Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001125

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/57811/2023
LP/06553/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On the 12 August 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD

Between

YZ
(Anonymity Order Continued)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms M Nayak-Oliver, Counsel, instructed by Greater Manchester Immigration Aid Unit
For the Respondent: Mr A Tan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 30 June 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. The parties may apply on notice to vary this order.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is my oral decision which I delivered at the hearing today.
Introduction
2. The Appellant is a citizen of Iran. He appeals with the permission of First-tier Tribunal Head dated 4 March 2025 against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Trent (“the Judge”), who, by way of a decision dated 23 September 2024 had dismissed the Appellant’s protection and human rights claim.
3. At this hearing, I am assessing whether or not there was a material error of law in the Judge’s decision. If I conclude that there was a material error of law in the Judge’s decision, I shall then decide whether to remake the decision here at the Upper Tribunal or if I should remit the matter to the First-tier Tribunal for a rehearing there.
The Appellant’s Grounds of Appeal
4. The Appellant had drafted grounds of appeal himself, which were brief. They state as follows:
“The judge accepted that I attended a significant number of protests against the Iranian government outside the Iranian embassy. The judge also accepted that I used a megaphone and setting fire to a photo of the Iranian president at these protests. However the judge failed to attach sufficient weight to this evidence.
The judge relied upon evidence from BA which was decided in 2011. This is over ten years ago. Facial recognition technology is widely used by the Iranian Government - as shown by the more recent evidence. Members of staff at the Embassy recorded the events.
The judge also failed to properly consider and apply the case law in my case.”
Grant of Permission to Appeal
5. On granting permission, the First-tier Tribunal had said amongst other things that it was unclear if the Appellant had drawn to the Judge’s attention that there was more recent evidence in respect of the facial recognition technology that he had referred to in his grounds of appeal. However, when granted permission to appeal the First-tier Tribunal Judge had concluded that it was arguable that because the Appellant had attended a significant number of protests against the Iranian government outside the Iranian Embassy in the UK, (including using a megaphone and setting fire to a photograph of the president), then thereby that it was arguable that the Judge failed to properly assess the risk faced by the Appellant on return.
6. The First-tier Tribunal Judge also said it was arguable that against the background it was arguable that the Judge had failed to provide adequate reasons for concluding that there was not a real risk that the Appellant had already been subjected to targeted surveillance by the Iranian state and which would not be neutralised by the deletion of his social media/Facebook account.
The Hearing Before Me
7. At the hearing before me, The Appellant’s case has been expanded somewhat by way of a skeleton argument, which has been drafted by Ms Nayak-Oliver dated 26 June 2025. I summarise that skeleton argument because it is detailed.
8. Firstly, it is said that there is a Ground 1 (albeit there is not actually a “Ground 1”, but I will separate the grounds in the way suggested). It is said that Judge Trent failed to adequately reason that the Appellant is not a genuine political believer. Alternatively, it is said that even if the Appellant is not a true believer and that his sur place activities are contrived, the Judge had failed to consider that the Appellant’s UK-based activities would cause him to be at risk of persecution based on imputed political opinion.
9. Ground 2 contends that the Judge misdirected himself in failing to consider or address with adequate reasoning the evidence against relevant and recent country guidance and case law. There is then reference to various case law, including recent Court of Appeal authority in MH (Bangladesh) v the Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688. There is reference to country guidance including PS (Christianity - risk) Iran CG [2020] UKUT 46 (IAC) and XX (PJAK – sur place activities - Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 23 (IAC). HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 430 is also referred to.
10. The skeleton argument concludes that the Judge had erred in law by failing to properly apply the country guidance to the accepted evidence of sur place activity and/or by failing to adequately reason his findings that the Appellant’s beliefs are non-genuine. It is said that the errors are material to the outcome and that I ought to find that there is a material error of law.
11. I heard oral submissions from both parties and I also considered a brief Rule 24 response on behalf of the Respondent handed to me today, albeit it did not seem to have been uploaded.
12. The Rule 24 states that when granting permission, the First-tier Tribunal had failed to identify a material error of law in the Judge’s decision and had instead had come to its own conclusion as to how it would have considered the same appeal. There is reference to the First-tier Tribunal Judge’s decision at paragraphs 34 to 47.
Consideration and Analysis
13. It is therefore necessary to look with care at the Judge’s decision. As a general observation, it is a lengthy decision and of course the length of a decision of itself does not mean that there is no error of law contained within it.
14. I observe the following in addition. At paragraph 16 the Judge noted that the Respondent had taken several points against the Appellant in respect of his credibility. The Judge also noted, at paragraph 20, that the Appellant’s account of kolbaring, i.e. transporting goods, was inconsistent with the external country information. Despite that, the Judge made clear “I consider it plausible that the Appellant would collect goods from the border areas inside Iran and carry them onward into the country”.
15. At paragraph 22 the Judge said, “In conclusion, I am satisfied that it is reasonably likely that the Appellant worked as a kolbar in Iran”. I interpolate here to say that the Judge had considered matters in the round and had therefore decided matters against the Respondent, just as he was required to do.
16. After the “kolbaring” subheading the Judge then provided a subheading of “Political Activity In Iran”. Here the Judge set out with detailed reasoning at paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27, through to 31 his views in respect of this subheading of Political Activity In Iran. The Judge said specifically at paragraphs 31 and 32 as follows:
“31. Considering all the evidence in the round, however, I am not satisfied that the core of the Appellant’s account is true. Many of the inconsistencies and issues to which I have referred go to the core of his account and cannot be reconciled or adequately explained. I am not satisfied that it is reasonably likely that the Appellant’s account of his involvement with the Komala Party is true. It is not reasonably likely that he supported the party, that he transported party materials, that such materials were found by the Iranian authorities at his family home, or that he is personally at risk on return as a result.
32. It follows that I find that the Appellant faces no real risk of persecution on return to Iran as a result of his actions prior to his arrival in the UK.”
In my judgment, the Judge clearly dealt with all matters in a detailed manner and in the round.
17. It is the next paragraph and subsequent matters which have been the real focus of the grounds and the submissions before me. I ask myself several questions to break this aspect down in terms of the risk to the Appellant and in assessing whether there is a material error of law in the Judge’s decision.
18. Does the fact that the Appellant is Kurdish and because he exited Iran illegally, mean that thereby because of the “hair trigger” approach explained in the Country Guidance case of HB (Kurds) that the Appellant might be at risk on return to Iran?
19. What am I to make of the fact that the Judge had concluded that the Appellant did not hold genuine political beliefs and that the Appellant is not a genuine supporter of the Komala Party?
20. Was the Judge correct to conclude that that will not offend against the principles in HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 31 and what am I to make of the sur place activities which have been referred to? I interpolate here to say that although MH (Bangladesh) was cited to me, there is no direct reference within the grounds or indeed in the cited case law to the Supreme Court’s decision, RT (Zimbabwe) and others [2012] UKSC 38 which had considered further that HJ (Iran) principle. HJ (Iran) dealt with one aspect of the Refugee Convention in relation to sexual orientation, RT (Zimbabwe) dealt specifically with political activity, including issues in respect imputed political opinion.
21. Returning to the instant case before me, the Judge then set out a further subheading for issue 2. That being the risk arising out of the Appellant’s sur place activities. There is no criticism that the Judge did not fully set out what the activities were and again these are set out in extensive detail at paragraphs 34 onwards within the Judge’s decision. This included the Appellant’s Facebook activity and also extensive details of the demonstrators themselves. During some of the demonstrations the Appellant wore a high visibility jacket and assisted organising the crowds. The question I ask is whether the Judge’s reasoning here was adequate? Those are really the matters which the original grounds, albeit somewhat enlarged within the skeleton argument and oral submissions stress for consideration. Within that, I ask did the Judge correctly apply the country guidance, background information and the facts to the case?
22. The Appellant’s skeleton argument states that the Judge had failed to set out the factors referred to in the country guidance case of BA, when assessing the Appellant’s ethnicity and evidence. The Judge had failed to consider the capacity for the Appellant’s sur place activity to come to the attention of the security services. MH (Bangladesh) is referred to. MH is a very recent (June 2025) judgment, but in any event, what the Court of Appeal says is declaratory of the law even though it was not available to the Judge in September 2024. In my judgment MH (Bangladesh) has not changed the law, which is set out in HJ (Iran) or RT (Zimbabwe). Although I do observe that it was said at paragraph 38 in MH,
“As Singh LJ pointed out during the course of argument, however, there are limits to this. As Elisabeth Laing LJ observed in the passage I have quoted from WAS (Pakistan), a tribunal can, and should, take judicial notice of the ease with which persons attending a demonstration can be photographed and filmed and the resulting photographs and films transmitted abroad. Similarly, a tribunal can, and should, take judicial notice of the fact that publicly-accessible websites and social media postings can readily be monitored by electronic means.”
23. Beyond the fact that it is generally understood that targeting and monitoring is technically easier, but resource intensive, however, the technical capabilities of methods of monitoring are matters that requires expert evidence not least because:
“(i) states differ in their capabilities; and
(ii) such capabilities change over time.”
24. It is also necessary to refer to paragraph 39 where it was said:
“Furthermore, as Paton LJ made clear in EM (Zimbabwe) the question of the capacity of the foreign state to carry out surveillance and monitoring cannot realistically be divorced from the questions of whether the person in question is already of interest to the regime and if not whether the activities relied on are likely to make the person of interest to the regime. To take a simple example, if there was a large demonstration outside the Bangladesh High Commission in London then there is considerable difference between a person who stands at the front waving a placard bearing a slogan hostile to the government and person who stands at the back with no placard. It is inherently more likely that the former will thereby get themselves noted by government agents, photographed and targeted for further surveillance for monitoring than the latter.”
25. In her skeleton argument, Ms Nayak-Oliver refers to the country guidance case of PS and she states at paragraph 16:
“Further, in PS (Christianity - risk) Iran CG [2020] UKUT 46 (IAC), the Upper Tribunal explained that ‘All returning failed asylum seekers are subject to questioning on arrival, and this will include questions about why they claimed asylum’ (Headnote at [(4)(i)]).”
26. When asked directly by me to deal with this submission, Mr Tan referred me to paragraph 110 of PS where it makes clear:
“We remind ourselves of the underlying reasoning in SSH & HR. The Iranian authorities know very well that many Iranians leave the country to seek asylum in the West, and that when they do so, they advance protection claims that by their nature will involve some criticism of the Iranian state. The Tribunal rejected the contention that it was reasonably likely that the Iranians would frame this as propaganda against the regime. On the contrary, the evidence before them indicated that an Iranian who had made up a story in order to claim asylum could re-enter the country without difficulty. It is only where ‘particular concerns’ arise that the subject will be sent for further questioning, and it is in this second-line questioning where the potential for ill-treatment will arise.”
27. I am of course well aware that RT (Zimbabwe) make clear that there is simply no basis upon which the Appellant can be expected to dissemble. Put another way, he cannot be expected to lie, but the passage referred to by Mr Tan makes clear that unless and until there are ‘particular concerns’ there will be no further questioning. There are no such concerns in this case in any event. Even with the high visibility jacket or the like being worn at the burning of photographs protests.
Conclusion
28. The Judge had the benefit of seeing and hearing from the Appellant. The Judge also had the benefit of hearing from the Appellant’s lawyer in terms of the issues-based assessment of the case. An issues-based approach is vital and the Judge cannot be expected to be searching for other possible issues of his own volition. It is not for me to look at the case afresh and to overturn the Judge’s decision merely because I disagree with the decision which has been reached. The case law is settled that the First-tier Tribunal is an expert Tribunal.
29. This was made clear in authorities such as Supreme Court’s decision in AH (Sudan).
30. There are only limited circumstances in which an appellate Tribunal may interfere with findings of fact and credibility by the First-tier Judge, who saw and heard the Appellant give his evidence. In Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464; [2022] 4 W.L.R. 48, Lewison LJ, with whom Males and Snowden LJJ agreed, explained interference with findings of fact and credibility is appropriate only where such a finding is ‘plainly wrong’ or ‘rationally insupportable’ at [2]-[5]:
“The appeal is therefore an appeal on a pure question of fact. The approach of an appeal court to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled:
(i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
(ii) The adverb “plainly” does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
(iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
(iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
(v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
(vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.”
31. I also take into account that in relation to the adequacy of reasons and interference with factual findings the observations of Dingemans LJ in Terghazi v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 2017; [2020] Imm. A.R. 461 at [45]:
“A further principle which it is relevant to note is that, even if an appellate court is entitled to hear an appeal because of an error of fact (because the appeal court has jurisdiction to hear appeals on facts) appellate courts should be very cautious in overturning findings of fact made by a first instance judge. This is because first instance judges have seen witnesses and take into account the whole “sea” of the evidence, rather than indulged in impermissible “island hopping” to parts only of the evidence, and because duplication of effort on appeal is undesirable and increases costs and delay. Judges hearing appeals on facts should only interfere if a finding of fact was made which had no basis in the evidence, or where there was a demonstrable misunderstanding of relevant evidence, or a demonstrable failure to consider relevant evidence so that the decision could not reasonably be explained or justified.”
32. I therefore look at the Judge’s decision as a whole and in the full context in which he came to the decision that he did and I refer again to some of the findings which were made by the Judge. The Judge’s reasoning is set out within the decision in some detail. As is clear at paragraph 36, the Judge said that the file “…does not show how much interaction there has been with any of his posts. From the individual screenshots, however, it is clear that there has been very little: they generally show almost no likes or comments.”
33. The Judge also said at paragraph 38 that:
“Although I am satisfied that I can give the Facebook evidence material weight, I am not satisfied that I can draw any conclusions beyond those matters accepted by Ms Diab. The interaction with the posts is minimal; and it is not clear to what extent individual posts have been made, or have remained public. I do not therefore find that any real risk of serious harm can arise out of the Appellant’s Facebook account on return to Iran.”
34. Carnwath LJ in Mukarkar v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1045; [2007] Imm. A.R. 57 at [40] approved by the Supreme Court in MM (Lebanon) v SSHD [2017] UKSC 10; [2017] 1 W.L.R. 771 at [107] said:
“… It is of the nature of such judgments that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case … The mere fact that one tribunal has reached what may seem an unusually generous view of the facts of a particular case does not mean that it has made an error of law, so as to justify an appeal under the old system, or an order for reconsideration under the new… However on the facts of a particular case the decision of a specialist tribunal should be respected…”
35. It is against that background that I consider paragraph 39 when the Judge then turned to the demonstrations and the Judge listed all of them with the correct dates. There were eighteen such demonstrations and the Judge said he accepted that the Appellant had attended them but importantly what the Judge also said was:
“What the evidence shows, however, is that prior to the refusal of his asylum claim in September 2023, the Appellant had attended just three demonstrations over the two and a half years he had spent in the UK, but that after his refusal he began attending regularly from October 2023.”
And then at paragraph 40, the Judge said:
“As to the demonstrations themselves, the Appellant’s evidence was that he did not organise any of them, and is not a member of any political organisation in the UK, but that at some of the demonstrations he wore a high-visibility jacket and assisted with organising the crowds. On 17 December 2023, he claims to have held a poster of the Komala flag and burnt a picture of the President of Iran, which he stamped on. A picture of him doing so was posted on his Facebook account the next day. On his Facebook page, there are pictures of him at demonstrations holding a megaphone, and he claimed in oral evidence that he had given short speeches of one or two minutes at most of the demonstrations. He would also chant and hold placards. There is no evidence that there was any media coverage of any of the demonstrations.”
36. Mr Tan particularly relies on this latter aspect in respect of media coverage of the demonstrations. The Judge then extensively, at paragraph 41, applied the factors in BA to the facts of the particular case. The Judge noted at 41(a):
(a) That there was no suggestion that they were calling for the violent overthrow of the Iranian regime.
(b) That the Appellant was not a long-term participant in demonstrations.
(c) There was no evidence that the Appellant had any formal role in organising the demonstrations.
(d) There was no evidence to suggest that there was any media coverage of the demonstrations.
(e) The Appellant gave evidence that there was perhaps some filming by Iranian Embassy officials inside the embassy. The Judge said he was willing to give the Appellant the benefit of the doubt in this regard but however, he did not accept that he would have been building a picture on 17 December 2023 or if he were filmed that his face would have been captured or that he would be recognisable from such a distance.
37. The Judge referred in a subsequent paragraph to there being no facial recognition technology and I referred earlier to the grant of permission, which dealt with this aspect, which has not in reality been taken any further. The Judge concluded at [42]:
“I have found that there is no real risk that the Appellant had an existing political profile before he left Iran. Nor, based on the level of the Appellant’s political activities in the UK and my observations as to the factors in BA more generally, I am persuaded that there is a real risk that his political profile is sufficiently significant as to give rise to a real risk that his face would be among the very few faces known to border officials in Tehran airport.”
38. Therefore, the Judge rejected that aspect of the Appellant’s case in clear and lawful terms. The Judge then turned to the risks which arise with the Appellant being questioned at Tehran Airport. The Judge had initially referred to all of the correct country guidance at paragraphs 13 and 14 of his decision and then used shorthand at paragraph 43, referring to the cases SSH and PS. The Judge correctly cited the headnote and a summary of the case. The Judge then extensively set out his findings in respect of the Facebook account. The Judge said at paragraph 45 that he found the Appellant’s evidence to be “far from convincing”. The Judge referred to various aspects of the Appellant’s claim and the concern he had about the adverse findings in respect of the Komala Party. The Judge concluded with extensive reasoning that he considered the Appellant had increased his political activity as a way of bolstering his appeal rather than because the Appellant was a genuine political believer.
39. The Judge rejected the Appellant’s lawyer’s submissions that it was open to him to conclude that all Iranian Kurds are genuine political believers and by way of example, the Judge referred to the Appellant’s own evidence that even his parents were not party supporters. The Judge however said that it is plausible and consistent that the Appellant might be a true believer but for the reasons he gave, the Judge concluded that the Appellant was not such a believer.
40. Insofar as the Facebook account was concerned, the Judge explained with sufficient reasoning that the Appellant can be expected to delete his anti-government Facebook account prior to his return and given the lack of existing political profile in Iran, it was not too late for him to do so. The Judge also, in compliance with the case law, then set out that although questioning will take place, that it would not be prolonged for there to be any harm.
41. Ms Nayak-Oliver’s skeleton argument was very helpful, but ultimately this was a case in which the Judge had the benefit of hearing from the Appellant. The Judge, as I have highlighted, found against the Respondent in respect of certain aspects, but the Judge also found against the Appellant in respect of certain other aspects. The reasoning by the Judge has been detailed. The reasoning is sufficient and, in my judgment, it clearly correctly applies the country guidance. Further, even though it was not all available to the Judge, the Judge’s decision also correctly applies the law in respect of sur place activity. The law has been clarified again by the Court of Appeal in the decision of MH (Bangladesh) which was handed down approximately 2 weeks ago.
42. In the circumstances, although Ms Nayak-Oliver has said and done all she can on behalf of the Appellant, I conclude that there is no material error of law in the Judge’s decision. Accordingly, I conclude that the Judge’s decision which had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds, shall stand. That is my judgment.
Notice of Decision
There is no material error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal which had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on protection and human rights grounds. That decision of the First-tier Tribunal stands.
The Appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal is therefore dismissed on all grounds.

Abid Mahmood

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

30 June 2025