Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case Nos: UI-2025-001107
UI-2025-001108

First-tier Tribunal Nos: HU/60063/2024
HU/61412/2024
LH/06567/2024
LH/06568/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 10th of October 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GREY

Between

SIMRAN KAUR
BAANI KAUR
Appellants
and

ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellants: Mr M. Mohzam, Counsel instructed by Twinwood Law Practice
For the Respondent: Ms A. Ahmed, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 15 September 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellants are citizens of India. They appeal against the decision of First-tier Tribunal (‘FTT’) Judge Abdar (the “Judge”) of 19 December 2024 dismissing their human rights appeals.
Background
2. The first appellant is the 22-year-old mother of the second appellant, a 6-year-old child. They made applications on 11 April and 13 June 2024 under Appendix FM of the Immigration Rules for entry clearance to join the sponsor, Mr Tarlok Singh, in the UK. Mr Singh is a British citizen. The respondent refused the applications on 16 July and 22 August 2024.
3. The respondent refused the first appellant’s (hereinafter “the appellant”) application on the basis she did not meet the relationship requirements of paragraphs E-ECP.2.1 to 2.10 of the Immigration Rules because she had not provided any evidence to support her claim to have divorced her (previous) husband. Consequently, the respondent was not satisfied that any previous relationship of the appellant had broken down permanently. Further, the application was refused on the basis the appellant did not meet the English language requirements. The refusal decision records that although the appellant claimed she was exempt from the English language requirements due to a “disability”, she had provided no evidence to demonstrate how long she had been suffering from the disabling condition, what the treatment and prognosis is and how the condition limits the appellant’s ability to speak and learn English to the required standard.
4. The refusal decision goes on to address paragraphs GEN.3.1. and GEN.3.2 of Appendix FM and states that the appellant provided no evidence to establish there were any exceptional circumstances which would render a refusal a breach of Article 8 ECHR because it would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellant or her family.
5. The second appellant’s application was refused on the basis the appellant’s application had been refused.
6. The appellants submitted appeals against the refusal of their application to the FTT on the grounds the refusal decisions breached their Article 8 rights and were unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. The appeals were heard on 1 November 2024 at Taylor House IAC before the Judge.
The FTT decision and grounds of appeal
7. At the hearing the Judge determined that the birth of the appellant’s second child on 9 September 2024 and the rights of the child was a “new matter” and the presenting officer at the hearing, having sought instructions, confirmed that the respondent consented to the Tribunal considering the new matter in this appeal.
8. In relation to whether the appellant was able to satisfy the relationship requirements under Appendix FM, the Judge assessed the documentary evidence produced in relation to the appellant’s claimed marriage to the sponsor and the divorce from her previous husband. The Judge set out the respondent’s observations from the FTT review, with which he agreed, that the appellant’s skeleton argument had failed to engage with the relationship issue and noted anomalies and discrepancies in the documentary evidence provided. This included the fact the date of the appellant’s previous marriage and divorce recorded in the documentary evidence were different to the dates declared in her entry clearance application.
9. Further concerns identified at [21] of the decision included the fact the Gurdwara marriage certificate in relation to the appellant’s and sponsor’s marriage is dated five days after the marriage was said to have taken place, it fails to state the names of the witnesses to the marriage, and a further certificate had been issued by “Revenue Department, Gov’t of NCT of Delhi Office of the District Magistrate Shadhara: Shadhara District” (dated 8 January 2024). The Judge observed that neither of the certificates referred to the appellant’s previous marriage and divorce. In relation to this matter the Judge states, “This may be the norm in India, I do not know and I have not been provided [with] any evidence on the issue that has been raised by the Respondent from the outset”. At [22] of the decision the Judge went on to set out further concerns with the divorce documentation and noted the delay of four years in completion of the divorce which was said to have been by “mutual consent”.
10. Having assessed the evidence before him, both regarding the appearance and content of the documents, the Judge concluded that he was not satisfied the marriage and divorce documents are reliable evidence and noted that they had not been provided with appellants’ applications. The Judge found that the appellants did not meet the Immigration Rules in respect of the relationship requirements
11. At [25] of the decision the Judge determined that the appellant did not qualify for an exemption from satisfying the English language requirements, observing that the appellant was pregnant at the time of her application rather than “disabled”.
12. Having found that the appellants were unable to satisfy the relevant requirements of the Rules, the Judge considered whether the appellants were able to demonstrate exceptional circumstances. At [27] he found that there was family life sufficient to engage Article 8 but found that any interference with the appellants’ family life was reasonable and proportionate. The Judge attached significant weight to the fact the appellants were unable to meet the requirements of the Rules. In relation to the family circumstances at [29] it states:
“Should HS remain in India, the sponsor would be able to freely visit HS and the Appellants in India to continue the family, as envisaged at the time of starting that family life. Alternatively, it is open for the 1st Appellant and the Sponsor to decide for HS to move to the UK to be with the Sponsor. I have not received any reliable evidence to suggest that this is not a viable option, albeit the latter option may be less desirable. On a holistic view, HS was born after the applications and the refusals and it is a matter for the 1st Appellant and the Sponsor, as HS’ parents, to decide where HS should remain, which will serve HS’ best interests.”
Grounds of appeal, grant of permission and error of law hearing
13. As indicated at the error of law hearing I found the grounds of appeal as originally pleaded unstructured and difficult to follow. I asked Mr Mohzam to clarify the key points of challenge from the grounds of appeal, and he identified the following three grounds:

a. It was not open to the Judge to make the findings that he did in relation to the marriage certificate and registration.
b. The Judge erred in failing to apply the correct test regarding the requirements under E-ECP.4.2 concerning the English language test.
c. There was no “proper evaluation” by the Judge in the Article 8 proportionality exercise.
14. I indicated that I would adopt these three issues for my analysis in this decision.
15. Permission to appeal was granted by UTJ Perkins on 1 May 2025 on all grounds. The decision states:
5. The First-tier Tribunals’ decision and Reasons may withstand scrutiny but I find that there is a disturbing tension between the Judge’s finding that the First Appellant had not shown that her previous marriage had ended but that the First Appellant, her daughter, HS and purported husband had established family life together (see paragraph 27).
6. The Second Appellant clearly did not satisfy the English Language Requirements but it was her case that had tried hard and was frustrated by finding language learning difficult and a demanding and worrying pregnancy (sic).
7. Against this background I find it arguable that the First-tier Tribunal’s finding that there were no exceptional circumstances that justified the appeal being allowed on human rights grounds was not reasoned adequately.
16. There was a rule 24 response from the respondent dated 23 July 2025 which, in summary, asserts that the Judge directed himself appropriately and made well-reasoned findings that were clearly open to him.
The error of law hearing, analysis and decision
17. I start by considering the asserted errors in the Judge’s assessment of whether the appellant is able to satisfy the requirements of the Immigration Rules.
18. The Judge found that the marriage and divorce documents adduced by the appellant were not reliable evidence and consequently the appellant had failed to demonstrate that she met the relationship requirements of the Rules.
19. In assessing the reliability of applicant’s documentation, the Judge identified significant matters which he found cast doubt on the reliability of the documents, not least the discrepancy regarding dates for the appellant’s previous marriage and divorce in the divorce documentation compared to the dates declared on her application form.
20. The refusal decision clearly identified that the decision-maker was not satisfied that the any previous relationship of the appellant had broken down permanently and the appellant was therefore on notice from the outset that this was a key concern of the respondent. The refusal decision did not identify any issues with the documentation because, unusually, it had not been submitted with the application. However, the respondent’s review identified a number of anomalies and inconsistences arising from the documentation.
21. The burden of proof is on the appellant to establish her claim. I note that the respondent’s review which identified the issues with the appellant’s documentation was dated the same day as the date of the hearing. The appellant was legally represented at the hearing, and it would have been open to the representative to have sought an adjournment on behalf of the appellant to adduce further evidence to try and address the concerns raised and to explain the discrepancies identified. There is no indication that this was done. At the hearing the sponsor was cross-examined about the discrepancy in dates given for the appellant’s previous marriage and divorce and why the documentation had not been provided with the applications, and he was unable to assist the Judge.
22. The grounds specifically address [21] of the decision where the Judge makes certain observations regarding the marriage documentation and states “This may be the norm in India, I do not know and I have not been provided [with] any evidence on the issue that has been raised by the Respondent from the outset”. In respect of this finding the grounds state:
“14. It is submitted that the FTT is not an expert in regards to Gudwara marriage certificates – it was not suggested that the Gudwara marriage certificate was not genuine it is for this reasons it is submitted that the FTT’s approach to this evidence is wrong and misconceived (sic).”
23. There is no merit to this submission. The Judge did not hold himself out as any kind of expert and did not make any direct finding that the marriage certificate was not genuine. The Judge’s observation relates to a gap he identified in the evidence before him so that, in light of the various anomalies identified, he could not be satisfied that the evidence before him was reliable. The Judge correctly and appropriately considered the reliability of the documentation in accordance with principles from Tanveer Ahmed (Ahmed (Documents unreliable and forged) Pakistan* [2002] UKIAT 00439).
24. The Judge’s conclusion regarding the documentation and, consequently, that the appellant had failed to satisfy the requirements of the Immigration Rules was manifestly open to him and was more than adequately reasoned.
25. Having found that the Judge did not err in his assessment of the relationship requirements of the Rules it is not material whether the Judge erred in his assessment of the English Language requirements because the appellant would not be able to satisfy the requirements of the Immigration Rules. In any event, I am not persuaded that any error has been identified in the grounds in relation to the Judge’s treatment of this issue. In oral submissions Mr Mohzam submitted that the Judge had only addressed E-ECP.4.2(b) in terms of whether the appellant has a disability and did not address E-ECP.4.3(c) and whether there were exceptional circumstances which prevented the applicant from being able to meet the requirements.
26. I note that at [2] of the decision under the heading “The legal framework” the Judge set out in full all parts of the E-ECP.4.2. On this basis there is no merit to any assertion that the Judge failed to direct himself correctly. Although the Judge deals with this issue briefly in the decision it is reasonable to conclude that this was because he had already reached a finding that the appellant could not meet the requirements of the Rules. The Judge engaged with the appellant’s case that she was unable to pass the English language test due to her pregnancy. He considered the supporting evidence and found that the “limited medical evidence” did not support the appellant’s case in this regard. Having directed himself correctly on the relevant provisions of the Rules, I find there is no indication that the Judge did not have the correct matters in mind when considering the exemptions for the English language requirements. The decision demonstrates that the Judge was aware of the evidence relied on by the appellant, had considered it and was not satisfied that it established her case in relation to this issue.
27. In conclusion on these matters, I find that the Judge did not materially err in law in determining that the appellant was unable to satisfy the requirements of the Immigration Rules.
28. I note the observation of UTJ Perkins that there appears to be some tension between the finding of family life sufficient to engage Article 8(1) with the findings in respect of the relationship requirements of the Rules. However, the finding of family life between the appellant, her children and the sponsor has not been challenged in these proceedings, and it is trite that it is possible to establish family life with others outside of marriage. However, given the very limited evidence on this issue before the FTT, I observe that it may have been helpful for the Judge to have provided further reasoning on this issue to better understand his finding and the nature and quality of family life found to exist. In the bundle of documents before the FTT there is no evidence of communication between the appellant and sponsor, no photographic evidence of them enjoying family life together, no evidence of the visits to India the sponsor is said to have made, and no witness statement from the appellant herself.
29. The issue before me, however, relates to the Judge’s treatment of Article 8(2) not Article 8(1). In the limited oral submissions made by Mr Mohzam on this matter he emphasised the Judge’s finding that there was family life and submitted that the Judge had failed to consider all relevant factors and circumstances holistically and consequently failed to come to a “proper conclusion”.
30. Although the Judge found family life existed between the appellant and sponsor, the right to family life under Article 8 is a qualified right; it insufficient to merely establish that family life exists such that Article 8(1) is engaged. If it is engaged, then a tribunal must decide whether the interference with private life is justified under Article 8(2). If an appellant does not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules, the public interest is normally in refusing leave to enter (or remain). The exception is where the refusal results in unjustifiably harsh consequences, such that refusal is not proportionate. The burden of proof is on the appellant to demonstrate unjustifiably harsh consequences.
31. The grounds assert that the Judge’s assessment was flawed because he did not make any proper reference to section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (the “2002 Act”). Whilst the Judge was required to take into account relevant factors set out in section 117B, there is no requirement to cite the section and relevant provisions in a decision. The grounds do not identify which aspect of section 117B it is asserted the Judge failed to consider. I must assume, unless I detect an express misdirection, or unless I am confident from the Judge’s express reasoning that the decision must be based on an implicit misdirection, that the First-tier tribunal, as a specialist tribunal, knows and has applied the correct law: ASO (Iraq) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 1282 at [41].
32. In my view it is clear from the decision that the Judge applied the correct law and had in mind the relevant statutory guidance from the 2002 Act in his assessment of Article 8(2). There is no specific mention of the fact the sponsor will financially support the appellant and her children, but financial independence is a ‘neutral factor’ and could not weigh in the appellant’s favour in the balancing exercise. The grounds do not identify any specific statutory factor which should weigh in the appellant's favour in the balancing exercise which the Judge failed to address. The Judge was manifestly correct to attach significant weight to the public interest in effective immigration controls in accordance with section 117B(1) and due to the fact the appellant does not meet the requirement of the Immigration Rules.
33. The grounds contend that it is in the best interests of the appellant’s and sponsor’s infant son (‘HS’), born 9 September 2024, and the second appellant to be in a single family unit with both the appellant and sponsor in the UK. Reliance is placed on the fact HS is a British Citizen. The decision demonstrates that the Judge took account of the children’s best interests but found that it was open to the sponsor to continue family life with the appellants and HS in India. The Judge noted that there was no evidence before him that options other than enjoying life in the UK as a single family unit were not viable. The Judge engaged with the case and the limited evidence before him at the time of the hearing. The additional evidence submitted to the Upper Tribunal which includes a medical letter relating to the appellant, a copy of HS’s British passport (issued 24 January 2025), a letter regarding the appellant’s divorce, and an affidavit from the appellant, were not in evidence before the Judge and post-date the decision under challenge.
34. The grounds rely on the fact HS is a British Citizen. It is noted that HS’s British passport was issued nearly three months after the decision. As observed by the Rule 24 response, it is reasonable to assume that since HS was born in India to an Indian mother, he is also entitled to Indian nationality. I observe that there is no equivalent to section 117B(6) of the 2002 Act in any provision of law or policy relating to entry clearance applications. Although HS’s British nationality is a relevant factor which was specifically noted by the Judge at [27] of the decision, as observed by this Tribunal in SD (British citizen children - entry clearance) Sri Lanka [2020] UKUT 43, the weight to be attached to such a factor will depend heavily on the particular circumstances and is not necessarily a powerful factor. SD further states that it is relevant to consider whether the child in question possesses dual nationality and what rights and benefits attach to that other nationality.
35. The fact that HS has British nationality cannot be considered as a “trump card” in respect of the appellants’ human rights appeal. It was a factor which was specifically observed by the Judge when addressing Article 8. Mr Mohzam claimed in submissions that the appellant and sponsor’s son had a hole in the heart but when pressed on this he was unable to point to any evidence to support this claim.
36. Although the Judge did not provide a lengthy, detailed analysis of Article 8 outside the Immigration Rules, I find that the reasoning provided was wholly adequate having regard to the very limited evidence before the Judge of the claimed exceptional circumstances. The decision demonstrates that the Judge engaged with the case the appellants advanced in the FTT, and the evidence adduced in support of the appeals.
37. The Judge reached findings that were reasonable open to him on the evidence and provided reasons which are sufficiently adequate to enable the losing party to understand why she has lost and to enable this Tribunal to examine his decision. The reasoning provided is indisputably adequate having regard to MD (Turkey) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWCA Civ 1958 at [26] and the Senior President of Tribunals Practice Direction: Reasons for Decisions of 4 June 2024.
38. For the reasons set out above I am not persuaded that the Judge materially erred in law in dismissing the appellants’ appeals. Accordingly, I dismiss the appellants’ appeal and uphold the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.
Notice of Decision
The appellants’ appeal is dismissed. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error on a point of law. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal shall stand.

Sarah Grey

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

29 September 2025