Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case Nos: UI-2025-001197

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/51006/2024
LP/10483/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 22 September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEBEDE

Between

SSK
(Anonymity Order made)
Appellant

and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Johnrose, instructed by Broudie Jackson Canter Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms C Newton, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 9 September 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s decision to refuse his asylum and human rights claim.

2. The appellant is a citizen of Chad born in April 1995, of Gouran ethnicity. He arrived in the UK on 2 November 2021 by plane, on a visit visa, and claimed asylum on 16 November 2021. He attended a screening interview on 16 November 2021 and made further representations on 21 January 2023. He was interviewed about his claim in three separate interviews, in 30 August 2023, 10 October 2023 and 7 December 2023. His claim was refused on 20 December 2023 and he appealed against that decision.

3. The appellant’s claim can be summarised as follows. His father was a member of the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT). In 2017 his father disappeared and his mother told him that he had joined the FACT rebels. The appellant’s mother, fearing reprisals from the authorities, moved to Faya with his brothers, but he remained in N’Djamena to continue his studies and lived with his father’s friend, AM, who worked in the Finance Ministry. Shortly after, AM informed the appellant that his family home had been confiscated by the authorities. In 2019 the appellant confided in a college friend that his father had joined FACT and as a result he started facing problems from other students and so left his course. He underwent an arranged marriage in February 2021. In April 2021 FACT rebels attacked the government during presidential elections and a week later President Deby was killed in a rebel attack and was replaced by his son. A military dictatorship took over and protests commenced against the dictatorship.

4. The appellant claimed that, on 26 April 2021, his friend BK persuaded him to assist in distributing leaflets that evening and to attend a demonstration the following day on 27 April 2021 for Wakit Tama (WT), against the military regime in Chad, and that he distributed more leaflets at the demonstration and carried a placard. He attended on the insistence of his friend. The appellant claimed that the demonstration was attacked by the authorities, that a woman was shot dead in front of him, and that his friend was arrested but he (the appellant) managed to escape. He went into hiding and told AM what had happened. AM called him on 3 May 2021 to tell him that the authorities had been to his house twice searching for him and that he should leave the country. AM made arrangements for him to leave and told him that his picture was in a newspaper article as one of those being sought by the authorities. AM collected the appellant on 20 August 2021 and took him back to his house to collect his ID card and on 28 September 2021 AM took him to Cameroon and made a visa application for him. The visa was issued on 20 October 2021. AM took him back to Chad and then on 2 November 2021 took him to the airport where he boarded a plane for the UK. The appellant claimed that he was allowed entry without being asked questions by immigration and he ended up sleeping on the street where he had his bag and passport stolen, until he was advised to go to the police and claim asylum. In December 2023 his mother told him that both his brothers had escaped to Libya and he believed that they had also joined the FACT rebels.

5. The respondent, in the refusal decision, considered that the appellant had provided inconsistent evidence and a lack of detail and did not believe his account. It was not accepted that he had come to the adverse interest of the authorities in Chad and it was not accepted that he was at risk on return to Chad. The respondent considered that the appellant’s actions in returning to Chad from Cameroon when he had a visa for the UK undermined the credibility of his claim to be at risk from the authorities in Chad, as did his ability to leave the airport in Chad without problems. The respondent considered further that the appellant’s delay in claiming asylum in the UK undermined his credibility. It was considered that his removal from the UK would not breach his human rights.

6. The appellant appealed against that decision. His appeal was heard by a First-tier Tribunal Judge on 14 January 2025. The appellant’s ethnicity was accepted at the hearing, but the judge noted that there was no evidence to show that he would be at risk on the basis of his ethnicity alone. The judge accepted that the appellant’s father was a FACT member, but did not find that his father’s ties to FACT would place him at risk on return. The judge did not accept the appellant’s account of his home being confiscated, given that it was a late addition to his account, and he found that none of the evidence indicated that FACT had anything to do with the authorities seeking him. He did not accept that the appellant’s brothers went to Libya to fight for FACT and he found that the appellant had embellished his account to a degree, to strengthen the perceived danger faced. As for the appellant’s involvement with WT, the judge noted that that was limited to attendance at a single demonstration in April 2021. Although he accepted that the appellant was present at the demonstration and handed out leaflets, he did not accept his claim to have handed out leaflets the previous night. He considered that, whilst handing out leaflets at the demonstration may have made the appellant somewhat more distinctive to onlookers, he would nevertheless have simply blended in with the many other people attending the demonstration, given the large numbers present. The judge did not accept the appellant’s account of his name being mentioned in a newspaper article and considered that he had taken his presence at the demonstration and sought to create a narrative around it. The judge did not accept that the authorities had come to search for the appellant and did not accept that he was a person of interest to the authorities. The judge noted that the appellant was relying upon sur place activities in the UK, namely being on Tiktok and posting videos about the authorities in Chad and about his friend being arrested during the protest, but observed that there was no supporting evidence and little detail in his account in that regard and considered that no risk would have derived from that. The judge concluded that the appellant was of no interest to the authorities in Chad and that he would be at no risk on return. He did not consider the appellant’s explanation for his delay in claiming asylum to be a credible one. He accordingly dismissed the appeal, in a decision promulgated on 14 January 2025.

7. The appellant sought permission to appeal the decision on five grounds: firstly, that the judge had given disproportionate weight to his evidence regarding the newspaper article in rejecting his claim that the authorities were aware of his participation in the demonstration and that they had raided his house, particularly when considered against the other positive findings made; secondly, that the judge had failed to make any clear finding whether it was accepted that his friend was detained at the demonstration, which was material to his claim that his own involvement would have become known to the authorities; thirdly, that the judge failed to make a clear finding about his account of the authorities’ raid on his father’s friend’s house and about the authorities searching for him; fourthly, that the judge had made contradictory and unclear findings, and had failed to provide an evidential basis or reasons for his findings; and fifthly, that the judge had failed to make any finding as to the sincerity of his political opinions or whether, if sincere, that would place him at risk on return.

8. Permission was refused on all grounds by the First-tier Tribunal. The application was renewed to the Upper Tribunal, and permission was then granted on the fifth ground:

“…. 2. The grounds of appeal are lengthy and, as was observed by the First-tier Judge who refused permission, despite industrious burrowing into the Judge’s reasons, the first four grounds of appeal do amount to little more than disagreements with the Judge’s assessment of the evidence and attribution of weight when considering that evidence. These grounds are not arguable.

3. I am however satisfied that ground five is arguable. The Judge made some findings favourable to the appellant concerning his attendance at political demonstrations in both Chad and the United Kingdom and it is arguable that in the light of those findings the Judge was required to go on to consider whether the appellant’s attendance at those demonstrations was because of his genuine support for Wakit Tama and if so what the implication of that support would be for him in Chad.

4. In accordance with the procedure identified in EH (PTA: limited grounds; Cart JR) Bangladesh [2021] UKUT 00117 (IAC) and applying rule 22(2)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure 37 2 (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 I direct that only ground five may be argued in the Upper Tribunal.”

9. The respondent did not produce a rule 24 response.

10. The matter then came before me for a hearing on 9 September 2025. As a preliminary issue, Ms Johnrose advised me that notice had been given by the appellant’s solicitors, on 4 September 2025, that an application was being made for the remaining grounds of appeal to be argued. She submitted that there would be procedural impropriety if there was a refusal to allow the other grounds to be renewed, as it was not possible, further to the decision in EH, and given that permission was granted to a limited extent, to judicially review the decision. Ms Newton opposed the admission of the remaining grounds, submitting that no such notice had been received by the respondent and that the judge had been explicit in his decision that the other grounds were mere disagreement.

11. At the time of the hearing there was nothing in the court records before me to show that an application had been made by the appellant’s solicitors for permission to appeal on grounds 1 to 4. Subsequent to the hearing, the application had been uploaded in the court records and I was therefore able to view it, as follows:

“We write further to the determination of Judge Keith dated 09/05/2025 and sealed 15/05/2025 partially allowing permission to appeal a decision of the First Tier Tribunal Judge Jepson promulgated on 14/01/2025. We wish to inform the Upper Tribunal that the Appellant intends to apply for the decision to permit permission on limited grounds to be reconsidered under Rule 22(4)(b).”

12. In any event I allowed Ms Johnrose to make the application to admit the other grounds, but I refused the application. Judge Bulpitt (and not Judge Keith) had made it clear in his decision that there was no arguable merit in the first 4 grounds and he provided reasons for so concluding. I accept that, following the guidance in EH, the appellant was not able to challenge that decision by way of judicial review given that permission had been granted, albeit on a limited basis. However that was not a reason to admit the other grounds when a decision had been properly made by one of my colleagues that the grounds were not arguable. Having considered the grounds myself I see nothing erroneous in Judge Bulpitt’s decision to reject those grounds as unarguable. As an aside I do not see that Rule 22(4)(b) of The Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 applies to decisions made by UTIAC, but in any event the Tribunal retains a discretion under Rule 5(2) to make an appropriate direction, and thereby to extend the arguable grounds. However, and having exercised my discretion accordingly, I refused to admit the first to fourth grounds.

13. The appeal then proceeded on the basis of the fifth ground only. Both parties made submissions before me in relation to that ground.

14. Ms Johnrose submitted, with regard to the fifth ground, that the judge had failed to make any finding on the sincerity of the appellant’s political opinion and support for WT, and had not undertaken any assessment of risk on return as a result of attending a demonstration for a proscribed organisation. She submitted that the judge had made various positive findings of fact: he accepted that the appellant had attended the demonstration in 2021 in Chad and handed out leaflets, he accepted that that may have led the appellant to stand out, he found that the appellant’s limited knowledge of WT was not inconsistent with him being a supporter of the organisation, and he did not reject the appellant’s account of his sur place activities in the UK. Given those positive findings of fact and the accepted profile, and considering that it was accepted that WT was a proscribed organisation, the judge needed to decide if the appellant was a genuine supporter and, if it was accepted, it was open to the judge to find that the appellant was at risk on return to Chad as a result. Ms Johnrose submitted that the judge had materially misdirected himself by requiring there to be events after the demonstration which would have put the appellant at risk, as he did at [41], and that he failed to give reasons why his attendance at a demonstration organised by a proscribed organisation, where he distributed leaflets, together with his sur place activities in the UK, was not sufficient to put him at risk. The judge followed an incorrect approach where he required the appellant to show that he had come to the attention of the authorities. That was a misstatement of the law. Ms Johnrose relied upon the case of WAS (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 894 in that respect. She submitted that the correct approach was to consider whether the appellant was a genuine supporter, and in the absence of any such finding, the judge had materially erred in law.

15. Ms Newton submitted that there was no reason for the judge to make a finding as to whether the appellant was genuine when he had otherwise made clear findings that he had been disingenuous in his claim. She submitted that the judge had accepted that the appellant had attended one demonstration in Chad, but had otherwise rejected his claim and found that he had embellished the claim and added bits to his account at the hearing, that he had held no prior political interest, that his account of arrest and detention was not credible, and that he would not have attracted adverse interest to himself at the demonstration. There was no error of law.

16. In response, Ms Johnrose submitted that it was not correct to say that the judge had found the appellant to be disingenuous when he had made a lot of positive findings. The judge was wrong to require there to have been events after the demonstration, as his attendance at the demonstration was accepted and was sufficient for him to make an assessment of risk, which he did not do. The judge’s finding at [66] that the appellant was not a person of interest was based upon a consideration of events after the demonstration such as the arrest and detention, but that was a separate issue, unconnected to the core claim that he had attended a demonstration for a proscribed organisation.

Analysis

17. The grounds assert that the judge erred by failing to make any findings on the sincerity of the appellant’s political opinions and whether, if sincere, those activities would put him at risk on return to Chad. However, whilst I accept that the judge did not make a specific finding in that regard, I do not consider that it was necessary for him to do so, or that any such arguable omission was a material one. That is because the sincerity of the appellant’s political opinion was not the relevant question in this case. This was not a ‘Danian’ type of case (Danian v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1999] EWCA Civ 3000). It is evident from the judge’s findings that he did not doubt the appellant’s sincerity, to the extent that he accepted that he was a supporter of WT. There was never any question that the appellant had involved himself with WT in bad faith, solely to provide a basis for his claim. The judge accepted the appellant’s account of having been encouraged to attend the one demonstration by his friend, but noted that that was the extent of his political involvement in Chad, having had no prior interest and that there was no evidence to show that his support for WT went beyond that. Although, as he noted, the appellant claimed to have been involved in further activities in the UK in support of WT by way of social media posts, the judge observed that there was no evidence of the nature of those activities and nothing to show that his account was even public, again demonstrating nothing more than a personal interest and support for the party.

18. Accordingly, the sincerity of the appellant’s political interests was not in doubt, and the relevant question was, rather, the level and extent of his political activity and whether that level of activity would put him at risk on return to Chad.

19. In answering that question, the judge, at [41] and [45], referred to the appellant’s own evidence being that he was only a supporter of WT and had not attended any other demonstrations prior to the one in April 2021, and he found the appellant’s limited knowledge of WT to be consistent with someone who had not undertaken any positive action for WT other than attending the protest and who was nothing more than a supporter of the party. In so far as Ms Johnrose suggested that the appellant’s attendance at the demonstration and his distribution of leaflets at the event was sufficient in itself to have put the appellant at risk, given that WT was a proscribed organisation, the judge clearly found that that was not the case. At [47], [62] and [66], the judge made it clear that he did not consider that such activity would have brought the appellant to the attention of the authorities at that time, and he gave cogent reasons for so concluding. It was the judge’s view that, absent anything else, the appellant had not shown that he would be at any risk on return to Chad.

20. It was for that reason that the judge considered that the appellant had to show something more, in order for him to be at risk on return to Chad and therefore considered that the events subsequent to the demonstration were relevant, if accepted as true. That was what he said at [41] and, contrary to Ms Johnrose’s assertion, there was nothing erroneous in that approach.

21. When assessing the appellant’s account of events, the judge gave full and cogent reasons at [65] and [66] for concluding that he had been disingenuous (to use Ms Newton’s term) in his evidence and had sought to elaborate his claim. The judge rejected the appellant’s account of his friend having given his name to the authorities, of the authorities coming to look for him and of his name being mentioned in a newspaper article, and he gave full and proper reasons for doing so. In fairness to the appellant, the judge gave limited weight, at [42] to [43] and [53], to an apparent inconsistency in the evidence as to whether he was himself arrested and detained, but accepted that it may have just been a misunderstanding. However the judge did not accept the appellant’s account of having distributed leaflets the night before the demonstration, that having been added to his account only later in his statement. Neither did he accept the appellant’s account that the police had been looking for him, noting at [54] inconsistencies in his evidence. At [56] the judge had concerns in regard to the appellant’s action in returning to Chad from Cameroon once he had obtained his visa and noted that those remained unanswered. At [57] to [58] and [66] the judge rejected the appellant’s account of his image appearing in a newspaper article, referring to inconsistencies and discrepancies in the evidence in that regard and giving cogent reasons for making the adverse credibility findings that he did. At [59] and [60] the judge gave reasons for his concerns about the appellant’s account of his friend having passed on his name to the authorities, his account of the authorities coming to look for him, and ultimately of him being a person of interest. Although the judge did not at that point reject the account outright, he explained why he had concerns and, having taken that together with the evidence as a whole, subsequently rejected the account, at [62] to [66], as he was perfectly entitled to do.

22. The judge then went on, at [61], to consider whether the appellant’s activities in the UK would have given rise to any adverse interest in him and would lead to adverse interest on his return to Chad, and considered the appellant’s claim to have been active on social media. However, as already mentioned, he observed that there was no evidence of any such activities and no information about the appellant’s posts to show that his account was even public and he found that, in such circumstances, there was no reason to conclude that that would have given rise to any risk of the appellant having come, or coming, to the attention of the authorities in Chad in that regard.

23. For all those reasons the judge concluded, as he was fully and properly entitled to do, that the appellant was not a person who would be of any interest to the authorises in Chad, either on the basis of his very limited past activities or his activities since leaving Chad. It mattered not that there was no explicit finding as to whether those activities had been undertaken as an expression of genuine political views, since the judge did not consider that a person of the appellant’s limited profile would be known to, or of interest to, the authorities. There was no evidence before the judge to suggest that the appellant had any intention or desire to be politically active or to involve himself in further activities in Chad which were of a level to bring himself to the attention of the authorities. Indeed, the appellant’s evidence was that he had only gone to the demonstration in the first place because his friend had insisted, and there was nothing to suggest that his intentions in regard to his political involvement had significantly changed since that time or that he had become anything more than a simple supporter of WT. The judge was accordingly not required to find that they had.

24. In the circumstances I find nothing of merit in the fifth ground of appeal. Nothing material arises out of it. The other grounds, as already found, are without arguable merit.

25. The judge reached a decision which was fully and properly open to him. He gave full consideration to all material issues before him and there was nothing erroneous in his approach to those issues. He directed himself appropriately. He gave full and careful consideration to all the evidence before him, both oral and documentary evidence, and properly assessed the weight to be accorded to that evidence, according more weight to some aspects of the appellant’s case than others, as he was entitled to do. Although he made findings of fact in the appellant’s favour, he also made clear adverse credibility findings on material issues, giving cogent reasons for reaching the conclusions that he did. He was perfectly entitled to make the decision that he did in the appeal.

Notice of Decision

26. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve a material error on a point of law requiring it to be set aside. The decision to dismiss the appeal stands.

Signed: S Kebede
Upper Tribunal Judge Kebede

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

11 September 2025