for the Competent Authority (CA) to make a decision as to whether she was a victim of modern slavery and that a decision had been made on 11 October 2021 that there were reasonable grounds for concluding that she was a victim of modern slavery. A conclusive grounds decision was awaited but had not yet been made (a positive conclusive grounds decision has since been made).

7. The appellant gave oral evidence before the judge. The judge did not accept that the appellant had given a credible account of being at risk on return to India as a result of her mother borrowing money from moneylenders, as no harm had come to her mother in the five years from 2012 to 2017 and in any event it was her mother and not herself who had borrowed the money. The judge did not find the appellant’s account of losing contact with her family in India to be credible, and concluded that she was still in touch with her mother and brother. The judge considered that the appellant would be at no risk from the traffickers in the UK as they were UK based and she had had no connection with them in India. The judge did not consider that the appellant would be at risk of being re-trafficked in India as she would have the support of her mother and brother there. As for Article 3, the judge accepted that the appellant was a seriously ill person on the basis of her mental health but considered that she could access the required medical treatment and medication in India, that she was not a suicide risk and that her removal would therefore not breach her human rights on that basis. The judge considered that there were no very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration in India and no compelling circumstances outside the immigration rules on Article 8 grounds. The judge accordingly dismissed the appeal on all grounds, in a decision promulgated on 14 November 2024.

8. The appellant sought permission to appeal the judge’s decision on five grounds. Firstly, that the judge had failed to apply the vulnerability guidelines and had failed to consider the impact that her vulnerability had on her credibility, contrary to the guidance in AM (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWCA Civ 1123. Secondly, that procedural unfairness had arisen as a result of the judge suggesting that she could contact her mother by post or social media when the point was never to put to her and she was therefore not given an opportunity to respond, contrary to the guidance in Maheshwaran v SSHD [2002] EWCA Civ 173. Thirdly, that the judge had failed to consider the evidence in the round before making a finding of fact, and had failed to take account of the various parts of the evidence where the appellant had referred to the loss of contact with her mother. Fourthly, that the judge had failed to consider the evidence and caselaw on the risks of re-trafficking for an accepted vulnerable victim of trafficking, with particular reference to TD and AD (Trafficked women) Albania CG [2016] URUT 00092 and HD (Trafficked women) Nigeria (CG) [2016] UKUT 454. Fifthly, that the judge had failed to engage with the argument made on Article 8 grounds that it would be unlawful to remove her whilst the conclusive grounds decision was outstanding.

9. Permission was granted in the First-tier Tribunal on all grounds and the matter came before me on 18 July 2025 to determine the error of law issue.

Error of Law Decision

10. At the hearing, the appellant relied on further documentary evidence, consisting of further medical evidence and the positive conclusive grounds decision.

11. In a decision promulgated on 1 August 2025, I set aside the judge’s decision, on a limited basis, as follows:

“13. I find no merit in the first three grounds. It is clear that the judge was fully aware of the appellant’s vulnerability and the relevance of her being a vulnerable witness. The judge made specific reference to the Joint Presidential Guidance at [6] and accepted that the appellant was a person who should be treated as a vulnerable witness and that the relevant directions on the treatment of vulnerable witnesses would be observed throughout the proceedings. The judge had full regard to the psychiatric report from Dr Ghosh and accepted that the appellant was suffering from a serious mental illness. It cannot, in such circumstances, properly be said that the judge did not take account of the appellant’s vulnerability when assessing her evidence. As Ms Nolan submitted, there was nothing in the appellant’s skeleton argument before the First-tier Tribunal which suggested that the appellant’s vulnerability had impacted upon her evidence on the core of her claim. Further, again as Ms Nolan properly submitted, the grounds do not establish how the appellant’s vulnerability could have affected the judge’s finding that the appellant was still in contact with her mother and brother in India. There was indeed nothing in the medical evidence which addressed that issue and which suggested that the appellant’s evidence may be adversely impacted in that regard by her vulnerability.

14. Likewise, I find no merit in the assertion in the grounds that there was procedural unfairness arising from the judge’s findings on the issue of contact with her mother and brother. I reject the assertion in the grounds that it was procedurally unfair for the judge to suggest that the appellant could contact her mother by post or social media and that the matter ought to have been put to the appellant. The appellant was perfectly aware that the respondent did not accept that she had lost contact with her mother and brother, as that was a point specifically made in the refusal decision and the Respondent’s Review. It was therefore entirely reasonable for the judge to expect the appellant to have provided a full and proper response to the respondent’s concerns, and for the judge to make her findings on the limited evidence that was available to her. The appellant had the benefit of legal representation throughout and there is therefore no proper reason why she did not provide a full response to that concern. In so far as the grounds assert that the judge failed to consider all the evidence in the round in reaching her adverse conclusion, the judge was not required to cite every piece of evidence when there was otherwise no reason to conclude that she had ignored parts of the evidence. On the contrary the judge referred to the evidence at [6] and made clear at [21] that she had considered all the evidence in the round. The fact that the appellant mentioned the loss of contact with her mother at several points in the evidence, as set out at [16] of the grounds and [24] of Ms Mair’s skeleton argument, did not preclude the judge from making the adverse findings that she did.

15. For all these reasons I do not find the first three grounds to be made out. It seems to me entirely reasonable for the judge to take issue with the appellant’s claim to have simply given up contacting her mother when the telephone number she had did not work. The judge was perfectly entitled, in the circumstances, to reject the appellant’s claim to have lost contact with her family in India for the reasons that she did on the evidence available to her.

16. As Ms Mair submitted, other aspects of the appellant’s claim flowed from that finding. Other than by way of challenge to the judge’s findings on contact with her mother - and the assertion that she did not know if her mother had been harmed by the moneylenders because she had no contact with her mother - the appellant has not challenged the judge’s adverse conclusion on her account of the risk arising from moneylenders in India. There has been no challenge to the judge’s findings at [22] that the appellant herself would not be of adverse interest to the moneylenders and that there was in any event a sufficiency of protection from the Indian authorities in that regard. The judge was accordingly fully and properly entitled to reject the appellant’s claim in that regard.

17. However I do find that the judge erred in law when considering the risk of re-trafficking. The judge dealt with that issue very briefly at [24], with the majority of her findings in that regard relating to a risk from the UK traffickers, which was never the appellant’s claim. The judge dismissed the appellant’s claim in regard to a risk of being re-trafficked from India on the grounds that she had the support of her mother and brother. However I agree with Ms Mair that the judge failed to consider other relevant factors and to undertake a full and proper assessment of the issue in line with the relevant country guidance in TD and AD, particularly given the appellant’s vulnerability and mental health issues.

18. In the circumstances I find that ground four is made out. I agree with Ms Mair that the decision is materially flawed in that particular respect and must be set aside. The decision can be re-made in the Upper Tribunal on that aspect of the case. The judge’s findings in regard to the risk from moneylenders and on Article 3 are preserved. A further hearing will therefore be listed in the Upper Tribunal, with directions given for the same below.”

12. The matter was then listed for a resumed hearing on 24 October 2025 and came before me for the decision to be re-made.

Hearing for the Re-making of the Decision

13. A supplementary bundle was produced for the hearing which included a supplementary skeleton argument from Ms Mair, a supplementary witness statement from the appellant dated 17 October 2025, letters from Talking Therapies Bolton and from a clinical and psychoanalytic psychotherapist, evidence of searches on social media for family members, a letter sent by the appellant to India together with an email response and correspondence with the NRM Competent Authority. It appeared that the bundle was not served on the respondent as the appellant’s solicitors were not aware that uploading it on the court system was sufficient, and Dr Ibisi objected to the bundle being admitted. However, given that Dr Ibisi confirmed that she had since had a full opportunity to consider the bundle, I saw no reason not to admit it.

14. The appellant did not appear at the hearing. I was told by Ms Mair that it had always been intended that the appellant would attend and give oral evidence, and that she had prepared for the appeal on that basis, but that the appellant had told her instructing solicitors that morning that she was not mentally well and could not attend. Her instructing solicitor had, according to Ms Mair, been so concerned about the appellant that he had told her (the appellant) to contact the crisis team. Ms Mair advised me that an adjournment was not sought and her instructions were for the appeal to proceed on the basis of submissions only as it could not be said with any confidence that the same would not occur on another occasion if the hearing were to be adjourned and re-listed.

15. In the circumstances, and despite my enquiry again as to whether the hearing should be adjourned, the appeal proceeded on the basis of submissions only.

16. Both parties made submissions before me.

17. Ms Mair submitted that, contrary to the respondent’s position, and in accordance with the guidance in DH (Particular Social Group: Mental Health) Afghanistan [2020] UKUT 223, the appellant should be accepted as being a member of a particular social group, either of ‘women in India’ or ‘victims of trafficking’, and thus the Refugee Convention was engaged. She submitted that simply having previously been trafficked was in itself an indication of risk on return, and that the appellant’s sense of self-worth had been so de-valued as a result of her previous experiences that she was vulnerable to being re-trafficked in India. Ms Mair relied on the cases of TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 00092 and HD (Trafficked women) Nigeria CG [2016] UKUT 00454 in relation to the principle that, whether or not the evidence showed that the country may have support services and a sufficiency of protection available, it was not the general evidence that was so relevant as the appellant’s own circumstances and her inability to access those service owing to her vulnerability. Ms Mair relied upon the statistics for returning victims of trafficking and the high percentage of those not accounted for, and the non-exhaustive list of increased risk factors at [168] of HD (Nigeria). She referred in particular to the risk to the victim of trafficking of being psychologically damaged and stigmatised, and to the risk of being discriminated against. With regard to the decision in TD (Albania) she referred to the position the appellant would find herself in if, having had access to a shelter, she then had to leave the shelter. Ms Mair submitted that there was an accumulation of factors which would lead to the appellant being at risk on return to India.

18. Ms Mair referred me to the specific country evidence which referred to Nigeria and Albania as Tier 2 countries, which meant that they were making a significant effort but did not meet the minimum standards for dealing with trafficking, and submitted that India was in the same category. The evidence showed that current efforts of the Indian authorities was unfavourable. India was ravaged by gender-based violence and sexual abuse and the state was not able to respond to the crisis. As for the evidence relating to the appellant’s own specific circumstances, Ms Mair relied on the report from Dr Ghosh which had been produced for the appeal before the First-tier Tribunal and which referred to the appellant’s feelings of humiliation and degradation, her inability to cope following the rape, and the risk of her mental health deteriorating if she were returned to India. Ms Mair submitted that the report stated that the risk of the appellant being re-trafficked was high. Ms Mair also referred to the more recent medical evidence in the supplementary bundle, and to the reports from Rashida Mustafa, a clinical and psychoanalytic psychotherapist which she said chimed with Dr Ghosh’s opinion, and which confirmed that the appellant was on the waiting list for CBT from the NHS. Ms Mair submitted that the appellant had many of the characteristics and vulnerabilities which placed her at heightened risk of re-trafficking in India, and that the evidence made it clear that interrupting the appellant’s therapy would be a serious setback. Ms Mair also referred to the conclusive grounds minutes and submitted that the information as to how she was vulnerable to exploitation was relevant to the risk of being exploited again in India. She submitted that the appellant would be returning to India with no skills, having failed to acquire the qualification for which she came to study in the UK, in psychological distress and suffering from mental health problems, and that she would be even more vulnerable to exploitation than previously. She submitted that the appellant was receiving emotional and financial support in the UK and was still struggling, so that she would be very vulnerable if returned to India without that support. She would not, in reality, be able to access any support in India.

19. Ms Mair acknowledged that there was a preserved finding from the First-tier Tribunal that the appellant remained in contact with her mother and brother in India, but she asked me to accept the appellant’s claim that she had lost contact with her family, on the basis of the fresh evidence showing her efforts to contact her mother. In the alternative, Ms Mair submitted that even with contact with her mother and brother, the appellant would still be vulnerable to re-trafficking, given that she had previously fallen victim to trafficking despite her protected childhood and would be returning to India with the stigma of her past experiences and as a highly vulnerable person. Ms Mair submitted that there was therefore no adequate protection for the appellant in India and she would be at risk of re-trafficking. She submitted that in any event there were very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration in India and exceptional circumstances which would make it unduly harsh for her to be removed. It would be disproportionate to remove the appellant whilst she was waiting for the outcome of her application for VTS, leave to remain as a victim of trafficking.

20. Dr Ibisi submitted that the appellant’s absence from the hearing spoke volumes about her credibility. She could have obtained help from her social worker to attend and little weight should be given to the excuses provided. Dr Ibisi submitted that, whilst submissions had been made about her mental health, the evidence was scarce. She was not currently accessing treatment but was on a waiting list. The evidence did not show that the appellant would be unable to access treatment in India. There was protection in India for victims of trafficking. The appellant was in contact with her mother and would have her support. She feared non-state agents and could seek help from the police. She was at no greater risk than any other women. There was nothing to suggest that the way she entered the world of trafficking would happen on return to India. She did not have the same issues about her immigration status as she had when she was trafficked and she would not be a lone woman without support. She would not be destitute as she had family support in India. She came from a privileged background as she was able to leave India and come to the UK to study. With regard to the issue of stigma, Dr Ibisi submitted that there was no reason why anyone would know of the appellant’s circumstances unless she chose to disclose that. She was not at risk of re-trafficking.

21. In reply, Ms Mair reiterated the points previously made.

Analysis and Discussion

22. As a starting point, I agree with Ms Mair that the appellant falls within a particular social group as a ‘victim of trafficking’. This is a pre-NABA (Nationality and Borders Act 2022) case and therefore the previous disjunctive approach, rather than the ‘conjunctive’ approach requiring both elements of the test to be satisfied, has been found to be applicable, as in the recent case of EMAP (Gang violence, Convention Reason) [2022] UKUT 335, at [93], with reference to DH at [46] to [75]. The Refugee Convention is therefore engaged to that extent.

23. However the main issue to be determined in this case, as set out in my previous error of law decision of 1 August 2025, is whether the appellant would be at risk on return to India of being re-trafficked. I do not accept that she would.

24. Ms Mair made lengthy submissions about the general principles in relation to victims of trafficking, with reference to the country guidance in AZ (Trafficked women) Thailand CG [2010] UKUT 118, HD (Nigeria) and TD and AD (Albania). She referred to the enhanced risk factors set out in HD (Nigeria) at [168] in submitting that the appellant was so psychologically damaged that she would be unable to access employment, that she was at risk of being stigmatised and ostracised, and that she was at risk of destitution.

25. I fully accept Ms Mair’s argument that, as a victim of trafficking who has experienced physical and mental abuse previously, the appellant has on that basis alone a level of vulnerability to being exploited again, as found at paragraph 4(c) of the headnote to HD (Nigeria). However it is of course the case that there are certain factors and characteristics which would make a person more open to such exploitation over and above the fact of their vulnerability from prior exploitation, and that not all former victim of trafficking would therefore be at risk of serious harm on return. That is made clear in all of those authorities. It is relevant to consider that, in the case of this appellant, she would be in an entirely different position in India to that which led to her being trafficked in the UK. This is not a case of a person having been trafficked to the UK by an international criminal organisation who fears being picked up again in India, and indeed the appellant does not put her case on that basis. As Dr Ibisi properly submitted, the appellant entered the world of trafficking and abuse in the UK, and fell victim to exploitation, as a lone woman without support, because of her precarious immigration status and promises of a residence document. However she would have no such issues in India. She would not have the uncertainty of her immigration status in India. She would not have language difficulties and she would be familiar with the life in that country. Furthermore, on the findings made by the First-tier Tribunal, she retains contact with her family and she would therefore have a network of support to return to, such that there is no reason why she would be homeless or destitute.

26. Ms Mair asked me to accept the fresh evidence produced by the appellant as support for her claim that she had no contact with her family. However I can give no weight to that evidence. The list at page 28 to 34 of the supplementary bundle from the appellant’s social media is unexplained and meaningless. The letter at page 35, said to be a letter from the appellant to her home address in India, is not in English and I do not know what it says. The email at page 37, said to be from the new owner of her family properly in India, is of no evidential value, as it could have been written by anyone and could not be tested in cross-examination, and furthermore is again not in English. As for the appellant’s evidence in her statement that she had received an email from KS stating that he was living in the property and that there was no news from neighbours about her family, and further that she had tried calling the family number to no avail, that is simply her own, untested evidence. The appellant did not attend the hearing to answer any questions put to her. There is no reason for me to accept her evidence at face value, given in particular the adverse credibility findings made by the First-tier Tribunal. In the circumstances I do not accept that the appellant has lost contact with her family and accordingly I reject the assertion that the appellant would be returning to India with no means of support. As for the assertion that the appellant would be stigmatised and ostracised in India because of her past experiences, I agree with Dr Ibisi’s submission that there is no reason why anyone would need to know about her past and that it is the appellant’s choice whether or not to disclose the matter. There is no evidence that anyone would know, or come to know, of her circumstances.

27. It was Ms Mair’s submission that, even if the appellant retained contact with her family in India, they could not provide her with professional support and could not prevent her falling into the hands of traffickers. However, with regard to professional support, the First-tier Tribunal found that there would be medical treatment available to the appellant in India and the appellant would be able to access medication and therapy if required. Those findings are at [27] to [34] of the First-tier Tribunal’s decision and are findings which have been preserved. As for the issue of state protection, Ms Mair referred to the background country evidence in submitting that the picture painted in the country reports of current efforts by the Indian authorities in relation to trafficking was unfavourable and that India fell into the tier 2 category of meeting the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. She also referred to reports of gender-based violence in India. Nevertheless the reports provided make clear that the Indian authorities are making efforts to precent human trafficking and to protect victims of trafficking and that they do provide a level of services and support by way of prevention and protection in all respects.

28. Ms Mair submitted that, irrespective of state protection being available in India, the relevant question was whether the appellant, because of her particular vulnerability and circumstances, would be in a position to access that protection, both in terms of mental health support and protection against re-trafficking. She submitted that, because of the appellant’s extreme vulnerability and her mental health state, she was a person who would be particularly open to exploitation in India and she would not be able to access protection from the state, either in terms of access to health treatment or prevention of re-trafficking. She submitted that the appellant was a psychologically damaged woman who was highly vulnerable and incapable of managing her life without the support system in place in the UK, and she referred to the fact that the appellant was in such a state of anxiety about today’s appeal hearing and so mentally unwell that she was not able to attend.

29. I have to agree with Dr Ibisi that the evidence available before the Tribunal in that respect is sparce. It seems to me that the extent of the appellant’s current psychological state as described by the appellant herself and by Ms Mair is not really borne out by the evidence. It is indeed the case that the respondent has fully accepted the appellant’s terrible experiences as a victim of trafficking in the UK, and there are no credibility issues arising in that regard. It is also the case that there is no dispute that the appellant has been traumatised by those experiences. The finding of the First-tier Tribunal Judge that the appellant has a mental health condition and that she is a ‘seriously ill person’ has not been challenged and is a preserved finding. I have carefully read the report from Dr Ghosh, which is now over two years old, and I have had full regard to the opinions given at the end of the report, as well as to the appellant’s medical notes, all of which were considered by the First-tier Tribunal.

30. However, I also note from [28] of the First-tier Tribunal’s decision that the appellant was not at that time receiving any input in the UK for her mental health other than medication (sertraline), and from [31] of the decision that she had had some counselling in 2022 and a few sessions in 2024, with no further input for her mental health condition since August 2024. There is nothing in the further evidence to suggest that the appellant’s condition has deteriorated since that time. The evidence suggests that the appellant continued to have no input for her mental health, other than medication, for several months, and that she has only very recently taken steps to access therapy through the NHS. It is apparent from the letter at page 20 of the supplementary bundle dated 28 July 2025 from Bolton Talking Therapies that she has now been placed on an NHS waiting list, following a telephone triage assessment appointment. That letter refers to difficulties with flashbacks, anxiety and depression triggered by past events, poor diet, poor sleep, hopelessness and low mood, but that was information described by the appellant herself. The only evidence of the appellant’s current psychological state since the report of Dr Ghosh, aside from her own description of her current state of health, consists of two short and rather uninformative letters from Rashida Mustafa, a clinical and psychoanalytic psychotherapist, dated 30 July 2025 and 3 October 2025. Those letters are expressed in somewhat vague terms and reveal little of the appellant’s current state. The letter of 30 July 2025 refers to the appellant having had 10 sessions of psychotherapy but does not explain over what period of time, and refers to further sessions being requested until February 2026. The appellant claims in her statement that her therapy with Ms Mustafa started on 30 April 2025. The letter provides little information other than to refer to the appellant’s past trauma and the intended steps to help her overcome that, and provides limited information about her current psychological state and her ability to function on a daily basis. The same can be said of the more recent letter of 3 October 2025 which again says little about the extent of the appellant’s mental health state and makes rather vague statements about the appellant’s concerns around stigma. There is certainly nothing in those letters which provides support for the extent of the appellant’s health concerns as described by Ms Mair.

31. I am only able to make my assessment, and reach a decision on the evidence before me. Irrespective of the sympathy invoked by Ms Mair’s submissions, the fact is that the evidence available to me is significantly lacking. I accept that the appellant may have been anxious about attending the hearing, but there is no evidence to suggest that she was simply too unwell to do so. Had she attended in person it may be that she could have presented a more compelling case, but she did not do so. There is nothing in that evidence to suggest that the appellant is as psychologically damaged and incapable of functioning in daily life as has been suggested. There is certainly nothing in the evidence to suggest that she would be incapable of accessing the medical treatment and facilities available to her in India or that she would be incapable of accessing assistance from the Indian authorities should she feel at any risk. I therefore reject the assertion that the appellant is so unwell as to be unable to access any support services in India.

32. For all these reasons I do not accept that the appellant has demonstrated that she would be at risk of being trafficked if she returned to India. She has family support in that country and would have somewhere to live. She has had only limited medical support in the UK and would be able to access any medication and support required in India. Although she did not complete her qualification in the UK, she has undertaken some studies here and is an educated woman. The evidence does not suggest that she would be incapable of finding and undertaking employment in India. There is no reason why she should fall into the hands of traffickers in India. I do not accept that the appellant has demonstrated that she would be at risk on return to India and I dismiss her appeal under the Refugee Convention and on humanitarian protection and Article 3 grounds. The findings of the First-tier Tribunal on Article 3 medical grounds are preserved.

33. With regard to Article 8, I accept that the appellant has established a private life in the UK on the basis of her length of residence and her ties in terms of access to therapy and medical assistance. However I do not accept that there would be very significant obstacles to her returning to India, for the reasons already given and for those given by the First-tier Tribunal. The appellant would be able to access medical care and treatment in India and has the support of her family there. There is no reason why she could not be integrated into the country where she lived for many years, including her entire childhood. I do not accept that there are any exceptional circumstances rendering the appellant’s removal to India unduly harsh, for the same reasons. I reject Ms Mair’s suggestion that removing her from her therapy would be unduly harsh, given that she has only recommenced therapy recently after a period of time and would in any event be able to access therapy in India if required. The appellant has been living in the UK without leave for many years and has no basis of stay here. Having had regard to the public interest factors in section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and to the appellant’s own individual circumstances, there are no factors relied upon which could outweigh the public interest in her removal. The appellant’s removal would not, therefore, be disproportionate and would not breach Article 8. In so far as Ms Mair relies upon the fact that the appellant has an outstanding application for VTS leave, I am satisfied that the respondent would not remove her whilst any such application was outstanding. The appeal is accordingly also dismissed on Article 8 grounds.

DECISION

34. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal having been set aside, the decision is re-made by dismissing the appellant’s asylum and human rights appeal.

Signed: S Kebede
Upper Tribunal Judge Kebede

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28 October 2025