Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001121

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/00230/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On the 11 August 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HARIA

Between

SN
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Murphy of Counsel instructed by Krisinth Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Mackenzie Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 14 May 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Anonymity
1. The First-tier Tribunal Judge (FTJ) granted an anonymity order in this appeal and no party before me requested that it be set aside. In the circumstances, I have considered the starting point for consideration of anonymity orders is the principle of open justice and find that in this case because the appellant claims a risk of persecution on return to Sri Lanka, the appellant’s interests outweigh the principle of open justice and an anonymity order is appropriate.
Background
2. The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka born in 1958. She appeals with permission against the decision of the FTJ to dismiss her appeal on asylum grounds.
3. The substance of the appellant’s case is that she is a Sri Lankan Tamil who is married with five children. Since 2004, her husband and son have supported the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The appellant and her family have been subjected to adverse attention from the Sri Lankan authorities. The appellant fears that if she is returned to Sri Lanka she will be arrested on arrival in Sri Lanka.
4. The appellant also claims there would be very significant obstacles to her integration in Sri Lanka as she suffers from depression and due to her fear of persecution at the hands of the authorities and because her husband is in fear of the authorities and therefore moves from place to place.
5. The appellant entered the UK from Colombo on 11 October 2021 accompanied by her youngest daughter on a visit visa to stay with her four daughters who are resident in the UK. The appellant’s son lives in France and her husband still lives in Sri Lanka in a village in an obscure forest area to avoid the attention of the authorities.
6. The FTJ rejected the appellant’s claim on the basis that it lacked credibility finding the asylum narrative to be a sheer fabrication.
7. The appellant relied on a psychiatric report produced by Consultant Psychiatrist Dr Saleh Dhumad dated 18 October 2024 who was of the opinion that the appellant’s presentation was consistent with a diagnosis of recurrent depressive disorder and given her unstable mental health with suicide risks, anxiety and severe depression the appellant was not fit to fly and would remain unfit for a few years until she recovers from her severe depression. Whilst acknowledging the appellant’s mental health condition the FTJ found that it fell short of the very high threshold required to succeed on a claim on Article 3 medical grounds and that her mental health is not such that it does not enable her to fly.
8. The FTJ dismissed the appellant’s appeal on asylum grounds.
The grounds of appeal
9. On 3 March 2025, the appellant was granted permission on all four pleaded grounds:
Ground 1: It is asserted that the FTJ failed to give adequate reasons for reaching a conclusion contrary to that of the expert in relation to the appellant’s fitness to fly.
Ground 2: The second ground contends that the FTJ failed to adequately consider the expert psychiatric evidence and came to his own conclusion as to the appellant’s fitness to fly without giving adequate or any reasons.
Ground 3: The third ground asserts the FTJ failed to adequately or at all weigh the expert evidence of the psychiatrist in the round in the assessment of credibility.
a. Ground 4: The fourth ground contends the FTJ failed to adequately or at all consider the issue of very significant obstacles to integration in Sri Lanka despite the issue being raised in the appeal skeleton argument (ASA) and implicitly also failed to consider the psychiatric report on the issue of very significant obstacles.
10. The common thread running through all four grounds is assertion that the FTJ undertook an inadequate consideration of the expert psychiatric evidence and failed to give adequate or any of reasons for coming to conclusions inconsistent with that of the expert psychiatrist.
Rule 24 Response
11. Ms Mackenzie for the respondent confirmed that although there was no Rule 24 response the respondent opposed all four grounds of appeal.
Error of Law Decision
Grounds 1, 2 and 3:
12. Grounds 1 and 2 challenge to the adequacy of the FTJ’s reasons. Ground 3 is parasitic on grounds 1 and 2 so I consider all three grounds together.
13. Ground 1 is a challenge to the FTJ’s lack of reasons for a finding at paragraph 73 of the decision that the mental health condition of the appellant is not accepted such that it would prevent her from flying, a finding which is contrary to the opinion of Dr Dhumad.
14. The FTJ at paragraph 73 states as follows:
“ 73. I do not accept that the mental health condition of the Appellant, such as it is, does not enable her to fly. She can be accompanied by one of her four daughters, as arranged between the extended members of her family in the UK, whose commonly generated income could contribute to supporting her in Sri Lanka, with presumably some of the assets realized from the sale of the family home in India being also still available for that purpose. In a context where, in my view, the complete lack of evidence and obscurity surrounding the economic life of the Appellant, and of her family in India and in the UK, exemplifies the evidential void that is the characteristic of the asylum narrative when it is looked at in the round.”
15. Ground 2 avers that the FTJ substitutes his own finding for that of Dr Dhumad without giving adequate or any reasons. Mr Murphy submitted that there is a complete lack of reasons given in the decision for coming to a view contrary to the opinion of Dr Dhumad at paragraph 8.5 of his report in which he states that the appellant will remain unfit to fly for a few years.
16. Ms Mackenzie submitted that it can be inferred the FTJ concluded no weight could be attributed to Dr Dhumad’s report as the FTJ states “…the mental health condition of the Appellant, such as it is…”. She submitted that the FTJ’s reasons for reaching this conclusion are noted at paragraph 72 where it is stated that presence of mental illness among asylum seekers cannot be regarded as exceptional and at paragraph 73 where the FTJ notes the complete lack of evidence and obscurity surrounding the appellant’s claim.
17. Furthermore, Ms Mackenzie submitted that the FTJ was considering the appellant’s mental health at the time of the hearing in the context of the evidential void of the appellant’s asylum claim whereas Dr Dhumad’s report had been produced three months prior to the hearing.
18. I acknowledge the FTJ was aware of the appellant’s mental health condition as it is referred to at paragraph 4 of the decision. At paragraph 31, the FTJ records the appellant’s evidence when asked whether she would go to a doctor or hospital in Sri Lanka as Dr Dhumad’s report states she has mental health issues. The FTJ at paragraph 42, records the appellant’s evidence confirming she has mental health issues as set out in Dr Dhumad’s report, that although the issues started in 2005, she did not have any treatment in Sri Lanka. It is clear from this the FTJ was well aware of the appellant’s mental health condition.
19. The FTJ was also aware of Dr Dhumad’s report as it is summarised at paragraph 5 of the decision
20. From paragraphs 48 to 73 the FTJ makes various credibility findings against the appellant’s asylum narrative based on it being implausible and contradictory and because of the lack of evidence in support.
21. At paragraph 65 the FTJ states:
“As with the lack of any evidence that the Appellant is in a mental health condition that necessitates the support of her daughters in her daily life.”
22. Although the FTJ acknowledges the appellant’s mental health conditions and summarises the expert psychiatric report of Dr Dhumad, there is on the face of the decision no consideration and assessment of the expert report and what if any weight is attributed to the opinions in the report. It was incumbent on the FTJ to have set out the reasons for departing from the views of Dr Dhumad, the reasons cannot be inferred from the statements referred to by Ms Mackenzie. It cannot be inferred that the FTJ concluded no weight is to be given to the report of Dr Dhumad. The FTJ may having assessed the expert report ultimately decided to give it no or little weight, but it is necessary for there to be reasons for reaching such a conclusion. The FTJ may reach a finding contrary to the opinion given in an expert report provided the FTJ gives reasons. The decision includes a summary of Dr Dhumad’s report at paragraph 5 but there is no assessment of the report.
23. The Court of Appeal in AM (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWCA Civ 1123 emphasised the need for parties and tribunals to apply the Practice Direction 'First-tier and Upper Tribunal Child, Vulnerable Adult and Sensitive Witnesses', issued on 30 October 2008 and the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010.
24. It may have been open to the FTJ to find that despite the appellant’s mental health and thus her vulnerabilities, when evaluating the inconsistencies in her account the difficulties with her evidence remained to such an extent that the lower threshold for establishing reasonable likelihood had not been met. Such an approach would be entirely consistent with HH (medical evidence; effect of Mibanga) Ethiopia [2005] UKAIT 00164, but it cannot be assumed that the FTJ has conducted such an exercise when there is no or no adequate reasoning in the determination itself.
25. The failure to give reasons or any adequate reasons on material matters constitutes an error of law: see R (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] ECWA Civ 982.
26. I find that the FTJ erred in law as asserted in grounds 1 , 2 and 3.
Ground 4:
27. Ground 4 relates to the failure of the FTJ to undertake a consideration of very significant obstacle to the appellant’s integration into Sri Lanka on return despite the issue being raised in the Appeal Skeleton Argument.
28. At the date of the decision the relevant provisions were those set out under Paragraph 276ADE(1) (vi) of the Immigration Rules which so far as is relevant provide as follows:
"276ADE(1) The requirements to be met by an applicant for leave to remain on the grounds of private life in the UK are that at the date of the application, the applicant:
…
(vi) subject to sub-paragraph (2), is aged 18 years or above, has lived continuously in the UK for less than 20 years (discounting any period of imprisonment) but there would be very significant obstacles to the applicant's integration into the country to which he would have to go if required to leave the UK."
29. The FTJ considers the asylum claim at paragraph 48 to 73 and concludes the decision by considering Article 8 ECHR at paragraphs 74 and 75. Ms Mackenzie accepted that the words “very significant obstacles” are not used in the decision.
30. It may be that the FTJ relied on the factors identified at paragraph 73 for finding there will be no very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration on return to Sri Lanka. If that was the case it was necessary for this to be stated in the decision, it cannot be inferred. Although there is a consideration of Article 8, the FTJ fails to make any findings on whether there would very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration on return to Sri Lanka.
31. I find this is a material error of law.
Disposal
32. I am mindful of the Court of Appeal case of AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and the guidance in Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC) that the usual course is for the Upper Tribunal to remake the decision even if it requires further findings to be made. However, having regard to the nature and extent of the factual finding required remittal to the First-tier Tribunal is appropriate in the circumstances of this appeal.
Notice of Decision
1. The decision of the FTJ involved the making of errors of law and is set aside in its entirety.
2. I remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing de novo before a judge other than the FTJ.

N Haria
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Haria
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

6 August 2025