Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-001174

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/00744/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 11th of July 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LOUGHRAN
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BARTLETT

Between

HJ
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr E Wilford, Counsel, instructed by MH Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr E Tufan, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 25 June 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant.
Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals with the permission of Upper Tribunal Judge Blundell against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Herlihy (‘the judge’) dated 25 January 2025.
Anonymity
2. We maintain the anonymity order made by the First-tier Tribunal, neither party asked us to discharge it.
Background
3. The appellant arrived in the UK on 18 September 2021 and claimed asylum on 19 September 2021. The appellant claims that on return to Iran the authorities will arrest and kill him because he distributed political materials whilst working as a kolbar.
4. Since his arrival in the UK, the appellant claims that he has undertaken various sur place activities, which also place him at risk on return to Iran.
The Respondent’s Decision
5. In a decision dated 4 December 2023 the respondent refused the appellant’s protection and human rights claim. The respondent maintained that decision in her review dated 11 October 2024. The respondent accepts that the appellant is of Kurdish ethnicity, that he worked as a kolbar in Iran and illegally exited Iran. The respondent does not accept that he is a supporter of the KDPI, he has participated in sur place activities in the UK or that he would be of adverse interest to the Iranian authorities.
The appeal to the First tier Tribunal
6. The appellant appealed against the refusal of his protection and human rights claim and the appeal came before the judge on 17 December 2024. The appellant gave oral evidence through a Kurdish Sorani interpreter.
7. In a determination dated 17 January 2025, the judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal. The judge rejected the appellant’s accounts of events in Iran.
8. The judge noted that notwithstanding her rejection of the appellant’s credibility she was still required to consider whether he would be at risk on account of his sur place activities but found that he would not be.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
9. The appellant applied for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal relying on the following grounds.
Ground 1: the assessment of the appellant’s account is made wholly in absence of any consideration of the background material.
Ground 2: the judge mistakenly finds that the Facebook evidence that is produced by the appellant does not comply with the requirements in XX (PJAK – sur place activities – Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 23 (IAC).
Ground 3: the judge fails to properly apply the country guidance cases to the facts found.
10. Permission to appeal was refused by the First-tier Tribunal but granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Blundell on 23 April 2025.
11. The respondent did not provide a response under Rule 24 of the Tribunal (Upper Tribunal) Procedure Rules 2008.
12. At the hearing we heard submissions from Mr Wilford on behalf of the appellant and Mr Tufan on behalf of the respondent.
Discussion
Ground 1
13. The judge rejected the appellant’s account that he had come to the attention of the Iranian regime for transporting KDPI material as a kolbar. In particular the judge found that she did not believe that the appellant (who was not politically active or from a politically active family) would transport political material and she did not believe that as a non-party member with no political involvement or profile, the appellant would have been entrusted to transport political material. The judge clearly placed significant weight on the fact that she did not find these aspects of the appellant’s account plausible however she did not cite any country background evidence to support her view.
14. We note that the Court of Appeal in HK v the Secretary of State [2006] EWCA Civ 1037 and MAH (Egypt) [2003] EWCA Civ 216 has emphasised the dangers of overreliance on inherent plausibility of an appellant’s account. In this case there is country background evidence relied upon by the appellant that corroborated his account. In particular we were taken to the respondent’s Country policy and information note (Iran) Kurds and Kurdish political groups version 4.0 May 2022 that states, “Awareness raising activities including distributing leaflets produced by party cells under the instruction of leaders in the KRI and circulated by party sympathisers or friends.”
15. In these circumstances we are satisfied that the judge materially erred by failing to have regard to relevant country background evidence and/or for failing to give adequate reasons as to why she found the appellant’s account implausible in the circumstances where there was country background evidence that appeared to corroborate it.
Grounds 2 and 3
16. We can address grounds 2 and 3 together.
17. We are not satisfied that the judge rejected the Facebook evidence relied on by the appellant on the basis that it did not comply with the requirements in XX. The judge simply records the requirements in XX but does not then state whether or not the evidence relied on by the appellant complied with those requirements.
18. However, we find the judge’s findings in respect of the appellant’s sur place activities, including his activity on Facebook inadequate and unclear.
19. In respect of whether the appellant has a genuine political belief the appellant submits in the grounds that the judge “does not appear to dispute the Appellant’s political intentions.” However Mr Tufan, submits that it can be inferred from the judge’s rejection of the appellant’s account of events in Iran that the judge also rejected that his sur place activities were motivated by genuinely held political beliefs. We are not persuaded by either submission. We are not satisfied that the judge made a finding whether or not the appellant’s activities are based on a genuine, political belief. We are also satisfied that the judge was required to do so. This is a clear material error of law. It is plainly relevant to whether the appellant would delete his Facebook account (again we could find no finding on whether he would do so anywhere in a decision) and/or whether he would continue to be politically active in Iran. In those circumstances the judge was obliged to make a finding on the appellant’s genuinely held political belief.
20. We are also satisfied that the judge materially erred by failing to apply the relevant country guidance cases.
21. The judge cites HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 00430 and notes that those of Kurdish ethnicity are regarded with even greater suspicion and that the Iranian authorities demonstrate a hair trigger approach to those suspected to be involved in Kurdish political activities, that the threshold for suspicion is low and the likely reaction extreme.
22. However, we are not satisfied that the judge went on to apply HB to the facts of this appellant’s case. As highlighted above it is accepted by the respondent that the appellant is of Kurdish ethnicity, he worked as a kolbar in Iran and illegally exited Iran. The judge also records that he has been politically active in the UK however she is not satisfied that it is an elevated point to draw the attention of the authorities. We are satisfied that the judge materially erred in its approach to the nature of investigation on return to Iran. The judge failed to consider the appellant’s risk factors cumulatively i.e. the judge failed to consider whether those points accepted by the respondent combined with his political activity in the UK would place him at risk.
23. For those reasons we are satisfied that the judge materially erred in law and we set the decision aside.
Disposal
24. We have considered whether to retain the matter for remaking in the Upper Tribunal in line with the general principles set out and statement 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement and AEB v the Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 IAC, given the issues and the amount of fact-finding that will be required, we are satisfied that the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal with no findings of fact preserved.
Notice of Decision
(a) There is an error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. Accordingly the decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside.
(b) The decision will be remitted to the First tier Tribunal to be heard by a different judge.
(c) No findings of fact are preserved.

G. Loughran
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

8 July 2025