UI-2025-001154

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 23 Sep 2025
• Promulgation date: 23 Dec 2025
• Publication date: 7 Jan 2026
• Last updated on: 7 Jan 2026

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001154

First-tier Tribunal : HU/56436/2023
LH/05610/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 23rd December 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD

Between

FT
(Anonymity Order Continued)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellants: Mr R Khubber of Counsel, instructed by Turpin Miller LLP
For the Respondent: Mr P Lawson, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at the Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 23 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. The parties may apply on notice to vary this order. I continue the anonymity order, previously made, because of the mental health and aligned issues in respect of child abuse referred to in the expert evidence.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. In this matter, I am dealing with the remaking of the decision in respect of the Appellant’s appeal. I do so pursuant to section 12 (2) (b) (ii) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 of the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal which had allowed the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision to refuse his human rights’ claims in connection with deportation.
2. The Appellant is a national of Tunisia and was born in January 1997. He is therefore approaching his 29th birthday.
3. The key issue in this appeal has been identified as being whether the Secretary of State’s decision dated 12 May 2023 is contrary to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights via Part 5A of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum 2002 and relevant domestic and Strasbourg case law. It was made clear in both oral and written submissions that a discrete Article 3 claim based on medical ill health is not pursued. It is contended though that the Appellant’s ill health and the adverse impact on it by deportation forms part of the consideration of matters relevant to whether deportation would be proportionate under Article 8 ECHR.
4. There are a substantial number of documents provided to me in this case. The documents provided to me include:
(i) Main bundle (in 4 parts) (963 pages);
(ii) Appellant’s Rule 15(2A) bundle comprising 36 pages with a further witness statement from the Appellant dated 17 September 2025 and background material relating to mental health service in Tunisia;
(iii) Appellant’s skeleton argument; and
(iv) An essential reading list provided the day before the hearing.
5. Clearly with such a large number of documents, it is not proportionate or necessary to refer to every part of the evidence. I record though that Mr Khubber’s skeleton argument has been very well drafted and has been useful in guiding me to which of the documents are considered to be more important by the Appellant, alongside the emphasis placed on documents.
6. It is helpful, as the Appellant’s essential reading document suggests at paragraph 4, to read the Appellant’s decision letter dated 21 May 2023 with the earlier decisions by the Respondent dated 15 March 2022 and 24 November 2021 alongside the Respondent’s Review dated 5 July 2024. I need not refer to those documents in full in this decision.
Procedural History
7. There is a substantial procedural history to this matter. The more recent events are that by way of a decision dated 8 January 2025 the First-tier Tribunal had allowed the Appellant’s appeal on human rights grounds. The Respondent had appealed against that decision. Permission to appeal had been granted by another judge of the First-tier Tribunal by way of a decision dated 7 March 2025.
8. The matter had then come for hearing before a panel of the Upper Tribunal comprising Upper Tribunal Judge Bulpitt and Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Manuell at a hearing on 27 June 2025. By way of a decision sealed on 31 July 2025 the Upper Tribunal had allowed the Respondent’s appeal against the First-tier Tribunal Judge’s decision. There was to be a remaking hearing. The matter was retained for hearing at the Upper Tribunal. It is that matter which has come for hearing before me. This is my decision in respect of the remaking of the decision.
Background
9. The Upper Tribunal’s decision sealed on 31 July 2025 helpfully refers to the background and I gratefully adopt some of what had been recorded:
“3. The appellant was born in 1997 and so is now 28 years old. He is a Tunisian national, although he was born in Libya which is where he lived before moving to Tunis while still a baby. His parents separated when he was about two years old and he moved to live with his maternal grandmother. When his maternal grandmother died in 2002, he was placed in a children’s home. In 2005 he regained contact with his father who was living, with indefinite leave to remain, in the United Kingdom. The appellant then moved to live with his paternal grandmother in Tunis.
4. In 2007, at the age of ten years old, the appellant obtained a visa to join his father in the United Kingdom. He entered the United Kingdom in October 2007 and he was granted indefinite leave to remain in May 2008. He has been resident in the United Kingdom since that date. Whilst in the United Kingdom the appellant suffered neglect and physical abuse from his father and in 2012, he was taken into the care of the Local Authority and placed with a foster family. A year later in 2013 he moved into his own accommodation with the support of the Local Authority.
5. The appellant committed criminal offences. In May 2013 whilst still a youth, he was given a Referral Order for the offence of possessing a bladed article in a public place. In July 2016 he committed offences of conspiring with others to supply heroin and cannabis and two offences of possessing an offensive weapon. He was sentenced for those offences on 20 January 2017 to four years imprisonment for the drugs offences and consecutive sentences of 1 month’s imprisonment for each of the weapon offences. He completed the custodial element of that sentence on 26 September 2018 and after spending a further two months in immigration detention, he was released on immigration bail on 13 November 2018
6. In the light of his offending the respondent took the decision to deport the appellant and in doing so refused his human rights claim to remain in the United Kingdom. The appellant appealed against that decision and his appeal was heard by a panel of First-tier Tribunal Judges in April 2019. The 2019 Decision
7. In their decision (the 2019 decision) issued the same month, the panel found (at [29]) that the appellant had given a truthful account of his childhood (which is reflected in the summary above). They found at [22] that the appellant had been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for more than half his life. At [23] the panel found that the appellant was socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, having lived in the country since the age of 10. In reaching this conclusion they made factual findings about the appellant’s ability to speak English fluently, his active participation in society through employment, his engagement with relevant organisations and the fact he was trying to learn from his mistakes and rehabilitate.
8. At [24] of their decision the panel recorded their conclusion that the appellant would not face very significant obstacles to integration in Tunisia and on that basis that he did not meet the terms of Exception 1 to the public interest in deportation. They explained that conclusion in the same paragraph and those that followed, by reference to a number of findings of fact including:
i. that the appellant has no social or cultural ties of his own in Tunisia, but has familial ties in Tunisia namely his father’s relatives who would support him if necessary, and that he has stayed with his relatives in Tunisia in the past, most recently in 2017 ( [24]);
ii. that despite his mental health difficulties the appellant had a positive work attitude and a positive attitude towards improving his life, as well as transferable skills as a labourer and a willingness to learn new skills (at [25]);
iii. That the appellant can speak Arabic and therefore language would not be a barrier to integration (at [25]);
iv. That the appellant has not sought any assistance for treatment of PTSD symptoms that had been observed (at [27]) that the appellant appears to be sufficiently strong to avoid further offending (at [28]). The panel separately noted that they had not been provided with a formal diagnosis of the appellant’s mental health condition or of what treatment he might require or with evidence of how his condition might be impacted by removal to Tunisia.
9. The appellant was refused permission to appeal against the panel’s decision and the deportation order remained extant. It was not however enforced and the appellant remained in the United Kingdom and had a short relationship with H.
10. When the relationship with H broke down in February 2020 the appellant sent her threatening and abusive messages which included threats to have her children taken away from her. H reported the threats to the police. Two days later the appellant got into H’s car uninvited as she left work and when she tried to get him out drew out a knife and threatened her. The appellant forced H to drive to her children’s school hysterical and terrified. At the school H was able to escape from the appellant and run screaming to get help. As a result of the offence H says she has continued to feel upset and anxious and her children have been upset as well.
11. The appellant was arrested and because he was on licence when he committed the offence, recalled to prison. He later pleaded guilty to offences of sending a malicious communication and possessing a bladed article. On 24 August 2020 he was sentenced to serve 27 months imprisonment for the bladed article offences with 4 months imprisonment concurrent for the malicious communications offence. The refusal of a human rights claim
12. In October 2021, having reached the end of the custodial element of his sentence, the appellant was moved into immigration detention for the purpose of his removal to Tunisia. On 2 December 2021 he made representations to the respondent about why he should not be removed from the United Kingdom. Those representations included
(i) a letter from Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist Dr Katie Thomas in which she diagnosed the appellant as suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and said that returning to Tunisia would be detrimental to his mental health, (
ii) a Clinical Discharge Report from Dr Woodward of the Prison Mental Health and Substance Misuse Team stating that the PTSD was the result of traumas the appellant experienced, including repeated sexually abuse, while in the children’s home in Tunisia and
(iii) a country expert report from Dr Hasan Hafidh concerning the treatment of convicted criminals in Tunisia and the access to mental health treatment that is available in Tunisia. The representations asserted that there were very compelling circumstances which meant the appellant should be allowed to remain in the United Kingdom.
13. The respondent refused those representations in March 2022 finding that they did not amount to a fresh human rights claim. The appellant sought a judicial review of that decision and when permission to bring judicial review proceedings was granted, the respondent eventually agreed to reconsider the appellant's representations.
14. On 12 May 2023 the respondent issued the decision which has led to these appeal proceedings. In the decision the respondent accepted that the appellant’s representations amounted to a fresh human rights claim, however the respondent refused that claim. The respondent did not dispute the diagnosis of the appellant suffering from PTSD but asserted that there was no evidence to demonstrate the appellant is receiving treatment for that condition and in any event that treatment would be available in Tunisia. Referring to the 2019 decision the respondent found that the appellant could rely on family support in Tunisia. Again, referring to the conclusions in the 2019 decision the respondent concluded that there were no very compelling circumstances which outweighed the public interest in the appellant's deportation and therefore refused to revoke the deportation order. The appeal to the First-tier Tribunal.
15. The appellant appealed against the respondent’s decision to the First-tier Tribunal. It took eighteen months before the appeal hearing took place in person in Birmingham before the Judge on 29 November 2024. The material adduced by the appellant for that hearing included the reports and letters from Dr Thomas, Dr Woodward and Dr Hafidh that had been submitted as part of the further representations, plus the appellant’s medical records from prison, an updated report from Dr Hafidh and a psychological risk report from psychologist Dr John Cordwell dated 14 May 2024.
16. The material adduced by the respondent for that hearing included the sentencing remarks of HHJ Wall who imposed the 27 months imprisonment sentence on the appellant in August 2020, the 2019 decision and the refusal of permission to appeal against that decision. Ms Kerr for the respondent accepted that, contrary to what is said at [64] of the respondent’s grounds of appeal to this Tribunal, the material adduced before the Judge did not include the sentencing remarks of the Judge who imposed the four year sentence of imprisonment in January 2017.
17. The Judge heard evidence from the appellant and submissions from the representatives before reserving his decision. He promulgated that decision on 8 January 2025. The Judge found the appellant to be “wholly credible” ([24]). The Judge then recognised the “very substantial public interest in the deportation of the appellant at [25] but stated at [26] his conclusion that: “Notwithstanding that formidable public interest I have, however, concluded that the appellant has demonstrated very compelling circumstances so as to outweigh it, keeping in mind how stringent the very compelling circumstances test is”. In the following paragraphs the Judge sets out the “cumulative reasons” that he says led him to arrive at that conclusion.
18. At [27] the Judge finds that the appellant would not have any support in Tunisia “from family or anybody else”. In explaining that finding the Judge refers to the appellant’s evidence that while he remains in contact with his father it is nominal contact of a few times per year and for a few minutes. The Judge recognises that the appellant still has a grandmother in Tunisia but says that there was no suggestion she was in a position to offer any meaningful support to the appellant. The Judge states that these circumstances are markedly different from those found by the Tribunal in the 2019 decision.
19. At [28] the Judge finds that the appellant “is considerably more estranged from Tunisian culture than he was in 2019” noting that the appellant only speaks Arabic to his father and that he struggles to do so without using Google Translate. The Judge records that the appellant has had no further visits to Tunisa since the one noted in the 2017 which was noted in the 2019 decision and finds “that for all practical purposes he is now estranged from the country” an estrangement which will constitute a very considerable difficulty for the appellant.
20. At [29] the Judge places “considerable weight” on the reports of Dr Hafidh. On the basis of that evidence the Judge finds that the appellant would face stigma and discrimination in light of his criminal history as well as great difficulty in accessing employment. In that respect the Judge states that “although he plainly has potential to be employed in the future, given his mental health he has no immediate real prospect of being employed at the present. There is no realistic prospect of his securing employment on return to Tunisia in the foreseeable future”.
21. At [30] and [31] the Judge assesses the evidence about the appellant's mental health noting that in contrast to the situation in 2019 “there is now clear and credible evidence of the appellant’s very significant mental health difficulties. The Judge finds that the appellant is in a precarious condition as a result of his very significantly traumatic background and that return to Tunisia would lead to a dramatic deterioration in the appellant’s mental state, impairing his ability to access appropriate care, treatment and support. The Judge found that this would “pose a very significant impediment indeed to his ability to lead anything like a functioning life in Tunisia”.
22. At [32] the Judge found that the appellant has lived in the United Kingdom lawfully for more than half his life and that he remains socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom notwithstanding his latest convictions noting the appellant’s compliance with conditions imposed on him and the fact he has not come to the adverse attention of authorities since his release from prison. The Judge goes on to find at [33] that the appellant is no longer a “persistent offender”, that he has taken meaningful steps towards rehabilitation and accepts that the appellant poses a low risk of reoffending. In this context the Judge says that “I accept his more recent offence was aberrant being in the context of a dysfunctional relationship which is unlikely to be repeated”.
23. The Judge then records his decision to allow the appellant’s appeal on human rights grounds. The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
24. The respondent sought and was granted permission to appeal by another First-tier Tribunal Judge on eight grounds…”
The Law
10. Mr Khubber had a provided a note in respect of the law. Mr Lawson said that he agreed that there were no issues in respect of the law as set out within that note. Mr Khubber had also confirmed that there was no reliance on Article 3 ECHR. Whilst the law is well settled, it is of utility to set out Mr Khubber’s note and to confirm that I have applied that law to this decision. That note states:
“The scheme of Part 5A of the 2002 Act and paras 398-399A of the 2014 rules is to ensure compliance with the requirements of Art 8 through a structured approach, which is intended to ensure that proper weight is given to the public interest in deportation whilst also having regard to other relevant factors as identified in the Strasbourg and domestic case law. The new regime is not intended to produce violations of Article 8 (see NA (Pakistan) and others v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 662; [2017] 1 WLR 207 at para 38. 3.3. (2). S.117C(6). It is necessary to read subsection (6) as applying equally in the case of medium offenders governed by subsection (3) (see NA paras 25-27). Further, the phrase in s.117C(6) of “very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2” required consideration of all relevant matters including matters that fell within the exceptions (NA paras 28- 34). Further i). it because of the high level of importance attached by Parliament to deportation of foreign criminals that, where neither Exception 1 nor 2 applies, the public interest in deportation can only be outweighed by very compelling circumstances, ii). when carrying out the full proportionality assessment which is necessary where the exceptions do not apply, facts and matters that were relevant to the assessment of whether either exception applied are not “exhausted” if the conclusion is that they do not. They remain relevant to the overall assessment and could be sufficient to outweigh the public interest in deportation either, if especially strong, by themselves or in combination with [2] other factors, iii). there is no exceptionality requirement, and it is important to appreciate the distinction in the criterion under s.117C(6) and s.117C(5). 3.4. (3). Precariousness and Part 5A/Article 8. Everyone, who, not being an UK citizen was lawfully present in the UK but did not have ILR was lawfully present in the UK but did not have ILR, had a “precarious” immigration status for the purposes of s.117B(5) and that consequently the established private life in the UK of any such person had “little weight” and would not assist most applications to remain on Art 8 grounds (Rhuppiah v SSHD [2018] UKSC 58; [2018] 1 WLR 5536 para 44). However, the effect of s.117A(2)(a) is clear. It recognises that the provisions of s.117B cannot put decision makers in a strait jacket which constrains them to determine claims under Article 8 inconsistently with the article itself. Inbuilt into the concept of “little weight” itself is a small degree of flexibility; but it is in particular s.117A(2)(a) which provides the limited degree of flexibility recognised to be necessary. Although in Rhuppiah the SC has defined a precarious immigration status for the purpose of s.117B(5) with a width from which most applicants who rely on their private life under Art 8 will be unable to escape, s.117A(2)(a) necessarily enables their applications occasionally to succeed. In general terms the observations made by Sales LJ in Rhuppiah CA at para 53 were still relevant: “Although a court or tribunal should have regard to the consideration that little weight should be given to private life established in [the specified] circumstances, it is possible without violence to the language to say that such generalised normative guidance may be overridden in an exceptional case by particularly strong features of the private life in question….” (see Rhuppiah SC para 49). 3.5. (4). Article 8 and the public interest issue. The correct approach to be taken to the “public interest” in the balance to be undertaken by a tribunal is to recognise that the public interest in the deportation of foreign criminals has a moveable rather than fixed quality. It is necessary to approach the public interest flexibly, recognising that there will be cases where the person’s circumstances in the individual case reduce the legitimate and strong public interest in removal (Akinyemi v SSHD (No.2) [2019] EWCA Civ 2098; [2020] 1 WLR 1843 (para 39). [3] 3.6. (5). Very Compelling Circumstances. More recently the Court of Appeal has helpfully reviewed the current law on Article 8 in the context of deportation appeals and Part 5A NIAA 2002: Yalcin v SSHD [2024 EWCA Civ 74. 3.7. The Court of Appeal allowed the Appellant’s appeal and reinstated the decision of the FTT which had earlier allowed the appeal under Article 8 ECHR. The Court, essentially held: i. In cases where the 2 exceptions did not apply, e.g. a serious offender (4 years plus) a full proportionality assessment was required e.g. per HA (Iraq) SC. NA (Pakistan) established that the effect of the “over and above” requirement was that, where the “very compelling circumstances” on which an Appellant relied under s.117(6) included an exception-specified circumstance, what was required was something substantially more than the minimum necessary to qualify for the relevant exception under s.117C(4) or (5): i.e. the Article 8 claim had to be especially strong. That higher threshold could be established in a number of ways: because the circumstance specified was “well beyond” what was sufficient to establish a bare or minimum satisfaction case or because it was complemented by other relevant circumstances or by a combination of both matters. (see paras 53, 57). ii. It was not necessary for a tribunal in a serious offender case to make explicit findings in the Appellant’s favour on the unduly harsh test or whether his case went beyond that. The Tribunal had to identify the factors to which it had given significant weight in reaching its overall conclusion. It should also indicate the relative importance of those factors but on a practical basis: it would be an unrealistic burden on tribunals if they had to decide and specify in every case whether the “something more” dimension consisted of the exception specified circumstances present to an elevated degree or some other [4] circumstances or a combination of the two. That approach was not inconsistent with NA which tribunals should follow. (see paras 59-60,62-63, 65). iii. It was inherent in the structure of s.117C that a serious offender will need to meet a higher threshold than a medium offender in order to satisfy the test under subsection (6). (para 58). 3.8. In Gadinala [2024] EWCA Civ 1410 the Court of Appeal gave further guidance on the relevance of criminal offending to the public interest. Although the Court stated that various considerations were relevant when considering the seriousness of an offence under s.117C NIAA 2002 (e.g. what the length of sentence would have been without a discount for a guilty plea), A submits that matters that are relevant to reducing the sentence imposed are not irrelevant when a Court is considering the proportionality question under Article 8(2) i.e. the Strasbourg guidance (e.g. Uner, Maslov) requires consideration of the nature and seriousness of the offence which includes the circumstances that resulted in a lesser period of imprisonment e.g. guilty plea (reflecting remorse) and youth when offending (reflecting lack of maturity at the relevant time).”
11. The Law was also referred to by the panel of the Upper Tribunal at the Error of Law stage and which I repeat for completeness:
“27. Part 5A of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (the 2002 Act) provides a complete code and structure for resolving disputes like this one about whether the interference with the private and family life a foreign criminal has established in the United Kingdom that their deportation would involve, is proportionate and therefore lawful applying the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act 1998. Its purpose is to promote consistency, predictability and transparency in decision making and to reflect the Government’s and Parliament’s view of how as a matter of public policy, the balance between an individual’s right to a private and family life and the state’s right to remove foreign criminals, should be struck.
28. Within Part 5A of the 2002 Act, section 117B(1-5) lists considerations which are relevant in all cases, whilst s117C lists the considerations applicable when the appellant’s deportation as a “foreign criminal” is proposed. “Foreign criminals” are defined in s117D and include a person who is not British and has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least twelve months.
29. Section 117B(1) identifies that the maintenance of effective immigration controls is in the public interest. Sections 117B(2) and (3) identify that it is in the public interest that those who seek to remain in the United Kingdom speak English and are financially independent. Sections 117B(4) and (5) identify that little weight should be given to a private life which has been established while a person has been in the United Kingdom unlawfully or precariously.
30. Section 117C relates specifically to foreign criminals. Section 117C(1) provides that the deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest and s117C(2) says that the more serious the offence the greater the public interest. S117C(4) and (5) contain two Exceptions to the public interest in deportation which apply in the case of foreign criminals who have been sentenced to less than four years imprisonment. The Exceptions do not apply to foreign criminals who like the appellant have received sentences of four years’ imprisonment or more for a single offence (“serious offenders”) though they remain relevant.
31. Section 117C(4) identifies that Exception 1 applies where the foreign criminal (a) has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of their life, (b) is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom and (c) there would be very significant obstacles to their integration in the country to which it is proposed they be deported. Exception 2 which relates to family life with partners and children is not relevant to the appellant’s case. Section 117(6) identifies that for serious offenders “the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 & 2” – the “very compelling circumstances test.”
32. Guidance on the application of the very compelling circumstances test for serious offenders is provided in part 4 of the judgment of Lord Hamblen in HA (Iraq) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22. The judgment identifies that the test requires a full proportionality assessment, considering all factors that have been found to be relevant by the European Cout of Human Rights and weighing the interference with the article 8 rights of the potential deportee against the public interest in his deportation The assessment must recognise that “great weight should generally be given to the public interest in the deportation of [qualifying] offenders but…it can be outweighed, applying a proportionality test, by very compelling circumstances: in other words by a very strong claim indeed…The countervailing considerations must be very compelling to outweigh the general public interest in the deportation of such offenders as assessed by Parliament and the Secretary of State” (see [49]).
33. The high threshold the test involves and how the Exceptions 1 and 2 relate to the very compelling circumstances test were considered at [50] of HA (Iraq) which approved the following passages from Jackson LJ’s judgment in NA (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 662:
“30. In the case of a serious offender who could point to circumstances in his own case which could be said to correspond to the circumstances described in Exceptions 1 and 2, but where he could only just succeed in such an argument, it would not be possible to describe his situation as involving very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2. One might describe that as a bare case of the kind described in Exceptions 1 or 2. On the other hand, if he could point to factors identified in the descriptions of Exceptions 1 and 2 of an especially compelling kind in support of an article 8 claim, going well beyond what would be necessary to make out a bare case of the kind described in Exceptions 1 and 2, they could in principle constitute ‘very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2’, whether taken by themselves or in conjunction with other factors relevant to application of article 8….
33. Although there is no ‘exceptionality’ requirement, it inexorably follows from the statutory scheme that the cases in which circumstances are sufficiently compelling to outweigh the high public interest in deportation will be rare. The commonplace incidents of family life, such as ageing parents in poor health or the natural love between parents and children, will not be sufficient.”
The Hearing Before Me
12. In assessing the matter and in assessing the Appellant’s evidence, I firmly have in mind the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No. 2 of 2010: Child, vulnerable adult and sensitive appellant guidance (“the 2010 Presidential Guidance”).
13. The Joint Presidential Guidance reminds the parties that while some individuals are by definition vulnerable, others are less easily identifiable. Paragraph 10.3 specifically deals with assessing evidence and states:
“Consider the evidence, allowing for possible different degrees of understanding by witnesses and appellant compared to those are not vulnerable, in the context of evidence from others associated with the appellant and the background evidence before you. Where there were clear discrepancies in the oral evidence, consider the extent to which the age, vulnerability or sensitivity of the witness was an element of that discrepancy or lack of clarity.”
14. The Appellant provided oral evidence before me. The Appellant’s request that he be permitted breaks at any time that he wished and that questions be broken down into understandable questions were granted. I take into account the Appellant’s vulnerability as also highlighted in the expert report. I make due allowance for memory and recital purposes the difficulties which the expert report refers to. I do not, for example, hold against the Appellant that he cannot recall the precise name of his medication or that he hesitates when giving evidence or when trying to recall events. I can see that this is likely to be because of the identified vulnerabilities. I also use the expert reports, both the subjective report relating to medical and psychological matters and the country expert reports, as a tool in assessing the evidence and credibility of the matters before me, including the Appellant’s own evidence.
15. The Appellant adopted his witness statements as part of his evidence. There is no utility in referring to those written statements at any length because there is, in reality, little dispute between the parties in respect of whether or not the Appellant has been telling the truth to the Respondent or to the various tribunals that he has been appearing at.
16. The Appellant said that he was currently learning about trading and that if he was allowed to stay in the UK ‘long term’ then his goal or career was to look to work in finance and economics. He referred to some 15000 of hours of multi study and trading and he wanted to know everything around trading. Some of this was in respect of the USA and some in respect of Asia. He told me that he had undertaken lots of tutorials online.
17. In relation to the situation with trauma and mental health, he referred to his General Practitioner and awaiting a call back but he was on medication with begin with a ‘P’ but he was not sure he knew the correct name.
18. He referred to his family in Tunisia and he said that page 12 onwards of his further statement set out the background. The last time that he had had contact with father was a few years ago. He said he thought it was in 2023. Asked how that contact was, he said he could not recall, but it did not go well.
19. In relation to his knowledge of Arabic, he said he spoken it before, but not learnt to read or write it. He said he not been schooled and could not even write his name in Arabic. The Appellant said he did not know why he did not go to school. He said he had lived in Tunisia until he was 9 or 10 years old. He said he lived “with grandma probably for 6 months or a year with dad’s side”. He said he had not known them before.
20. The Appellant said that prior to living with his mother, he was at boarding school. He said he had stayed there for 4 years and then said it was for 3 years. He said it was a place “for people who were street kids” and that “they get housed and fed and stuff like that “Asked if really meant boarding school or whether he meant it was an orphanage, the Appellant said it was a cross of both. He then said it was not a boarding school because, “From what I know a Boarding school is for rich kids. It is for kids with no parents or if they had been abandoned and they get placed in these sorts of things.”
21. The Appellant was asked why if this was a structured environment that he had not learnt to read and write but that he had been beaten with sticks and that he knew nothing and avoided school.
22. The Appellant said that his Arabic was “not that great”. He said, “If you speak one language for 20 years then you forget the words and the language as it is not constantly refreshed.” Asked if returned to Tunisia, why he could not speak to people in some Arabic, the Appellant said that they would find it hard to communicate with him. He said the Arabic in Tunisia speak is not the Arabic everywhere else. He said it was Derja Arabic (being the Arabic spoken in Tunisia).
23. Asked why he could not use his training and skills from the UK to get a job in Tunisia, the Appellant said that he had worked on cars. He said he had also done some trading. The Appellant was asked about p165 of the bundle and why he could not work a job in a garage. He said he had not done the training to be fully qualified. He had only completed level 2. He said he did not have the language skills either.
24. The Appellant said the training he was now doing was so that he could become an entrepreneur. He said “I buy low and sell high. It is supply and demand. I will go 10 toes on it.”
25. He said he trades US stocks and he did not think because the NY Stock Exchange was American with Wall Street, there would be such an opportunity in Tunisia.
26. In respect of medication, he said he could not pronounce the name of his medication but said it was to do with his PTSD.
27. He said he had had counselling before he had moved to his current new area.
28. The Appellant referred to the pictures of his family in the bundle. Including his grandmother, his uncle and a ‘few kids’. There was also an aunty. He said he knew that, “My mother’s side took my dad’s side to court and so there is no contact with each other. They are more middle class… not middle class, but my mum’s side is poor.”
29. The Appellant said he last visited Tunisia in 2014 when he was aged 16 or 17. He said he had lost touch with his uncles, aunty and grandma. “a while ago”.
30. Asked to provide more detail, the Appellant said that this was around the same time as he last saw his father which was in 2023. He said, “I only interacted as my dad called them whilst I with them.”
31. The Appellant said, “I do not have a great relationship and he has been going back and telling them and from there whatever left was relationship with family has severed. To be honest I did not get treated good when I was there”. As for whether his father had poisoned them against him, The Appellant said, “I do not know. My mum’s court case against my dad has made them bitter.”
32. Asked about this mother, the Appellant said, “I have met my mum once or twice. I do not know her. I did not. I was acting with her: I stayed with her other kids. Truth is for her to hear me and she could not hear me and her leaving was why I was angry as a kid.” He said the emotions never heal, even now as an adult.
33. In respect of family in the UK, the Appellant said, “Dad had children with a lady he had married”. The Appellant said he has a half sister and half brother. He said that the last time that he saw them was in 2023. One of his half siblings was aged around 13 to 14 years and the other was probably aged 9.
34. There is a substantial amount of expert evidence. I do not set out all the reports in great detail because it is not necessary to do so.
35. Dr Katie Thomas, Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist said in her letter dated 19 October 2021 said in a 5 line report that the Appellant was “suffering from a diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder”.
36. Dr B Adeyani, Acting Consultant Psychiatrist said in a short letter dated 21 March 2024 that the Appellant has an enduring mental illness/mental health problems and takes regular medication for this. It is said, “He seems to have made good progress in terms of his mental health with treatment”. There is a diagnosis of PTSD.
37. Dr Anne Woodward provided a clinical discharge report dated 28 September 2021. It states that the Appellant ought to continue to receive support from psychological service in the community to address his PTSD and childhood trauma. The earlier part of the report also refers to his ‘uncle’ in fact turning out to be his ‘brother’.
38. Dr John Cordwell provided a psychological risk assessment report dated 14 May 2024. He recommended an urgent re-referral for individual psychological therapy. Treatment was also required for anxiety and depression. Dr Cordwell seems to know the law because he referred to Supreme Court authority at paragraph 1.7 of his report and that the Appellant is a ‘seriously ill person’ for the purposes of the law. I note however that Mr Khubber disavowed any reliance on Article 3 ECHR in both written and oral submissions.
39. Dr Cordwell was of the view that there would be a deterioration in the Appellant’s mental health should he be ‘returned’ to Tunisia and an exacerbation of depression and anxiety. It would be aggravated by a sense of isolation, lack of support, unstable accommodation and lack of financial resources. Dr Cordwell states that it would be very distressing for the Appellant.
40. Dr Cordwell assessed the risk of suicide as low. Dr Cordwell also said that whilst the Appellant presents as a low likelihood of ‘interpersonal’ violence (which surely must mean violence against others) but that, “the risk of future intimate partner violence would increase if and when he was in an intimate relationship…” Dr Cordwell stated that the Appellant said he has dyslexia and that his CV says he has 9 GCSEs including English, Maths and science.
41. Dr Cordwell referred to the relationship that the Appellant had had with H and which had led to the criminal conviction referred to above in respect to his behaviour towards H. In 2022 the Appellant then had a relationship with a different woman K. K’s brother had called the police whereby the Appellant had been physically aggressive within that relationship to K. The police did not proceed with charges. The Appellant told Dr Cordwell that he had been angry with K ‘many times’.
42. Dr Cordwell referred to the Appellant reporting anxiety and nervousness about the immigration proceedings being powerful and as contributing to his sense od distress and fearfulness. There is also extensive reference to the PTSD, ADHD and past substance abuse. This includes the use of crack cocaine in 2022 (paragraph 6.1.4.15).
43. The risk of re-offending in respect of ‘interpersonal violence’ the risk was said to be low. However, Dr Cordwell said that the risk of future intimate partner violence would increase if and when the Appellant was in a relationship (which he currently is not). There was also a separate assessment of non-violent offending for which Dr Cordwell assessed the risk as ‘medium’.
44. There is a country report by Dr Hasan Hafidh dated 26 November 2021 with an update dated 23 April 2024. It was said for example:
(i) There are a number of practical problems that the Appellant would face including arbitrary detention, lack of employment prospects, precarious situation resulting from problematic relationship with his family, lack of adequate public healthcare/accessibility;
(ii) Since the earlier report, the overall situation in Tunisia had not changed dramatically but there had been a downturn in the economy and increased poverty and unemployment. The political structure has become increasingly authoritarian. Possible implications of the Appellant’s ill health would mean that the Appellant would have to pay for services if he was not employed, and there were very limited services are available for the Appellant’s current needs.
45. There is also some additional background material in the R15(2A) evidence, to which Mr Lawson of which Mr Lawson did not object to in terms of its admission and I which I take into account. It is of not of great use and appears rather random. I note the reference to the hospital in Tunis though dedicated entirely to mental health. That states in summary:
(i) Article dated 26 March 2021 stating the “As Mental Healthcare Needs Increase, Public Services Fail to Keep Up”. It refers to a hospital dedicated entirely to mental health in Tunis. They need more resources and staff to do their job properly.
(ii) A marital rape note dated 29 August 2025 at page 19 of 36;
(iii) At page 22 onwards there is an Article in the Journal of Global Health that there was a 68% sample of reporting of a lack of accessibility to mental health services. There is also reference to social stigma and silence in respect of mental illness. The limitation of the report notes that there was a small sample size for the survey;
(iv) An Article about “Lifting the veil on Tunisia’s child abuse problem”. It refers to a ‘staggering proportion’ of children in Tunisia suffering violence at the hands of their parents.
Consideration and Analysis
46. I have in mind the closing submissions of the parties alongside the Appellant’s skeleton argument for this hearing. I make due allowance for the Appellant’s vulnerability. In view of the approach of the Respondent in her Reasons for Refusal Letters and the approach of Mr Lawson at the hearing before me in cross examination, I am prepared to conclude to the required standard that what the Appellant referred to as having happened to him in Tunisia when he was a child did occur. Similarly, he faced difficulties with his father in the UK. I am also prepared to accept that the Appellant will find it difficult to leave the UK and that he will be anxious, depressed, worried and that his PTSD will exacerbate, as will those other conditions. His ADHD and dyslexia make it more difficult for him. I accept too that these proceedings are causing him the anxiety, nervousness and the like that Dr Cordwell refers to.
47. Because there have been previous decisions in this case then I must apply Devaseelan (Second Appeals - ECHR - ExtraTerritorial Effect) Sri Lanka * [2002] UKIAT 00702l. As was correctly said at the Error of Law hearing, it was held in Devaseelan that in a second appeal the first adjudicator’s decision should always be the starting point for a second adjudicator’s consideration of an Appellants case. Devaseelan further recognised that whilst the first adjudicator’s decision is the authoritative assessment of the Appellant’s status at the time it was made, facts happening since the first adjudicator’s determination can always be taken into account by the second adjudicator. The 2019 decision of the panel of the First-tier Tribunal is my starting point.
48. I do not repeat all 25 April 2019 Panel’s decision at the First-tier Tribunal Judge comprising Designated Judge McCarthy and First-tier Tribunal Judge McCarthy (page 887 of the main bundle), but I note by way of example the following was stated:
(i) We are not satisfied the appellant faces very significant obstacles in integrating in Tunisia. The strongest difficult we can identify is that he has been away from Tunisia since he was ten years old and has no social or cultural ties of his own in that country. However, the appellant admits to having support available from his father’s relatives, which means he has familial ties in Tunisia. He thinks they will be displeased by his past behaviour but acknowledges he would be able to turn to them despite their disappointment. The appellant says he has visited Tunisia and stayed with his relatives in the past, the last time being when he was 17.
(ii) We recognise that despite any mental health problems caused by past trauma, the appellant has a positive work attitude as evidenced by his ability to secure employment since his release. We also recognise he has a positive attitude to improving his life as shown through the evidence of those supporting him. The appellant has transferrable skills as a labourer and is willing to learn new skills. We have no evidence that the appellant would not be able to find comparable work in Tunisia. The appellant can speak Arabic and language would not be a barrier to integration.
(iii) For the sake of completeness, we record the following. We are satisfied the appellant has established private life rights in the UK within the meaning of article 8(1) because we accept he is socially and culturally integrated here. He has been lawfully present throughout his time in the UK, which is a further indication he has established private life rights here. We recognise that his expulsion from the UK will severe that private life and therefore the respondent must show there are strong reasons to justify his expulsion.
(iv) We find the reasons for expulsion are strong. The appellant has admitted to committing a serious crime that involved drug dealing for which he received a long sentence in a Young Offenders Institution. There is strong public revulsion regarding such crimes and there is a need to deter such crimes. The sentencing remarks of Ward HHJ describe the public revulsion in the appellant’s crimes. Deportation of foreign criminals forms part of the State’s arsenal of deterrence and such action is necessary in a democratic society to maintain public order.”
49. I therefore note that the Panel in 2019 found the Appellant to have a positive work attitude and I must say I found the Appellant to be genuinely interested in wanting to work hard and to forge a career or work in trading stocks and shares and I accept he wants to be an entrepreneur. He has been on courses for some time and is trying to improve his skills and his employability. My impression was he was drive and wants to succeed. I have some awareness of the languages used by the Appellant, including his country’s dialect of Arabic, which is different to the Arabic used in the Middle East. I note though that the Appellant has not been speaking in Arabic very much and is not fluent in Arabic. For example, the Appellant told me, and I accept that he used Google Translate to speak completely with his father/his relatives. Overall, I conclude that the Appellant was trying to assist me to understand his situation in a truthful manner. Naturally, the Appellant presented a picture of concern and worry because he does not wish to leave the UK. That is understandable, but I do not think that he was deliberately lying to me or that he was trying to hide things from me.
50. I will not set out the law in any great detail because it is agreed between the parties and I have set out the note of it above.
51. There can be no doubt that the Appellant is a person who received a sentence of imprisonment of 4 years and so he is in the highest category in terms of his offending. Nor can there be any doubt that he meets Exception 1 in view of the amount of time that he has spent in the UK. I note though that there was a period of time after 2019 when the Panel at the First-tier Tribunal made its decision that needs to be considered. Deportation was not effected by the Respondent and the Appellant therefore had precarious leave until his application was permitted to proceed to hearing at the First-tier Tribunal following judicial review proceedings.
52. It is necessary to consider the balance sheet approach referred to by Lord Hamblen in HA (Iraq) which I have set out above. I have also set out above the references to the judgment of Underhill LJ in Yalcin and to consider “what is the “something more” that brings the appellants case “over and above” the Exceptions” Because Mr Khubber relies heavily on Yalcin I repeat some of those references here. I note though that whilst Mr Khubber referred to Yalcin being an appeal which was allowed, the facts in Yalcin involved an Appellant with a family, including children whereas the instant case before me is a matter in respect of Article 8 private life only and with no family or children matters:
“53. The starting-point is to identify the basic structure of the law in this area. At para. 47 of his judgment in HA (Iraq) Lord Hamblen approved the summary which I gave at para. 29 of my judgment in this Court:
"(A) In the cases covered by the two Exceptions in subsections (4)-(5), which apply only to medium offenders, the public interest question is answered in favour of the foreign criminal, without the need for a full proportionality assessment. Parliament has pre-determined that in the circumstances there specified the public interest in the deportation of medium offenders does not outweigh the article 8 interests of the foreign criminal or his family: they are, given, so to speak, a short cut. The consideration of whether those Exceptions apply is a self-contained exercise governed by their particular terms.
(B) In cases where the two Exceptions do not apply – that is, in the case of a serious offender or in the case of a medium offender who cannot satisfy their requirements – a full proportionality assessment is required, weighing the interference with the article 8 rights of the potential deportee and his family against the public interest in his deportation. In conducting that assessment the decision-maker is required by section 117C (6) (and paragraph 398 of the Rules) to proceed on the basis that 'the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2'."
54. It might be thought to follow from the fact that the Exceptions are a "self-contained" short-cut they have no role to play where a full proportionality assessment is required, and that accordingly in the present case the FTT was right to make no reference to them. But the complicating factor is the requirement in section 117C (6) that the public interest requires deportation unless "there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2". The effect of those words was considered in NA (Pakistan). I need to consider with some care what the Court said in that case.
53. Underhill LJ explained further that,
“57. NA (Pakistan) thus establishes that the effect of the over-and-above requirement is that, in a case where the "very compelling circumstances" on which a claimant relies under section 117C (6) include an Exception-specified circumstance ("an Exception-overlap case") , it is necessary that there be something substantially more than the minimum that would be necessary to qualify for the relevant Exception under subsection (4) or (5): as Jackson LJ puts it at para. 29, the article 8 case must be "especially strong". That higher threshold may be reached either because the circumstance in question is present to a degree which is "well beyond" what would be sufficient to establish a "bare case", or – as shown by the phrases which I have italicised in paras. 29 and 30 – because it is complemented by other relevant circumstances, or because of a combination of both. I will refer to those considerations, of whichever kind, as "something more". To take a concrete example, if the Exception-related circumstance is the impact of the claimant's deportation on a child (Exception 2) the something more will have to be either that the undue harshness would be of an elevated degree ("unduly unduly harsh"?) or that it was complemented by another factor or factors – perhaps very long residence in this country (even if Exception 1 is not satisfied) – to a sufficient extent to meet the higher threshold; or, as I have said, a combination of the two.
58. There is nothing at all surprising about this, at least in the case of a serious offender. Even if the over-and-above requirement were not explicit, it is in my view inherent in the structure of section 117C that a serious offender will need to meet a higher threshold than a medium offender in order to satisfy the test in subsection (6).”
54. Finally, Underhill LJ made clear in respect of the task of the judge making the decision as follows:
62. As for (ii), it is also logically inherent in such a case that the tribunal will have found the "something more" which is necessary to satisfy the higher threshold under subsection (6): see para. 57 above. I agree that it would in principle conduce to transparent decision-making if the tribunal identified with precision in every case what the something more consisted of; but that will not always be straightforward. The proportionality assessment is generally multi-factorial and requires a holistic approach. A tribunal must of course in its reasons identify the factors to which it has given significant weight in reaching its overall conclusion. It is no doubt also desirable that it should indicate the relative importance of those factors, but there are limits to the extent to which that is practically possible: the factors in play are of their nature incommensurable, and calibrating their relative weights will often be an artificial exercise. It would in my view place an unrealistic burden on tribunals for them to have to decide, and specify, in every case whether the something more consists of the Exception-specific circumstance being present to an elevated degree, or of some other circumstance or circumstances, or a combination of the two. There may be cases where for some reason peculiar to the case this degree of specificity is necessary; but I do not believe that there is any universal rule. We should not make decision-making in this area more complicated than it regrettably already is.”
55. Returning to the balance sheet approach, on the one hand is the is the very serious offending in this case involving drugs and violence. Including that the second tranche of offending was whilst the Appellant had been awaiting deportation following the earlier decision of the Panel of the First-tier Tribunal in 2019. On any reading that further offending at such a time is also a very serious matter. The expert report of Dr Cordwell can be summarised as stating that the ‘interpersonal’ risk of violence is low, but if and when the Appellant has an intimate relationship then the risk will be higher. The risk of the Appellant committing other (non violent) offences is ‘medium’. The public interest is clearly a very weighty matter. It is set out within statute and which I am required to have at the forefront of my consideration. The use of a knife by the Appellant against his former partner and making her drive to her children’s school from where she was then able to escape is plainly a serious matter on any reading. Indeed, a terrifying elucidation of it is set out within the Crown Court Judge’s sentencing remarks,
56. The maintenance of effective immigration control is in the public interest.
57. Little weight is to be given to a private life established while residence is precarious or unlawful. The period 2019 (after the FTT Panel’s decision) to 2021, covers a period whilst the fresh claim was being considered by the Respondent. Even ignoring this precarious leave, I cannot see how the appeal could possibly be allowed. I refer to the reasons below.
58. However, on the other hand, there are a number of significant factors militating against deportation. These are that the Appellant meets Exception 1 (being the time he has spent in the UK). It is also relevant that he was as a child.
59. The comparative assessment of the Appellant’s life in the UK and Tunisia is that he was aged around 10 (differs according to different documents, some say aged 9) when he was brought to the UK by his father. The Appellant later secured Indefinite Leave to Remain. He therefore ‘grew up’ as a teenager in the UK. The Appellant’s life in Tunisia was miserable, including being away from his parents in a boarding school where he was badly treated. His family did not provide much in the way of assistance. He was, in effect, trafficked to the UK.
60. The Appellant has some contact albeit limited with his paternal side of the family. He law saw his father in 2023. His father then made contact with the extended family too for the Appellant to speak with, albeit limited by the use of telephone and there were language issues. There are some family members in Tunisia, but the relationships are weak.
61. The Appellant received some mental health service provision, including whilst in prison, but since then he continues with medication for a variety of matters including for his ADHD, PTSD, anxiety and depression.
62. Whilst there can be some limited reduction in terms of the public interest when noting the background to the Appellant, I conclude that such reduction is very limited. Especially when compared to the offending, the manner of the offending, even after a previous deportation order. The chance given to the Appellant shows his struggles to act in a lawful manner. I am aware that there has been no recorded offending since 2020 but he was in detention and on immigration bail for a time. He was therefore being ‘supervised’ for a time. I note the extensive expert evidence of Dr Cordwell, but those are not of themselves anywhere near sufficient matters to outweigh the public interest in this case in terms of this Appellant’s private life. I refer to this further below. Even though I accept that the Appellant is arguably socially and culturally integrated in the UK, that is not of itself sufficient either.
63. I assess the claimed very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s integration in Tunisia. I do not accept he satisfied despite his unusual and unfortunate history even when I take a broad, practical approach which appreciates the individual circumstances of his case. I explain further below.
64. I accept that an important aspect to this element is that Appellant’s background shows he suffers from mental ill-health issues and has experienced past serious harm as a child. I note though that the Appellant was in Tunisia again in 2014. He has retained some links via his father. His use of Arabic is not good, but he has some Arabic. Events have changed for the better to assist with communication because since the 2019 FTT decision, Google Translate and similar apps have excellent features as language tools to assist in communication. I conclude that this Appellant, driven as he is, will want to thrive wherever he is. He will want to continue his research and work as a trader of stocks and shares, be they US stocks or those of other countries. He also has his experience of working on cars in a garage which he will be able to put to use, if required to do so. The Appellant has contact with his paternal side and as recently as 2 years ago in 2023. I accept the contact is fractious and might even take the Appellant out of his comfort zone, but that is what moving to another place does. Even if it is merely moving within one city or town within the UK. The practical effect will initially be strange and uncomfortable, but I conclude that this Appellant has the drive and determination to work at it. He will have his considerable English language skills to use in the capital of Tunisia and where has lived for some 10 years and where he visited as recently as 2014.
65. As for the inability to access suitable treatment for his mental health I note that the report of Dr Cordwell referred to urgent re-referrals in 2024. It is not easy though to receive medical treatment whether for mental health or otherwise even in this country because of waiting lists and the like. It did not appear to me that even such ‘urgent’ referrals had been achieved, but even if they had, the Appellant clearly continues to do well with his treatment and remains compliant. I conclude he wants to do well and I conclude that there is no reason to think he will not want to continue to do well once in Tunisia.
66. Whilst I accept the country expert report that treatment locations are indeed limited in Tunisia, that is not a reason to allow the appeal. That is because there is a specialist hospital in Tunis (which is where the Appellant has links via his paternal family because he was taken there initially). That is referred to in the Rule 15(2A) bundle of evidence. I accept that there might be a delay in the Appellant getting employment and perhaps a delay in him getting treatment, but treatment is plainly available in Tunisia, including in Tunis. As I have said above, the reports referred to the Appellant having made good progress in the UK with his treatment.
67. I accept that there can be discrimination and stigma for those with mental health issues in Tunisa, but that is something that the Appellant will have to deal with in a country which is not as developed as the UK. He has the advantage of being able to be able to stand up for himself and will have the benefit of being abel to use his skills in English too. Of itself, the stigma and discrimination is not an issue which can come near to me allowing the appeal. In any event, the Appellant will be armed with all of his medical reports that he has used for these proceedings to assist those he consults for his treatment in Tunisia. He will be able to have those translated, if necessary, using an appropriate cost-free app. In any event, the Respondent’s decision refers to a relocation package that the Appellant can avail himself of. He did not provide me with any evidence to state he could not or why that relocation package, clearly referred to, would not aid him. The treatment in Tunisia may not initially be as sophisticated as it has been here in the UK, but in my judgment the Appellant will use his considerable drive and enthusiasm to get what he requires. He is aware of what he has and he knows the medication he requires, albeit he cannot pronounce its name correctly. He will be able to take some medication with him too. In my judgment, standing back, the mental health issues, even when coupled with the child abuse issues is not of such a degree to mean the appeal can be allowed. The access to the medical treatment even for this Appellant is possible, albeit it will feel uncomfortable for the Appellant to be out of his comfort zone because he is used to the system in the UK. That uncomfortableness does not mean that the high test in law is met to allow the appeal.
68. Therefore, whilst I accept that the Appellant’s education was here in the UK that and that he has a significant links to the UK, his links to Tunisia are also still significant. The Appellant has some ability in Arabic; his culture has remained too including his religion which is referred to in the expert report of Dr Cordwell. This includes with his most recent partner of 2022. Sadly, that relationship had also led to some issues, including the police being involved, although it had not led to any charges. The Appellant himself referred to the difficulties in that relationship being matters he had caused in terms of his anger.
69. I make clear that I do not doubt that the Appellant will find the change from living in his provided accommodation and his Personal Independence Payment and Universal Credit that he received in the past, to be a difficult change. Indeed, he is likely to find it difficult and uncomfortable. The test though is not so low as that to enable me to allow the appeal. The higher court authorities have repeated the high test to be met before an appeal can be allowed. In my judgment this appeal comes nowhere near that high “especially strong” requirement.
Conclusion
70. My impression of the Appellant is that he is a hard working and ambitious person. He was forthright and wants to succeed. Whilst, I have considered the background of what Dr Cordwell, the psychologist, said when preparing his report after 5 hours of sessions with the Appellant (alongside the other reports), it is for me to decide the case on all of the evidence. I consider the matters holistically. The expert evidence focuses on certain aspects only.
71. I know that the Appellant will be disappointed to read this decision, but I am sure he will be aware the Upper Tribunal is required to apply the law.
72. In my judgment, on balance, the Respondent’s decision to refuse the Appellant’s Article 8 claim is not unlawful because deportation would not result in a disproportionate breach of his right to private life. The Appellant’s case does not exhibit very compelling circumstances under s.117C(6) NIAA 2002.
73. Alternatively, even taking all of the evidence at its highest, on balance, I find I am unable to get near to allowing this appeal because there is nothing in this case which enables me to conclude that “there is something substantially more than the minimum that would be necessary to qualify for the relevant Exception under subsection (4) or (5). As Jackson LJ put it, the Article 8 case needed to be "especially strong". I conclude that the case is not especially strong. Whilst there can be sympathy for the Appellant and what he faced as a child, that does not get near to me being able to allow the appeal.
74. Therefore, despite Mr Khubber’s helpful written and oral submissions, I am unable to agree with him.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contained a material error of law.
I remake the decision.
I dismiss the appeal on all grounds including in respect of Article 8 ECHR.
The Anonymity Order is continued.

Abid Mahnood

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber


2 December 2025