Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001093

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/66245/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 10th of July 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HANSON

Between

AIM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr F Aziz of The UK Law Firm
For the Respondent: Ms Z Young, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 4 July 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals with permission a decision of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the Judge’), promulgated following a hearing at Manchester on 7 January 2025, in which the Judge dismissed his appeal against the refusal of his application for international protection and/or leave to remain in the United Kingdom on any other basis.
2. The Appellant is a citizen of Iraq who the Judge records was 23 years of age at the date of the hearing.
3. At [9] the Judge records seeking clarification of the Secretary of State’s position and at [10] proceeding on the basis the Respondent accepted that state protection and an internal relocation option would not be available to the Appellant if a real risk in his home area had been established.
4. The Judge records there being no dispute as to whether the events in Iraq or the Appellant’s sur place activities qualified as Convention reasons [18], or whether considering the credibility of the account the Appellant fears persecution for that Convention reason which the Judge notes relate purely to events in Iraq [19]. Having worked through the evidence the Judge rejects the claim that even if the Appellant did work at a warehouse and drugs were discovered and/or that the Appellant’s home was raided as a result, it was not accepted due to the credibility concerns set out in the determination that if the person referred to as A does exist he has influential relatives within the PUK or any other body, leading to this limb of the appeal being dismissed [51].
5. From [52] the Judge considers whether the Appellant will be persecuted for a Convention reason which focused upon his sur place activities in light of the earlier findings. Having analysed the evidence, the Judge at [62] finds not being satisfied the Appellant is at risk of persecution as a result of his sur place activities as he falls within the low-level protester category set out in country policy and would not be a person of any interest on return on the basis of the available evidence.
6. The Judge addressed the issue of documentation from [66] noting some inconsistencies in the Appellant’s evidence, leading to it being found at [72] that it was not accepted the Appellant could not communicate with his family who have his CSID.
7. The Appellant sought permission to appeal which was refused by another judge the First-tier Tribunal on 18 February 2025 and renewed to the Upper Tribunal where permission was granted, on 18 March 2025, on limited grounds - Ground 3 only - in the following terms:
3. I find ground three is arguable. While the judge properly directs himself, it is arguable that he did not apply the correct standard of proof (see [49]).
4. The Grounds are otherwise unarguable. I endorse the decision of [ ] who refused permission. They are a disagreement with the findings of the judge. The issues raised in ground 1 do not disclose an arguable error of law. They do not say what evidence or explanation the judge disregarded. In so far as weight to attach to the evidence is concerned, that is a matter for the judge. It is unclear what cultural factors referred to in ground 1.
5. The judge considered sur place activities (see [60] –[61]) and explained why he concluded why the appellant’s involvement was low-level and why he would not be a person of interest. It is not explained what evidence or alternative explanation the judge did not consider. The judge applied XX CG [2022] UKUT 00023 (see [59]) when assessing the appellant’s Facebook activity. He had not downloaded his account. He considered at [60] whether it would bring him to the attention of the authorities. His findings do not disclose an arguable error of law.
6. In respect of ground 4, it is not explained what country guidance the judge did not consider or how he misapplied the Country Guidance at [61] of the decision.
8. The appeal is opposed by Ms Young on behalf of the Respondent on the basis the Judge set out the correct legal self-direction and has not been shown to have applied an incorrect standard or burden of proof.

Discussion and analysis
9. The Judge in the section of the determination headed “legal framework” at [17] – [19] wrote:
17. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, and appellant must show a well founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden is upon the Appellant. As per the decision in Karanakaran v SSHD [2000] 3 All ER 449 the single standard of proof is a reasonable degree of likelihood. I must determine whether it is reasonably likely that:
(a) Taking the claim at its highest, there is a Convention reason;
18. The Respondent raises no argument on this topic, either as to events in Iraq or sur place activity.
(b) Considering the credibility of the account, Appellant fears persecution for that Convention reason;
19. This element of the appeal relates purely to events in Iraq. No challenge has been made to the existence of sur place activity. Any argument therefore goes to objective risk generated. I will address that in the next section.
10. It is also important to have regard to the guidance provided by Court of Appeal in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 which makes it clear that appellate judges should not interfere with decisions of judges below unless they are ‘plainly wrong’.
11. The Judge clearly set out the correct legal self-direction and the fact that Appellant may disagree with the Judge’s findings and conclusions does not mean an incorrect burden or standard of proof was applied.
12. Ground 3 as pleaded reads:
Ground 3 - Misapplication of the Standard of Proof
8. To Judges decision fails to demonstrate that the correct standard of proof - a reasonable degree of likelihood - was properly applied ([17],[47], [49]). Whilst the Judge recited the standard, there is no indication that it was effectively used in assessing the evidence.
9. The overall findings suggest that the Judge applied an unduly high threshold when assessing the Appellant’s risk. The rejection of key elements of the Appellant’s account based on minor inconsistencies or perceived credibility issues indicates that the Judge required a level of certainty that exceeds the standard of proof applicable in protection claims.
13. At [17] the Judge set out the legal self-direction as noted above.
14. At [47] the Judge writes:
47. Mr Aziz in his closing noted the comparatively low standard of proof, suggesting that the core elements of the Appellant’s account have been consistent. At least some of the inconsistencies raised - such as the passed bottle/tin matter -had been addressed before the hearing took place. They were not last-minute additions to the narrative. Whilst right, nevertheless elements such as that and the role the Appellant held at the warehouse raised a degree of doubt.
15. At [49] the Judge wrote:
49. In saying that, I bear in mind even if part of an account is found to be untruthful that does not necessarily mean the rest is so. Nevertheless, even allowing for the low standard required to sustain a protection claim the purported threats when combined with other aspects of concern set out above prove fatal to the account. For every suggested consistency (such as working at a warehouse) there is a corresponding discrepancy (variation about the Appellant’s role.) Each of itself is relatively minor. However, when considering things globally there is enough whereby I simply do not believe the Appellant’s account.
16. It is important, as with any determination, that the document is read as a whole. The paragraphs referred to in Ground 3 do not support that argument the Judge misunderstood or misapplied the correct burden and/or standard of proof. Indeed at [49] the Judge sets out the correct legal self-direction and that because there was inconsistency in one part of the account it did not mean that all of the account had to be rejected. The Judge clearly considered the evidence with the required degree of anxious scrutiny as a result of which both consistencies and inconsistencies were identified.
17. The Judge’s conclusion is based upon an assessment of the evidence of a whole and has not been shown to be infected by procedural legal error by the Judge applying the wrong burden or standard of proof. As stated, just because the Appellant does not like the outcome does not mean the Judge erred in this way.
18. Whilst the Appellant may disagree with the outcome and prefer a more favourable resolution to enable him to stay in United Kingdom, that is not sufficient. The grounds do not establish the Judge’s findings are outside the range of those reasonably open to the Judge on the evidence or are rationally objectionable. The Judge’s findings are adequately reasoned and I was not referred to any specific aspect of the evidence or findings that would support the Appellant’s case to the required degree to enable me to find material legal error.
Notice of Decision
19. The First-tier Tribunal has not been shown to have materially erred in law.
20. The determination shall stand.

C J Hanson

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

4 July 2025