Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001112

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/68554/2023
LP/05478/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 17th of September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD

Between

SR
ANONYMITY ORDER CONTINUED
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr E Banham of Counsel, instructed by Seren Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms L Clewley, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Bradford on 28 July 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. The parties may apply on notice to vary this order.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is my oral decision which I delivered at the hearing today.
Background
2. The Appellant appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Clarkson (“the Judge”) who by way of a decision dated 10 January 2025 dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on protection and human rights grounds.
3. First-tier Tribunal Judge Mulready granted permission by way of a decision dated 5 March 2025. Judge Mulready said when granting permission as follows:
“The judge accepted the Appellant’s vulnerability on grounds of his PTSD and memory loss, but the Decision records no consideration of this in the assessment of the Appellant’s credibility, particularly as to the timings of encounters with the criminal gang who the judge accepted had threatened the Appellant. The Decision does not address the point that the internal relocation in Georgia took place during the COVD-19 related lockdown and that the circumstances in which it would take place now would be different. ... These are arguable errors of law material to the outcome of the appeal, and so permission is granted on all grounds on which it is sought”.
The Hearing Before Me
4. Mr Banham, counsel for the Appellant, sought to take me through each of the 5 grounds of appeal. I invited him to place particular focus on the grounds relying on vulnerability because that could affect the Judge’s findings as a whole.
5. Ms Clewley on behalf of the Respondent contends that if one looks at the Judge’s decision as a whole, and in particular taking into account certain paragraphs, then there was no material error of law in the Judge’s decision.
6. Ms Clewley states that paragraph 20 of the Judge’s decision said the assessment of credibility was a holistic exercise. At paragraph 21 the Judge referred to there being a structured approach to the assessment of credibility. Paragraph 22 referred to assessing evidence required the Judge to be aware that some forms of disability can cause or result in impaired memory. Therefore, the order and manner in which evidence is given may be affected by mental, psychological or emotional trauma or disability and thereby comprehension of questioning may have been impaired.
7. At paragraph 23 the Judge referred to the Court of Appeal’s decision in AM (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWCA Civ 1123 and the Judge set out as follows:
“The core principles of asylum law and practice which have particular importance in claims from children and other vulnerable persons were namely:
“a. given the gravity of the consequences of a decision on asylum and the accepted inherent difficulties in establishing the facts of the claim as well as future risks, there is a lower standard of proof, expressed as ‘a reasonable chance’, ‘substantial grounds for thinking’ or ‘a serious possibility’;
b. while an assessment of personal credibility may be a critical aspect of some claims, particularly in the absence of independent supporting evidence, it is not an end in itself or a substitute for the application of the criteria for refugee status which must be holistically assessed;
c. the findings of medical experts must be treated as part of the holistic assessment: they are not to be treated as an ‘add-on’ and rejected as a result of an adverse credibility assessment or finding made prior to and without regard to the medical evidence;
d. expert medical evidence can be critical in providing explanation for difficulties in giving a coherent and consistent account of past events and for identifying any relevant safeguards required to meet vulnerabilities that can lead to disadvantage in the determination process, for example, in the ability to give oral testimony and under what conditions;
e. an Appellant’s account of his or her fears and the assessment of an Appellant’s credibility must also be judged in the context of the known objective circumstances and practices of the state in question and a failure to do so can constitute an error of law; and
f. in making asylum decisions, the highest standards of procedural fairness are required”.
8. I was taken to paragraph 24 of the decision where the Judge correctly referred to the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010 which states that consequences of being a vulnerable person differ according to the degree to which an individual is affected. It is for the Judge to determine the extent of an identified vulnerability, the effect on the quality of the evidence and the weight to be placed on such vulnerability in assessing the evidence before them, taking into account the evidence as a whole. Ms Clewley also referred to paragraph 31 in which the Judge set out the law in relation to credibility with various references but it also stated, “I have taken (into) account the alleged vulnerabilities that potentially could affect the Appellant’s ability to give evidence”.
9. Mr Banham’s point comes to this: when one reads paragraphs 35 and 38 in particular the Judge referred to aspects where he was not satisfied in relation to different versions of, for example, the screening interview and also as to whether or not the responses provided by the Appellant were in accordance with the other evidence which was available. Put another way, was the judge right to make adverse credibility findings against this Appellant in the way in which they were made? One part of Mr Banham’s submissions were in relation to the screening interview and whether or not in a screening interview an Appellant can be expected to have provided significant detail of their asylum claim or whether that comes later.
Consideration and Analysis
10. I remind myself that the expertise of the First-tier Tribunal has been impressed upon the Upper Tribunal for very many years since, including more recently in the decision of the Court of Appeal in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688 9 June 2025. Arnold LJ, with whom Singh and King LJJ agreed explained the importance of the role of the Appellate Court or Tribunal. It was said at paragraph 29:
“There have been many recent authorities in both the Supreme Court and this Court on the need for appellate courts and tribunals to be cautious before interfering with findings of fact and evaluative assessments by lower courts and tribunals, and in particular specialist tribunals such as the FTT. For present purposes it is sufficient to cite Lord Hamblen’s summary in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, [2022] 1 WLR 3784 at [72]:
‘It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead.”
11. Even with the expertise of the First-tier Tribunal firmly in mind, in my judgment, fundamental matters arise. Although the Judge has referred clearly and at length to AM (Afghanistan) and to the Joint Presidential Guidance, the issue is whether the Judge applied that Joint Presidential Guidance and AM (Afghanistan).
12. Ms Clewley agreed that if the Judge had not undertaken that task then the decision as a whole would require further assessment. Namely, that the decision would need therefore to be set aside and to be considered again because credibility was at the heart of assessment of the case.
13. Although I have to say the grounds of appeal drafted by the Appellant’s solicitors were not the clearest because they merge into one and are not clearly enumerated which they should be, there was particular reference to vulnerability within both grounds 1 and 2. In any event, Ms Clewley was at no disadvantage in being able to deal with the grounds of appeal because that was the specific basis upon which First-tier Tribunal Judge Mulready granted permission. I have read out already paragraph 3 of the grant of permission.
14. Care should be taken by the parties when drafting grounds of appeal. The case law is clear, including the decision of the Upper Tribunal in Raj and DAM (Grounds of Appeal, Limited Grant of Permission) [2025] UKUT 00150 (IAC). The Judicial headnote makes clear:
“2. Whether a party is represented or not, they are required to identify the arguable errors of law in the grounds of appeal, adequately, so that the arguable error can be considered by a judge.
3. Each point of law, where there is more than one, must be clearly and succinctly identified as a numbered ground of appeal with sufficient detail so that the Tribunal and the parties are able to identify the essential issue raised by that ground. The grounds of appeal will rarely need to be lengthy. Each ground of appeal should identify succinctly, in clearly numbered paragraphs or (sub paragraphs):
a. The relevant passage(s) in the decision of the FtT.
b. Any relevant primary or secondary legislation only to the extent necessary to do so.

c. Any authority binding upon the judge that is capable of supporting the ground.

d. Brief submissions proving a short explanation to support the ground.”
15. It is necessary therefore to look to see whether within the decision the Judge assessed the quality of evidence and the weight to be placed upon it the light of the Appellant’s identified vulnerabilities. In my judgment that is absent from the Judge’s decision. In my judgment it is not sufficient for a Judge to set out what the law is in respect of assessing a vulnerable witness’s evidence and to state they have applied it, but not in fact going on to state how the vulnerability was factored into the assessment of the case specifically. What specifically did the Judge make of the memory loss, PTSD and other factors which were clearly evidenced in this case?
16. Mr Banham took me to certain parts of the bundle including pages 89 and 33 along with page 484 which refer to some of the recording of the Appellant’s memory issues. Those pages state,
“main concern from daughter-in-law is memory loss, short term memory is reduced, occasionally forgets where he lives/where he is going, sometimes has been wandering, does not do cleaning, cooking, etc., is looked after by family members”.
17. These were specific and relevant matters. In my judgment, an Appellant such as this, aged in his 60s, with the identified vulnerabilities required the Judge to say that he had taken this into account matters specifically. The Judge ought to have gone further to say that despite specifically taking the vulnerabilities into account, that he still found against the Appellant with reasons why.
18. This is a protection claim which requires the most anxious scrutiny I cannot be satisfied that the Judge applied the Joint Presidential Guidance or AM (Afghanistan).
19. In the circumstances, despite the quite clear case law that I should hesitate long before I disturb the findings of a specialist First-tier Tribunal, this is a case in which the errors of law by the Judge are significant. The errors relate to the decision making as a whole and in the circumstances, I have no alternative but to conclude that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal must be set aside.
20. I have considered whether or not this is a matter which ought to remain for consideration here at the Upper Tribunal and I have considered the submissions which have been made. Applying AEB [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC), I consider whether to retain the matter for remaking here at the Upper Tribunal, in line with the general principle set out in statement 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement. I take into account the history of this case, the nature and extent of findings to be made as well as the nature of the errors in this case. I further consider it would be unfair for either party to be unable to avail themselves of the two-tier decision-making process. I therefore remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal with no retained findings.
21. Whilst I do not consider the Appellant’s arguments in respect of Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 to be particularly strong, in the circumstances because I am setting aside the decision as a whole I do not restrict the nature of the rehearing which will take place. The rehearing will take place on all grounds and there are no retained findings. The hearing will take place before a Judge other than First-tier Tribunal Judge Clarkson. As I understand it, the Appellant lives in Gloucestershire and therefore the hearing can take place at Newport again, but I will hear from Mr Banham in case he suggests that the hearing taking place at somewhere other than Newport.
Notice of Decision
The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains a material error of law and it set aside.
The matter is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a rehearing on all issues.
The anonymity direction is continued.

Abid Mahmood

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28 July 2025