Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001173

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/58657/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

14th May 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HANSON

Between

ADO
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms L Mensah instructed by the Jackson Lees Group Limited.
For the Respondent: Dr Ibisi, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 9 May 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant appeals with permission a decision of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the Judge’), promulgated following a hearing at Manchester on 9 January 2025, in which he dismissed the appeal against the refusal of the application for international protection and/or leave to remain in the United Kingdom on any other basis.
2. The Appellant is a citizen of Iraq, born on the 5 December 1999 in Sulaymaniyah. His application made on 12 July 2021 was refused on 3 October 2023.
3. The Judge identifies the issues in dispute at [8] and having considered the documentary and oral evidence sets out findings of fact from [13] of the decision under challenge.
4. In relation to the agreed issues the Judge writes:

13. I find that I am not satisfied, even to the lower standard of proof, that:

(i) the Appellant has provided a credible account of the events that led to his departure from Iraq or Iran;
(ii) he has come to the adverse notice of the KRG authorities as a consequence of his sur place activities;
(iii) the Appellant would be at real risk on account of his sur place activities; or
(iv) he does not have access to his CSID card.

5. The Judges detailed reasons in support of those findings are set out from [15] leading to his conclusions from [128].
6. The Judge sets out issues on which he finds there is no reasonable likelihood of at [134] in the following terms:

134. I therefore find that there is no reasonable likelihood or real risk that:

(i) the Appellant’s father acted as a spy for the Ettela’at;
(ii) his father was arrested and assassinated by the PUK in the Winter of 2016;
(iii) the Appellant and his mother were interrogated by the PUK, about his father’s activities, and then released on bail pending further investigations;
(iv) the Appellant and his family fled to Iran;
(v) they lived in Iran between 2016 and 2021;
(vi) the Iranian authorities provided the Appellant and his family with maintenance and accommodation throughout that period;
(vii) the Appellant was approached by the Ettela’at in 2021, with a view to his recruitment as a spy;
(viii) the Appellant and his family fled Iran as a result; (ix) they became separated in Turkey;
(ix) the PUK would have any adverse interest in the Appellant on account of his father’s activities, or the fact that he had spent 5 years in Iran, there being no reliable evidence that he did so.

7. Thereafter the Judge assesses other aspects of the claim leading to the protection claim being dismissed [209], and it being recorded that no attempt was made to argue that the Appellant qualified for leave to remain under Article 8 ECHR at [110].
8. The Appellant sought permission to appeal which was granted on limited grounds by another judge of the First-tier Tribunal, the operative part of the grant being in the following terms:

2. I am satisfied that it is at least arguable that the FtT Judge did make material errors of law.
3. As to the matters at #3 to 5 of the grounds. It is arguable that the Judge was confused and mistakenly believes that the Appellant had spent 5 years in Iraq, rather than Iran, and that he was in fear of being returned to Iran rather than Iraq, of which he is national. The FtT Judge also seems to refer to sur place activities in Iran, which seems to make little sense.
4. As to matters referred to at # 6 to 7 of the grounds. The questions asked were in relation to different matters and the Judge was entitled to take a different approach to the sufficiency of the details given in the answers. The FtT Judge also considered the inconsistencies as a whole. The weight to be attached to those matters was one for the Judge. I see nothing in this point.
5. As to the matters at # 8 to 9 of the grounds. It is arguable that despite the FtT Judge noting that corroboration was not generally required, he then went on to effectively require it in circumstances where it was reasonable for him to do so.
6. As to matters at # 10 to 11 of the grounds. On the basis that counsel did indeed refer the FtT Judge to the passages relied upon, it is arguable that the FtT Judge failed to have any or sufficient regard to country evidence provided. This material was arguably highly relevant.
7. As to the matters at # 12 to 16 the strength of these appear to directly related to the view taken as to the other grounds. On that basis they can be argued.

Discussion and analysis

9. I will focus my findings on the four grounds on which permission to appeal has been granted.
10. Ground 1 relates to an alleged failure by the Judge to give due weight to the correct background information. This ground is an example of somebody seeking to challenge a decision of a judge by looking at the minutiae of the findings made to ascertain whether there is anything in them on which they can hang an argument that the judge erred in law. That approach has been discouraged by the Court of Appeal.
11. At [4] the Judge writes in the section in which he summarises the background:

4. The Appellant asserts that he would be at risk on return to Iraq because (i) his father acted as a spy for the Iranian Ettela’at in Iraq; (ii) he skipped bail whilst under and investigation by the PUK; (iii) who spent five years in Iraq at the expense of the Ettela’at; and (iv) his sur place activities. He also asserts that he will be at risk on return of Iran because he refused to act as a spy for the Ettala’at and left the country using money belonging to them.

12. The Grounds assert the Appellant did not say he spent five years in Iraq as he spent five years in Iran, which is said to compound the list of issues wrongly recording sur place activities in Iran.
13. It is important that this detailed and well-structured and reasoned determination is read as a whole. The Judge is not criticised for recording the issues in dispute at [8] which are those the Judge determined. The Judge’s findings read as a whole clearly show proper consideration was given to the claim that was being made in relation to the correct country. Even if there was a mix-up between Iraq and Iran in the section in which the Judge was summarising the case in its most basic form, it has not been shown that this had a material impact upon the findings set out from [13] to [209] of the decision under challenge. The Judge found the Appellant had not been telling the truth in relation to any aspect of his claim which included whether he had gone to Iran at all. The Judge, in fact, finds that he had not established that this aspect of the claim was true.
14. I find no material legal error made out in relation to Ground 1.
15. Ground 2, paragraphs (8 – 9) of the grounds seeking permission to appeal asserts the Judge’s negative findings relied upon unreasonably requiring the Appellant to adduce corroborative evidence which is said to be contrary to the guidance provided by the Court of Appeal in MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216.
16. It is not disputed that if a judge dismisses a claim on the basis that corroboration had not been provided that would amount to an error of law.
17. The Appellant’s argument is that the Judge required corroborative evidence, but also that the Judge applied a higher standard of proof to the evidence provided by the Appellant which was unreasonable.
18. I find no merit in the claim the Judge applied an incorrect burden or standard of proof. Judges of the First-tier Tribunal are accepted as being experts in the field of immigration and asylum law. They do not need to set out the burden and standard of proof as it is assumed they have applied the correct burden and standard unless it is proved otherwise. The fact an unsuccessful appellant may disagree with a judge’s findings does not mean an incorrect burden or standard was applied by the judge in question. In this appeal such a claim is totally without merit.
19. The Judge correctly recorded there was no requirement to adduce corroborative evidence at [95] which is not only a legally correct self-direction, but one which shows the Judge was alive to ensuring that the findings which were made were not based on the need for corroborative evidence to be accepted as being true, to the lower standard. The Judge also wrote more in [95] than is referred to in [8] of the Grounds seeking permission to appeal
20. The Grounds specifically refer to [95] to [105] of the determination under challenge. This is, again, an example of seeking to cherry pick a very short section of a paragraph in a determination and attempting to try and build an argument of legal error around it, ignoring the Judge’s findings as a whole. In [95] the Judge actually wrote:

95. I acknowledge that there is no requirement for corroboration in this jurisdiction. However, for all that corroboration is not a sine qua non of a credible account, it is not irrelevant either. The Tribunal is entitled to take into account the failure of a party to provide supporting evidence, that is or should readily be available, where there is no credible explanation for the failure to produce it. Moreover, this may be a factor of considerable weight in relation to credibility where there are doubts about the credibility of a party for other reasons (see, TK (Burundi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 40, Thomas LJ, at paragraph 16).

21. The Judge’s observation that the Appellant did not produce any independent evidence in support of his account of events that led to his departure is factually correct. At [96] the Judge accepts that the Appellant could not reasonably be expected to adduce evidence from individuals in Iran, if this account were true, or that at least it will be undesirable for him to attempt to do so given the dangers to which such individuals will be exposed if detected, which is a demonstration of the Judge giving the Appellant the benefit of the doubt in relation to one aspect of his evidence. It is not the Judge dismissing the claim for lack of corroboration.
22. At [97] the Judge finds that other family members who had fled with the Appellant will be in a position to confirm his account of the events that led to his departure from both Iraq and Iran which has not been shown to be a finding outside the range of those reasonably open to the Judge on the evidence. At [99] the Judge finds the Appellant had not adduced any independent evidence to show he had made any genuine attempt to locate his family members or that they had made any attempt to contact him in the three or four years since it was claimed they had been separated. That has not been shown to be a finding outside the range of those reasonably open to the Judge on the evidence. The Judge is finding of no independent evidence to show the Appellant had searched for his mother or siblings on social media, or attempted to ascertain their whereabouts or contacted his grandmother in Iraq and ask her whether she had had any contact with them or knows where there are, has not been shown to be a finding outside the range of those open to the Judge on the evidence. It is not a finding that corroboration is required.
23. At [101] the Judge finds the evidence implicates that the Appellant was in contact with uncles in Iraq prior to the winter of 2016 and at [102] that the uncles would have been able to confirm whether they had any contact with his family since that time. At [103] the Judge finding the Appellant had not adduced any independent evidence to show he had searched social media for his uncles is not a requirement for corroboration. The finding of the Judge that it was reasonable to expect the Appellant to contact his uncles by letter, if required, as he was aware of the home address, is not a finding outside the range of those available to the Judge on the evidence. The reference to independent evidence is not a reference to a requirement for corroboration, but a recognition by the Judge that on the Appellant’s own evidence what he had claimed had not been proved to be true. The Judge was looking for anything that might support the Appellant’s case to enable him to find other than he did in the determination that the Appellant had lied throughout his evidence.
24. When pressed on this point during her submissions Ms Mensah claimed that the Judge was influenced in rejecting the Appellant’s account in light of the missing evidence by requiring corroboration. I find such submission to be totally without merit and one which seeks to distort the actual findings and approach adopted by the Judge. The Judge rejected the Appellant’s account, not due to requirement for corroborative evidence, but because the Appellant’s own evidence lack credibility and had not been shown to be true. The Judge is saying that there was insufficient evidence, when considering the claim in the round, to discharge the burden upon the Appellant in relation to the claims he was making.
25. The Judge was aware of the relevant country and it is not made out that if he had written Iraq instead of Iran, if required, this might have changed the Judge’s mind about matters. Such a claim is totally without merit and not made out on a reading of the determination as a whole.
26. I do not find it made out that the Judge erred in law in dismissing the appeal for want of corroboration and do not find it made out the Judge’s assessment of the weight to be given to the evidence, or the merits of the claim, is in contravention of the Court of Appeal guidance to be found in MAH (Egypt).
27. Ground 3 asserts the Judge failed to have regard to material evidence. This is a specific challenge to the Judge’s findings at [122] in which the Judge found he had no country evidence that Iranians recruit Kurdish Sunni Muslim Iraqis as spies in Iraq.
28. That paragraph of the determination comes within a section of the determination at [110] – [122] in which the Judge was considering several points raised under the heading of “plausibility” by the Appellant. The Judge identifies a number of issues within that section of the determination which properly cast doubt upon whether the claims that were being made were true.
29. The Judge’s conclusions in relation to this aspect of the appeal are set out at [121] – [122]. In the first of these paragraphs the Judge gives the Appellant the benefit of the doubt where he writes:

121. Leaving aside the points raised by the Respondent, it cannot be said that any part of the Appellant’s account of the events that led to his departure from Iraq or Iran, is so contrary to common sense or experience of human behaviour, or so far-fetched or contrary to reason, as to be incapable of belief, when viewed through the spectacles provided by the country background information on Iran. It follows that no part of that account can simply be discarded as inherently implausible.

30. The Judge tempers that observation at [122] where he writes:

122. However, the difficulty for the Appellant is that it cannot be said that the events that he describes are events of a type that might well happen in Iraq or Iran, or that the Appellant’s account is consistent with the known situations in either of those countries. It is not within Judicial Notice that the Ettela’at recruit Kurdish Sunni Muslim Iraqis to act as spies in Iraq; or that they would accommodate and maintain the family of any such individual indefinitely in Iran, if he were killed; or, that they would seek to recruit the son of a spy who had been detected and killed by the Iraqi authorities, to spy for them in Iraq – something that seems fraught with difficulties. Nor did the Appellant refer me to any expert evidence or country background information in support of any of those claims. It follows that, whilst it cannot be said that any part of the Appellant’s account is implausible, I am unable to say go any further than that. There is no, or no sufficient, evidential basis before me to support a finding that the account is plausible or very plausible. All that I am able to say is that it is not impossible or incapable of belief.

31. There is therefore more in [122] than the Judge finding that there was no country evidence that Iran recruits Kurdish Sunni Muslims as spies in Iraq. It is also relevant to know the exact language used by the Judge which is that the particular judge did not have judicial notice that the Ettela’at recruit Kurdish Sunni Muslim Iraqis to act as spies in Iraq or that they would accommodate and maintain the family of any such individual indefinitely in Iran if he was killed, or that they would seek to recruit the son of a spy who had been detected and killed by the Iraqi authorities to spy for them in Iraq. The Judge also writes “Nor did the Appellant refer me to any expert evidence or country background information to support any of those claims”.
32. The Appellant asserts in that final sentence the Judge erred as reference was made in the submissions to three paragraphs in the Respondent’s CPIN in the following terms:

“2.4.11 Iranian intelligence services operate in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and spy on the activities of the Iranian Kurdish political parties, political and human rights activists and journalists (see Monitoring in the KRI “

“14.2.1 The Danish Immigration Service report of February 2020 cited different sources who commented on Iranian state activity in the Kurdish Region of Iraq (KRI): ‘The Ministry of Intelligence and the IRGC Intelligence Service are both active in KRI in different ways, and they spy on the activities of the Iranian Kurdish political parties, political and human rights activists and journalists. The IRGC international forces (the so-called ‘Qods’ forces) are also active in Iraq. ‘The Iranian intelligence authorities threaten and target the political parties in KRI. As an example, a source pointed to the bombardments on 8 September 2018 of the KDPI camp Koya.’

14.2.2 The same report also indicated that the IRGC used Iranian Kurds resident in the KRI as spies to report on the main Iranian Kurdish political parties and activists based in Erbil and Sulaimaniya.”

33. It is not disputed that Iran operates an intelligence network in Iraq. There are numerous examples of Iran backed militias such as the Popular Mobilisation Force operating within Iraq and corrupt politicians who are favourable to the ideology of the Iranian cause, often fuelled by anti-American sentiment. The Judge does not find that Iran does not have a network of proxies in the Middle East in addition to the PMF. The extent of Iranian influence in Iraq was demonstrated by the presence of Qassem Soleimani, a high-ranking officer in the Iranian military, who was assassinated by the Americans in Iraq.
34. Paragraph 2.4.11 only says Iranian intelligence services operate in the IKR. The Judge does find they do not. Such a statement does not disclose arguable legal error in the actual finding made by the Judge.
35. Paragraph 14.2.1 again speaks of Iranian state activity in the IKR but the Judge does not dispute this occurs. That paragraph provides examples of Iranian infiltration but, again, the Judge does not find this does not occur. At paragraph does not establish material legal error in the Judges actual findings.
36. Paragraph 14.2.2 specifically states that the Iranian authorities used Iranian Kurds resident in the IKR to spy. The Judge’s finding was that it was not made out they would use Sunni Muslim Iraqi Kurds to spy. The source referred to in the Grounds do not bear any resemblance to the Judge’s actual findings. Having reviewed the material made available the Judge was factually correct to record the absence of any country evidence to show that the Appellant’s claims in relation to the employment of his father as an Iranian spy was likely to be true.
37. I find no legal error made out in relation to Ground 3.
38. Ground 4, paragraphs [12 -16] the Ground seeking permission to appeal raise a number of issues.
39. At [12] it is argued that as a result of the Judge’s approach to plausibility and credibility his approach to whether the Appellant could access identity documents on return to Iraq was also materially flawed. This argument is in part, predicated, on the claim to have lived in Iran, but the Appellant’s claim was found to lack credibility and the Judge specifically finds that neither he nor his family had ever lived in Iran. There is also no legal error established in relation to the Judge’s approach to plausibility and credibility and therefore no legal error made out in this paragraph which is, in effect, disagreement with the Judge’s findings and no more.
40. At [13] it is argued the Judge’s rejection of the Appellant’s claims in relation to his sur place activities is flawed. It is said the Judge’s handling of this issue at [154], [165], and [170] is based upon the Judge’s finding regarding the lack of country or expert evidence to show the claim is plausible. Such a claim is without merit.
41. The Judge considers whether the Appellant will be at risk on return to Iraq on account of his sur place activities between [137] – [201], concluding in the final paragraph that he was not satisfied, even to the lower standard of proof, that the Appellant will be at real risk on return to Iraq on account of his sur place activities.
42. I have found above the Judge did not dismiss the appeal for want of corroboration. At [154] the Judge’s reference to there been nothing before him to suggest the Appellant engaged any political activity is reference to his subjective evidence and is factually correct. At [165] the Judge analyses the evidence made available and the comments with regard to posts being few in number and lack of evidence in relation to other aspects recorded is factually correct. At [170] the Judge again refers to lack of evidence but this, again, is a factually correct statement and not seeking corroboration in the manner the Appellant alleges.
43. This challenge is, in reality, an attempt to try again to pick away at the determination by suggesting that selective quotes are sufficient to undermine the far more detailed and extensive examination of the evidence and findings made by the Judge.
44. At [14] the Appellant asserts the Judge’s approach to S V Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 148 is flawed as a result of the Judge’s approach to plausibility and credibility, but it has been found there is no arguable merit in the challenge to either of these issues. Beyond this statement there is nothing to indicate that the Judge’s findings are materially flawed.
45. [15] of the Ground seeking permission to appeal is blank with no text in the copy provided to the Upper Tribunal.
46. At [16] the Grounds assert as a result of the earlier alleged failings the Judge’s rejection of the Appellant’s ability to return and integrate into Iraq and the proportionality is also flawed but, again, the earlier matters did not establish material legal error.
47. It is also clear, as recorded in the earlier paragraph and [210] that no attempt was made to argue that the Appellant qualified for leave to remain under Article 8 of the ECHR on the basis of his right to respect for his family or private life. It was not a matter raised before the Judge and so it cannot be material legal error for the Judge not to deal with it. The Judge records that no such argument could have been made on the basis of the evidence before him and the findings made, which is a legally sustainable position in light of the rejection of the Appellant’s claims as a whole.
48. A person challenging a decision of Judge of the First-tier Tribunal must have regard to the guidance provided by the Court of Appeal in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 462 at [2], Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201 at [26] and Hamilton v Barrow and Others [2024] EWCA Civ 888 at [30-31]. I have done so.
49. The Judges adverse credibility findings are within the range of those reasonably available to him. The Judge clearly considers the evidence with the required degree of anxious scrutiny, has made a number of findings in a carefully structured determination which are adequately reasoned. The Grounds, whilst disagreeing with the overall findings and seeking to reargue the Appellant’s appeal, fail to establish legal error material to the decision to dismiss the appeal. The determination is not plainly wrong or rationally objectionable. On that basis the appeal is dismissed.

Notice of Decision

50. Appeal dismissed.

CJ Hanson

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

12 May 2025