Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER

Case Nos: UI-2025-001136
UI-2025-001138 & UI-2025-001139

FtT Nos: PA/66623/2023,
PA/66625/2023 & PA/66626/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

01st July 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’CALLAGHAN
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE COLE

Between

(1) EB (ALBANIA)
(2) DB (ALBANIA)
(3) KR (ALBANIA)
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellants
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellants: Ms A Jones, Counsel, instructed by Connaught Law Limited
For the Respondent: Mr B Hulme, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 23 June 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellants, EB and her minor children DB and KR, are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellants. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellants appeal a decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing their protection and human rights appeals. The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Hanes (‘the Judge’) was sent to the parties on 26 January 2025.
Anonymity
2. The First-tier Tribunal issued an anonymity order in respect of all three appellants, though no reasons were given for the order being made. Neither party requested that we set the order aside.
3. EB has received a positive conclusive grounds decision from the Competent Authority. Section 2(1)(db) of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 provides lifelong anonymity to persons who have made allegations that they have been subject to human trafficking contrary to section 2 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. The respondent accepts EB to be a victim of trafficking. In the circumstances, she benefits from the operation of the statutory provision and enjoys lifelong anonymity.
4. We confirm the anonymity order in respect of the minor appellants, DB and KR, to prevent the possibility of EB being subject to jigsaw identification.
Relevant Facts
5. The appellants are a family. EB is the mother of DB and KR, both of whom are minor children. Neither father of the children has British nationality, nor is it said that they have permission to remain in this country. The father of DB has no contact with his child. The father of KR has agreed contact twice a month. This arrangement has been privately agreed between the parents and no Child Arrangement Order is in place.
6. EB travelled to the United Kingdom whilst pregnant in 2018, entering this country in the back of a lorry. She claimed asylum some weeks later and was referred to the National Referral Mechanism. In 2018 she received a positive reasonable grounds decision and, almost five years later, she received a positive conclusive grounds decision in 2023.
7. In the meantime, EB gave birth to a stillborn child five months after her arrival in this country. We extend our sympathy to her for her loss. She subsequently became a mother to DB and KR, whose international protection claims were joined with hers under the Family Asylum Claims process.
8. Following the issuing of the conclusive grounds decision, the respondent refused the family’s application for international protection by a decision dated 11 December 2023. EB was accepted to be a member of a particular social group, but it was not accepted by the respondent that she faced a real risk of persecution on her return to Albania. The appellants exercised their statutory right of appeal.
Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
9. The Judge heard the appellants’ appeal at Taylor House on 3 January 2025. EB was accepted to be a vulnerable witness. She gave evidence and was cross-examined.
10. The Judge identified at [3] of her decision that the issues before her were:
i. Whether EB has a genuine fear of persecution if returned to Albania on the basis of her membership of a particular social group; and
ii. Article 8 ECHR private life rights.
11. The appellants did not rely upon article 3 ECHR or article 8 ECHR family life rights.
12. Being mindful of the scope of the appeal before this Tribunal, we observe that it is unfortunate that the Judge did not address with the representatives and set out with clarity at the outset of her decision the facts agreed between the parties.
13. EB stated that she is fearful of her family as she did not marry the person they wished for her to marry, which led to her being rejected by then and required to leave home. She is fearful of her former fiancé. She is also fearful of her former partner who forced her to be a sex worker.
14. She identified herself as being a member of a particular social group on three bases:
i. as a victim of trafficking;
ii. as a victim of domestic violence; and
iii. as a single mother with illegitimate children.
15. The Judge found EB to be incredible as to various elements of her personal history. She concluded that EB was at a lower risk of re-trafficking, that her former partner who controlled her sex work was not part of an organised prostitution gang and operated on his own, that her former fiancé had no continuing interest in her and that her family did not possess such strict cultural beliefs as to cause her a real risk of persecution on her return as single mother with two illegitimate children, at [21].
16. The Judge further found that the father of KR would be able to provide support to EB and his child on their return to Albania, at [22]-[24]. Alternatively, the Judge found that EB could secure support for herself and her children on return to Albania, and that EB was sufficiently well-educated to be able to find employment to pay for childcare. Additionally, she could secure support from her siblings if her parents were unwilling to aid, and also from friends, at [25].
17. The article 8 appeal was dismissed both under and outside the Immigration Rules, at [27].
18. We observe that when assessing the evidence of a victim of trafficking who has been forced to engage in sex work for several months, a judge should properly consider whether trauma impacts memory, particularly of events occurring at the time of non-consensual sex work. On initial consideration it may be that the continuing impact of trauma was not at the forefront of the judge’s mind in respect of certain findings at [13]. However, this potential concern does not establish a material error because of the unchallenged conclusions reached by the Judge in respect of the medical evidence filed in this appeal.
19. We consider it appropriate to record in our decision two important findings by the Judge in respect of medical evidence relied upon by EB, an accepted victim of trafficking and a woman forced into non-consensual sex work. EB’s solicitors filed with the First-tier Tribunal a letter from a doctor at a private clinic who has been treating EB for anxiety and depression since 2021. The letter states that EB was prescribed Sertraline for panic attacks and that she suffers vertigo, headaches and severe hypochondria. The dosage of the antidepressant was not confirmed. No evidence was filed relating to the doctor or his clinic. The Judge directed at the hearing, with no objection from Ms Jones, that there be an online search of the clinic’s website. The search disclosed the doctor’s medical qualifications and gave a summary of the clinic’s specialisms, which are identified in the decision as including the provision of aesthetic treatments including Botox. The website did not confirm the doctor as having qualifications in either psychology or psychiatry. The Judge gave little weight to the doctor’s letter.
20. It is unfortunate that basic checks were not undertaken before reliance was placed upon the letter which may have permitted the doctor an opportunity prior to the hearing to address his qualification to diagnose and treat anxiety.
21. The second finding is at [18]:
“18. ... It would appear that [the consultant psychiatrist] was not provided with a print out of the GP summary record (10 pages) updated to November 2023. The Tribunal was not provided with a copy of the instructions by solicitors to [the consultant psychiatrist] or any update from [the consultant psychiatrist] to date of hearing.”
22. It is not clear to the panel as why an updated report was required. The report was nine months old at the time of the hearing, and having read it we do not consider it to be adversely affected by age.
23. The Judge noted the guidance of this Tribunal in HA (expert evidence, mental health) Sri Lanka [2022] UKUT 111 (IAC), [2022] Imm AR 809, and relied upon the failure to provide a summary of the GP records when giving limited weight to a report from a consultant psychiatrist.
24. We observe that the consultant psychiatrist records in the “sources of information” section of her report that she was provided with the respondent’s bundle which was uploaded to MyHMCTS on 1 February 2024. We further observe that the GP summary is to be found at Annex N of the bundle, at pages 123 to 141. The Judge therefore appears to us to have erred in considering the GP summary records not to have been placed before the consultant psychiatrist. It is unfortunate that the instructions were not filed in the appellant’s bundle, nor that the consultant psychiatrist expressly addressed the records in her report. Additionally, it is unfortunate that this panel has had to work its way through various bundles to identify whether the summary was placed before the consultant psychiatrist. No issue was taken by the appellants with the Judge’s finding either in the grounds of appeal or orally before us at the hearing. Consequently, the appellants have not advanced that the error of fact is an error of law. We observe that this appeal offers a salient reminder of the importance of GP records being carefully and expressly considered by an expert providing medical opinion to this Chamber: HA, at [160].
25. Noting the approach adopted in this matter, the panel recalls Lewinson LJ’s pithy observation in Fage UK Ltd v Chobani UK Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 5, at [114]: “... the hearing is not a dress rehearsal, ‘It is the first and last night of the show’.” This observation is as applicable to pre-hearing preparation as to the subsequent evaluation of facts.
Grounds of Appeal
26. The grounds of appeal were drafted by Ms Jones, who represented the appellants before the First-tier Tribunal. The grounds advanced are:
i. The Judge departed from the position agreed by the parties in a combination of the reasons for refusal, or decision, letter, the appellants’ skeleton argument and the respondent’s review, without giving proper notice of her intention to do so or permitting an opportunity to make further submissions.
ii. The Judge drew adverse inferences from post hearing questions which were asked in a procedurally unfair manner without permitting further submissions to be made.
iii. The Judge made assumptions and indulged in speculation in relation to risk on return, which is unjustified in all the circumstances.
27. First-tier Tribunal Judge McMahon granted the appellants permission to appeal to this Tribunal by a decision sent to the parties on 7 March 2025, observing, inter alia:
“3. Grounds 1 and 2 go to the issue of procedural fairness. It is arguable that the Judge’s departure from agreed matters without giving either party an opportunity to comment is a material error of law. In addition, although the Judge did provide both parties with an opportunity to make submissions on the post-hearing evidence relied on by the Appellants, it is arguable that the Judge erred in respect of the timescales for providing those submissions and subsequently using that evidence as a basis for making adverse credibility findings.
4. Ground 3 is also arguable as it is unclear how the Judge reached the conclusion that the Appellants would have family support on return.”
Analysis
Ground 1
28. The core of the first ground is that the Judge was presented with a position agreed by both the appellants and the respondent, conveyed by a combination of the decision letter, the appellants’ skeleton argument and the respondent’s review. The Judge’s decision addresses the agreed issues concisely at [3]:
“... The [reasons for refusal letter] accepted that the appellant was a member of a Particular Social Group (PSG) ...”
29. We asked Ms Jones to take us through what was said to be the accepted position of both parties identifiable from the documents before the Judge. She first took us to the decision letter dated 11 December 2023 and noted that at § 40 the respondent accepted EB’s name, her date of birth and that she was an Albanian national. The next subheading in the document is “Material facts I accept”. Within this section it is accepted at § 41 that EB is an Albanian national and at § 42 that she is a victim of trafficking. No further acceptances are identified in this short section. The next paragraphs proceed to consider section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004.
30. Ms Jones then took us to a section of the decision letter titled “Well-founded fear of persecution” where it was confirmed again at § 48 that the respondent accepted EB to be a victim of trafficking. Within this paragraph, when assessing whether there was a well-founded fear of persecution, the respondent confirmed that she did not accept EB would face a risk of persecution or a real risk of serious harm on return to Albania. She then proceeded to identify guidance from the Upper Tribunal country guidance decision in TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 92 (IAC).
31. We cite the next two paragraphs of the refusal decision in full:
“49. Applying the above criteria: You have stated you are from a village […], which is in […], Albania. You have stated that your father worked as a farmer, and after at (sic) the time when you left, he was unemployed. However, also that your mother is also unemployed and only your eldest sister worked while the youngest was studying, this shows that your family was able to financially support themselves in Albania. Whilst you stated you would not have a support network available to you in Albania, but you had a friend that you were able to get support from and live with for six months. She also helped you leave Albania along with her cousin who helped you after you left Albania. You have not been in contact with her since as you have stated that you have no contact with anyone in Albania and she was the last person you had contact with.
50. Whilst you may have lost contact with your friend, it is noted you reached [out] to her after a long time before and there is no reason why you could not seek to re-establish that contact now.”
32. Ms Jones submits that the words “applying the above criteria” can only mean that all of the facts subsequently referenced were accepted by the respondent. We shall address this submission below.
33. At § 51 the decision letter details, inter alia:
“51. ... However, it is accepted you do have a family in Albania that you could reconnect with. It is considered that even if your family was not willing to support you on return to Albania, the government of Albania has services in place to support the reintegration of victims on return to Albania ...”
34. Ms Jones’ position before us on behalf of the appellants was that the reference to the word “accepted” in this paragraph should not be considered as being a true acceptance, rather it was merely the respondent identifying her point of view.
35. The difficulty for the appellants is identified by the contortion, and we do not use the word pejoratively, that Ms Jones was required to adopt before us, where express reference to “accepted” is not to read as meaning “accepted”, but that reference to “applying the above criteria” is meant to establish that there was express acceptance of relevant factors. We observe that the decision has a section expressly concerned with the material facts accepted by the respondent. As addressed above, those material factors are limited to EB being an Albanian national and a victim of trafficking. It is proper to observe that her name and date of birth were accepted at § 40, but this acceptance is readily identifiable by the respondent stating, “I am satisfied”.
36. We conclude that there is no explicit acceptance of personal history at §§ 49 and 50. Indeed many of the sentences simply refer to no more than EB having stated certain acts and events. We are satisfied that on a reasonable reading of these two paragraphs the respondent was doing no more than viewing or assessing the relevant test as to well-founded fear of persecution through the lens of EB’s stated case. If these facts were accepted, there would have been clear reference to such acceptance in the section of the letter devoted to expressly confirmed accepted personal facts.
37. We are supported in our conclusion by the respondent’s review dated 25 July 2024 where § 1 confirms that she continues to rely upon the decision letter. She notes at § 8 the Competent Authority’s decision that EB is a victim of modern slavery and that EB was subject to forced prostitution from approximately September 2017 to January 2018. However, nowhere in the review is there any express reference to EB’s personal history being accepted beyond her nationality and that she is a victim of trafficking. Indeed, at § 9 the respondent is clear that she does not find it credible that EB’s family and friends would not help her if she returned to Albania. The respondent is clear at § 9 that she will test the credibility of EB in cross-examination.
38. The appellants’ skeleton argument was drafted by Ms Jones and is dated 11 April 2024. As expected from Ms Jones it is a clear and carefully drafted document. Ms Jones accepted before us that there was no reference to §§ 49 and 50 of the decision as setting out agreed facts. She also accepted that the skeleton argument did not expressly identify agreed facts. Rather, there was a generalised assertion at para. 40 of the document that “the credibility of [EB] is accepted.” This general assertion, we conclude, goes beyond the scope of the decision letter as illuminated by the respondent’s subsequent review.
39. In the circumstances, we are satisfied that the only agreed facts before the Judge were that EB is an Albanian national and that she is a victim of trafficking. The appellants now complain that the Judge made adverse findings regarding EB’s contact or otherwise with a named friend in Albania, the position of the minor children and her ability to reconnect with family and friends in Albania. These were not agreed facts and therefore the criticism advanced before us that the adverse findings arose from the Judge departing from the parties’ agreed position has no basis.
40. We consider our position is reinforced by events at the First-tier Tribunal hearing. The Judge asked several questions to EB as to the named friend in Albania and following these questions, the Presenting Officer undertook further cross-examination. There were questions as to the length and the nature of her stay with the friend before she left Albania, about the friend’s husband, whether she remained living in the same house, the nature of her contact with her friend since she was interviewed as part of the asylum process or claim, the possibility that she and the children could stay with the friend if returned to Albania, the extent to which the friend would help her and her children, and how much the friend had known about her forced engagement as a sex worker. Ms Jones accepts that she raised no objection to any or all of these questions. We conclude at the hearing Ms Jones quite properly understood and accepted that these were questions that could properly be put by the Judge, evidencing that the appellant’s history as to her engagement with her friend was not agreed.
41. This ground is dismissed.
Ground 2
42. Ground 2 is founded upon the Judge drawing adverse inferences from post-hearing questions which are said by the appellants to have been asked in a procedurally unfair manner. The grounds, as drafted, assert that having asked these questions in writing the Judge did not permit further submissions on the issues raised. The challenge as to a failure to permit submissions was withdrawn by Ms Jones at the hearing for reasons we detail below.
43. The questions were asked by directions issued by the Judge on 16 January 2025, thirteen days after the hearing. There are five questions which we detail below and concern SR, the father of KR:
i. Is SR an Albanian national? (it is stated that he was born in Albania on the birth certificate of KR).
ii. Where is SR currently residing: the UK, Albania or elsewhere?
iii. What is SR’s immigration status in the United Kingdom?
iv. Is the appellant currently in a relationship with SR? Yes or No. If not, when did the relationship end (approximate date)?
v. If the answer to the first part of (iv) is ‘no’:
(a) has there been any contact with SR since the relationship ended? If yes, please confirm the frequency and the nature of that contact including after the birth until now (the appellant, KR),
(b) has SR contributed to the support of any of the children and/or the appellant since KR’s birth? If yes, please give details.
44. The Judge directed:
“... any further submissions by either the Appellant or Respondent (if deemed necessary by either the Appellant or Respondent and only if they wish to do so), to be provided within 3 working days (by 27 January 2025 at the latest or earlier depending on when the answers are provided) after receipt of the above answers and limited to one page. The Appellant to provide her answers on or before 5 pm on 22 January 2025. If it is not possible for the Appellant to provide either an original or scanned signature in time, her solicitors may confirm in writing (a qualified named practitioner to sign) the answers obtained from the Appellant (specify whether the answers received orally, for eg by telephone, or in writing), the date and the use of an interpreter.
If no answers are received from the Appellant as set out above, a decision will be made without further notice on the basis of the current evidence.”
45. EB provided written answers to the questions via her solicitors. She confirmed that SR is the father of KR, that he resides in the United Kingdom, that his current immigration status is unknown but that he was previously an asylum seeker, and that EB’s relationship with SR ended in October 2023. Additionally, EB confirmed that she communicates with SR about their son’s health and wellbeing and that SR sees his son twice a month. Their communication is limited to coparenting matters, and SR does not contribute financially or otherwise to the support of his son.
46. Consequent to receipt of the answers the Judge directed on 21 January 2025:
“A response was received on 20 January 2025 (uploaded) from the Appellant to Directions dated 16 January 2025. If either of the parties intends to make submissions relevant to the new evidence, it is to be uploaded before 24 January 2025.”
47. We understand that when drafting the grounds of appeal Ms Jones was not made aware that directions in respect of submissions were issued on two occasions. Ms Jones properly sought instructions when informed of the directions and withdrew this element of the challenge.
48. The duty of fairness applies in asylum and immigration appeals. When fact-finding, a tribunal has a reasonable inquisitorial function to make its own inquiries in the context of full disclosure and discussion of all relevant issues at a hearing: Secretary of State for the Home Department v MN and KY [2014] UKSC 30, [2014] 1 WLR 2064, per Lord Carnwath at [25]. A tribunal can put questions on any issue that is not the subject of a clear and unequivocal concession. However, when considering all the circumstances of a case, questioning should not be unfair. Consequently, whilst it may be open to a judge to ask simple, clarifying questions post-hearing, substantive questions addressing issues not addressed in oral evidence may be fairly addressed only by reconvening the hearing and permitting the parties to examine and cross-examine before making oral submissions. The reconvening of a hearing permits the parties time to prepare.
49. We have considered the approach adopted by the Judge to her post-hearing questions. They may be said to be more than simple questions of clarification. Additionally, the timeframe within which the answers were to be provided was short, being mindful of the requirement to secure an interpreter, arrange for EB to attend her solicitors’ office as well as the unexpected cost of further work. The very short timeframe for preparing and filing submissions may unintentionally impact the ability to secure the involvement of counsel. There is difficulty in understanding the proportionality of the direction that no more than one-page of written submissions be filed as being appropriate when in hindsight the questions go to the Judge’s conclusion that SR will provide support to EB and his child if and when they return to Albania.
50. However, and in our view as expressed to Ms Jones somewhat surprisingly, the appellants’ solicitors simply acquiesced to the request and provided answers to the questions. There was no request for the hearing to be reconvened, not was complaint made about the procedure adopted by the Judge.
51. Two opportunities were provided by directions for the appellants to file written submissions. The offers were not acted upon by the appellants’ solicitors. Ms Jones confirmed her instructions that it was a decision made by the solicitors not to file written submissions and not to request for the hearing to be reconvened. On instruction Ms Jones informed us that her instructing solicitors accepted that they had a professional role to protect the position of their clients, the appellants, and in hindsight they accept that they should have understood at the very least the importance of making submissions on the issue(s) raised by the questions.
52. The appellants contend that these post-hearing questions were not put to EB at a hearing with her counsel in attendance, that it was procedurally unfair for the Judge to require these questions to be answered in writing and then to make adverse credibility findings on the basis of the answers provided. The real difficulty for the appellants is that at the time the questions were asked, they were legally represented, and their solicitors consented to the approach adopted. As accepted before this panel, the solicitors decided not to request the hearing to be reconvened and to file no written submissions. Whilst the approach adopted in respect of these detailed questions may be unorthodox, ultimately, we find that it cannot be said to be unfair when the appellants’ solicitors agreed to the procedure adopted.
53. There is no merit to ground 2.
Ground 3
54. Ground 3 advances the contention that the Judge engaged in speculation when stating:
“... that the appellant’s family was not sufficiently traditional to object to the children, without considering the extent of “traditional” which would lead to the Appellant’s two illegitimate children being accepted.” [para. 17 of the grounds]
55. The concern advanced by Ms Jones is that the notion that the family, particularly EB’s father, was not sufficiently traditional was speculative and was not supported by EB having been told to leave the house as a young woman. The grounds identify that the Judge:
“... is speculating that a woman treated with this ‘harsh reaction’ would nevertheless get support on return with two illegitimate children.” [para. 18 of the grounds]
56. We asked Ms Jones to identify where the Judge expressly found that the family was not sufficiently traditional. Our attention was directed to § 21 and § 25 of the decision and we were asked to read into these paragraph that certain findings of fact were made that accorded with the challenge now advanced. As to § 21, we were directed to:
“21. ... I am not satisfied that the appellant’s father is of any danger to the appellant (or her children) or any other member of her family. The appellant attended university until the age of about 25 in […] and was not yet married at the age of 27 after being engaged for 2 years. Although originally from northern Albania, the appellant’s family lived in Tirana from […]. I am not satisfied that the appellant’s family engage in strict traditional beliefs which would put her in danger.”
57. The finding that the family does not engage in strict traditional beliefs is reasoned, and not speculative. Reference is made to EB attending university, not being married at the age of 27 and having been permitted to be engaged for two years. Whilst another judge may have reasonably reached a different conclusion we are satisfied that the Judge could reasonably upon these facts conclude that EB’s family cultural beliefs did not place her at real risk of serious harm. We consider this element of the challenge amounts to no more than a disagreement with findings of fact.
58. We note that § 25 is an alternative to a finding at § 24 that SR would be able to provide support to EB and his child, if they were to return to Albania. § 25 details that on return EB could gain entry to a shelter and that she and her children will be provided with accommodation, food and basic healthcare and access to counselling. She would be offered some childcare to enable her to attend vocational training and her stay in the shelter could be as long as two years. If she were to be required to leave and live on her own, EB is sufficiently well-educated to find a job. The First-tier Tribunal also found:
“25. ... Furthermore, I am not satisfied that she would not have family support (such as her sisters if her parents are unwilling to help) or friends such as [...] to assist her. According to the appellant, [...] took care of her in her own home for about 6 months and then assisted her in arranging a flight to Belgium where she stayed with her cousin and then arranged for her trip to the UK. These are the action of a very close friend or relative.”
59. This paragraph does not aid the appellants in advancing this ground. The reasoning flows from the finding at § 21 that the family do not engage in strict traditional beliefs, and at its core is a conclusion that EB’s sisters would be willing to help a sibling. In any event, the conclusion as to the views of the family is additional to the unchallenged finding that SR will provide support, as will the friend who aided EB in leaving the country.
60. In the circumstances we dismiss this ground.
Notice of Decision
61. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal sent to the parties on 26 January 2025 does not contain a material error of law. The appeal is dismissed.
62. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal stands.
63. An anonymity order in respect of all three appellants is confirmed.

D O’Callaghan
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

30 June 2025