Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM
CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001145

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/64872/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 2 December 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MANDALIA

Between

LN
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation
For the Appellant: Mr K Forrest, counsel instructed by JRI Law.
For the Respondent: Mr A Mullen, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Edinburgh Tribunal Hearing Centre on 14 August 2025
Decision and Reasons
Anonymity
1. This appeal concerns a claim for international protection by a victim of trafficking. Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.”
Introduction
2. The appellant is a national of Vietnam. On 8 September 2021 he made a claim for asylum. The claim was refused by the respondent on 30 November 2023. The respondent accepts the appellant is a victim of trafficking but claims the appellant will not be at risk upon return to Vietnam because there will be sufficient protection available to him and in any event, he can internally relocate.
3. The appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s decision was dismissed by First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”) judge Clapham (“the FtT judge”) for reasons set out in a decision promulgated on 26 January 2025 (“the decision”).
4. The appellant claims the decision of the FtT judge is vitiated by material errors of law. The appellant claims that at the outset of the hearing before the FtT, the Tribunal was invited to treat the appellant as a vulnerable witness on the basis that it is common ground that he is a victim of trafficking.
5. The respondent had not previously raised any concerns regarding the credibility of the appellant. The appellant claims that at paragraph [26] of the decision, the judge refers to the debt owed to the traffickers. The judge refers to the appellant owing $19,000 plus interest and a claim that it would take one year to pay back the debt. The appellant claims there is no reference in his statement to him being able to pay the debt back in one year. His evidence was that he would have to continue working for the trafficker until the debt was repaid. In cross-examination, the appellant said he did not know whether the debt owed was being reduced by the work he was undertaking. He said he had been told that the money was “just enough money for food”. The appellant’s claim is therefore that the debt remained outstanding and that despite the appellant working in Russia for seven months, the debt remained. The appellant also claims that he has had infrequent contact with his mother since his arrival in the UK and there may well have been other visits to her, that the appellant is unaware of. The ‘money lender’ has an on-going interest in the appellant and they would go to any length to get their money back.
6. In submissions before the FtT judge, the appellant’s representatives had submitted that without a certificate from the government of Vietnam recognising the appellant as a victim of trafficking, the appellant will be unable to access protective services on return. The appellant claims the FtT judge applied to high a standard of proof when she said, at [32], that “The existence of one or more factors does not mean that re-trafficking is at all certain”. The issue was whether there would be a real risk of re-trafficking on return.
7. The appellant also claims the judge refers at paragraph [34] to there being no diagnosis in respect of any medical conditions. There was however evidence before the FtT regarding the health of the appellant in the form of medical record and those responsible for treatment including the appellant’s GP and Psychologists. The judge failed to have adequate regard to that evidence in reaching her decision.
8. The appellant also claims that the FtT judge directed that the submissions made by the parties representatives would not be translated to the appellant whilst they were being made and neither did she make provision for a summary to be provided. The appellant claims that an impartial and informed observer may have formed the view that the judge did not consider this part of the hearing to be worthy of court time, and giving the impression of ‘apparent bias’. The appellant claims he was denied the opportunity of hearing the points made against him, and to advise his representatives of any points that he may have wished to be addressed in response to the Presenting Officers’ submissions. It is said in the grounds of appeal that the appellant may well have formed the view that the judge did not think his case was important.
9. Permission to appeal was granted by FtT Judge McMahon on 7 March 2025. Judge McMahon said:
“2. The grounds assert that the Judge erred in law by raising the Appellant's credibility as an issue when it had not been raised by the Respondent (ground 1); made errors as to material facts in the Appellant’s claim (ground 2); and conducted the hearing in a manner which was procedurally unfair (ground 3).
3. Ground 1 is arguable because it is clear from [4] that the parties did not consider the Appellant’s credibility to be a principal controversial issue to be determined by the Judge, yet despite this it is clear that a core component of the Judge's decision concerns the Appellant’s credibility.
4. Ground 2 is also arguable because the Judge’s decision about the timescale for the Appellant repaying the debt appears to be contrary to the evidence before her; and further, the Judge does not appear to have properly engaged with the medical evidence before her.
5. I do not have the benefit of a statement or transcript of proceedings which would shine a light on the conduct of the hearing, however ground 3 is at least arguable based on the submissions made by the representative in the application for permission. It is arguable that by failing to be present during the translation of the closing submissions, the Judge denied the Appellant the opportunity to tailor his closing submissions to respond to points raised by the Respondent.
The Hearing of the Appeal Before Me
10. Mr Forrest submits the respondent had accepted in her decision that the appellant is a victim of trafficking. He accepted however that the appellant’s claim, as set out in paragraph [26] of the decision that the traffickers had visited his mother in Vietnam was a claim that had not been made by the appellant until the hearing of the appeal. Mr Forrest accepts that it was therefore open to the judge to find that the traffickers had not visited the appellant’s mother, as he had claimed, for the reasons given by the judge at paragraphs [26] and [27] of the decision.
11. However, Mr Forrest submits the judge said at paragraphs [32] that the appellant’s evidence regarding any debt is mere speculation. Mr Forrest referred to paragraph [36] of the appellant’s witness statement before the FtT in which he had confirmed that he owes money to the traffickers. He said that he believes he owes the $19,000 and that he was told he had to work to pay that off. His evidence is that he believes he still owes that debt. The respondent accepts the appellant was trafficked and there was, Mr Forrest submits, evidence before the Tribunal from the appellant as to what he understands the position to be. There was sufficient evidence that the appellant was treated in such a way that a debt was built upon, and the appellant claims he will not be able to repay that debt. The conclusion reached by the judge that the appellant’s evidence of any debt being owed is “mere speculation”, is entirely unreasonable.
12. Mr Forrest referred to the respondent’s CPIN: Vietnam: Trafficking, published in December 2023, which addresses, at [3.1.4], the factors that may increase the risk of an individual being abused or re-trafficked. They include an outstanding debt, being known to the trafficker, absence of a supportive family or other supporting network, lack of educational and vocational skills, and importantly, mental heath disorders caused and/or exacerbated by experiences of abuse when originally trafficked. Mr Forrest submits the FtT judge failed to engage with the medical evidence that was before the Tribunal. There is an entry in the appellant’s medical records of a consultation with his GP on 24 July 2023 in which the appellant complained about ‘problems sleeping’ and the appellant being prescribed Mirtazapine. The appellant also referred to a ‘poor appetite’. There was evidence before the FtT in the form of a letter from the ‘Glasgow Psychological Trauma Service’ (authorised on 20 July 2023) from Sally Jowett, a Principal Clinical Psychologist, to the appellant’s GP following a discussion with the appellant in June 2023. The appellant referred to feeling ‘sad and depressed’ and spoke of wanting to work and being bored staying at home. Mr Forrest accepts the judge did not ignore the evidence altogether, but submits the judge failed to have regard to the relevance of the appellant’s mental heath as a factor that in creases the risk of the appellant being re-trafficked.
13. Finally, Mr Forrest adopts the third ground of appeal as set out concerning the procedure adopted by the judge for the translation of closing submissions. He accepts there is no transcript of the hearing before the FtT, before me.
14. In reply, Mr Mullen submits the appellant’s evidence that the traffickers had visited his mother in Vietnam first emerged during cross-examination at the hearing before the FtT, and the judge was entitled to reach a decision as to the credibility of that evidence. Mr Mullen submits that in his witness statement dated 11 January 2023 the appellant claimed, at paragraph [36], that he believes he owes $19,000 and that the ‘trafficker’ had been to his house. The appellant’s evidence as recorded in paragraphs [16] of [17] of the FtT judge’s decision was that the traffickers had visited his mother’s house to ask where the appellant is. They have visited once only, and although the appellant was unable to say exactly when that was, he thinks it was in October 2024. Mr Mullen submits the appellant has provided an inconsistent account of events and the judge was entitled to reject the claims made at the hearing. Mr Mullen submits that in the absence of a transcript of the hearing before the FtT, there is nothing to demonstrate that the hearing before the FtT was tainted by any procedural unfairness or bias.
Decision
15. The appellant claims the Tribunal was invited to treat the appellant as a vulnerable witness on the basis that it is common ground that he is a victim of trafficking. Although I accept that the judge does not refer to the appellant having been treated as a vulnerable witness, that is immaterial to the outcome of the appeal. The appellant was represented at the hearing of the appeal and the grounds of appeal fail to identify any basis upon which it can be said that the evidence of the appellant should have been treated with caution, or any other adjustments that were needed but not provided, because of vulnerability.
16. The FtT Judge set out the issues in the appeal in paragraph [4] of her decision. The judge acknowledged at paragraph [11] of her decision that the respondent had accepted the appellant is a victim of trafficking, but rejected his claim to be at risk of re-trafficking. The judge heard evidence from the appellant as set out in paragraphs [12] to [21] of the decision. At paragraph [25] the judge said:
“The Appellant’s main fear is that he will be re trafficked if returned to Vietnam. The onus is on the Appellant to show he is at risk and that there is no state protection or opportunity to relocate elsewhere in the country. From the evidence before I consider that he has failed to show that there is such a risk. I will rehearse in the following paragraphs why I consider this to be the case.”
17. The judge then went on to set out her reasons for concluding that the appellant will not be at risk upon return to Vietnam. The assessment of the risk upon return and the credibility of the claim advanced by an appellant is always a highly fact sensitive task. The judge was required to consider a number of factors. They include, whether the account given by the appellant was of sufficient detail, whether the account is internally consistent and consistent with any relevant specific and general country information, and whether the account is plausible. The ingredients of the story, and the story as a whole, have to be considered by reference to the evidence available to the Tribunal. The judge was required to resolve what had happened in the past, and whether the appellant would be at risk on return in the future.
18. In reaching my decision, I have reminded myself of the restraint which an appellate body must exercise when considering an appeal against the decision of a specialist judge at first instance. Appellate Courts do not lightly interfere with findings of fact made by a trial judge. In Henderson v Foxworth Investments Ltd [2014] UKSC 41, [2014] 1 WLR 2600, Lord Reed (with whom Lords Kerr, Sumption, Carnwath and Toulson agreed) said at paragraph 67:
"in the absence of some other identifiable error, such as (without attempting an exhaustive account) a material error of law, or the making of a critical finding of fact which has no basis in the evidence, or a demonstrable misunderstanding of relevant evidence, or a demonstrable failure to consider relevant evidence, an appellate court will interfere with the findings of fact made by a trial judge only if it is satisfied that his decision cannot reasonably be explained or justified".
19. Here, it was common ground that the appellant was a victim of trafficking and the issue at the heart of the appeal was whether there is a real risk of the appellant being re-trafficked. It was, as Mr Forrest accepts, undoubtedly open to the judge to consider and reject the appellant’s claim as set out in paragraphs [16] and [17] of the decision that the traffickers had visited his mother’s house in Vietnam to ask where the appellant is. That was a claim made during the course of the hearing itself. As the judge also said, there was no information about what happened when the visit had taken place nor why they chose not to visit for some three years after the appellant had left, notwithstanding his claim that they knew where he lived. The judge repeated at paragraph [32], as she was entitled to, that she did not believe the appellant’s evidence regarding the ‘trafficker visiting his mother”.
20. At paragraph [26] of the decision the judge also refers to the claim in the appellant’s witness statement that he owes $19,000 plus interest. I acknowledge that it is difficult to see the evidential basis for the judge adding “and that it would take one year to pay back the debt”. The appellant does not say in his either of his witness statements that it would take one year to pay back the debt. It is not a claim recorded as part of the appellant’s evidence at paragraphs [14] to [16] of the decision. Having carefully considered the decision as a whole, the reference to it taking one year to pay back the debt, is immaterial to the outcome of the appeal. As the judge went on to say at [26]: “the fact is that he worked in Russia for some 7 months and he simply does not know what if any debt is owed.”. That is undoubtedly correct. In his witness statements, the appellant states he believes he still owes the money. The judge recorded at paragraphs [14] and [15] of her decision that the appellant was unable to say whether the sums due to the traffickers were deducted from his earnings or whether any additional payments were added to the debt for the appellant’s travel from France to the UK. Although the appellant is accepted to be a victim of trafficking, that is not to say that a debt remains outstanding to the traffickers, and it was open to the judge to say, as she did at paragraph [32] of her decision, that the appellant’s evidence regarding any debt owed is ’mere speculation’, particularly in the context of the appellant’s story considered as a whole and the absence of any credible evidence of steps being taken by the traffickers to recover money from the appellant’s mother who continues to reside in Vietnam.
21. I also reject the appellant’s claim that in reaching her decision the judge failed to have adequate regard to the CPIN regarding the factors that may increase the risk of the appellant being re-trafficked. Here, the judge did not accept there was credible evidence of the appellant having an outstanding debt to the traffickers. The judge found at [33] that the appellant’s mother remains in Vietnam and that she can certainly provide the appellant with emotional support if not financial support. The judge noted the appellant has not said what other family he has in Vietnam and that the appellant has had at least some employment in the past.
22. The focus of the submissions made by Mr Forrest in this respect was upon the medical evidence and the reference in the CPIN to ‘Mental heath disorders’ that may have been caused and/or exacerbated by experiences of abuse. It is however clear from what is said at paragraph [34] of the decision that the judge had in mind the limited medical evidence that was before the Tribunal. There is, as Mr Forrest submits an entry in the appellant’s GP records on 24 July 2023 of the appellant complaining of having problems sleeping and of a ‘poor appetite’. The letter from Dr Sally Jowett simply confirms the appellant was assessed and that he engaged well during the assessment appointment. The letter confirms the appellant has been sent some trauma psychoeducation resources and will be supported by a worker at ‘Survivors of Human Trafficking in Scotland’. The letter confirms the appellant was interested in accessing antidepressant medication. The judge was right to say that the is “no diagnosis in resect of any medical conditions”, and plainly noted that the appellant has suffered from anxiety and a lack of sleep. The judge noted the appellant is due to see a counsellor and it was open to the judge to conclude that this did not increase his vulnerability. I reject the claim that the use of the word “The existence of one or more factors does not mean that re trafficking is at all certain” in paragraph [32] indicates the judge imposes a higher standard of proof. The decision must be read as a whole. The judge quite properly said:
“34. …As I said the onus is on the Appellant to show that he is a vulnerable person in respect of re trafficking or that he has an inability to work. He shown neither. Indeed, he has expressed a willingness to work in the UK. I have seen nothing substantial in this regard.
35. Even if the Appellant is unable to return to his home area, he can relocate to avoid his traffickers. Vietnam has a substantial population, and I have seen nothing to suggest that his traffickers are so powerful to trace him elsewhere in the country even given the system of registration.”
23. I turn finally to the criticism made regarding the conduct of the appeal and the failure by the judge to ensure there was simultaneous translation of the closing submissions being made during the course of the hearing. I can deal with this ground briefly since beyond the broad claims made in the grounds of appeal there is nothing that even begins to identify any prejudice to the appellant or any bias on the part of the judge. For example neither the grounds of appeal nor the submissions made by Mr Forrest before me even now, identify any submission that may have been made by the Presenting Officer that the appellant would, had the submission been translated to him, have wished to expressly address or respond to. In the absence of any established procedural unfairness, an impartial and informed observer would only conclude that the hearing of the appeal was concluded in accordance with the overriding objective of dealing with the case fairly and justly.
24. The decision of the FtT judge must be read as a whole. It is clear in my judgment that the judge has reached a decision upon the core elements of the claim, by reference to the evidence before the Tribunal, giving adequate reasons for the decision and conclusions reached. The focus should be on the way the judge performed the essence of her task. It s clear in my judgment that the judge reached a decision that was open to the FtT following an analysis of the claims made by the appellant. The Upper Tribunal should not overturn a judgment at first instance unless it really cannot understand the original judge's thought process when the judge was making material findings. The decision is to be read looking at the substance of the reasoning and not with a fine-tooth comb in an effort to identify errors. It is necessary to guard against the temptation to characterise as errors of law what are in truth no more than disagreements about the weight to be given to different factors. A fact-sensitive analysis of the risk upon return was required and in my judgement the judge reached a decision that was open to the Tribunal.
25. It follows that I conclude there is no material error of law in the decision of the FtT capable of affecting the outcome of the appeal and I dismiss the appeal.
Notice of Decision
26. The decision is dismissed.
27. The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Clapham promulgated on 26 January 2025 stands.

V. Mandalia
Upper Tribunal Judge Mandalia

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

7 November 2025