Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001127
PA/53985/2024
LP/05297/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

12th of September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LODATO
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DEAKIN

Between

AA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Phillips (counsel) instructed by HMA Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Nappy (Senior Home Office Presenting Officer)

Heard at Field House on 29 July 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. On the 13 May 2025, Upper Tribunal Judge Lodato and Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Ruth heard AA’s appeal against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Swinnerton to dismiss the appeal on international protection and human rights grounds. By decision sealed 28 May 2025, Upper Tribunal Judge Lodato and Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Ruth allowed that appeal and set aside First-tier Tribunal Judge Swinnerton’s decision in its entirety. AA’s appeal was retained by the Upper Tribunal for remaking. This is the re-determination of AA’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision of 30 January 2024 refusing AA’s protection, humanitarian protection, and human rights claims.
2. In sum AA claims to have been a senior leader of a spiritual movement in Pakistan which we will refer to as ‘XY’ so as to avoid identifying her. She remained in this position until forced into hiding following the targeted killing of her husband (himself a former senior leader of XY) and further suspicious activity. AA claims to have remained in hiding before travelling to the United Kingdom and claiming asylum on the basis that she would be persecuted for her religious beliefs should she return to Pakistan. AA also argues that she would be at real risk of suffering Article 3 ECHR harm should she return to Pakistan on account of her mental health and she maintains that requiring her to return to Pakistan would constitute a disproportionate interference with her Article 8 ECHR right to family life with her United Kingdon based family.
Legal Framework (Asylum Claim)
3. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden of proof rests on the appellant. As her asylum claim was made on or after 28 June 2022, s.32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (‘the 2022 Act’) applies.
4. In considering whether the appellant qualifies as a refugee, we must apply a two-stage test. As per the guidance in JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) Botswana [2024] UKUT 00100, we must first determine the following matters on the balance of probabilities:
a. Taking the appellant’s claim at its highest, is there a convention reason?
b. Does the appellant fear persecution for that convention reason?
5. If so, we must go on to determine whether it is reasonably likely that:
a. The appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason;
b. There would not be sufficient protection available; and
c. The appellant could not internally relocate.
6. Section 31 of the 2022 Act addresses the meaning of persecution and actors of persecution in the following terms:
31 Article 1(A)(2): persecution
(1) For the purposes of Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention, persecution can be committed by any of the following (referred to in this Part as "actors of persecution”)—
(a) the State,
(b) any party or organisation controlling the State or a substantial part of the territory of the State, or
(c) any non-State actor, if it can be demonstrated that the actors mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b), including any international organisation, are unable or unwilling to provide reasonable protection against persecution.
(2) For the purposes of that Article, the persecution must be—
(a) sufficiently serious by its nature or repetition as to constitute a severe violation of a basic human right, in particular a right from which derogation cannot be made under Article 15 of the Human Rights Convention, or
(b) an accumulation of various measures, including a violation of a human right, which is sufficiently severe as to affect an individual in a similar manner as specified in paragraph (a).
(3) The persecution may, for example, take the form of—
(a) an act of physical or mental violence, including an act of sexual violence;
(b) a legal, administrative, police or judicial measure which in itself is discriminatory or which is implemented in a discriminatory manner;
(c) prosecution or punishment which is disproportionate or discriminatory;
(d) denial of judicial redress resulting in a disproportionate or discriminatory punishment;
(e) prosecution or punishment for refusal to perform military service in a conflict, where performing military service would include crimes or acts as described in Article 1(F) of the Refugee Convention (on which, see section 36).
7. Section 33 addresses the meaning of the various Refugee Convention reasons. Where relevant, it provides:
33 Article 1(A)(2): reasons for persecution
(1) For the purposes of Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention—
…
(b)the concept of religion may include consideration of matters such as—
(i) the holding of theistic, non-theistic or atheistic beliefs,
(ii) the participation in formal worship in private or public, either alone or in community with others, or the abstention from such worship,
(iii) other religious acts or expressions of view, or
(iv) forms of personal or communal conduct based on or mandated by any religious belief;
8. Sufficiency of protection and internal relocation are the subjects of ss.34 and 35:
34 Article 1(A)(2): protection from persecution
(1) For the purposes of Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention, protection from persecution can be provided by—
(a) the State, or
(b) any party or organisation, including any international organisation, controlling the State or a substantial part of the territory of the State.
(2) An asylum seeker is to be taken to be able to avail themselves of protection from persecution if—
(a) the State, party or organisation mentioned in subsection (1) takes reasonable steps to prevent the persecution by operating an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution, and
(b) the asylum seeker is able to access the protection.
35 Article 1(A)(2): internal relocation
(1) An asylum seeker is not to be taken to be a refugee for the purposes of Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention if—
(a) they would not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in a part of their country of nationality (or in a case where they do not have a nationality, the country of their former habitual residence), and
(b) they can reasonably be expected to travel to and remain in that part of the country.
(2) In considering whether an asylum seeker can reasonably be expected to travel to and remain in a part of a country, a decision-maker—
(a) must have regard to—
(i) the general circumstances prevailing in that part of the country, and
(ii) the personal circumstances of the asylum seeker;
(b) must disregard any technical obstacles relating to travel to that part of that country.
The Hearing
9. AA (with the assistance of an interpreter) and her son gave evidence in person. We were provided with a Consolidated Bundle, including (among other documents) witness statements produced by AA (dated 30 September 2024 and 10 January 2024), a witness statement from AA’s son (dated 30 September 2024), an Expert Report from Livia Holden, and AA’s asylum and screening interviews. We were also provided with a Supplementary Bundle (containing certified translations of three videos). We were shown these videos at the start of the hearing as well as a fourth video of what AA claimed to be CCTV footage of her house in Pakistan from 7 October 2021.
10. We have read and taken into account the evidence provided to us.
11. We were invited to direct that AA be treated as a vulnerable witness. There was no objection to this application and we accordingly made that direction.
Discussion
(i) Convention Reason
12. We must first determine on the balance of probabilities whether AA has a characteristic which could cause her to fear persecution for a convention reason. This falls to be determined on the balance of probabilities.
13. AA claims to be a former senior member of XY (namely the former ‘Ameer’ or leader of one of its largest branches) and to have remained in that role until she went into hiding in October 2021. She claims that XY is perceived to be heretical in Pakistan and that its members have been accused of blasphemy and persecuted for their beliefs.
14. AA claims to have joined XY around age 14-15 when she was at school. She explains that while some “hardline Islamic clerics” were opposed to the movement, she experienced no serious difficulties when she first joined. AA claims that XY formed a women’s wing in around 1986-1987 and that she was appointed leader of one of its major branches. AA claims that XY held a large-scale conference in 1996 (attended by some 600,000 people) and that both the Pakistani Government and Muslim groups took steps against XY from this point. AA claims that, facing arrest, the former leader of XY left Pakistan for the United Kingdom in 1999 and remained living in the United Kingdom until his death. She claims that splits in XY followed and that, in 2011 the ‘Aalami Ameer’ (described as being like the CEO) of XY was assassinated in Pakistan, his home was “robbed and vandalised” and his children kidnapped. She claims that they were subsequently released and relocated to the United Kingdom.
15. In her expert report Dr Holden explained that followers of the founder of XY who disseminate his beliefs are liable to prosecution for blasphemy and vulnerable to harm from radical orthodox groups in Pakistan (para. 19) and that XY is organised into male and female groups (para. 23). Dr Holden was of the view that AA being a prominent member of XY is consistent with the video evidence (para. 74) – we record that some of the videos seen by Dr Holden were not available to us. We do not consider this to be material.
16. Mr Nappy, on behalf of the Secretary of State, did not accept that AA was the former leader of the relevant branch of XY. He argued that this fact was not mentioned by AA in her screening or asylum interviews and that it was only mentioned in her asylum witness statement. He submitted further that, if she had been a former leader as claimed, AA would have produced further and better evidence to support her assertion. He did, however, accept in his opening submissions that, if we found AA’s account to be credible, AA would have a characteristic which could cause them to fear persecution for a Convention reason.
17. Having considered the evidence with care, we have no hesitation in finding that AA was a senior member of XY (and leader of a major branch of the XY women’s movement) as claimed. We note the following in particular:
18. First AA has provided clear and consistent witness evidence (both written and oral) to explain her role in XY. It is correct that AA did not expressly state that she was a leader of XY in her screening interview. We remind ourselves, however, that “…a screening interview is not done to establish in detail the reasons a person gives to support her claim for asylum…” (YL (Rely on SEF) [2004] UKIAT 145 at para. 19). AA’s screening interview records that AA and her husband were “members” of XY and AA’s fear of being targeted on this basis. AA was not required to provide fine details of her membership at the screening stage and her failure to do so does not support the submission of inconsistency relied on by the Secretary of State. As to the account provided by AA at her substantive asylum interview, we note that when asked at Q45 “Why do you fear that you could be a target. Why would the people who killed your husband now want to kill you.” AA answered in terms: “because we were holding leading position in the organisation (sic)”. We note further that AA’s substantive asylum interview of 12 January 2024 post-dates her Asylum Statement of 10 January 2024 in which she clearly explained her role in XY (see para. 4). There was therefore no reason for her to withhold this information.
19. Second AA’s son gave written and oral evidence in support of his mother’s account. We found him to be convincing and credible on this point.
20. Third AA produced two business cards which referred to her leadership role in XY. The description of her role on these cards is consistent with AA’s account. The Secretary of State did not challenge the veracity of these cards.
21. Fourth at the start of the hearing AA showed us three videos. These showed AA assuming a prominent role (e.g. being seated in a chair akin to a throne and having garlands around her neck) at what appeared to be a religious meeting. We are mindful of the fact that we have only seen short extracts of these videos and, given that the videos record activities taking place in a different cultural context, it is difficult for us to assess social nuances. Nevertheless, especially when seen against the background of the above and Dr Holden’s evidence, we find that these videos provide strong support for AA’s claim to have held a leading role in XY.
22. Finally Mr Nappy submitted that AA’s failure to provide further evidence in the form of letters from past/current leaders in XY to support her claim undermines her account. We do not accept this submission. In our judgment the evidence provided by AA on this point amply discharges the burden of proof and there was no requirement for her to provide further evidence. Further, and in any event, AA’s case has consistently been that she went into hiding on the night of 7 October 2021 and that contacting XY members to ask for their support would have undermined her attempt to maintain her low-profile. We accept that explanation.
23. Having accepted AA’s account of her role as a senior leader in XY, we are satisfied on the balance of probabilities that AA does have a characteristic which could cause her to fear persecution for a convention reason. We note too that Mr Nappy accepted that, if AA were found credible, this condition would be made out. Given the evidence on this point, we consider this concession to have been properly made.
(ii) Subjective Fear
24. We go on to consider whether, on the balance of probabilities, AA does in fact fear persecution in Pakistan as a result of her religion. It seems to us that this question is most usefully approached by considering whether AA has established key elements of her account. To the extent she has done so this will lend significant support to an inference that she fears persecution on return to Pakistan for reasons of religion.
25. AA’s core claim can be summarised as follows:
a. As set out above, AA held a prominent role in XY. We have accepted that the accuracy of this claim has been established on (at least) the balance of probabilities.
b. AA’s husband had been a prominent leader in the same organisation.
c. In 2021 AA’s husband made pronouncements that were “incredibly embarrassing” (see AA’s witness statement at para. 18) for others with links to XY.
d. On 21 September 2021, AA’s husband was murdered in a targeted killing at the family house.
e. After AA’s husband was buried, two members of the Pakistani Rangers attended her house and informed her that “the actual target of the attack was not just my husband but me and my children as well” (AA’s witness statement at para. 19).
f. AA states that she does not know who was responsible for the killing but that she “strongly suspects” (AA witness statement at para. 20) that responsibility lies either with the sons of the former leader of XY or an XY splinter group.
g. On 7 October 2021 AA’s son-in-law noticed that he was being followed by a white Toyota Corolla and, having gone to bed, his neighbour noticed two men in helmets trying to break into his house. Guards were called and they left.
h. On the same evening someone tried to enter AA’s house. This was captured on CCTV. Police attended and spoke to AA’s son. They informed him that “whoever killed [AA’s] husband would not stop until they completed their mission and … he could not always guarantee that the police would be able to come every time. He advised [AA’s son] that to protect us, we needed to move from the property immediately” (see AA’s witness statement at para. 22).
i. AA and her family accordingly left the family home that evening and, having failed to find a hotel in which to stay, travelled to AA’s sister’s house in Baluchistan. Save for a period of time with her daughter in Doha, AA remained in hiding in her sister’s house for around a year before travelling to the United Kingdom.
26. The Secretary of State accepted that AA’s deceased husband had been killed by unknown assailants and that his death was being investigated by the Police. The rest of AA’s account was disputed.
27. In relation to the core elements of AA’s account we observe as follows:
28. First we start from the accepted fact that AA’s husband was murdered. We find this undoubted fact to be highly material both to consideration of AA’s subjective fear and the credibility of her account in general. While the identities of those responsible for his murder have not been established, AA was of the view that he had been killed by relatives of a previous leader of XY/members of a splinter group. AA’s reasons for adopting this view were not challenged.
29. The Secretary of State did maintain that, as AA’s husband had not held a senior XY role for some 8-10 years, his killing could not be properly linked to his religious activities. We do not agree. AA explained in her witness statement that before her husband was murdered he was becoming “increasingly vocal and prominent appearing on a daily TV programme during Ramadan on an online TV station …” Mr Nappy did suggest that we had not been provided with a translation of AA’s husband’s television appearance but we do not consider this materially undermined AA’s evidence as to her husband’s profile. AA made clear that, while her husband may have given offence during these appearances, he had not made critical comments in these appearances so it was not necessary for us to engage with the detail of what was said. AA also gave evidence that, due to her husband’s former leadership role, critical comments made at festival in August 2021 would have been particularly embarrassing to the sons of the former leader of XY. Again, this was not challenged by the Secretary of State. We note further AA’s son’s evidence that he had been contacted by various members of the Pakistani intelligence services and military and informed that it was believed that those responsible for the murder came from “within our movement” which AA’s son understood refer to members of XY. This too was not directly challenged and we accept that comments along these lines were made.
30. Second on 11 March 2024 an officer at Sir Syed Police Station in Karachi provided a letter that was sent to AA via her sister. This letter is important and we quote it at length:
On 21.09.2021 an F.I.R. No.854/2021 U.S 302/34 PPC was registered at Sir Syed Town Police Station. in relation to the murder by unknown persons of [AA’s Husband], resident of [address]. Police intelligence believes that that was a targeted attack and that the target was not just [AA’s Husband] but also his wife and children.
On the night of 07.10.2021, [AA’s son] … contacted Rafaqat Butt, the Investigating Officer, in the case complaining that some unknown persons were trying to break into his home. He shared some footage obtained from his home security cameras with the IO. Due to the concerns the police had for the family's safety in light of [AA’s Husband’s Murder], a police vehicle was dispatched to the premises but the suspects had by this point fled the area.
Immediately after this incident, the IO advised [AA’s son] that • he could not guarantee the police would be able to assist or· attend to the premises on each occasion there was an attempt on their lives, and that for their immediate protection and safety, they should relocate from the property. I am aware that the family moved from the premises that same night and have since· relocated to the UK safely.
The police have still not arrested the perpetrators of the murder and the investigation is still being carried out for the same.
31. Mr Nappy submitted that this letter was not reliable as it significantly post-dated the events in question and that it had been obtained to bolster AA’s claim. In our view the date of the letter does not undermine its reliability. It was clearly sensible for AA to seek to obtain this evidence to support her asylum claim. Applying the principles set out in Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 00439 and considering the evidence in the round we find that AA has established that reliance can properly be placed on this document. While Mr Nappy relied on the fact that the letter was not supported by a chain of provenance and should not be given weight for that reason, he did not explicitly submit that the letter was not a genuine document or, if it was, that it had been obtained fraudulently. There is nothing on the face of the document to suggest it should be discounted. The account set out in the police letter is restrained and not obviously calculated to bolster AA’s asylum claim. The police letter is consistent with underlying evidence (including an unchallenged WhatsApp message date stamped 7 October 2021) and CCTV footage provided to the Tribunal (see below) as well as AA’s version of events. We note too that the events it records align with AA’s unchallenged account that she left her house on 7 October 2021 and went to live with her sister. In light of the factors just mentioned, we do not consider the absence of chain of provenance documents to be sufficiently telling to undermine our conclusion that weight can properly be placed on the police letter.
32. The account of events in the police letter plainly supports the account advanced by AA and AA’s son. We note in particular the confirmation that (i) police considered that an attempted break-in did take place on 7 October 2021 (ii) police considered that the target of the 21 September 2021 attack included AA and her family (as well as AA’s husband) (iii) the police considered that they were unable to protect AA at her home and advised her to move. We also note that the police letter makes clear that, although investigations were ongoing, those responsible for the killing had not been apprehended as at March 2024. AA’s brother gave evidence that his maternal uncle regularly follows up about this matter with the police and that this remains the case. When questioned as to why AA’s son had produced no evidence from AA’s maternal uncle to support this he stated that he had not thought of doing so. AA’s frankness on this point weighs in favour of his being a credible witness. We therefore proceed on the basis that those responsible for AA’s husband’s killing remain unidentified and un-apprehended.
33. In our view the police letter provides sufficient support to the credibility of AA’s account and, by inference, the establishing of AA’s subjective fear.
34. Third as noted above, we were shown CCTV footage of the alleged break in 7 October 2021. We accept Mr Nappy’s submission that the short CCTV video does not obviously show an attempted break in and does not show the men in the video to be carrying weapons. However, considered in the context of the evidence as a whole (in particular the police report mentioned above, the unchallenged WhatsApp record indicating that this CCTV footage was in fact sent to the police on 7 October 2021, and AA’s unchallenged claim that she in fact permanently left her house on 7 October 2021 and moved to her sister’s house), we find that the CCTV video weighs in favour of the credibility of AA’s claim. We note that there was some discrepancy between the timing of the sharing of the video and evidence as to the timing of the alleged attempted break-in. In our view this was not sufficiently significant to undermine the credibility of AA’s core account.
35. We accordingly take the view that this video is reliable and that it supports a finding that AA’s account is credible.
36. Fourth we note the proximity in time between the murder of AA’s husband and the events of 7 October 2021 (both the alleged break-in at AA’s house and the unchallenged attempted break-in at AA’s son-in-law’s of the same evening) and consider that this suggests a link between these events.
37. Fifth there was no specific challenge to AA’s claim to have left the family house in Karachi on 7 October (along with family members) following the break in that she and travelled to stay with her sister in Baluchistan where she remained for a year (apart from a trip to Doha). AA provided a credible reason for her decision to leave her home at that point – namely her fear of being attacked. Not only did the Secretary of State fail to challenge this explanation, but she advanced no potential alternative explanation for AA’s relocation.
38. Further, both AA and AA’s son explained the steps they took to hide their identities while staying with AA’s sister in Baluchistan. This included being covered with a type of blanket while sitting in a car every time they left the house. This evidence was not specifically challenged by Mr Nappy. In our view there is no plausible explanation for this activity save that AA was, in fact, in fear.
39. Mr Nappy did, however, make the broad submission that AA’s evidence that she remained in hiding while living with her sister in Baluchistan was incredible. He argued that, as AA had travelled both domestically and internationally during the period, her account could not be accepted. We do not agree. Dealing with Mr Nappy’s submissions in turn:
a. Mr Nappy suggested the fact that AA had not been approached or attacked while living with her sister in Baluchistan undermined the credibility of her account. Given that AA’s case was that she had spent the period she lived with her sister in hiding we do not accept this submission.
b. The only example of domestic travel relied on by Mr Nappy was a trip made by AA to have her fingerprints taken for visa and ID requirements. The Secretary of State had originally asserted that AA travelled to Islamabad for this purpose, AA claimed that she instead travelled to Karachi and provided documentary evidence of this appointment in support. We understand Mr Nappy to have proceeded on the basis that AA did, in fact, travel to Karachi but insofar as it is material, we prefer AA’s evidence on this point. In any event we do not consider domestic travel for the purposes of obtaining a visa to be inconsistent with AA’s account that she was in hiding while living with her sister.
c. Similarly, we accept that, in the period AA was living with her sister, AA travelled to Doha where she stayed with her daughter for two some months. Mr Nappy suggested that the fact that AA returned to Pakistan was inconsistent with AA’s case. While we accept that AA’s decision to return to Pakistan from Doha weighs against her account, we do not find this to be determinative. AA’s evidence was that she was not permitted to remain in Doha for a longer period. This was not challenged by the Secretary of State and there was no evidence before us to support a claim that AA could have claimed asylum in Doha or what this would have entailed.
40. Taken as a whole we find that AA’s actions following the events of 7 October 2021 support an inference that, while she was living with her sister, she was in fear of being harmed.
41. Sixth AA’s account is supported by her son’s evidence (both oral and as set out in his witness statement of 30 September 2024). Dr Holden also states in terms that followers of the founder of XY who disseminate his views are vulnerable to harm from radical orthodox Islamic groups in Pakistan (para. 19). Dr Holden’s account of tensions with a rival organisation purporting to disseminate the teachings of the founder of XY is also broadly consistent with AA’s evidence.
42. Seventh we accept that when AA obtained her visa for travel to the United Kingdom she stated that wanted to visit her son, that AA flew the United Kingdom via Doha on 30 September 2022 and that she did not claim asylum until 1 March 2023. AA explained that this delay was caused by practical difficulties and her not knowing how to make a claim. We accept that AA did not originally make clear that she wished to claim asylum and did delay making her asylum claim. This is of some significance given AA’s evidence that she had given consideration to making such a claim prior to her arrival in the United Kingdom. We accept Mr Nappy’s submission that this weighs against AA in the credibility balance. However, in light of AA’s explanations for her delay (namely issues with money and mental health difficulties) and, in particular, the cogent evidence in support of AA’s core account set out above, we do not find that these concerns materially undermine AA’s credibility.
43. In sum, the evidence suggests that AA’s husband was murdered in a targeted killing as a result of religious views expressed on behalf of XY; AA was a senior leader of XY; AA has reason to believe that killing to have been orchestrated by members of a religious sect; AA was informed by official sources that it is likely that she and her family were also targets of the attack in which her husband was murdered; some 2 ½ weeks after the murder of both AA’s son-in-law and AA experience attempted break-in, the police who attend AA’s property advised that for reasons of “immediate protection and safety, [AA and her family] should relocate from the property”; AA in fact relocated to her sister’s house; those responsible for the murder of AA’s husband/the attempted break-ins have never been identified or apprehended.
44. Against that background we find AA’s account to be broadly credible in material respects. We accordingly find on the balance of probabilities that AA did fear persecution when she left her home on 7 October 2021 and, noting in particular that those responsible for her husband’s killing and/or the failed break-ins have been neither apprehended nor identified, that she continues to fear persecution as a result of her religion should she return to Pakistan. We note that the Secretary of State did not submit that AA’s fear has abated since the events addressed above.
(iii) Risk of Persecution
45. At this stage of the analysis the question we must answer is whether there is a reasonable likelihood, if AA were to be returned to Pakistan, she would be persecuted on the basis of her religious belief. This question falls to be evaluated holistically. We reiterate Singh LJ’s well-known remarks in MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216 at para. 52: “It is also well established that the standard required is less than a 50% chance of persecution occurring. Even a 10% chance that an applicant will face persecution for a Convention reason may satisfy the relevant test …”
46. We remind ourselves that, in order to amount to “persecution”, those responsible for the conduct must fall within the categories provided for at s.31(1) of the 2022 Act, the conduct in issue must be of a kind provided for at s.31(3) of the 2022 Act and it must be sufficiently serious to constitute a severe violation of a basic human right.
47. The Secretary of State did not accept that AA was at risk of persecution on return to Pakistan. We have addressed a number of the arguments made by the Secretary of State in the section above. Mr Nappy also made the further arguments when contesting risk on return:
a. Mr Nappy relied on facts that the AA had never received any threats, had never been reported to the authorities in Pakistan despite allegedly being a leader of XY for some 40 years, and that she was unable to identify her (or her husband’s) assailants to submit that AA was not at risk on return. In light of AA’s credible account of the murder of her husband and the subsequent attempted break-in at her family home, and police concerns that AA and her family were also targeted in those attacks we do not consider the facts that no threats were directly made to AA or that she could not definitively identify her or her husband’s assailants to materially undermine her case on risk on return.
b. Mr Nappy submitted that the fact that AA was able to live safely in Baluchistan for about a year and to travel domestically and internationally while living there demonstrates that she was not at risk. We do not accept this. AA explained that she remained in hiding while living with her sister, to the extent of being covered with a blanket when travelling by car. That seems to us to provide a credible explanation for the fact that AA was able to live safely over this period. It does not affect our assessment of risk on return (we have addressed the Secretary of State’s submissions on the relevance of AA’s travel above).
c. Mr Nappy submitted that as AA had left XY in 2022 that her profile was lower and that she was no longer at risk. He relied on para. 75 of Dr Holden’s Expert Report which reads: [the murders of the former leader of XY and AA’s husband] “…indicates the likelihood that, if the Appellant resumes her activity as a leader of the women section of the [XY] in Karachi, she will be likely exposed to the risk of harm.” This answer was given in answer to the question “Would this risk be enhanced if the Appellant continued to engage in the teachings of her faith?” It in no way suggests that the Appellant, having ceased to engage the teachings of her faith is not at risk. In the very next section of Dr Holden’s report, she goes on to ask: “Is there a risk for the Appellant of being targeted in a sectarian attack from orthodox religious groups?” Dr Holden explained: “The dissemination of the teaching of [the founder of XY], if the Appellant propagates them openly, in conjunction with her prominence as leader of the [XY] women branch in [a place in Pakistan], are factors exposing her to the risk of accusation of blasphemy, which, as indicated in section iii of this report, likely leads to prosecution from state agents and violence from non-state agents.” Again, in our view, it does not follow from this that, having stopped disseminating XY teachings and having ceased to take a prominent (or indeed any) role in XY, that a risk which had already accrued had abated. Applying the lower standard we find that AA would be at risk on return.
48. For the reasons set out above, we consider AA’s account of the core pillars of her account to be credible. In our view it follows that there is a reasonable likelihood AA would suffer acts of physical violence at the hands of a non-state actor that would be sufficiently serious to amount to persecution on the basis of her religious belief should she return to Pakistan. As set out below, the Secretary of State conceded that, if we found AA’s account to be credible, the Pakistani authorities would be unable to provide sufficient protection to AA. It follows that s.31(1) (c) of the 2022 Act is satisfied in this case.
(iv) Sufficiency of Protection
49. Mr Nappy made a number of submissions in relation to sufficiency of protection. He pointed to, among other information, the CPIN “Actors of Protection, Pakistan, July 2024” and noted that AA was not in fear of state authorities. He also noted that, despite AA’s relying on a news article from September 2024 reporting on a call for XY to be banned, no such ban had been imposed and no stronger measures had been adopted against XY. Members (including AA) remained free to practice. Mr Nappy submitted that this undermined AA’s argument that sufficient protection would not be available to her on return. Mr Nappy pointed to para. 79 of Dr Holden’s evidence in which she observed that “only high-profile cases can attract the attention of the higher judiciary and achieve an order of protection” and noted that that, on her account, AA was a high profile case.
50. However, having made these submissions, Mr Nappy then accepted that if we found AA’s account to be credible and found the documents (in particular the police letter recording that AA’s son was told after the 7 October attempted break-in that protection at the family home could not be offered) to be reliable, protection by the Pakistani authorities would not be an answer to AA’s asylum claim. As set out above, we do so find. We accordingly proceed on the basis that the protection available to AA should she return to Pakistan would not provide AA with reasonable protection against persecution.
(v) Internal Relocation
51. AA will not fall to be treated as a refugee if she would not have a well-founded fear of persecution in some part of Pakistan and she can reasonably be expected to travel to and remain in that part of Pakistan (see s.35 of the 2022 Act).
52. Mr Nappy said that internal relocation was reasonably open to AA. Mr Nappy relied on §2.1.1 of the CPIN “Pakistan: Internal Relocation” (Version 2.0, July 2024) which provides as follows:
In general, a person fearing ‘rogue’ state actors and non-state actors is likely to be able to internally relocate, particularly to larger urban areas and cities such as (but not limited to) Karachi, Lahore, and Islamabad.
53. While this statement provides important background context, it is expressly caveated and we do not find it to be determinative in the present case. On the basis of the evidence before us, we do not accept that internal relocation is a viable option for AA. XY is a high-profile organisation with a presence across Pakistan. We have found that AA is a high-profile member of that organisation. She took significant steps to avoid being recognised after her move to Baluchistan which suggests that AA thought she was at risk of being identified after her move. We accordingly find that AA is at risk of being recognised should she relocate. We have seen no evidence to support a claim that the nature of the threat to AA is localised and/or that it would be abated by AA’s relocation, indeed the evidence suggests the opposite.
54. We accept the Secretary of State’s observation that AA was not subject to threats or mis-treatment following her move to live with her sister in Baluchistan. However, as set out above, we accept that AA lived in hiding while in Baluchistan and, indeed, that she took fairly extreme measures to conceal her location. In oral evidence AA explained that she did not socialise, did not use her phone and lived in fear in case her location was discovered. We have already addressed AA and her son’s evidence of how they concealed themselves while travelling. As such, we do not accept that AA’s experience in Baluchistan is indicative of the fact that she would not be at risk should she return to another part of Pakistan nor do we accept that it would be reasonable to expect AA to continue to live in hiding (as she did when living with her sister) in order to lower her risk of persecution.
55. As such, we do not accept that internal relocation is an answer to AA’s claim for asylum.
Conclusion
56. For the reasons set out above we find on the balance of probabilities that AA has a characteristic which could cause her to fear for one of the five reasons set out in the Refugee Convention and that AA does, in fact, fear such persecution. We find further that there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that AA would suffer such harm on return to Pakistan, that she would not benefit from state protection and that she has no reasonable internal flight alternative. We accordingly find AA’s asylum claim to be made out.
57.
58. In light of that finding it is not necessary for is to go on to consider whether AA can claim asylum in the alternative in reliance on HJ (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 31; whether she benefits from Humanitarian Protection and/or whether requiring her to return to Pakistan would breach her rights under Articles 3 and/or 8 ECHR.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is allowed on Refugee Convention grounds.

ANDREW DEAKIN

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

11 September 2025